This series will cover the history of Modern Pakistan, from the earliest notions of a separatist Muslim governance to the creation of Pakistan and all the way to 2023.

You can read post covering 1857 – 1927 here: A History of Modern Pakistan #1 1857 – 1927

You can read post covering 1927- 1939 here: A History of Modern Pakistan #2 1927 – 1939

You can read post covering 1939 – 1947 here: A History of Modern Pakistan #3 1939 – 1947

You can read post covering 1947 – 1953 here: A History of Modern Pakistan #4 1947 – 1953

You can read post covering 1953 – 1958 here: A History of Modern Pakistan #5 1953 – 1958

1958 – 1970

General Ayub Khan as President

When General Ayub Khan took control of Pakistan in October 1958, he inherited a country that had spent its first eleven years struggling to establish political stability. The parliamentary system had produced repeated changes of government, the Constitution had been suspended, and the civil service, political leadership and military had all become deeply involved in the running of the state. Ayub Khan presented himself as the man who could finally bring order to Pakistan and move it towards economic development.

Ayub was not simply a soldier who suddenly appeared in politics. He had risen through the British Indian Army, became Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army in 1951 and had already served as Defence Minister before the 1958 coup. His understanding of Pakistan was therefore shaped heavily by the military and bureaucratic establishment. He believed that political parties and parliamentary politicians had failed to govern effectively and that Pakistan required strong central leadership before it could become a stable modern state.

Foreign policy became an important part of his strategy. Pakistan had already been moving closer to the United States during the 1950s, joining the American-backed SEATO and Baghdad Pact arrangements, and Ayub strengthened this relationship further. Pakistan allowed the United States to use facilities for intelligence and reconnaissance operations directed towards the Soviet Union, including the U-2 surveillance programme. In return, Pakistan received significant American military and economic assistance. Ayub believed that a strong relationship with the United States would strengthen Pakistan economically and militarily, particularly against India.

There was, however, a price to this relationship. Pakistan was increasingly being drawn into the Cold War, and its foreign policy became closely associated with the Western bloc. Ayub nevertheless also understood the strategic importance of China and worked towards developing closer relations with Beijing. This would become increasingly important after the deterioration of Pakistan’s relationship with the United States following the 1965 war with India.

Ayub’s immediate priority was to move Pakistan away from the political instability of its first decade. He wanted to demonstrate that military rule could deliver something civilian governments had struggled to achieve, namely economic growth, administrative discipline and a stronger state.

The Basic Democracies and the 1960 Referendum

Ayub did not initially present military rule as a permanent replacement for democracy. Instead, he developed a new political system known as Basic Democracies. The idea was that democracy should begin at the local level rather than through national political parties, which Ayub believed had become corrupt, divisive and disconnected from ordinary Pakistanis.

The system created a network of local councils whose members became known as Basic Democrats. These representatives were intended to provide a link between ordinary citizens and the government, but they also became the electoral college through which the President and later members of the national and provincial legislatures could be elected.

In February 1960, Ayub held a referendum asking the Basic Democrats whether they had confidence in him and his programme. The result was overwhelmingly in his favour, with the official result showing more than 95 percent voting “Yes”. The referendum gave Ayub the political mandate he needed to formalise his position and begin constructing a new constitutional system around the presidency.

The significance of the referendum was therefore greater than the question itself suggested. Ayub was not asking the population whether they wanted a military government. He was using a controlled form of indirect democracy to establish legitimacy for the political system he was creating.

Second Five-Year Plans (1960–1965)

Ayub’s government then turned its attention towards the economy. Pakistan had experienced economic growth during the 1950s, but development had been uneven and political instability had made long-term planning difficult. The Second Five-Year Plan, covering 1960 to 1965, therefore became one of the central pillars of the Ayub era.

The underlying objective was straightforward. Pakistan needed to move rapidly from an overwhelmingly agricultural economy towards a more productive and industrialised one. The government invested heavily in agriculture, irrigation, power generation, transport and industry, while encouraging private businesses to expand.

