

Usool Shaashi

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Introduction

الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ الَّذِي أَعْلَىٰ مَنْزِلَةَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ بِكَرِيمِ خَطَابِهِ وَرَفَعَ دَرَجَةَ الْعَالَمِينَ
بِمَعَانِي كِتَابِهِ وَخَصَّ الْمُسْتَنْبِطِينَ مِنْهُمْ بِمَزِيدِ الْإِصَابَةِ وَتَوَابِهِ

All praise belongs to ALLAAH, who has elevated the status of the Mu'mineen by means of his Noble speech and elevated the rank of the Ulama by (granting them understanding of) the meaning of His Book (the Quraan). He has bestowed upon those who extract rulings (of Shariaat) from amongst them (the Ulama) with increased favour and reward.

وَالصَّلَاةُ عَلَى النَّبِيِّ وَأَصْحَابِهِ وَالسَّلَامُ عَلَى أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ وَأَحْبَابِهِ

May peace descend upon His Nabi (Hadhrat Muhammed ﷺ) and his Sahabah, and salutations upon Imaam Abu Hanifah رحمه الله and his students.

The principles of Fiqh

وَبَعْدُ فَإِنَّ أُصُولَ الْفَقْهِ أَرْبَعَةٌ كِتَابُ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى وَسُنَّةُ رَسُولِهِ وَاجْتِمَاعُ الْأُمَّةِ
وَالْقِيَاسُ فَلَا بُدَّ مِنَ الْبَحْثِ فِي كُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْ هَذِهِ الْأَقْسَامِ لِيُعْلَمَ بِذَلِكَ
طَرِيقُ تَخْرِيجِ الْأَحْكَامِ

The Usool(principles)of Fiqh(jurisprudence) are four;

- 1- The Book of ALLAAH (the Quraan),**
- 2- Sunnat of Rasulullaah ﷺ (Hadeeth),**
- 3- Ijmaa(consensus)of the Ummat(of Rasulullaah ﷺ),**
- 4- Qiyaas(deduction).**

It is necessary to research and discuss each of these Usool(principles)separately so that one will be able to understand the method in which the Ahkaam(laws)of Shariaat are derived.

Section One

The Book of ALLAAH

الْبَحْثُ الْأَوَّلُ فِي كِتَابِ اللَّهِ

The first section, (*deals with the methods in which laws are derived from the*) **Book of ALLAAH**¹.

Lesson one

Khaas and Aam

فَالْخَاصُّ لَفْظٌ وَضِعَ لِمَعْنَى مَعْلُومٍ أَوْ لِمُسَمًّى مَعْلُومٍ عَلَى الْإِنْفِرَادِ كَقَوْلِنَا
فِي تَخْصِيصِ الْفَرْدِ زَيْدٌ وَفِي تَخْصِيصِ النَّوعِ رَجُلٌ وَفِي تَخْصِيصِ
الْجِنْسِ إِنْسَانٌ

Khaas is a word which refers to a specific meaning or object without referring to anything else. An example of **Khaas** of an individual is the name **Zaid** (*this refers specifically to the individual whose name is Zaid and negates all other individuals*), in specifying a class is the word **Man**

¹The Book of ALLAAH is the Quraan which ALLAAH Ta'ala revealed to Rasulullaah ﷺ, which has been recorded and narrated with Tawaatur (*i.e. it is reported in every generation by such a large number of people such that it is inconceivable for it to have been a lie.*)

(this refers specifically to the male gender and not the female gender) **and an example of specifying a species is the word human** (This refers specifically to the human species and not other species such as animals, etc).

وَالْعَامُّ كُلُّ لَفْظٍ يَنْتَظِمُ جَمْعاً مِنَ الْأَفْرَادِ إِمَّا لَفْظاً كَقَوْلِنَا مُسْلِمُونَ
وَمُشْرِكُونَ وَإِمَّا مَعْنَى كَقَوْلِنَا مَنْ وَمَا

Aam is a word which refers to a number of individuals or items of a group (at the same time), either by the word being plural such as the word **Muslimeen** or **Mushrikeen** (which refers to all of the Muslims or Mushriks at the same time), or in meaning such as the words **مَنْ** (whoever) and **مَا** (whatever).

The ruling of Khaas

وَحُكْمُ الْخَاصِّ مِنَ الْكِتَابِ وَجُوبُ الْعَمَلِ بِهِ لَا مَحَالَةَ فَإِنْ قَابَلَهُ خَبَرُ
الْوَاحِدِ أَوْ الْقِيَاسُ فَإِنْ أَمَكْنَ الْجَمْعُ بَيْنَهُمَا بِدُونِ تَغْيِيرٍ فِي حُكْمِ الْخَاصِّ
يُعْمَلُ بِهِمَا وَإِلَّا يُعْمَلُ بِالْكِتَابِ وَيُتْرَكُ مَا يَقَابِلُهُ

The ruling of Khaas is to practise upon it entirely without any doubt. If Khabar Wahid (Hadeeth) or Qiyaas (deduction) comes in opposition to it (a Khaas word of the Quraan); if it is possible to practice on both (Khabar Wahid or Qiyaas and the Khaas of the Quraan) without altering the ruling of Khaas then we will practice on both (Khabar Wahid or Qiyaas and the Khaas of the Quraan) and if this (to practice on both Khabar Wahid or Qiyaas without altering the ruling of Khaas) is not possible then we will practice upon the Khaas and disregard the Khabar Wahid or Qiyaas.

Example one

مِثَالُهُ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {يَتَرَبَّصْنَ بَأَنْفُسِهِنَّ ثَلَاثَةَ قُرُوءٍ} فَإِنَّ لَفْظَةَ الثَّلَاثَةِ خَاصٌّ فِي تَعْرِيفِ عَدَدٍ مَعْلُومٍ فَيَجِبُ الْعَمَلُ بِهِ وَلَوْ حُمِلَ الْأَقْرَأُ عَلَى الْأَطْهَارِ كَمَا ذَهَبَ إِلَيْهِ الشَّافِعِيُّ بِاعْتِبَارِ أَنَّ الطَّهْرَ مُذَكَّرٌ دُونَ الْحَيْضِ وَقَدْ وَرَدَ الْكِتَابُ فِي الْجَمْعِ بِلَفْظِ الثَّانِيثِ دَلٌّ عَلَى أَنَّهُ جَمْعُ الْمُذَكَّرِ وَهُوَ الطَّهْرُ لَزِمَ تَرْكُ الْعَمَلِ بِهَذَا الْخَاصِّ لِأَنَّ مَنْ حَمَلَهُ عَلَى الطَّهْرِ لَا يُوجِبُ ثَلَاثَةَ أَطْهَارٍ بَلْ طَهْرَيْنِ وَبَعْضُ الثَّالِثِ وَهُوَ الَّذِي وَقَعَ فِيهِ الطَّلَاقُ

An example of this (disregarding Qiyaas for Khaas) is the verse of the Quraan;

{يَتَرَبَّصْنَ بَأَنْفُسِهِنَّ ثَلَاثَةَ قُرُوءٍ}

"Divorced women should wait (should abstain from remarrying) for three courses (after divorce, called Iddah)." (Surah Baqarah: 228)

The word "three" is Khaas, representing a (single and) specific amount (i.e. Three, no more and no less) and it is therefore compulsory to practice upon it (completely). If we were to say that the word 'قروء' (courses) refers to 'طهر' (purity), as Imaam Shaafie □ has, because the word purity is masculine plural (whereas the word "three" is feminine and the rule of Arabic grammar is that if a number is feminine then its subject will be masculine) and not the word Haidh (which is feminine in usage). The Quraan has used a plural which is feminine (the word 'ثلاثة' - three) which proves that its subject is masculine plural which is 'طهر'- purity, then we will have to abandon practicing on the Khaas (if we accept the opinion of Imaam Shaafie □ because those who regard it ('قروء'-courses) to refer to purity will not be able to complete

three complete courses of purity but rather it will be two and a portion of the third, in which the Talaq was issued.

فَيُخْرِجُ عَلَىٰ هَٰذَا حُكْمَ الرَّجْعَةِ فِي الْحَيْضَةِ الثَّالِثَةِ وَزَوَالِهِ ۖ وَتَصَحِيحُ
نِكَاحِ الْغَيْرِ وَإِبْطَالُهُ ۖ وَحُكْمُ الْحَبْسِ وَالْإِطْلَاقِ وَالْمَسْكَنِ وَالْإِنْفَاقِ
وَالْخُلْعِ وَالطَّلَاقِ وَتَزْوُجِ الزَّوْجِ بِأَخْتِهَا وَأَرْبَعٍ سِوَاهَا وَأَحْكَامِ الْمِيرَاثِ
مَعَ كَثْرَةِ تَعْدَادِهَا

As a result of this (difference of opinion), the rulings differ with regards to reconciliation (between the spouses) in the third Haidh (Ahnaaf say the husband has the right to reconcile as she is still in her Iddah) and its termination (Imaam Shaafie says they cannot reconcile because her Iddah has terminated), permissibility of marrying another (in the third Haidh, which according to Imaam Shaafie □ is permissible because her Iddah has terminated) and its impermissibility (according to Ahnaaf because she is still in her iddah), the ruling of remaining in the house of iddah (according to Ahnaaf she cannot leave the house of Iddah as she is still in her iddah) or leaving (according to Imaam Shaafie □ her Iddah has terminated and she can therefore leave the house). (There is also a difference of opinion; whether is it compulsory to provide) Housing and maintenance (according to Ahnaaf it is Waajib because she is still in Iddah whereas Imaam Shaafie says it is not as her Iddah has terminated), (permissibility of) Khul'a and Talaq (Ahnaaf say Khul'a can be made as well as another Talaq issued as she is still in Iddah whereas Imaam Shaafie □ says it is not permissible), marrying the sister of the wife or a fourth besides her (Imaam Shaafie □ says it is permissible as her Iddah has terminated and as a result is no longer his spouse thus making it permissible for him to marry her sister and take a fourth wife as opposed to Ahnaaf who say it is impermissible because she is still his spouse on account of her Iddah still being

incomplete), as well as the many rulings with regards to **inheritance** (*Ahnaaf say that if anyone of them pass away in the third Haidh then the other will inherit as before the termination of the Iddah they remain married whereas Imaam Shaafie □ says they will not inherit from each other as her Iddah has already terminated*).

Example Two

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ ۖ تَعَالَى { قَدْ عَلِمْنَا مَا فَرَضْنَا عَلَيْهِمْ فِي أَزْوَاجِهِمْ } خَاصٌّ فِي التَّقْدِيرِ الشَّرْعِيِّ فَلَا يُثْرِكُ الْعَمَلُ بِهِ بِاعْتِبَارِ أَنَّهُ عَقْدٌ مَالِيٌّ فَيُعْتَبَرُ بِالْعُقُودِ الْمَالِيَّةِ فَيَكُونُ تَقْدِيرُ الْمَالِ فِيهِ مَوْكُلاً إِلَى رَأْيِ الزَّوْجَيْنِ كَمَا ذَكَرَهُ الشَّافِعِيُّ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى

Similarly (*another example of disregarding Qiyaas for Khaas*)
is the verse of the Quraan;

{ قَدْ عَلِمْنَا مَا فَرَضْنَا عَلَيْهِمْ فِي أَزْوَاجِهِمْ }

"Indeed We are aware of what (injunctions) We have stipulated (especially) for them (the Mu'mineen) with regards to their wives." (*Surah Ahzaab: 50*)

(*the words "We have stipulated" is Khaas (specific) in the stipulation of the amount of Mehr (dowry) and therefore we will not abandon practicing on it by making Qiyaas (deducing) that it is the same as a monetary transaction and thus regard it as such by leaving the stipulation of Mehr to the opinion of the spouses, as Imaam Shaafie □ has.*

وَفَرَعَ عَلَىٰ هَذَا أَنَّ التَّخْلِيَّ لِنَفْلِ الْعِبَادَةِ أَفْضَلُ مِنَ الْإِسْتِعَالِ بِالنِّكَاحِ وَأَبَاحَ إِبْطَالِهِ بِالطَّلَاقِ كَيْفَ مَا شَاءَ الزَّوْجُ مِنْ جَمْعٍ وَتَفْرِيقٍ وَأَبَاحَ إِرْسَالِ التَّلْثِ جُمْلَةً وَاحِدَةً وَجَعَلَ عَقْدَ النِّكَاحِ قَابِلًا لِلْفَسْخِ بِالْخُلْعِ

As a result of this (*Imaam Shaafie* □ equating Nikaah to a monetary transaction he says that) **remaining engaged in Nafil Ibaadat is superior to performing Nikaah, and it is permissible (for the husband to) terminate the Nikaah with Talaaq in whichever manner he desires either by issuing them all at once (in one period of purity as opposed to Ahnaaf who regard such a Talaaq as Bid'ah) or separate (one in each consecutive period of purity) or even all three (Talaaq) at once (is regarded as permissible by Imaam Shaafie □ as opposed to Ahnaaf who regard the one who issues such a Talaaq as a heinous sinner).** (In addition since Imaam Shaafie □ has equated Nikaah to a monetary transaction he says that) **The contract of Nikaah is annulled by Khul'a** (whereas Ahnaaf say that Khul'a is a Talaaq-Baa'in).