Land reform was also introduced. The government imposed ceilings on land ownership, although the limits varied according to the type of land and the system of cultivation. The purpose was to reduce the concentration of land in the hands of very large landowners and encourage greater agricultural productivity. In practice, however, the reforms did not fundamentally destroy the power of the landed elite. Large landowners were often able to protect their interests through legal arrangements, political influence and the redistribution of land among family members.

This became one of the central criticisms of the Ayub era. Pakistan was becoming richer, but the benefits of that growth were not being distributed equally.

The government also encouraged private industry. State-owned enterprises and industries were transferred or expanded under private ownership, while investors were given incentives to establish new businesses. Industrial production increased rapidly, cities expanded and a new business class emerged.

This period became associated with the famous phrase “22 families”, referring to the concentration of a very large proportion of Pakistan’s industrial and financial wealth in the hands of a small number of families. Whether the exact figure accurately represented the whole economy is debated, but the underlying criticism was real. Economic growth was accompanied by increasing concentration of wealth.

For supporters of Ayub, this was the price of building a modern industrial economy. For his critics, it showed that the system was producing prosperity for the wealthy while ordinary workers and farmers were receiving a much smaller share of the gains.

The social reforms of the period were more substantial than Ayub’s critics sometimes acknowledge. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 introduced reforms to marriage and divorce, including compulsory registration of marriages, restrictions on polygamy and procedural requirements around divorce. It also sought to protect women’s rights within marriage and family law. The reforms were controversial among some religious scholars because the state was intervening directly in areas traditionally governed by Islamic jurisprudence and personal practice.

The government also invested heavily in education, communications, transport, electricity and scientific development. Pakistan’s cultural industries expanded considerably during the 1960s, with film, literature, music and television becoming increasingly important parts of national life.

The period also saw the development of Pakistan’s scientific and technological institutions. The country’s space programme began in this era through the establishment of the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, better known as SUPARCO, in 1961. Pakistan was becoming more urban, more industrial and increasingly connected to the outside world.

By the middle of the 1960s, Ayub could point to substantial economic achievements. Growth rates were high, industrial production had expanded and major infrastructure projects were being completed. This is why the period is often remembered as the “Decade of Development.”

But there was another side to the story. Economic growth was heavily concentrated in particular regions and social classes, and the perception that the government favoured West Pakistan, particularly the industrial and landed elites, became increasingly powerful in East Pakistan.

The seeds of the later political crisis were therefore being planted at the same time as the economy was growing.

1960 Islamabad created

In 1960, the government officially began developing Islamabad as Pakistan’s new capital.

Karachi had been the capital since independence and remained Pakistan’s largest commercial city, but Ayub’s government believed that a new capital was required. Karachi’s location on the coast made it more exposed to potential attack, while the government also wanted to separate the political administration of the country from the commercial and business interests concentrated in Karachi.

Islamabad was chosen in the north of West Pakistan because of its relatively central position within the western wing, its proximity to Rawalpindi and the military establishment there, its climate and its strategic location. The area also placed the capital considerably closer to Kashmir than Karachi had been.

The new capital was designed as a planned city rather than allowed to grow organically. Greek architect Constantinos Apostolou Doxiadis was commissioned to design the master plan, and construction began during Ayub’s rule.

The capital would not simply become a new administrative centre. Over time, Islamabad became a physical representation of the new Pakistan Ayub wanted to build, planned, modern, orderly and centrally controlled.

1962 Constitution

Ayub had promised to restore constitutional government, but he had no intention of returning to the parliamentary system of 1956.

A Constitution Commission was therefore established to recommend a new political structure. The result was the Constitution of 1962, which came into force on 8 June 1962.

The new constitution fundamentally changed Pakistan’s system of government. Instead of the parliamentary system established in 1956, Pakistan adopted a presidential system in which executive authority was concentrated heavily in the hands of the President.