Example three

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى {حَتَّى تَنْكِحَ زَوْجاً غَيْرَهُ} خَاصٌّ فِي وُجُودِ
النِّكَاحِ مِنَ الْمَرْأَةِ فَلَا يُنْزَكُ الْعَمَلُ بِمَا رَوَى عَنِ النَّبِيِّ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ "أَيُّمَا
امْرَأَةٍ نَكَحَتْ نَفْسَهَا بِغَيْرِ إِذْنٍ وَلِيِّهَا فَتَكَاحُهَا بَاطِلٌ بَاطِلٌ بَاطِلٌ

Similarly (an example of disregarding Khabar Wahid for Khaas) **is the verse of the Quraan,**
{حَتَّى تَنْكِحَ زَوْجاً غَيْرَهُ}

"(If he divorced her the third time then she is not lawful for him thereafter) **until she marries another husband.**" (Surah Baqarah: 230)

(the words "She marries" is Khaas which means that the person who actually contracts the marriage is the woman) **which is Khaas in Nikaah being correct if carried out by a woman so we will not abandon acting on it (Khaas) because of what has been narrated from Rasulullaah □, "Whichever**

women will perform her Nikaah without the permission of her Walie (father or Shar'ie representative) then her Nikaah is invalid, invalid, invalid"(as Imaam Shaafie □ has).

وَيَتَفَرَّغُ مِنْهُ الْخِلَافُ فِي حَلِّ الْوُطِيِّ وَلُزُومِ الْمَهْرِ وَالنَّفَقَةِ وَالسُّكْنَى
وَوُقُوعِ الطَّلَاقِ وَالْتِكَاحِ بَعْدَ الطَّلَاقِ الثَّلَاثِ عَلَى مَا ذَهَبَ إِلَيْهِ قَدَمَاءُ
أَصْحَابِهِ بِخِلَافِ مَا اخْتَارَهُ الْمُتَأَخَّرُونَ مِنْهُمْ

As a result of this (difference of opinion that a woman can perform her own Nikaah according to Ahnaaf but according to Imaam Shaafie □ the Nikaah is invalid) **there is difference of opinion regarding the permissibility of intercourse** (Ahnaaf say it is permissible as the Nikaah is valid but according to Imaam Shaafie □ intercourse is impermissible as the Nikaah is invalid), **incumbency of Mehr (dowry), maintenance and housing** (Ahnaaf say it is compulsory on account of the Nikaah being valid and Imaam Shaafie □ says it is not as the Nikaah is invalid), **whether Talaaq is valid** (according to Ahnaaf it is valid whereas Imaam Shaafie □ says it is not as the Nikaah is invalid), **and(if)Nikaah** (with the same person is valid) **after issuing three Talaaq(in this Nikaah) according to the opinion of the earlier Shaafie scholars** (Ahnaaf say Nikaah is only permissible after 'Halalah', i.e. she marries another person, consummates the marriage and is divorced after which it will be permissible for her to remarry the first husband, whereas Imaam Shaafie □ and the earlier scholars of the Shaafie Madhab on account of the Nikaah being invalid say the three Talaaq did not apply and it is therefore permissible for her to marry)**as opposed to the stance adopted by the latter Shaafie scholars** (who hold the same view as Ahnaaf that it is only permissible for her to remarry the first husband after 'Halalah').

Definition of Aam

وَأَمَّا الْعَامُّ فَتَوَعَّانِ عَامٌ خُصَّ عَنْهُ الْبَعْضُ وَعَامٌ لَمْ يُخَصَّ عَنْهُ شَيْءٌ فَالْعَامُّ
الَّذِي لَمْ يُخَصَّ عَنْهُ شَيْءٌ فَهُوَ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْخَاصِّ فِي حَقِّ لُزُومِ الْعَمَلِ بِهِ لَا
مُحَالَةً

Aam (A word which refers to a number of individuals or items of a group at the same time) **is of two types;** (the first is) **Aam in which some of it** (the individuals or items of the group) **have been excluded and** (the second is) **Aam in which nothing** (none of its individuals or items) **have been excluded.**

Aam Ghair Makhsoosul Ba'adh

فَالْعَامُّ الَّذِي لَمْ يُخَصَّ عَنْهُ شَيْءٌ فَهُوَ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْخَاصِّ فِي حَقِّ لُزُومِ الْعَمَلِ
بِهِ لَا مُحَالَةً

The(the ruling for) **Aam in which nothing has been excluded**(known as 'Aam Ghair Makhsoosul Ba'adh) **is the same as Khaas in that it is incumbent to practise upon it entirely without any doubt.**

Example One

وَعَلَى هَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا قُطِعَ يَدُ السَّارِقِ بَعْدَ مَا هَلَكَ الْمَسْرُوقُ عِنْدَهُ لَا يَجِبُ
عَلَيْهِ الضَّمَانُ لِأَنَّ الْقَطْعَ جَزَاءُ جَمِيعِ مَا اكْتَسَبَهُ السَّارِقُ فَإِنَّ كَلِمَةَ مَا
عَامَّةٌ يَتَنَاوَلُ جَمِيعَ مَا وَجَدَ مِنَ السَّارِقِ وَبِنَقْدِيرِ إِيْجَابِ الضَّمَانِ يَكُونُ
الْجَزَاءُ هُوَ الْمَجْمُوعُ وَلَا يُتْرَكُ الْعَمَلُ بِهِ بِالْقِيَاسِ عَلَى الْغَضَبِ

Based upon this (That 'Aam Ghair Makhsoosul Ba'adh' is the same as Khaas in that it is incumbent to practise upon it entirely without any doubt) **we say, when the hand of a thief is cut after the stolen item has been lost, then 'Dhamaan** (to claim the value of the stolen goods from the thief) **will not be**

Waajib because cutting the hand of the thief is punishment for all the crimes the thief has committed as the word 'ما' (in the verse,

" السَّارِقَ وَالسَّارِقَةَ فَاقْطَعُوا أَيْدِيَهُمَا جَزَاءً بِمَا كَسَبَا "

As for the male and female thief, cut of their (right) hands as punishment for *what (all) they earn {from the sin of stealing}*) is **Aam** and includes all (the crimes) that the thief perpetrated and in making 'Dhamaan' **Waajib**, the punishment (instead of being one) will be increased (as then the punishment will be two; cutting off the hand and 'Dhamaan'). We will not abandon practicing on it (the general and comprehensive nature of Aam, that cutting off the hand is the punishment for all his crimes) by making **Qiyaas** (comparing it) to **Ghasab** (forceful seizure, hijacking, etc, as Imaam Shaa'fie □ has).

Proof that 'ما' is Aam

وَالدَّلِيلُ عَلَى أَنَّ كَلِمَةَ مَا عَامَّةٌ مَا ذَكَرَهُ ُ مُحَمَّدٌ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى إِذَا قَالَ
الْمَوْلَى لِجَارِيَتِهِ أَنْ كَانَ مَا فِي بَطْنِكَ غُلَامًا فَأَنْتِ حُرَّةٌ فَوَلَدْتَ غُلَامًا
وَجَارِيَةً لَا تُعْتَقُ

The proof that the word 'ما' is Aam is what Imaam Muhammed □ has mentioned, "If a master tells his female slave, "If what (all) is in your womb is a boy then you are free" and then gives birth to (twins) a boy and a girl then she will not be set free (because the word 'ما' includes and refers to all and everything that is in her womb).

Example Two

وَبِمِثْلِهِ نَقُولُ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {فَاقْرَأُوا مَا تيسَّرَ مِنَ الْقُرْآنِ} فَإِنَّهُ َعَامٌّ فِي جَمِيعِ مَا تيسَّرَ مِنَ الْقُرْآنِ وَمِنْ ضَرُورَتِهِ عَدَمُ تَوْقُفِ الْجَوَازِ عَلَى قِرَاءَةِ الْفَاتِحَةِ وَجَاءَ فِي الْخَبَرِ أَنَّهُ قَالَ لَا صَلَاةَ إِلَّا بِفَاتِحَةِ الْكِتَابِ فَعَمَلُنَا بِهِمَا عَلَى وَجْهِ لَا يَتَغَيَّرُ بِهِ حُكْمُ الْكِتَابِ بِأَنْ نَحْمِلَ الْخَبَرَ عَلَى نَفْيِ الْكَمَالِ حَتَّى يَكُونَ مُطْلَقُ الْقِرَاءَةِ فَرَضًا بِحُكْمِ الْكِتَابِ وَقِرَاءَةُ الْفَاتِحَةِ وَاجِبَةٌ بِحُكْمِ الْخَبَرِ

In a similar manner we say regarding the verse,

{فَاقْرَأُوا مَا تيسَّرَ مِنَ الْقُرْآنِ}

"Recite that which is easy." (Surah Muzzammil: 20)

That it is Aam and includes the entire Quraan whichever may be easy (for the Musallee to read) and from its requisites (of Aam) the permissibility of Salaah will not be dependent upon the recitation of Surah Faatihah (as Imaam Shaafie □ has stated, i.e. Surah Faatihah will not be Fardh as the verse above states that any portion of the Quraan which the Musallee finds easy to read is Fardh). It has come in Hadeeth that Rasulullaah □ has said, "There is no Salaah without the recitation of Surah Faatihah" which we will practice upon in conjunction with the verse in a manner that will not change the order of the Quraan (which permits recitation of any portion of the Quraan) by concluding that the Hadeeth negates perfection (that Salaah is not perfect or complete without Surah Faatihah even though valid) such that reciting any portion of the Quraan will be Fardh in accordance with the order of the Quraan and reciting Surah Faatihah will be Waajib in accordance with the Hadeeth.

Example Three

وَقُلْنَا كَذَلِكَ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى { وَلَا تَأْكُلُوا مِمَّا لَمْ يُذْكَرِ اسْمُ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ } إِنَّهُ يُوجِبُ حُرْمَةَ مَثْرُوكِ التَّسْمِيَةِ عَامِداً وَجَاءَ فِي الْخَبَرِ أَنَّهُ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ سُئِلَ عَنْ مَثْرُوكِ التَّسْمِيَةِ عَامِداً فَقَالَ كُلُّهُ فَإِنَّ تَسْمِيَةَ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى فِي قَلْبِ كُلِّ امْرِئٍ مُسْلِمٍ فَلَا يُمْكِنُ التَّوْفِيقُ بَيْنَهُمَا لِأَنَّهُ لَوْ ثَبَتَ الْحِلُّ بِتَرْكِهَا عَامِداً لَثَبَتَ الْحِلُّ بِتَرْكِهَا نَاسِياً فَحِينَئِذٍ يَرْتَفِعُ حُكْمُ الْكِتَابِ فَيُتْرَكُ الْخَبَرُ

In a similar manner we say regarding the verse,

{ وَلَا تَأْكُلُوا مِمَّا لَمْ يُذْكَرِ اسْمُ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ }

"Do not eat from (the meat of) that (animal) on which ALLAAH's name was not taken (when it was slaughtered)."

(Surah An'aam: 121)

(That it is Aam and) forbids that (all meat) on which ALLAAH's name was omitted intentionally (even if it is slaughtered by a Muslim). It has been mentioned in Hadeeth that Rasulullaah ﷺ was asked about (the animal on which) ALLAAH's name (is) not taken intentionally (when slaughtering) and he replied, "Eat! For undoubtedly Allah's name is in the heart of every Muslim" (because of which Imaam Shaafie رحمه الله says; if a Muslim intentionally omits Tasmiyyah then too the meat is Halaal). It is not possible to reconcile between the verse of the Quraan and Hadeeth because if it is proven that it (the meat) is Halaal when (Tasmiyyah- Allah's name is) omitted intentionally then it will (most certainly) be proven to be Halaal when omitted unintentionally and this would result in the verse of the Quraan being abandoned (entirely, which is why), the Hadeeth will be disregarded (and the animal on which ALLAAH's name has been omitted intentionally will be regarded as Haraam).

Example Four

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى {وَأُمَّهَاتُكُمُ اللَّائِي أَرْضَعْنَكُمْ} يَقْتَضِي بِعُمُومِهِ حُرْمَةَ نِكَاحِ الْمُرْضِعَةِ وَقَدْ جَاءَ فِي الْخَبَرِ لَا تَحْرُمُ الْمَصَّةُ وَلَا الْمَصْنَتَانِ وَلَا الْإِمْلَاجَةُ وَلَا الْإِمْلَاجَتَانِ فَلَمْ يُمَكِّنِ التَّوْفِيقُ بَيْنَهُمَا فَيُنْزَكُ الْخَبَرُ

Similarly is the verse,

{وَأُمَّهَاتُكُمُ اللَّائِي أَرْضَعْنَكُمْ}

"(Also Haraam for you to marry is) **Your suckling mothers** (those women who breastfed you before you turned two years of age. All the daughters, granddaughters, sisters, aunts, mothers, and grandmothers of the suckling mother may also not marry the child she breastfed)." (Surah Nisaa: 23)

The general connotation of which dictates that it is impermissible for one to marry the woman who breastfed him (in all circumstances). It has been reported in Hadeeth, "Sucking once or twice does not establish Hurmat (impermissibility to marry) nor does inserting (the nipple) once or twice (in the mouth establish impermissibility to marry). Since it is not possible to reconcile the verse of the Quran with the Hadeeth we will disregard the Hadeeth (and say that it is impermissible to marry one's suckling mother even if one sucked only once or twice as opposed to Imaam Shaafie □ who says that Hurmat is only established after drinking five gulps).

Aam Makhsoosul Ba'adh

وَأَمَّا الْعَامُّ الَّذِي خُصَّ عَنْهُ الْبَعْضُ فَحُكْمُهُ أَنَّهُ يَجِبُ الْعَمَلُ بِهِ فِي الْبَاقِي مَعَ الْإِحْتِمَالِ

As far as the Aam in which some of it (the individuals or items of the group) have been excluded (known as Aam Makhsoosul Ba'adh) its ruling is that it is Waajib to practice upon it for the rest (of those who have not been excluded) with the probability that the others may be excluded as well.

فَإِذَا قَامَ الدَّلِيلُ عَلَى تَخْصِيسِ الْبَاقِي يَجُوزُ تَخْصِيسُهُ بِخَبَرِ الْوَاحِدِ وَالْقِيَاسِ إِلَى أَنْ يَبْقَى الثَّلَاثُ وَبَعْدَ ذَلِكَ لَا يَجُوزُ فَيَجِبُ الْعَمَلُ بِهِ

Thus if proof is established which excludes the rest then it will be permissible to exclude it with Khabar Wahid (Hadeeth) or Qiyaas as long as three (individuals or items) are left (under the ruling of Aam) after that it will not be permissible to exclude any other from it and it will be Waajib to practice on it (the Aam Makhsoosul Ba'adh in which its constituents have been removed until only three remain).

وَأَمَّا جَازَ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ الْمُخَصَّصَ الَّذِي أَخْرَجَ الْبَعْضَ عَنِ الْجُمْلَةِ لَوْ أَخْرَجَ بَعْضًا مَجْهُولًا يَنْبَغُ الْإِحْتِمَالُ فِي كُلِّ فَرْدٍ مُعَيَّنٍ فَجَازَ أَنْ يَكُونَ بَاقِيًا تَحْتَ حُكْمِ الْعَامِّ وَجَازَ أَنْ يَكُونَ دَاخِلًا تَحْتَ دَلِيلِ الْخُصُوصِ فَاسْتَوَى الطَّرْقَانِ فِي حَقِّ الْمُعَيَّنِ

This exclusion (excluding individuals or items with Khabar Wahid or Qiyaas after some have been excluded by a Qath'ie proof- regarding which there is no doubt to its authenticity and meaning) is permissible because the proof which excluded some of the unknown constituents (individuals or items that are included in it) from Aam establishes the probability that certain known constituents may be excluded as well. (The explanation of this is) It is permissible that the constituent (individual or item) is still included under the ruling of Aam (that the ruling still applies to it as it has not been excluded) or it is permissible to included the constituent (individual or

item) in the proof of exclusion (and say that it too has been excluded from the ruling). Thus for each known individual (or item) both sides (i.e. to either remain under Aam or be excluded by the proof) is the same.

فَإِذَا قَامَ الدَّلِيلُ الشَّرْعِيُّ عَلَى أَنَّهُ مِنْ جُمْلَةِ مَا دَخَلَ تَحْتَ دَلِيلٍ
الْخُصُوصِ تَرَجَّحَ جَانِبُ تَخْصِيصِهِ

Thus when a Shar'ie proof has been established that it is included in the proof which excludes it from the ruling then the side of exclusion will be given preference (and the individual or item will be excluded from the ruling of Aam).

وَإِنْ كَانَ الْمُخَصَّصُ أَخْرَجَ بَعْضًا مَعْلُومًا عَنِ الْجُمْلَةِ جَازَ أَنْ يَكُونَ
مَعْلُولًا بِعِلَّةٍ مَوْجُودَةٍ فِي هَذَا الْفَرْدِ الْمُعَيَّنِ فَإِذَا قَامَ الدَّلِيلُ الشَّرْعِيُّ
عَلَى وُجُودِ تِلْكَ الْعِلَّةِ فِي غَيْرِ هَذَا الْفَرْدِ الْمُعَيَّنِ تَرَجَّحَ جِهَةٌ تَخْصِيصِهِ
فَيُعْمَلُ بِهِ مَعَ وُجُودِ الْإِحْتِمَالِ

If the proof which excludes part of its known constituents (individuals or items) from its ruling then it is possible it is because of a specific illat (property or characteristic) found in that individual (or item) and if Shar'ie proof is established which proves that the very same Illat (property or characteristic) is found in another besides this specific individual (in whom the Illat was found) then we will given preference to it being excluded (i.e. it too does not fall under the ruling or Aam and has been excluded from its ruling) and we will practice on (the remaining constituents of) Aam (Makhsoosul Ba'adh) with the probability that more may be excluded.

Lesson on Mutlaq and Muqayyad

فصل في المطلق والمقيد ذَهَبَ أَصْحَابُنَا إِلَى أَنَّ الْمُطْلَقَ مِنْ كِتَابِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى إِذَا أَمَكْنَ الْعَمَلُ بِإِطْلَاقِهِ فَالزِّيَادَةُ عَلَيْهِ بِخَبَرِ الْوَاحِدِ وَالْقِيَاسِ لَا يَجُوزُ

Our scholars (*scholars of the Hanafi Madhab*) **have taken the stance that if it is possible to practice upon the Mutlaq** (*a word having a specific meaning that does not have a restrictive clause attached to it*) **of the Quraan unrestrictedly** (*without adding any clause to it*) **then it is not permissible to add to it** (*add a clause to it*) **using Khabar Wahid (Hadeeth) or Qiyaas.**

Note: - Muqayyad is a word having a specific meaning that has a restrictive clause attached to it.

Example One

مَثَلُهُ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {فَاغْسِلُوا وُجُوهَكُمْ} فَلَمَّا مَوَّرُ بِهِ هُوَ الْغَسْلُ عَلَى الْإِطْلَاقِ فَلَا يُرَادُ عَلَيْهِ شَرْطُ النِّيَّةِ وَالتَّرْتِيبِ وَالْمَوْلَاةِ وَالتَّسْمِيَةِ بِالْخَبَرِ وَلَكِنْ يُعْمَلُ بِالْخَبَرِ عَلَى وَجْهِ لَا يَتَغَيَّرُ بِهِ حُكْمُ الْكِتَابِ فَيُقَالُ الْغَسْلُ الْمُطْلَقُ فَرَضٌ بِحُكْمِ الْكِتَابِ وَالنِّيَّةُ سُنَّةٌ بِحُكْمِ الْخَبَرِ

An example of this (*that it is not permissible to add a clause to the Mutlaq of the Quraan using Khabar Wahid or Qiyaas when it is possible to practice on it unrestrictedly*) **is the verse** (*of Wudhu*),

{فَاغْسِلُوا وُجُوهَكُمْ}

"Wash your faces" (*Surah Maa'idah: 6*)

Ghusal with no additional clauses has been ordered in this verse so we will not add to it the clause of Niyyat (*to make intention for Wudhu as Imaam Shaafie □ has*), **Tarteeb** (*to*

make Wudhu in the correct sequence as Imaam Shaafie ؓ has), **Muwaalaat**(to wash each part before the previous one dries as Imaam Maalik ؓ has) **and Tasmiyyah**(to recite Bismillaah as Imaam Dawood Thaahirie ؓ has , and say they are Fardh when making wudhu as the Quraan has ordered one to wash without any additional clauses or restrictions) **using Khabar Wahid**. **Instead we act upon the Khabar Wahid (Hadeeth) in such a manner that will not alter the ruling of the Quraan so we will say that that washing the face, etc is Fardh in accordance with the ruling of the Quraan and Niyyat (as well as Tarteeb, Muwaalaat and Tasmiyyah) is Sunnat in accordance with Khabar Wahid (Hadeeth).**

Example Two

وَكَذَلِكَ قُلْنَا فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {الزَّانِيَةُ وَالزَّانِي فَاجْلِدُوا كُلَّ وَاحِدٍ مِّنْهُمَا مِائَةَ جَلْدَةٍ} إِنَّ الْكِتَابَ جَعَلَ جَلْدَ الْمِائَةِ حَدًّا لِلزَّانَا فَلَا يَزَادُ عَلَيْهِ التَّعْزِيبُ حَدًّا لِقَوْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ الْبِكْرُ بِالْبِكْرِ جَلْدُ مِائَةٍ وَتَعْزِيبُ عَامٍ بَلْ يُعْمَلُ بِالْخَبَرِ عَلَى وَجْهِهِ لَا يَتَغَيَّرُ بِهِ حُكْمُ الْكِتَابِ فَيَكُونُ الْجَلْدُ حَدًّا شَرْعِيًّا بِحُكْمِ الْكِتَابِ وَالتَّعْزِيبُ مَشْرُوعًا سِيَاسَةً بِحُكْمِ الْخَبَرِ

Similarly (just as in the example above where the Mutlaq of the Quraan was not changed by Khabar Wahid) **we say regarding the verse,**

{الزَّانِيَةُ وَالزَّانِي فَاجْلِدُوا كُلَّ وَاحِدٍ مِّنْهُمَا مِائَةَ جَلْدَةٍ}

"The (unmarried) female and male who commit fornication should both be given a hundred lashes (when the act of fornication is conclusively proven in a court of Shari'ah)."
(Surah Noor: 2)

The Quraan has made one hundred lashes the punishment for Zinaa (fornication) so we will not add exile to it as a

punishment (as the verse is *Mutlaq*, not having any additional clauses or restrictions) **from the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ**; "If an unmarried man fornicates with an unmarried woman then give them both a hundred lashes and exile them" (as Imaam Shaafie رحمه الله has). Instead we will practice on the Hadeeth in a manner that will not add to the ruling of the Quraan by one hundred lashes being the Shar'ie punishment in accordance with the Quraan and exile permissible under certain circumstances in accordance with the Hadeeth (thus the *Mutlaq* of the Quraan will not have any additional clauses added to it as is the viewpoint of Ahnaaf).

Example Three

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى { وَلَيَطَوَّفُوا بِالْبَيْتِ الْعَتِيقِ } مُطْلَقٌ فِي مُسَمَّى الطَّوَافِ بِالْبَيْتِ فَلَا يَزَادُ عَلَيْهِ شَرْطُ الْوُضُوءِ بِالْخَبَرِ بَلْ يُعْمَلُ بِهِ عَلَى وَجْهِ لَا يَتَغَيَّرُ بِهِ حُكْمُ الْكِتَابِ بَأَنْ يَكُونَ مُطْلَقُ الطَّوَافِ فَرَضًا بِحُكْمِ الْكِتَابِ وَالْوُضُوءُ وَاجِبًا بِحُكْمِ الْخَبَرِ فَيَجْبِرُ النُّفْصَانُ اللَّارِمُ بِتَرْكِ الْوُضُوءِ الْوَاجِبِ بِالْأَمْرِ

Similarly (just as in the example above where the *Mutlaq* of the Quraan was not changed by *Khabar Wahid*) **is the verse,**

{ وَلَيَطَوَّفُوا بِالْبَيْتِ الْعَتِيقِ }

"And perform Tawaaf around the Freed House (The Ka'abah, which has been freed from tyrants)." (Surah Hajj: 29)

Which is Mutlaq (free from any restrictive clauses) in describing the Tawaaf round the Ka'abah so we will not add to it the condition (prerequisite) of Wudhu (by making Wudhu Fardh for Tawaaf as Imaam Shaafie رحمه الله has) **from Hadeeth** but will practice on it in a manner whereby we

will not change the ruling of the Quraan by making Tawaaf itself Fardh in accordance with the Quraan and Wudhu Waajib in accordance with the Hadeeth and the inevitable deficiency caused by abandoning Wudhu which is Waajib is offering Dam(*sacrifice*).

Example four

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى {وَارْكَعُوا مَعَ الرَّاكِعِينَ} مُطْلَقٌ فِي مُسَمَّى الرُّكُوعِ فَلَا يَزَادُ عَلَيْهِ شَرْطُ التَّعْدِيلِ بِحُكْمِ الْخَبَرِ وَلَكِنْ يُعْمَلُ بِالْخَبَرِ عَلَى وَجْهِهِ لَا يَتَغَيَّرُ بِهِ حُكْمُ الْكِتَابِ فِي كَوْنِ مُطْلَقِ الرُّكُوعِ فَرَضًا بِحُكْمِ الْكِتَابِ وَالتَّعْدِيلِ وَاجِبًا بِحُكْمِ الْخَبَرِ

Similarly (just as in the example above where the Mutlaq of the Quraan was not changed by Khabar Wahid) **is the verse,**

{وَارْكَعُوا مَعَ الرَّاكِعِينَ}

Which is Mutlaq (free from any restrictive clauses) **in describing Ruku**, so we will not add to it (the ruling of the Quraan) **the condition of Ta'adeel** (to carry out all the postures of patiently and without rushing) **from Khabar Wahid** (Hadeeth, as Imaam Shaafie □ and Imaam Abu Yusuf □ have) **but (instead) will practice on the Khabar Wahid in a manner where we will not alter the ruling of the Quraan by making Ruku itself Fardh in accordance with the Quraan and Ta'adeel Waajib in accordance with the Hadeeth.**

A deduction made from the ruling of Mutlaq

وَ عَلَى هَذَا قُلْنَا: يَجُوزُ التَّوَضُّعُ بِمَاءِ الزَّعْفَرَانِ وَبِكُلِّ مَاءٍ خَالَطَهُ شَيْءٌ طَاهِرٌ فَغَيَّرَ أَحَدٌ أَوْصَافِهِ

Based upon this (*principle that the Mutlaq of the Quraan will remain as such and will not have a restrictive clause added to it*) **we say it is permissible to perform Wudhu with saffron water and any (type of) water in which something pure has been mixed causing one of its (three) qualities (taste, colour, smell) to change.**

لَآنَّ شَرْطَ الْمَصْيَرِ إِلَى التَّيَمُّمِ عَدَمُ مُطْلَقِ الْمَاءِ وَهَذَا قَدْ بَقِيَ مَاءً مُطْلَقًا فَإِنَّ قَيْدَ الْإِضَافَةِ مَا أَزَالَ عَنْهُ اسْمَ الْمَاءِ بَلْ قَرَّرَهُ ۖ فَيَدْخُلُ تَحْتَ حُكْمِ مُطْلَقِ الْمَاءِ وَكَانَ شَرْطُ بَقَايِهِ عَلَى صِفَةِ الْمُنْزَلِ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ قَيْدًا لِهَذَا لِمُطْلَقٍ وَبِهِ يَخْرُجُ حُكْمُ مَاءِ الزَّعْفَرَانِ وَالصَّابُونِ وَالْأَشْنَانِ وَأَمْثَالِهِ

The reason for this (*permissibility to use such water*) **is that the condition for permissibility of Tayammum is the complete absence of any form of water and this (saffron water and water in which something pure has been mixed causing one of its qualities to change) still remains a type of water as the attached clause (of saffron and of whatever has been mixed with the water) does not remove the suffix of water from it (and it is still called saffron-water) and instead establishes that it is water and will therefore fall under the category of water. To maintain that the water must remain in the condition it came from the sky (as Imaam Shaafie □ has done) is a restrictive clause for this Mutlaq (of the Quraan) and in doing so (adding this restrictive clause) others types of water such as saffron water, soapy water, perfumed water, etc will be excluded (and not regarded as water with which Wudhu can be performed).**

وَخَرَجَ عَنْ هَذِهِ الْقَضِيَّةِ الْمَاءُ النَّجِسُ بِقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {وَلَكِنْ يُرِيدُ لِيُطَهَّرَكُمْ} وَالنَّجَسُ لَا يُعِيدُ الطَّهَارَةَ وَبِهَذِهِ الْإِشَارَةِ عُلِمَ أَنَّ الْحَدَّثَ شَرْطٌ لَوْجُوبِ الْوُضُوءِ فَإِنَّ تَحْصِيلَ الطَّهَارَةِ بِدُونِ وُجُودِ الْحَدَّثِ مُحَالٌ

And excluded from this rule (*that these waters still remain a type of water with which wudhu can be made because of it having the suffix water attached to it*) **is Najas** (impure water) **because of the verse,**

{وَلَكِنْ يُرِيدُ لِيُطَهَّرَكُمْ}

"But wants to purify you." (Surah Maa'idah: 6)

As Najas (impure water) does not aid in purification. We also learn from this verse ("but want to purify you") that in order for Wudhu to be Waajib one must be in a state of Hadath (lesser impurity) first as purification is impossible without Hadath.