The President became both head of state and the central executive authority. Ministers were appointed by the President and were responsible to him rather than to a parliamentary majority. The legislature was unicameral, with a National Assembly whose members were elected indirectly through the Basic Democracies system.

The constitution also established provincial assemblies and recognised fundamental rights and an independent judiciary. Pakistan remained a federal state, although the concentration of power at the centre was considerable.

Islam remained an important part of the constitutional structure. Pakistan was designated the Republic of Pakistan, rather than initially retaining the exact constitutional title “Islamic Republic”, although the name was restored later in the 1960s. The constitution contained provisions requiring the state to enable Muslims to order their lives according to Islamic principles, promote Islamic education and establish institutions concerned with Islamic research. The President had to be a Muslim.

Ayub’s constitutional vision was therefore not secular in the sense of removing Islam from public life. Instead, he attempted to combine Islamic principles with a strong presidential state and a programme of modernisation.

The crucial difference was political. Ayub believed that Pakistan needed a disciplined form of democracy rather than the party-based parliamentary democracy that had failed during the 1950s. His Basic Democrats would elect the President and members of the assemblies, but ordinary citizens would not directly choose the country’s national leadership.

Ayub therefore believed he had solved Pakistan’s problem of unstable parliamentary government.

His opponents believed he had simply removed the people from the centre of democracy.

The key features were:

• Federal System
• A written and detailed constitution that can be adopted by any future government
• Pakistan shall be an Islamic republic under the name of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
• Islamic law was to be implemented where possible. Laws should conform to Qur’an and Sunnah.
• US-type presidential system was enforced to overcome political instability and establish a firm socio-economic and political order. All the executive authority was vested in the President who was unanimously responsible for the business of the central government. All the ministers were appointed by him and they were accountable to him alone. The president also enjoyed certain legislative, military and judicial powers.
• Unicameral Legislature: National Assembly with a 5-year term
• Indirect BD Election: The Public were not educated enough to select a president. Instead, they would elect the Basic Democrats who would elect the President.
• Independence of Judiciary and powers over legislature and executive.
• Fundamental Rights
• Provincial Assembly
• Facilitate Muslims to practise their religion taking into account deeper principles and concepts.
• Only a Muslim could be qualified for the election as president.
• Teaching of the Quran and Islamiyah to the Muslims of Pakistan was made compulsory.
• Proper organization of Zakat, waqf, and mosques was ensured.
• Practical steps were to be taken to eradicate what were seen as social evils by Islam, such as the use of alcohol, gambling, etc.
• Islamic Research Institute: assisting in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis.
• Endeavour to strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim countries.

1965 Elections

The political test came in 1965.

Ayub Khan stood for re-election, but this time he faced a formidable opponent. The Combined Opposition Parties united behind Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and one of the most respected figures in Pakistan.

Fatima Jinnah represented something larger than an ordinary opposition candidate. She was closely associated with the country’s founder and became a symbol for those who wanted Pakistan to return to a more genuinely parliamentary and democratic system.

The election was conducted through the Basic Democrats rather than a direct vote of the population. Ayub won with approximately 62 percent of the Electoral College vote.

The result gave Ayub another term, but the election exposed the depth of opposition to his rule. His opponents alleged electoral manipulation, pressure on Basic Democrats and the use of state machinery to influence the result. Fatima Jinnah remained an enormously popular figure, particularly in urban areas and in East Pakistan.

Ayub had therefore won the election, but the contest demonstrated that the political stability he had created was partly dependent on restricting the mechanisms through which ordinary Pakistanis could challenge his authority.

1965 War with India

The greatest challenge to Ayub’s foreign policy came in 1965.

The Kashmir dispute remained unresolved and tensions between India and Pakistan had continued throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, sending infiltrators into Indian-administered Kashmir in the hope of encouraging an uprising against Indian rule. When the operation failed to produce the expected result, the conflict escalated rapidly.