Example five

قَالَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى الْمُظَاهَرُ إِذَا جَامَعَ امْرَأَتَهُ فِي خِلَالِ
الْإِطْعَامِ لَا يَسْتَأْنِفُ الْإِطْعَامَ لِأَنَّ الْكِتَابَ مُطْلَقٌ فِي حَقِّ الْإِطْعَامِ فَلَا يُزَادُ
عَلَيْهِ شَرْطُ عَدَمِ الْمَسِينِ بِالْقِيَاسِ عَلَى الصَّوْمِ بَلِ الْمَطْلُوقُ يَجْرِي عَلَى
إِطْلَاقِهِ وَالْمُعَيَّدُ عَلَى تَقْيِيدِهِ

Imaam Abu Hanifah □ **said, "If a Mathaahir¹** (*a man who compared his wife to one of his blood relatives such as his mother, sister, daughter, etc*) **indulges in intercourse with his wife while feeding (the sixty poor people and before sixty are fed) then there is no need to restart the feeding again (the feeding will not be rendered void as in the case with fasting)**

¹ It is impermissible for such a person to indulge in sexual intercourse or even kiss his wife after comparing his wife to his blood relatives or any of their limbs. If he wishes to revoke his statement then he must give a Kaffaarah (penalty) of setting a slave free before he can indulge in any physical relation with her. If he is unable to do this then he should fast for two consecutive months before he can indulge in any physical relation with her. If he has intercourse with his wife before completing the fast of two months then this Kaffaarah will be rendered void and he will have to fast for another two consecutive months. If this too is not possible then he should feed sixty poor people, however this does not have the restrictive clause of having to be before physical action.

because the Quraan is Mutlaq with regards to feeding (and does not have the restrictive clause of having to be before intercourse) so we will not add the restrictive clause of being before intercourse by making Qiyaas (comparing it to) fasting. Instead what is Mutlaq will be kept unrestricted and what is Muqayyad will be kept restricted (to the clause attached to it).

وَكَذَلِكَ قُلْنَا الرِّقَبَةُ فِي كَفَّارَةِ الظَّهَارِ وَالْيَمِينِ مُطْلَقَةٌ فَلَا يُرَادُ عَلَيْهِ شَرْطُ
الْإِيْمَانِ بِالْقِيَّاسِ عَلَى كَفَّارَةِ الْقَتْلِ

In a similar manner (as the ruling just mentioned above of feeding the poor being Mutlaq) we say the slave that has to be set free in the Kaffaarah of Thihaar (when one compares his wife to a blood relative) and of Yameen (breaking an oath) is (also) Mutlaq (and does not have any clause attached to it stipulating that it has to be a Muslim slave) so we will not add the clause of (the slave) having Imaan to it by making Qiyaas (comparing it) to Kaffaarah of murder (where the restrictive clause of the slave being Mu'min was mentioned).

An objection

فَإِنْ قِيلَ إِنَّ الْكِتَابَ فِي مَسْحِ الرَّأْسِ يُوجِبُ مَسْحَ مُطْلَقِ الْبَعْضِ وَقَدْ
قَيِّدَ تَمَوُّهُ بِمَقْدَارِ النَّاصِيَةِ بِالْخَبَرِ وَالْكِتَابُ مُطْلَقٌ فِي انْتِهَاءِ الْحُرْمَةِ
الْغَلِيظَةِ بِالنِّكَاحِ وَقَدْ قَيِّدَ تَمَوُّهُ بِالْدُّخُولِ بِحَدِيثِ امْرَأَةِ رِفَاعَةَ

(Firstly) If anyone were to say (object by saying) that the Quraan with regards to Masah (passing wet hands) over the head makes Mutlaq Masah (passing the hands over the head without specifying any margin) of a small portion Waajib

and you (Ahnaaf) have added the clause (to what is Mutlaq in the Quraan) of the portion equal to the forehead (quarter head) from Khabar Wahid (Hadeeth). (Secondly if one were to say that) The Quraan is Mutlaq with regards to Nikaah reversing the prohibition caused by Talaaq Mughalazah (that the contract of Nikaah is sufficient to remove the prohibition of remarriage caused by the issuing of three Talaaq) but you (Ahnaaf) have added the clause of intercourse (with the second husband as incumbent to remove the prohibition caused by the three Talaaq to what is Mutlaq in the Quraan) from the Hadeeth of the wife of Rifaa'ah.

قُلْنَا إِنَّ الْكِتَابَ لَيْسَ بِمُطْلَقٍ فِي بَابِ الْمَسْحِ فَإِنَّ حُكْمَ الْمُطْلَقِ أَنْ يَكُونَ
الْأَتَى بِأَيِّ فَرْدٍ كَانَ أَتَى بِالْمَأْمُورِ بِهِ وَالْأَتَى بِأَيِّ بَعْضٍ كَانَ هَهُنَا لَيْسَ بِأَتَى
بِالْمَأْمُورِ بِهِ فَإِنَّهُ لَوْ مَسَحَ عَلَى النِّصْفِ أَوْ عَلَى الثَّلَاثِينَ لَا يَكُونُ الْكُلُّ
فَرَضًا وَبِهِ فَارَقَ الْمُطْلَقُ الْمُجْمَلُ

We would say (in reply to the first objection) that the Quraan is not Mutlaq with regards to Masah (of the head) because the ruling of Mutlaq is that if the act (in this case Masah) is carried out on any part (portion) then one will be fulfilling what one has been ordered to (meaning that whatever portion is made Masah of will be regarded as Fardh) and in this case carrying it out on any part will not be regarded as fulfilling what one has been ordered to (as all of it will not be regarded as Fardh) because if one were to make Masah on half or two thirds (of the head) then all of it will not be regarded as Fardh (as according to both Imaam Shaafie □ and Imaam Abu Hanifah □ a portion will be regarded as Fardh and a portion as Sunnah, which would negate the verse being Mutlaq) and this is what differentiates between Mutlaq and Mujmal (unclear, and in need of explanation such as the portion which is Fardh to make Masah of in this verse).

وَأَمَّا قَيْدُ الدُّخُولِ فَقَدْ قَالَ الْبَعْضُ إِنَّ النِّكَاحَ فِي النَّصِّ حُمْلٌ عَلَى الْوُطْئِ إِذِ الْعَقْدُ مُسْتَقَادٌ مِنْ لَفْظِ الزَّوْجِ وَبِهَذَا يَرْوَى السُّوَالُ وَقَالَ الْبَعْضُ قَيْدُ الدُّخُولِ ثَبَتَ بِالْخَبَرِ وَجَعَلُوهُ مِنَ الْمَشَاهِيرِ فَلَا يُلْزَمُهُمْ تَقْيِيدُ الْكِتَابِ بِخَبَرِ الْوَاحِدِ -

(And in reply to the second objection we would say) **As far as the clause of intercourse is concerned; some have said (replied) that (the word) marries mentioned in the verse ("She is not lawful for him thereafter until she marries another husband." -Surah Baqarah: 230) refers to intercourse because the contract of Nikaah is already implied by the word "husband" (as he can only be her husband if the contract of Nikaah was performed and saying that "marries" also refers to the contract of Nikaah will either make its usage for repetition or for emphasis and it is an accepted principle that taking another meaning in such a case is better than accepting it to be for repetition or for emphasis) and with this (explanation) the objection is unfounded. Some (Hanafi scholars) have said that the clause of intercourse has been proven from Khabar, which the Muhadditheen have categorised as Mashoor (a Hadeeth where in any generation, no less than three people narrate a Hadeeth) which means that Ahnaaf have not added a clause to the Quraan from Khabar Wahid (but from Hadeeth- Mashoor with which it is permissible to do so).**

Lesson on Mushtarak and Mu'awwal

فصل في المشترك و المؤول الْمُشْتَرَكُ مَا وُضِعَ لِمَعْنَيْنِ مُخْتَلِفَيْنِ أَوْ لِمَعَانٍ مُخْتَلِفَةٍ الْحَقَائِقُ مِثْلُهُ قَوْلُنَا جَارِيَةٌ فَإِنَّهَا تَتَنَاوَلُ الْأُمَّةَ وَالسَّيْفِيَّةَ وَالْمُشْتَرَى فَإِنَّهُ يَتَنَاوَلُ قَابِلَ عَقْدِ الْبَيْعِ وَكَوْكَبَ السَّمَاءِ وَقَوْلُنَا بَائِنٌ فَإِنَّهُ يَحْتَمِلُ الْبَيْنَ وَالْبَيَانَ

Mushtarak is a word that has two different meanings or many meanings with each referring to different objects. An example (*example one*) of this is the word 'جارية'- Jaariyah which refers to a female slave as well as a ship (*which are entirely different from each other*) or (*example two is*) the word 'مُشْتَرَى'- Mushtaree which refers to the buyer (*in a sale*) as well as a star in the sky or (*example three is*) the word 'بَائِن'- Baa'in which means separation as well as explanation.

The ruling of Mushtarak

وَحُكْمُ الْمُشْتَرَكِ أَنَّهُ إِذَا تَعَيَّنَ الْوَاحِدُ مُرَادًا بِهِ سَقَطَ إعتبارُ إرادةٍ غَيْرِهِ
لِهَذَا أَجْمَعَ الْعُلَمَاءُ رَحِمَهُمُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى عَلَى أَنَّ لَفْظَ الْفُرُوعِ الْمَذْكُورِ فِي
كِتَابِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى مَحْمُولٌ إِمَّا عَلَى الْحَيْضِ كَمَا هُوَ مَذْهَبُنَا أَوْ عَلَى
الطُّهْرِ كَمَا هُوَ مَذْهَبُ الشَّافِعِيِّ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى

The ruling of Mushtarak is that if one meaning has been specified (*by supporting evidence or proof*) then consideration of the other meanings falls away (*and only that one particular meaning can be implied*¹). Based upon this (*principle that once one meaning has been specified then another cannot be considered*), the Ulama, may ALLAAH's mercy be upon them, are in consensus that the word 'الْفُرُوع'- courses mentioned in the Quraan ("*Divorced women should*

¹ Mushtarak having several meanings implied at the same time is known as 'Umoom Mushtarak' and according to the Hanafi school of thought is not possible and only one meaning can be implied as opposed to Imaam Shaafie who says that both meanings can be implied at the same time.

wait (should abstain from remarrying) for three courses.") refers to either **Haidh**, as is our (Hanafi) viewpoint, or (refers to) **purity**, as is the view of **Imaam Shaafie** □ (and both cannot be implied at the same time).

Example One

وَقَالَ مُحَمَّدٌ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى إِذَا أَوْصَى لِمَوَالِي بَنِي فُلَانٍ وَلِبَنِي فُلَانٍ مَوَالٍ مِنْ أَعْلَى وَمِنْ أَسْفَلٍ فَمَاتَ بَطَلَتْ الْوَصِيَّةُ فِي حَقِّ الْفَرِيقَيْنِ لِاسْتِحَالَةِ الْجَمْعِ بَيْنَهُمَا وَعَدَمِ الرُّجْحَانِ -

(Based upon the principle, if one meaning has been specified then consideration of the other meanings fall away) **Imaam Muhammed** □ said, "If a person makes a **Waseeyat** (bequest) for the 'مَوَالِي' - **Mawaali** (plural of **Mowla**, which is **Mushtarak** and refers to the one who sets a slave free as well as the slave who was set free) of a certain person's children, and the children of that person have a **Mowla** from above (the person who set the children free) and a **Mowla** beneath them (slaves whom the children set free), and then dies then the **Waseeyat** (bequest) will be annulled in favour of both parties (neither the slaves who were set free by the children or the person who set the children free will inherit because of this bequest) because it is impossible for both to be implied (at the same time) and neither can be specified (over the other).

وَقَالَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى إِذَا قَالَ لِرَؤُوسَتِهِ أَنْتِ عَلَيَّ مِثْلُ أُمِّي لَا يَكُونُ مُظَاهِراً لِأَنَّ اللَّفْظَ مُشْتَرَكٌ بَيْنَ الْكِرَامَةِ وَالْحُرْمَةِ فَلَا يَرْجَحُ جِهَةُ الْحُرْمَةِ الْإِبَالَنِيَّةِ

(Based upon the principle, if one meaning has been specified then consideration of the other meanings fall away) **Imaam Abu Hanifah** □ says that If a person tells his wife, "You are like my mother to me" he will not be a **Mathaahir** because

the word ("like") is Mushtarak and can imply either respect (implying that he respects and honours his wife in the same manner as he does for his mother) **or Hurmat** (that his wife is Haraam upon him in the same way that his mother is Haraam for him) **and the meaning of Hurmat cannot be specified except with intention** (thus if his intention was for Hurmat then only will this meaning be specified over the other).

Example Two

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا قُلْنَا لَا يَجِبُ النَّظِيرُ فِي جَزَاءِ الصَّيْدِ لِقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَىٰ {فَجَزَاءٌ مِّثْلُ مَا قَتَلَ مِنَ النَّعَمِ} لِأَنَّ الْمِثْلَ مُشْتَرَكٌ بَيْنَ الْمِثْلِ صُورَةً وَبَيْنَ الْمِثْلِ مَعْنَى وَهُوَ الْقِيَمَةُ وَقَدْ أُرِيدَ الْمِثْلُ مِنْ حَيْثُ الْمَعْنَى بِهَذَا النَّصِّ فِي قَتْلِ الْحَمَامِ وَالْعَصْفُورِ وَنَحْوِهِمَا بِإِلَّا تَفَاقٍ فَلَا يُرَادُ الْمِثْلُ مِنْ حَيْثُ الصُّورَةُ إِذْ لَا عُمُومٌ لِلْمُشْتَرَكِ أَصْلًا فَيَسْقُطُ إِعْتِبَارُ الصُّورَةِ لِاسْتِحَالَةِ الْجَمْعِ

Based upon this (principle that if one meaning has been specified then consideration of the other meaning falls away) **we say that** (slaughtering) **a similar animal is not Waajib for hunting** (while in Ihraam) **because of the verse, "The penalty for the person (in Ihraam) who intentionally kills any game is a domestic animal similar to the animal (which he) killed"** (but rather it will be Waajib on him to give the price of the animal away as Sadaqah). **The reason for this** (giving the price of the animal as Sadaqah and not slaughtering a domestic animal) **is that the word "المِثْلُ"-similar is Mushtarak referring to both 'Mithl Suwarie' (similar in size) and 'Mithl Ma'aanwi' which is similar in price and 'Mithl Ma'aanwi' (similar in price) is unanimously intended by this verse in the killing of pigeons, sparrows, etc** (all Fuqahaa are in agreement that if a pigeon, sparrow, etc is killed then the price of it will be given in Sadaqah) **so 'Mithl Suwarie' (an animal similar in size) will not be added to this** (and said to be Waajib as well in

addition to giving the price) because in reality there is no 'Umoom Mushtarak' (two different meanings cannot be intended at the same time) so consideration of (the other meaning which is) 'Mithl Suwarie' will fall away because it is impossible for both to be implied (at the same time).

Definition of Mu'awwal

ثُمَّ إِذَا تَرَجَّحَ بَعْضُ وُجُوهِ الْمُشْتَرَكِ بِغَالِبِ الرَّأْيِ يَصِيرُ مُؤَوَّلًا وَحُكْمُ الْمُؤَوَّلِ وَجُوبُ الْعَمَلِ بِهِ مَعَ إِحْتِمَالِ الْخَطَا

Then if one of the implications (meanings) of Mushtarak is given preference (over the other meanings) based on firm judgement (because of proof or evidence that supports that meaning) it becomes Mu'awwal¹. The ruling of Mu'awwal is that it is Waajib to act upon it with the possibility of it being incorrect.

Example One of Mu'awwal

وَمِثَالُهُ فِي الْحُكْمِيَّاتِ مَا قُلْنَا إِذَا أَطْلَقَ الثَّمَنَ فِي الْبَيْعِ كَانَ عَلَى غَالِبِ نَفْدِ الْبَلَدِ وَذَلِكَ بِطَرِيقِ التَّأْوِيلِ وَلَوْ كَانَتْ النُّفُودُ مُخْتَلِفَةً فَسَدَ الْبَيْعُ لِمَا ذَكَرْنَا وَحَمْلُ الْأَقْرَاءِ عَلَى الْحَيْضِ وَحَمْلُ النِّكَاحِ فِي الْآيَةِ عَلَى الْوَطْئِ وَحَمْلُ الْكِنَايَاتِ حَالِ مُذَاكَرَةِ الطَّلَاقِ عَلَى الطَّلَاقِ مِنْ هَذَا الْقَبِيلِ

An example of this (of Mu'awwal) in Ahkaam is what we say, "If the price (of an item) in a sale is kept Mutlaq (in that the currency is not specified) then it (the currency) will be the prevalent currency of that town. This (specification of the currency) was made through Ta'weel (deliberation and deduction, that only the prevalent currency of the town could be implied). However if there are several currencies prevalent in that town then the sale will be invalid because

¹ In essence Mu'awwal is a word having different meanings in which the intended meaning has been specified using proof or evidence that supports that meaning.

of what we have mentioned (that it is impossible for both to be implied at the same time and neither can be specified over the other). **Specifying the meaning of "قروء" - courses to be Haidh, "marries" in the verse** ("She is not lawful for him thereafter until she marries another husband." -Surah Baqarah: 230) **to be intercourse and insinuations (hints) during the discussion of Talaaq on (to mean) Talaaq (thus if during the discussion of Talaaq one hints at it or says something which suggests it will be considered to be Talaaq even if the word Talaaq is not said) are of this variety** (where one of the meanings were given reference over the other using Ta'weel).

Example Two

وَعَلَىٰ هَٰذَا قُلْنَا الدَّيْنَ الْمَانِعُ مِنَ الزَّكَاةِ يُصْرَفُ إِلَىٰ أَيْسَرِ الْمَالَيْنِ قَضَاءً
لِلدَّيْنِ وَفَرَعَ مُحَمَّدٌ عَلَىٰ هَٰذَا فَقَالَ إِذَا تَزَوَّجَ امْرَأَةً عَلَىٰ نِصَابٍ وَلَهُ
نِصَابٌ مِنَ الْعَنَمِ وَنِصَابٌ مِنَ الدَّرَاهِمِ يُصْرَفُ الدَّيْنُ إِلَى الدَّرَاهِمِ حَتَّى
لَوْحَالَ عَلَيْهِمَا الْحَوْلُ يَجِبُ الزَّكَاةُ عِنْدَهُ فِي نِصَابِ الْعَنَمِ وَلَا تَجِبُ فِي
الدَّرَاهِمِ

Based upon this(principle that when a word has many meanings then one meaning will be given reference using proof or supporting evidence) **we say, "The Debt (one owes to another) which prevents Zakaat (from becoming Waajib) will be conferred to that wealth which is easiest of the two to pay the debt** (for example, if Zaid has a debt and possesses Dirhams equal to the Nisaab of Zakaat as well as forty sheep on which Zakaat is also Waajib, the debt will be conferred to the dirhams because it is the easiest of the two (between dirhams and sheep) with which to pay the debt. Thus after a year passes the debt will be subtracted from the amount of dirhams he possesses and Zakaat will not be Waajib on the Dirhams but will still remain Waajib on the Sheep).

Imaam Muhammed has derived from this (*the ruling above that the debt will be conferred to that which is easiest of the two to pay the debt*) **that if a man marries a woman on the Nisaab** (*of Zakaat that he will give the Nisaab to her as Mehr*) **and he has the Nisaab of sheep and the Nisaab of Dirhams then the debt** (*of Mehr*) **will be conferred to the dirhams such that after a year passes Zakaat will be Waajib on the sheep he possesses but not on the Dirhams** (*as the debt (Mehr) he owes to his wife has been conferred to it*).

Definition of Mufassar

وَلَوْ تَرَجَّحَ بَعْضُ وُجُوهِ الْمُشْتَرَكِ بَيَّانٍ مِنْ قَبْلِ الْمُتَكَلِّمِ كَانَ مُفَسَّرًا
وَحُكْمُهُ أَنَّهُ يَجِبُ الْعَمَلُ بِهِ يَقِينًا

If the meaning of Mushtarak has been clarified by the speaker then it is known as Mufassar. The ruling of Mufassar is that it is Waajib to act upon it without a doubt.

Example of Mufassar

مِثَالُهُ إِذَا قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَيَّ عَشْرَةُ دَرَاهِمٍ مِنْ نَقْدٍ بُخَارًا فَقَوْلُهُ مِنْ نَقْدٍ
بُخَارًا تَفْسِيرٌ لَهُ فَلَوْلَا ذَلِكَ لَكَانَ مُنْصَرِفًا إِلَى غَالِبِ نَقْدِ الْبَلَدِ بِطَرِيقِ
التَّأْوِيلِ فَيَتَرَجَّحُ الْمُفَسَّرُ فَلَا يَجِبُ نَقْدُ الْبَلَدِ

An example of Mufassar is if one says, "I owe a certain person ten Dirhams from the currency of Bukhaara." His statement, "from the currency of Bukhaara" is the clarification of it (*the currency*). Were it not for his clarification then the prevalent currency of the town would have been specified through Ta'weel (*deliberation and deduction, making it Mu'awwal*). However Mufassar will be given preference (*over Mu'awwal*) and the prevalent currency of the town will not be Waajib (*but rather the*

currency of Bukhaara will be Waajib as this has been clarified by the speaker).

Lesson on Haqeeqat and Majaaz

فصل في الحقيقة والمجاز
كُلُّ لَفْظٍ وَضَعَهُ ۚ وَاضِعُ اللَّغَةِ بِإِزَاءِ شَيْءٍ فَهُوَ حَقِيقَةٌ لَهُ ۖ وَلَوْ اسْتُعْمِلَ فِي
غَيْرِهِ يَكُونُ مَجَازًا لَا حَقِيقَةً

Every word which the grammarian has created for a certain thing (which implies or refers to certain thing literally) is called Haqeeqat and if it used for another (it is not used for its original meaning) then it is Majaaz and not Haqeeqat.

The ruling of Haqeeqat and Majaaz

ثُمَّ الْحَقِيقَةُ مَعَ الْمَجَازِ لَا يَجْتَمِعَانِ إِرَادَةً مِنْ لَفْظٍ وَاحِدٍ فِي حَالَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ

Then both Haqeeqat and Majaaz cannot be intended at the same time by the same word (the literal and figurative meaning cannot be implied by the same word at the same time).

Example One

وَلِهَذَا قُلْنَا لَمَّا أُرِيدَ مَا يَدْخُلُ فِي الصَّاعِ بِقَوْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ لَا تَبِيعُوا
الدَّرْهَمَ بِالدَّرْهَمَيْنِ وَلَا الصَّاعَ بِالصَّاعَيْنِ سَقَطَ إِعْتِبَارُ نَفْسِ الصَّاعِ حَتَّى
جَازَ بَيْعُ الْوَاحِدِ مِنْهُ بِالْأَثْنَيْنِ

Based upon this (that Haqeeqat and Majaaz cannot be implied at the same time) we say when that which is contained in the Saa'a (utensil used for measuring) is implied by the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, "Do not sell one Dirham in for (in exchange for) two Dirhams nor (should you sell) one Saa'a (what is contained in one Saa'a) for two (what is

contained in two Saa'a)" then the Saa'a (measuring utensil which is the literal meaning) **itself will not be intended** (as Majaaz is implied here of what is contained in the Saa'a) **such that it will be permissible to sell one Saa'a (measuring utensil) for two (measuring utensils).**

وَلَمَّا أُرِيدَ الْوِقَاعُ مِنْ آيَةِ الْمَلَامَسَةِ سَقَطَ إِعْتِبَارُ إِرَادَةِ الْمَسِّ بِالْيَدِ

(In a similar manner) **When sexual relations** (which is the Majaaz) **is implied by the** (word "touching" in the) **verse of Malaamasah** (the verse is, "If you are ill, on a journey, returning from the toilet or from touching (engaging in sexual relations with) your wives and you do not find water." Surah Maa'idah: 6) **then touching with the hand** (which is Haqeeqat) **will not be intended** (as the meaning of both Haqeeqat and Majaaz cannot be implied at the same time).

Other examples based on this principle

قَالَ مُحَمَّدٌ إِذَا أَوْصَى لِمَوَالِيهِ وَلَهُ مَوَالٍ أَعْتَقَهُمْ وَلِمَوَالِيهِ مَوَالٍ أَعْتَقَهُمْ
كَانَتْ الْوَصِيَّةُ لِمَوَالِيهِ دُونَ مَوَالِي مَوَالِيهِ

Imaam Muhammed □ **says that if a person makes a bequest for his Mawaali (freed slaves) and he has Mawaali (slaves) whom he has freed and his Mawaali (freed slaves) have other slaves whom they have set free(which is Majaaz) then the bequest will be for his Mawaali only (as this Haqeeqat)and not the Mawaali of his Mawaali (in other words the bequest will only be for those slaves whom he had set free personally and not for both types of Mawaali as in this case Haqeeqat and Majaaz will be implied at the same time).**

وَفِي السَّبْرِ الْكَبِيرِ لَوْ اسْتَأْمَنَ أَهْلُ الْحَرْبِ عَلَى آبَائِهِمْ لَا تَدْخُلُ الْأَجْدَادُ
فِي الْأَمَانِ وَلَوْ اسْتَأْمَنُوا عَلَى أُمَّهَاتِهِمْ لَا يَنْبَغُ الْأَمَانُ فِي حَقِّ الْجَدَّاتِ

And in 'As-Siyarul Kabeer', (which is a book written by Imaam Muhammed □ he writes) if the enemy in battle seeks asylum for their fathers then their grandfathers will not be included (as Haqeeqat refers to fathers only and Majaaz would imply the grandfathers as well and both cannot be implied at the same time) and if they seek asylum for their mothers then their grandmothers will not be included (as Haqeeqat refers to mothers only and Majaaz would imply the grandmothers as well and both cannot be implied at the same time).