India crossed the international border in September 1965, and full-scale war broke out between the two countries.

The war was fought across several fronts, including Kashmir and the international border between Punjab and Rajasthan. Neither side achieved a decisive victory, and the conflict eventually ended after the United Nations called for a ceasefire.

The Soviet Union then offered to mediate between India and Pakistan, leading to the Tashkent Declaration of January 1966. Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri agreed to withdraw their forces to positions held before the conflict and restore diplomatic relations.

Although the war ended without a decisive military outcome, it had significant political consequences inside Pakistan. Many Pakistanis had expected a major victory over India and were disappointed by the eventual settlement. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had served as Foreign Minister under Ayub, became increasingly critical of the government’s handling of Tashkent and eventually broke with Ayub.

The war also damaged Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. Pakistan had expected its American alliance to provide stronger support, but the United States imposed an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan. Pakistan increasingly concluded that its relationship with Washington could not be relied upon in the way Ayub had hoped.

At the same time, the war strengthened Pakistan’s relationship with China.

The strategic balance of South Asia had therefore changed. Pakistan had survived another war with India, but the conflict had exposed weaknesses in its foreign-policy strategy and created new political opposition to Ayub Khan.

Third Five-Year Plans (1965–1970)

The Third Five-Year Plan, covering 1965 to 1970, was designed to continue the economic expansion of the previous period while placing greater emphasis on exports, domestic investment and employment.

The government wanted private industry to continue driving economic growth while increasing Pakistan’s capacity to export goods and earn foreign currency. Industrialisation continued and urban areas expanded rapidly.

But the international environment was now less favourable. Foreign assistance declined after the 1965 war and Pakistan faced greater financial constraints. The government could no longer rely on the same level of external support that had helped finance earlier development.

More importantly, the economic divide between East and West Pakistan was becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.

East Pakistan produced a substantial proportion of Pakistan’s export earnings, particularly through jute, yet many Bengalis believed that the political and economic system channelled a disproportionate share of investment towards West Pakistan. Infrastructure, industrial development and military installations were heavily concentrated in the western wing.

The argument was becoming increasingly simple in East Pakistan.

If Bengal was producing so much of Pakistan’s wealth, why did Bengal have so little control over it?

This question would soon become the centre of Pakistani politics.

Six-Points of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman

In 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, presented his famous Six-Point Programme.

Mujib was not initially demanding the complete destruction of Pakistan. His argument was that the existing federal structure had failed East Pakistan and that the country needed a radically decentralised system in which the provinces controlled most of their own affairs.

The Six Points called for a federal and parliamentary system based on universal adult franchise, with representation in the legislature according to population. The federal government would have responsibility mainly for defence and foreign affairs, while the provinces would have control over most other matters.

Mujib also proposed major changes to taxation and foreign exchange arrangements. The provinces would raise their own taxes and contribute to the federal government, while separate accounts would be maintained for the foreign exchange earnings of the two wings. He also called for East Pakistan to have its own militia or paramilitary force.

The proposals were therefore about far more than provincial administration. Mujib wanted East Pakistan to control its own economy, taxation and internal security while retaining a common Pakistan for defence and foreign affairs.

To many in West Pakistan, however, the Six Points amounted to the creation of a state within a state. They feared that if East Pakistan controlled its own taxation, foreign exchange and security forces, the federal government would become little more than a shell.

The Six Points consequently became a turning point. The political debate was no longer simply about whether Bengalis were receiving fair representation. It was now about whether the structure of Pakistan itself was capable of accommodating the political and economic demands of its largest population.

he staunchly presented a Six-Point formula in 1966:

1. Federal parliamentary system with representation based on provincial population
2. Federal government will be restricted only to foreign affairs, defence and currency, except economic issues which the provinces will administer
3. Two currencies for either wing or single currency with two federal reserves.
4. Provinces will collect taxes and then give shares to federal government for administration, foreign affairs and defence.
5. There would be separate accounts of foreign exchange earnings for each wing.
6. East Pakistan would be entitled to have militia or paramilitary force solely under its jurisdiction.