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا أَوْصَىٰ لِابْنِ بَنِي فَلَانَ لَا تَدْخُلُ الْمَصَابِيهُ بِالْفُجُورِ
فِي حُكْمِ الْوَصِيَّةِ وَلَوْ أَوْصَىٰ لِبَنِي فَلَانَ وَلَهُ بَنُونَ وَبَنُونَ بَنِيهِ كَانَتْ
الْوَصِيَّةُ لِبَنِيهِ دُونَ بَنِي بَنِيهِ

Based on this (principle that Haqeeqat and Majaaz cannot be implied at the same time) we say that if a person makes a bequest for the Baakirah (virgin) girls of a certain tribe then those who have committed Zinaa will not be included (The Haqeeqat of Baakirah refers to that girl who is still a virgin and Majaaz refers to that girl who is unmarried even if she committed Zinaa. If those girls who committed Zinaa are included in this bequest also then Haqeeqat and Majaaz will be implied at the same time which is impermissible). (In the same manner) If a person makes a bequest for the children of a certain person and he has both children and grandchildren then the bequest will be for his children only and not his grandchildren (because Haqeeqat refers to his children and Majaaz to the grandchildren and both cannot be implied at the same time).

قَالَ أَصْحَابُنَا لَوْ حَلَفَ لَا يَنْكِحُ فَلَانَةً وَهِيَ أَجْنَبِيَّةٌ كَانَ ذَلِكَ عَلَى الْعَقْدِ
حَتَّىٰ لَوْ زَنَىٰ بِهَا لَا يَحْتَنُ

Our scholars (of the Hanafi Madhab) say if a person takes an oath that he will not make Nikaah with a certain woman and she is unmarried then this will refer to marriage (which is Majaaz and his oath would literally mean that he would not marry that woman) such that if he commits Zinaa with her (indulges in sexual relations with her, which is the Haqeeqat of Nikaah, without marrying her) he will not break his oath (as both Haqeeqat and Majaaz cannot be implied at the same time).

Objection to this rule

وَلَيْنَ قَالَ إِذَا حَلَفَ لَا يَضَعُ قَدَمَهُ فِي دَارِ فُلَانٍ يَحْنُثُ لَوْ دَخَلَهَا حَافِيًا أَوْ مُتَنَعِّلًا أَوْ رَاكِبًا

If someone were to say (in objection to the rule that Haqeeqat and Majaaz cannot be implied at the same time) **that if a person takes an oath that he will not set foot into the house of a certain person, he will break his oath whether he enters it barefoot** (which is Haqeeqat and what is implied by setting foot in the house), **wearing shoes or riding a horse** (or any other conveyance, which is Majaaz for setting foot in the house). (In other words Haqeeqat and Majaaz are implied at the same time as we say that he has broken his oath whether he enters the house barefoot or any other way.)

وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْ حَلَفَ لَا يَسْكُنُ دَارَ فُلَانٍ يَحْنُثُ لَوْ كَانَتْ الدَّارُ مِلْكًا لِفُلَانٍ أَوْ كَانَتْ بِأَجْرَةٍ أَوْ عَارِيَّةٍ وَذَلِكَ جَمْعُ بَيْنِ الْحَقِيقَةِ وَالْمَجَازِ

(The second objection) **In a similar manner** (Haqeeqat and Majaaz are implied at the same time) **if a person takes an oath that he will not stay in a certain person's house, he will break his oath** (if he stays in that house) **whether the house really belongs to the other** (which is Haqeeqat) **or he is**

renting it or borrowed it (*which is Majaaz*) even though this would mean that Haqeeqat and Majaaz are implied at the same time.

وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْ قَالَ عَبْدُهُ حُرِّيَوْمٌ يَقْدُمُ فَلَانٌ فَقَدِمَ فَلَانٌ لَيْلًا أَوْ نَهَارًا يَحْنُثُ

(The third objection) **In a similar manner** (*Haqeeqat and Majaaz will be implied at the same time*) **if a person says that his slave is free the day a certain person arrives then his slave will be set free whether that person comes in the day** (*Haqeeqat*) **or night** (*Majaaz*).

قُلْنَا وَضَعُ الْقَدَمِ صَارَ مَجَازاً عَنِ الدُّخُولِ بِحُكْمِ الْعُرْفِ وَالْدُّخُولُ لَا يَتَفَاوَتُ فِي الْفَصْلَيْنِ

We say (*in reply to this objection*) **that setting foot refers to the Majaaz meaning which has been determined by common usage to be entry** (*therefore the oath would mean; if I enter the house of a certain person*) **and entry is not absent in both instances** (*one will be entering the house whether it be barefoot or in any other manner*).

وَدَارُ فَلَانٍ صَارَ مَجَازاً عَنِ دَارِ مَسْكُونَةٍ لَهُ ۖ وَذَلِكَ لَا يَتَفَاوَتُ بَيْنَ أَنْ يَكُونَ مِلْكاً لَهُ ۖ أَوْ كَانَتْ بِأَجْرَةٍ لَهُ ۖ

(*In reply to the second objection we say that*) **The house of a certain person is Majaaz for the house in which he lives and does not change whether he owns the house or is renting it** (*and in both cases will be the house he is living in and thus entry into it will break one's oath*).

وَالْيَوْمُ فِي مَسْئَلَةِ الْقُدُومِ عِبَارَةٌ عَنِ مُطْلَقِ الْوَقْتِ لِأَنَّ الْيَوْمَ إِذَا أُضِيفَ إِلَى فِعْلٍ لَا يُمْتَدُّ يَكُونُ عِبَارَةً عَنِ مُطْلَقِ الْوَقْتِ كَمَا عُرِفَ فَكَانَ الْحِنْثُ بِهَذَا الطَّرِيقِ لَا بِطَرِيقِ الْجَمْعِ بَيْنَ الْحَقِيقَةِ وَالْمَجَازِ

(In reply to the third objection we say that) **Day in the matter of 'Qudoom' (arrival) refers to any time because if the word 'Yoom'- Day is attached to a 'Ghair Mumtad' verb (such a verb which cannot be restricted to a specific time but may be prolonged or can continue for a lengthy period) then time is implied (and the sentence would mean the time that a certain person arrives) as is well known (in the laws of grammar). Thus the oath will be broken in this manner (by usage of Umoom Majaaz¹) and not by implying Haqeeqat and Majaaz at the same time.**

Three types of Haqeeqat

ثُمَّ الْحَقِيقَةُ أَنْوَاعٌ ثَلَاثَةٌ مُتَعَذِّرَةٌ وَ مَهْجُورَةٌ وَمُسْتَعْمَلَةٌ وَفِي الْقِسْمَيْنِ
الْأَوَّلَيْنِ يُصَارُ إِلَى الْمَجَازِ بِالِاتِّفَاقِ

Haqeeqat is of three types; Mut'adhirah (Haqeeqat or literal meaning which is difficult or almost impossible to achieve), **Mahjoorah** (Haqeeqat or literal meaning which 'Urf' [i.e. society or common usage] has discarded and does not consider), **Must'amilah** (Haqeeqat or literal meaning which is recognised and commonly used in society, in other words is neither Haqeeqat-Mut'adhirah nor Haqeeqat-Mahjoorah). **In the first two cases (Mut'adhirah and Mahjoorah) all (i.e. Imaam Abu Hanifah, Imaam Abu Yusuf and Imaam Muhammed) are in agreement that Majaaz will be considered (over Haqeeqat).**

¹ 'Umoom Majaaz' is when a single broad and inclusive meaning is taken which incorporates both the literal and figurative meaning.

Example of Haqeeqat-Mut'adhirah

وَنَظِيرُ الْمُتَعَذِّرَةِ إِذَا حَلَفَ لَا يَأْكُلُ مِنْ هَذِهِ الشَّجَرَةِ أَوْ مِنْ هَذِهِ الْقَدْرِ فَإِنْ أَكَلَ الشَّجَرَةَ أَوِ الْقَدْرَ مُتَعَذِّرٌ فَيُنْصَرَفُ ذَلِكَ إِلَى ثَمَرَةِ الشَّجَرَةِ وَالْإِلى مَا يَحُلُّ فِي الْقَدْرِ حَتَّى لَوْ أَكَلَ مِنْ عَيْنِ الشَّجَرَةِ أَوْ مِنْ عَيْنِ الْقَدْرِ بِنَوْعٍ تَكَلَّفَ لَا يَحْنُثُ

An example of Mut'adhirah (*Haqeeqat or literal meaning which is difficult or almost impossible to achieve*) **is when a person takes an oath that he will not eat this tree or pot. Since it is impossible (or extremely difficult) to eat the tree or pot (itself), it will be taken to mean the fruit of the tree (and not the tree itself which is Majaaz) or contents of the pot (and not the pot itself which is Majaaz) such that if a person eats the tree (its bark, leaves, or branches, etc) or pot (or a piece thereof) with extreme difficulty he will not be breaking his oath (because the meaning of Majaaz has been taken and Haqeeqat and Majaaz cannot be intended at the same time)**

وَعَلَى هَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا حَلَفَ لَا يَشْرَبُ مِنْ هَذِهِ الْبَيْرِ يَنْصَرَفُ ذَلِكَ إِلَى الْأَغْتِرَافِ حَتَّى لَوْ فَرَضْنَا أَنَّهُ لَوْ كَرَعَ بِنَوْعٍ تَكَلَّفَ لَا يَحْنُثُ بِالِاتِّفَاقِ

Based upon this (*principle that in the case of Haqeeqat Mut'adhirah and Haqeeqat Mahjoorah the meaning of Majaaz will be taken*) **we say that if a person takes an oath that he will not drink this well then the meaning will be taken to be draw out water (from it and drink which is Majaaz) such that if we were to presume that he sipped (directly from the well by lowering himself into it) with extremely difficulty he will not be breaking his oath (as the meaning of Majaaz has been taken and Haqeeqat and Majaaz cannot be intended at the same time) according to all (Imaam Abu Hanifah, Imaam Abu Yusuf and Imaam Muhammed).**

Example of Haqeeqat-Mahjoorah

وَنَظِيرُهُ ۖ الْمَهْجُورَةُ لَوْحَلَفَ لَا يَضَعُ قَدَمَهُ ۖ فِي دَارِ فُلَانٍ فَإِنَّ إِرَادَةَ
وَضَعَ الْقَدَمِ مَهْجُورَةٌ عَادَةٌ

An Example of Mahjoorah (*Haqeeqat* or literal meaning which 'Urf' [i.e. society or common usage] has discarded and does not consider) is if a person takes an oath that he will not set foot into a certain person's house as literally placing a single foot is not meant generally (which is the *Haqeeqat* or literal meaning of "setting foot", instead the meaning of *Majaaz* will be taken here which is to enter the house in any way. Thus if he merely places one foot into the house but does not enter it then he will not break his oath as *Haqeeqat* and *Majaaz* cannot be intended at the same time. However if his *Niyyat* was for only placing a foot then his oath will break¹).

Another example of Haqeeqat-Mahjoorah

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا قُلْنَا التَّوَكُّيلُ بِنَفْسِ الْخُصُومَةِ يَنْصَرِفُ إِلَىٰ مُطْلَقِ جَوَابِ
الْخَصْمِ حَتَّىٰ يَسَعِ لِلْوَكِيلِ أَنْ يُجِيبَ بِنَعْمٍ كَمَا يَسَعُهُ ۖ أَنْ يُجِيبَ بِلاَ لِأَنَّ
التَّوَكُّيلَ بِنَفْسِ الْخُصُومَةِ مَهْجُورٌ شَرْعًا وَعَادَةً

Based upon this (principle that in the case of *Haqeeqat Mut'adhirah* and *Haqeeqat Mahjoorah* the meaning of *Majaaz* will be taken) we say (as opposed to *Imaam Shaafie*) that appointing someone as *Wakeel* (representative) in a dispute will taken to be permitting him to reply (on your behalf) to the disputant such that the *Wakeel* (representative) is permitted to reply in the affirmative just as he is permitted to reply in the negative (the summary of this case is that when a person appoints another to be his representative in a

¹ 'Haashiyah Usool Shaashi'

dispute then he is literally only permitting the other to defend him and if the Wakeel were to affirm the case of the disputant then he would be acting against his appointment as Wakeel to defend him. Since this meaning of Haqeeqat is discarded or not used in Shariaat the meaning of Majaaz will be taken and it will be said that the Wakeel has been given permission to reply, whether it be in the affirmative or negative.)

Ruling of Haqeeqat-Must'amilah

وَلَوْ كَانَتْ الْحَقِيقَةُ مُسْتَعْمَلَةً فَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ لَهَا مَجَازٌ مُتَعَارَفٌ فَالْحَقِيقَةُ أَوْلَى
بِلاَ خِلَافٍ وَإِنْ كَانَ لَهَا مَجَازٌ مُتَعَارَفٌ فَالْحَقِيقَةُ أَوْلَى عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ
وَعِنْدَهُمَا أَلْعَمَلُ بِعُمُومِ الْمَجَازِ أَوْلَى

If Haqeeqat-Must'amilah does not have a commonly used Majaaz then (practicing on the) Haqeeqat is preferred (over practicing on the Majaaz) according to all (Imaam Abu Hanifah, Imaam Abu Yusuf, Imaam Muhammed). (However) if Haqeeqat Must'amilah has a commonly used Majaaz then according to Imaam Abu Hanifah □ the Haqeeqat is preferred (over Majaaz unless there is evidence that Haqeeqat has not been intended) whereas according to Imaam Abu Yusuf □ and Imaam Muhammed □ practicing on 'Umoom Majaaz' (a single broad and inclusive meaning incorporating both the literal and figurative meaning) is preferred.

Example of Haqeeqat Must'amilah

مِثَالُهُ ۖ لَوْ خَلَفَ لَا يَأْكُلُ مِنْ هَذِهِ الْحِنْطَةِ يَنْصَرِفُ ذَلِكَ إِلَى عَيْنِهَا عِنْدَهُ ۚ
حَتَّى لَوْ أَكَلَ مِنَ الْخُبْزِ الْحَاصِلِ مِنْهَا لَا يَحْنُثُ عِنْدَهُ ۚ وَعِنْدَهُمَا يَنْصَرِفُ

إِلَى مَا تَتَضَمَّنُهُ الْجِنَظَةُ بِطَرِيقِ عُمُومِ الْمَجَازِ فَيَحْنُثُ بِأَكْلِهَا وَيَأْكُلِ
الْخُبْزَ الْحَاصِلَ مِنْهَا

An example of this (where a commonly used Majaaz is present with Haqeeqat-Must'amilah) is if a person takes an oath that he will not eat from this wheat then this will be taken to refer to the wheat (itself, which is Haqeeqat-Must'amilah) according to Imaam Abu Hanifah □ such that if he eats from the bread made from the wheat then he will not be breaking his oath, whereas according to Imaam Abu Yusuf □ and Imaam Muhammed □ it will refer to anything comprising of that wheat using 'Umoom Majaaz' so he will break his oath if he eats the wheat itself or anything made from it.

Another example of Haqeeqat-Must'amilah

وَكَذًا لَوْحَلَفَ لَا يَشْرَبُ مِنَ الْفُرَاتِ يَنْصَرِفُ إِلَى الشَّرْبِ مِنْهَا كَرَعًا
عِنْدَهُ ۚ وَعِنْدَهُمَا إِلَى الْمَجَازِ الْمُتَعَارَفِ وَهُوَ شَرْبُ مَائِهَا بِأَيِّ طَرِيقٍ كَانَ

Similarly (as the above example where a commonly used Majaaz was present with Haqeeqat-Must'amilah) if a person takes an oath that he will not drink from the River Euphrates then according to Imaam Abu Hanifah □ it will mean to sip directly from it (as this is the literal meaning of it and it is possible) whereas according to Imaam Abu Yusuf □ and Imaam Muhammed □ the commonly used Majaaz will be considered which is to drink its water in whatever way.

Difference in opinion regarding the manner in which Majaaz substitutes Haqeeqat

ثُمَّ الْمَجَازُ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ خَلْفٌ عَنِ الْحَقِيقَةِ فِي حَقِّ اللَّفْظِ وَعِنْدَهُمَا خَلْفٌ
عَنِ الْحَقِيقَةِ فِي حَقِّ الْحُكْمِ حَتَّىٰ لَوْ كَانَتِ الْحَقِيقَةُ مُمَكِّنَةً فِي نَفْسِهَا إِلَّا
أَنَّهُ إِمْتَنَعَ الْعَمَلُ بِهَا لِإِمْنَاعِ يُصَارُ إِلَى الْمَجَازِ وَالْأَصَارَ الْكَلَامُ لُغَوًا
وَعِنْدَهُ يُصَارُ إِلَى الْمَجَازِ وَإِنْ لَمْ تَكُنِ الْحَقِيقَةُ مُمَكِّنَةً فِي نَفْسِهَا

Then Majaaz is regarded as a substitute for Majaaz in speech and according to Imaam Abu Yusuf ﷺ and Imaam Muhammed ﷺ it is a substitute for the ruling such that if the (meaning of) Haqeeqat is possible (to apply) but cannot be applied due to an impediment (difficulty in applying the ruling) then (only) Majaaz will be taken. If (the meaning of Haqeeqat is) not (possible to apply from the beginning) then the speech will be meaningless. (However) According to Imaam Abu Hanifah ﷺ we will take Majaaz even if the (meaning of) Haqeeqat is not possible in itself.

مِثَالُهُ إِذَا قَالَ لِعَبْدِهِ وَهُوَ أَكْبَرُ سِنًا مِنْهُ هَذَا ابْنِي لَا يُصَارُ إِلَى الْمَجَازِ
عِنْدَهُمَا لِاسْتِحَالَةِ الْحَقِيقَةِ وَعِنْدَهُ يُصَارُ إِلَى الْمَجَازِ حَتَّىٰ يُعْتَقَ الْعَبْدُ

An example of this (difference of opinion between Imaam Abu Hanifah and his two students; Imaam Abu Yusuf and Imaam Muhammed) is when a person tells his slave, who is elder than him, "This is my son." (In this case) Imaam Abu Yusuf ﷺ and Imaam Muhammed ﷺ will not take (the meaning of) Majaaz because the (meaning of) Haqeeqat is not possible (and in order for something to be a substitute, in this case Majaaz, it is necessary for the primary ruling to be applicable first. Since the ruling is not possible here because the slave is elder then the master, making it impossible for the slave to be the son of the master, the statement will be taken to be meaningless). According to Imaam Abu Hanifah ﷺ

Majaaz will be taken (even though the literal meaning is not possible because Majaaz is a substitute for the speech and not

the ruling. Thus it is not necessary for the ruling to be applicable first) **such that the slave will be set free** (because if one becomes master of his own son then his son will be set free automatically, thus the saying of the master, "This is my son." Is the equivalent of saying, "I set you free").

Example

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا يُخَرَّجُ الْحُكْمُ فِي قَوْلِهِ لَهُ ۖ عَلَىٰ أَلْفٍ أَوْ عَلَىٰ هَذَا الْجِدَارِ وَ
قَوْلُهُ ۖ عَبْدِي أَوْ جِمَارِي حُرٌّ

Based upon this (principle that Imaam Abu Hanifah says Majaaz is a substitute for Haqeeqat in speech and Imaam Abu Yusuf and Imaam Muhammed say it is a substitute for the ruling) **the rulings are deduced for the saying "I owe or this wall owes a certain person one thousand"** (Imaam Abu Yusuf and Imaam Muhammed say that since the meaning of Haqeeqat is not possible, as it is impossible for the wall to owe anyone a thousand, Majaaz cannot be taken, thus the sentence will be futile and a thousand will not be incumbent on anyone. Imaam Abu Hanifah on the other hand says that Haqeeqat does not have to be possible for Majaaz to be taken and therefore the meaning of Majaaz is intended here, thus a thousand will be incumbent on anyone of the two who can take responsibility for the debt, which is the speaker in this case) **and "My slave or my donkey is free"** (Imaam Abu Yusuf and Imaam Muhammed say that since the meaning of Haqeeqat is not possible, as it is impossible for the donkey to be set free, Majaaz cannot be taken, thus the sentence will be futile and neither the donkey nor the slave will be set free. Imaam Abu Hanifah on the other hand says that Haqeeqat does not have to be possible for Majaaz to be taken and therefore the meaning of Majaaz is intended here, thus either one of the two will be set free who is eligible to be set free, which is the slave in this case).

A reply to an objection

وَلَا يُلْزَمُ عَلَى هَذَا إِذَا قَالَ لَامْرَأَتِهِ هَذَا بِنْتِي وَلَهَا نَسَبٌ مَعْرُوفٌ مِنْ غَيْرِهِ حَيْثُ لَا تَحْرُمُ عَلَيْهِ وَلَا يُجْعَلُ ذَلِكَ مَجَازاً عَنِ الطَّلَاقِ سَوَاءً كَانَتْ الْمَرْأَةُ صُغْرَى سِنًا أَوْ كُبْرَى لِأَنَّ هَذَا اللَّفْظَ لَوْ صَحَّ مَعْنَاهُ لَكَانَ مُنَافِيًا لِلنِّكَاحِ فَيَكُونُ مُنَافِيًا لِحُكْمِهِ وَهُوَ الطَّلَاقُ وَلَا اسْتِعَارَةً مَعَ وُجُودِ التَّنَافِي بِخِلَافِ قَوْلِهِ هَذَا ابْنِي فَإِنَّ الْبُتُوَّةَ لَا تُنَافِي ثُبُوتَ الْمَلِكِ لِلْأَبِ بَلْ يَنْبَغُ الْمَلِكُ لَهُ ثُمَّ يُعْتَقُ عَلَيْهِ

(An objection on Imaam Abu Hanifah's principle that Majaaz is a substitute for Haqeeqat in speech and not in ruling is if a person says regarding his wife, "This is my daughter", even though her parentage from another is well-known or she is elder than him, then according to the principle of Imaam Abu Hanifah the meaning of Majaaz should be taken and it will be taken to be Talaaq. The reply to this objection is that) **It does not become necessary as a result of this** (principle of Imaam Abu Hanifah) **that when a person tells his wife, "This is my daughter" and her parentage from another is well-known for her to be Haraam upon him** (the ruling of Thihaar will not apply) **nor will it be taken to be Majaaz of Talaaq whether she (his wife) be younger or elder than him. The reason for this is that if the meaning of this word (daughter) is correct (and it is taken literally to mean his blood-daughter) then it will oppose (the validity of) Nikaah** (as it is impossible for Nikaah to exist between them when she is his daughter) **and therefore will oppose the ruling of Nikaah** (when there is no Nikaah then Talaaq cannot be issued). **Isti'aarah** (taking an alternate meaning for a word) **cannot be taken when two things opposing each other** (which is this case is Nikaah and being his daughter) **as opposed to the saying (to one's slave), "This is my son" as being his son does not oppose him being the owner (of his son). In fact ownership will first be**

established for the father and (only) thereafter (will the) the son will be set free.

Lesson of the methods of Isti'arah

فِي تَعْرِيفِ طَرِيقِ الاسْتِعَارَةِ اِعْلَمْ اَنَّ الاسْتِعَارَةَ فِي اَحْكَامِ الشَّرْعِ مُطَرَّدَةٌ بِطَرِيقَيْنِ اَحَدُهُمَا لَوْجُودِ الْاِتِّصَالِ بَيْنَ الْعِلَّةِ وَالْحُكْمِ وَالثَّانِي لَوْجُودِ الْاِتِّصَالِ بَيْنَ السَّبَبِ الْمَحْضِ وَالْحُكْمِ فَالْأَوَّلُ مِنْهُمَا يُوجِبُ صِحَّةَ الاسْتِعَارَةِ مِنَ الطَّرَفَيْنِ وَالثَّانِي يُوجِبُ صِحَّتَهَا مِنْ أَحَدِ الطَّرَفَيْنِ وَهُوَ اسْتِعَارَةُ الْأَصْلِ لِلْفَرْعِ

Understand that Isti'arah (taking an alternate meaning for a word) **in the rulings of Shari'ah are possible in two ways.** The first is when there is a relationship between the illat (principal cause of the Hukam) and Hukam (ruling) and the second is when there is a relationship between the Sabab (method of deriving the Hukam) and Hukam. The ruling of the first case (where there is a relationship between the Illat and Hukam) is that Isti'arah is permissible for both (the Illat can be said referring to the Hukam and the Hukam can be said referring to the Illat) and the ruling for the second case (where there is a relationship between the Sabab and Hukam) is that Isti'arah is permissible for one and that is Isti'arah of the Asal(Sabab) with the Far'a (Hukam, that is one can say the Sabab referring to the Hukam but not the other way.)

Example of the first type of Isti'arah

مِثَالُ الْأَوَّلِ فَيَمَّا إِذَا قَالَ إِنْ مَلَكَتُ عَبْدًا فَهُوَ حُرٌّ فَمَلَكَ نَصْفَ الْعَبْدِ فَبَاعَهُ ثُمَّ مَلَكَ النِّصْفَ الْآخَرَ لَمْ يُعْتَقْ إِذْ لَمْ يَجْتَمِعْ فِي مِلْكِهِ كُلِّ الْعَبْدِ وَلَوْ قَالَ إِنْ اشْتَرَيْتُ عَبْدًا فَهُوَ حُرٌّ فَاشْتَرَيْتُ نَصْفَ الْعَبْدِ فَبَاعَهُ ثُمَّ اشْتَرَيْتُ النِّصْفَ الْآخَرَ عَتِقَ النِّصْفَ الثَّانِيَّ وَلَوْ عَلَى بِلْمَلِكِ الشَّرَاءِ وَ

بِالشَّرَاءِ الْمَلِكُ صَحَّتْ نِيَّتُهُ بِطَرِيقِ الْمَجَازِ لِأَنَّ الشَّرَاءَ عَلَيْهِ الْمَلِكُ
وَالْمَلِكُ حُكْمُهُ فَعَمَّتِ الْإِسْتِعَارَةُ بَيْنَ الْعِلَّةِ وَالْمَعْلُولِ مِنَ الطَّرَفَيْنِ إِلَّا
أَنَّهُ فِيمَا يَكُونُ تَخْفِيفًا فِي حَقِّهِ لَا يُصَدَّقُ فِي حَقِّ الْقَضَاءِ خَاصَّةً لِمَعْنَى
التُّهْمَةِ لَا لِعَدَمِ صِحَّةِ الْإِسْتِعَارَةِ

An example of the first case (where there is a relationship between the illat and Hukam) is when a person says, "If I become owner of a slave then he is free" and then (later) becomes owner of half a (share of a) slave which he then sells and then later becomes owner of the other half then (in this case) the slave will not be set free as he did not become owner of the entire slave (at one time, which is the common meaning of ownership). (However) If he were to say, "If I purchase a slave then he is free" and then purchases half a (a share of) slave which he then sells and then (later) purchases the other half, then the second half will be set free (because purchase in common usage does not mean that one has to purchase the entire slave at one time but will be true even purchased in shares. Once he purchases the second half then it will be said that he has purchased the entire slave and the slave will be set free but since the first half was sold and now belongs to another, only the share which he owns will be set free). If (in these two scenarios of ownership and purchasing) ownership is taken to mean purchasing and purchasing to mean ownership then his Niyyat (intention) will be correct according to the method of Majaaz because purchasing is the Illat (principal cause) for ownership and ownership is its Hukam (ruling which applies on purchasing), thus Isti'aarah is permissible for both (become owner can mean purchase in the first statement and purchase can mean become owner in the second statement) except that the easier scenario (of the two) for him will not be accepted in court because of 'Tuhmat' (suspicion that he may be lying to for his own benefit) and not that the method of Isti'aarah is incorrect.