End of the Ayub Era

By the late 1960s, the achievements of the Ayub era were increasingly being overshadowed by its political weaknesses.

There had undoubtedly been substantial economic development. Pakistan had expanded its industrial base, improved infrastructure, increased agricultural production and experienced rapid economic growth. Cities such as Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi expanded, and a new industrial and commercial middle class emerged.

But the benefits were unevenly distributed. Wealth became concentrated among a relatively small number of industrial and landed families, while many ordinary workers and farmers continued to experience poverty. Regional inequality was also becoming more pronounced, with East Pakistan increasingly convinced that the economic system was designed to benefit the western wing.

Political opposition was growing as well. Ayub’s government had restricted political parties, controlled the press and maintained a system in which national political power ultimately depended upon the President and his Basic Democrats.

In 1967, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto founded the Pakistan Peoples Party, adopting the slogan “Islam is our faith, democracy is our polity, socialism is our economy” and appealing directly to workers, students and the urban poor. Bhutto attacked Ayub’s economic policies and argued that the country’s prosperity had benefited a small elite rather than ordinary Pakistanis.

At the same time, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s movement in East Pakistan was becoming increasingly powerful. The Six Points had given Bengali grievances a clear political programme, while students and other groups were increasingly demanding greater autonomy.

By 1968, protests against Ayub’s government had spread across the country. Students, workers, lawyers and political parties joined demonstrations. The government responded with arrests and repression, but the movement continued to grow.

Ayub’s health was also deteriorating, and he was increasingly unable to control the political crisis. In March 1969, he resigned rather than attempt to continue governing through further repression.

Ayub’s eleven-year rule therefore left a complicated legacy.

He had inherited a politically unstable and economically underdeveloped country and transformed it into a significantly more industrialised state. His period in office saw major infrastructure projects, rapid economic growth, expansion of education and the development of a stronger scientific and industrial base. This is why his supporters remember the period as Pakistan’s Decade of Development.

Yet the same system that produced economic growth also produced serious political and regional inequalities. The concentration of political power in the presidency weakened democratic institutions, the concentration of wealth created resentment among workers and poorer citizens, and the failure to adequately address East Pakistan’s political and economic grievances created a crisis that economic growth alone could not solve.

The central problem of Pakistan was therefore changing.

In 1958, Ayub had taken power because the political system appeared incapable of governing the country.

By 1969, his own system had become the source of the political crisis.

General Yahya Khan as President

When Ayub Khan resigned, he handed power to General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army.

Yahya inherited a country that was already in political turmoil. His first task was therefore not to continue Ayub’s presidential system but to dismantle it and prepare Pakistan for elections.

He abolished the 1962 Constitution and introduced a Legal Framework Order to provide the rules under which elections would be held and a new constitution prepared. Most importantly, Yahya abandoned the One Unit Scheme and restored the four provinces of West Pakistan, namely Punjab, Sindh, North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan.

This was a major political change.

For the first time since the One Unit Scheme had been introduced in 1955, the people of West Pakistan would again have their own provincial political identities formally recognised. At the same time, East Pakistan remained a single province.

Yahya also committed himself to holding Pakistan’s first genuinely nationwide general election based on one person, one vote.

This was potentially revolutionary. Under the previous system, the Basic Democrats had effectively acted as the electoral college, and political representation had been manipulated to maintain parity between East and West Pakistan. Now the principle of population would finally determine representation.

And that created a problem that Ayub’s system had spent more than a decade trying to avoid.

East Pakistan had the majority of Pakistan’s population.

If one person meant one vote, East Pakistan would have the largest number of seats in the National Assembly.

For the first time, the political question could no longer be postponed.

Pakistan was about to discover what its people actually wanted.