Example of the second type of Isti'aarah

وَمَثَلُ الثَّانِي إِذَا قَالَ لَامْرَأَتِهِ حَرَّرْتُكَ وَتَوَى بِهِ الطَّلَاقَ يَصِحُّ لِأَنَّ التَّحْرِيرَ بِحَقِيقَتِهِ يُوجِبُ زَوَالَ مِلْكِ النُّصْعِ بِوَاسِطَةِ زَوَالِ مِلْكِ الرَّقَبَةِ فَكَانَ سَبَبًا مَحْضًا لَزَوَالِ مِلْكِ الْمُتْعَةِ فَجَازَ أَنْ يُسْتَعَارَ عَنِ الطَّلَاقِ الَّذِي هُوَ مَزِيدٌ لِمِلْكِ الْمُتْعَةِ

The example of the second type (of Isti'aarah where there is a relationship between the Sabab an Hukam) is when a person says to his wife, "I set you free" with the intention of Talaaq, the Talaaq will apply because (the term) "setting free" in reality absolve ones right to sexual relations by means of one absolving his ownership thus "setting free" is the Sabab (method of deriving the Hukam) for absolving oneself from the right to sexual relations. Thus it is permissible to take it (the term, "setting free") to mean Talaaq which (also) absolves oneself from the right to sexual relations (in other words one can say the Sabab and refer to the Hukam).

وَلَا يَقَالُ لَوْ جُعِلَ مَجَازًا عَنِ الطَّلَاقِ لَوَجِبَ أَنْ يَكُونَ الطَّلَاقُ الْوَاقِعُ بِهِ رَجْعِيًّا كَصَرِيحِ الطَّلَاقِ لِأَنَّا نَقُولُ لَا نَجْعَلُهُ مَجَازًا عَنِ الطَّلَاقِ بَلْ عَنِ الْمَزِيدِ لِمِلْكِ الْمُتْعَةِ ۖ وَذَلِكَ فِي الْبَائِنِ إِذَا الرَّجْعِيُّ لَا يُرِيدُ مِلْكَ الْمُتْعَةِ عِنْدَنَا

We will not say (regarding the ruling above) that if it is the Majaaz of Talaaq then a Talaaq Raj'ie(revocable Talaaq) should apply by it (the statement, "I set you free") in the same manner as a Sareeh (clear, unambiguous)Talaaq because we say that we have not made it the Majaaz of Talaaq but rather (it is Majaaz) for absolvment from the right to sexual intercourse and this (absolving one from sexual intercourse) is only possible with (Talaaq) Baa'in because (Talaaq) Raj'ie does not disallow one the right to intercourse according to us (the Hanafi school of thought).

وَلَوْ قَالَ لَامْتِهِ طَلَّقْتُكَ وَتَوَلَّى بِهِ التَّحْرِيرَ لَا يَصِحُّ لِأَنَّ الْأَصْلَ جَازٌ أَنْ يَنْتَبِتَ بِهِ الْفَرْعُ وَ أَمَّا الْفَرْعُ فَلَا يَجُوزُ أَنْ يَنْتَبِتَ بِهِ الْأَصْلُ

(Continuing with the example of the second type of Isti'aarah where the Sabab can refer to the Hukam but the Hukam cannot refer to the Sabab) **If one says to his female slave, "I give you Talaah", with the intention to set her free then it is incorrect (and the slave will not be freed) because it is permissible to say the Sabab (setting free) and apply the Hukam (Talaah) but not permissible to (to say the Hukam, which is Talaah, and) apply the Sabab (setting free).**

Deduction

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا تَقُولُ يَنْعَقِدُ النِّكَاحُ بِإِفْظِ الْهَبَةِ وَالتَّمْلِيكِ وَالْبَيْعِ لِأَنَّ الْهَبَةَ بِحَقِيقَتِهَا تُوجِبُ مِلْكَ الرَّقَبَةِ وَمِلْكَ الرَّقَبَةِ يُوجِبُ مِلْكَ الْمُنْعَةِ فِي الْأَمَاءِ فَكَانَتِ الْهَبَةُ سَبَبًا مَحْضًا لِثَبُوتِ مِلْكَ الْمُنْعَةِ فَجَازَ أَنْ يُسْتَعَارَ عَنِ النِّكَاحِ وَكَذَلِكَ لَفْظُ التَّمْلِيكِ وَالْبَيْعِ وَلَا يَنْعَكِسُ حَتَّى لَا يَنْعَقِدَ الْبَيْعُ وَالْهَبَةُ بِإِفْظِ النِّكَاحِ

Based upon this (principle that the Sabab can refer to the Hukam but the Hukam cannot refer to the Sabab) **we say, Nikaah will be complete with the words of Hibah** (if the woman says; I gift myself to you, in the presence of two witnesses and the man accepts), **Tamleek** (if the woman says; I give ownership of myself to you, in the presence of two witnesses and the man accepts), **and Bay'a** (if the woman says; I sell myself to you, in the presence of two witnesses and the man accepts) **because Hibah (to gift) in reality establishes ownership and ownership establishes the right to sexual intercourse in female slaves, thus Hibah is a Sabab for establishing the right to sexual intercourse and it will therefore be correct for it** (the words of Hibah, "I gift myself

to you") **to refer to Nikaah** (because the words of Hibah establish the right to sexual intercourse just as Nikaah does). **The same goes for the words of Tamleek** (I give ownership of myself to you) **and Bay'a** (I sell myself to you, because these words after establishing ownership, establish the right to sexual intercourse in female slaves and it will therefore be correct for it to refer to Nikaah as it establishes the same right as Nikaah). (However) **the opposite is impermissible such that Hibah and Bay'a will not be complete using the words of Nikaah** (one cannot gift something to another saying, I marry this to you", in such a case ownership will not be transferred. The same goes for Bay'a, i.e. one cannot sell something to another with the words, "I marry this to you" and the transaction will be invalid.)

Niyyat is not necessary

ثُمَّ فِي كُلِّ مَوْضِعٍ يَكُونُ الْمَحَلُّ مُتَعَيَّنًا لِنَوْعٍ مِنَ الْمَجَازِ لَا يَحْتَاجُ فِيهِ إِلَى النِّيَّةِ

Then in every instance in which (the meaning of) **any type of Majaaz can fit, Niyyat is not necessary** (in every instance where the meaning of Haqeeqat cannot apply the meaning of Majaaz will be taken automatically and will not be dependent on one's Niyyat- intention)

An objection

ثُمَّ فِي كُلِّ مَوْضِعٍ يَكُونُ الْمَحَلُّ مُتَعَيَّنًا لِنَوْعٍ مِنَ الْمَجَازِ لَا يَحْتَاجُ فِيهِ إِلَى النِّيَّةِ لَا يُقَالُ وَلَمَّا كَانَ إِمْكَانُ الْحَقِيقَةِ شَرْطاً لِصَحَّةِ الْمَجَازِ عِنْدَهُمَا كَيْفَ يُصَارُ إِلَى الْمَجَازِ فِي صُورَةِ النِّكَاحِ بِلَفْظِ الْهَبَةِ مَعَ أَنَّ تَمْلِيكَ الْحُرَّةَ بِالْبَيْعِ وَالْهَبَةِ مَحَالٌّ لَأَنَّا نَقُولُ ذَلِكَ السَّمَاءِ وَأَخَوَاتِهِ

(The author now mentions an objection on the standpoint of Imaam Abu Yusuf and Imaam Muhammed regarding Majaaz.) **it will not be said that when practicing on the meaning of Haqeeqat must be possible (but difficult due to exterior factors) before Majaaz can be taken according to Imaam Abu Yusuf □ and Imaam Muhammed □, so how can the meaning of Nikaah be taken with the words of Hibah when becoming owner of a free woman is impossible through Hibah and Bay'a (sale, in other words the since meaning of Haqeeqat is not possible, i.e. one cannot become owner of a free woman through these transactions, so how can the meaning of Majaaz, i.e. Nikaah, be taken by Imaam Abu Yusuf and Imaam Muhammed) because we will say (in reply to this objection) this (becoming owner of a free woman through Hibah or sale) is possible in one way and that is if she becomes Murtad (abandons Islaam), flees to the land of the disbelievers and is then caught (and brought back to the lands of Islaam as a slave where it is now possible to transfer ownership of her through Hibah or sale). This has become an example of touching the sky (taking an oath to touch the sky) and other similar cases (where an oath was taken on a seemingly impossible act, which should render the statement futile because of its impossibility but is still regarded as valid because of it being possible through a miracle).**

Lesson on Sareeh and Kinaayah

فصل فى الصَّرِيحِ وَ الْكِنَايَةِ
الصَّرِيحُ لَفْظٌ يَكُونُ الْمُرَادُ بِهِ ظَاهِرًا كَقَوْلِهِ بَعْتُ وَ اشْتَرَيْتُ وَ امْتَالِهِ
وَحُكْمُهُ أَنَّهُ يُوجِبُ ثُبُوتَ مَعْنَاهُ بِأَيِّ طَرِيقٍ كَانَ مِنْ أَخْبَارٍ أَوْ نَعْتٍ
أَوْ نِدَاءٍ وَمِنْ حُكْمِهِ أَنَّهُ يَسْتَعْنِي عَنِ النِّيَّةِ وَعَلَى هَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا قَالَ لَامِرًا
تَبَهُ أَنْتَ طَالِقٌ أَوْ طَلَقْتُكَ أَوْ بَاطَلَقْتُ بَعْعُ الطَّلَاقِ نَوَى بِهِ الطَّلَاقَ أَوْ لَمْ يَنْوِ
وَكَذَا لَوْ قَالَ لِعَبْدِهِ أَنْتَ حُرٌّ أَوْ حَرَّرْتُكَ أَوْ يَا حُرٌّ

Sareeh is a word the meaning of which is clear (*transparent and unambiguous, with no need for further clarification*) **such as the words** 'بُعْتُ' - "I sold" and 'اشْتَرَيْتُ' - "I bought", etc. **The ruling of Sareeh is that its** (*apparent*) **meaning will be established** (*adhered to*) **regardless of the manner it has been mentioned in, whether it be Khabar** (*information*), **sifat** (*adjective*) **or Nidaa** (*title or label*). **Another ruling of Sareeh is that it is not dependent upon Niyyat** (*intention, since its meaning is apparent and clear there will be no need to determine the intention of the speaker before applying the Hukam to his speech*). **Based upon this** (*that Niyyat is not necessary in Sareeh speech*) **we say if a person tells his wife, "You are divorced"** (*an example where a Sareeh word has been used as sifat- adjective*), **"I gave you Talaaq"** (*an example where a Sareeh word was used as Khabar- to give information*) **or** (*addressing his wife, he says,*) **"O Divorced one!"** (*An example where a Sareeh word was used as a title for another*), **the Talaaq will apply whether the person had the intention for Talaaq or not. In a similar manner** (*intention will not be taken into account*) **when one tells his slave, "You are free"** (*example of Sifat*), **"I set you free"** (*example of Khabar*), **or "O free one!"** (*example of Nidaa, and in all three cases the free will be set free whether the speaker had the intention to set the slave free or not*).

Deduction

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا قُلْنَا إِنَّ التَّيَمُّمَ يُفِيدُ الطَّهَارَةَ لِأَنَّ قَوْلَهُ ۖ تَعَالَىٰ {وَلَكِنْ يُرِيدُ لِيُطَهِّرَكُمْ} صَرِيحٌ فِي حُصُولِ الطَّهَارَةِ بِهِ وَلِلشَّافِعِيِّ فِيهِ قَوْلَانِ أَحَدُهُمَا أَنَّهُ طَهَارَةٌ ضَرُورِيَّةٌ وَالْآخَرُ أَنَّهُ ۖ لَيْسَ بِطَهَارَةٍ بَلْ هُوَ سَائِرٌ لِلْحَدَثِ

Based upon this (*principle that Sareeh is a word with a clear meaning, which will be established regardless of the manner it was mentioned in*) **we say that Tayammum promotes**

Tahaarat (is complete purity without restriction) because the verse of ALLAAH Ta'ala,

{وَلَكِنْ يُرِيدُ لِيُطَهِّرَكُمْ}

"But wants to purify you." (Surah Maa'idah: 6)

is Sareeh (clear and unambiguous) in obtaining Tahaarat with it (Tayammum). Imaam Shaafie □ (however) has two opinions; one is that it is 'Tahaarat-Dharooriyah' (Tahaarat only out of necessity and will there for apply as long as the necessity remains) and the other is that it is not Tahaarat but 'Saatirul Hadath' (conceals impurity for the period during which one performs his ibaadat and after completion no longer does so).

Differences which arise as a result of this

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا يُخْرَجُ الْمَسَائِلُ عَلَىٰ مَذْهَبَيْنِ مِنْ جَوَازِهِ قَبْلَ الْوَقْتِ وَأَدَاءِ الْفَرِيضَتَيْنِ بِنَيْمٍ وَاحِدٍ وَ إِمَامَةُ الْمُتَنَبِّئِينَ لِلْمُتَوَضِّئِينَ وَجَوَازُهُ بِدُونِ خَوْفٍ تَلْفِ النَّفْسِ أَوْ الْعَضْوِ بِالْوُضُوءِ وَجَوَازُهُ لِلْعِيدِ وَالْجَنَازَةِ وَجَوَازُهُ بِنِيَّةِ الطَّهَارَةِ

Based upon this (difference of opinion amongst Imaam Abu Hanifah and Imaam Shaafie, whereby Imaam Abu Hanifah says that Tayammum is unrestricted Tahaarat and Imaam Shaafie says that it is Tahaarat out of necessity) **extraction of Masaa'il (rulings) between the two Mathaahib (between the Hanafi and Shaafie Madhab) differ with regards to performing Tayammum before the time of Salaah sets in** (Imaam Abu Hanifah says that it is permissible to perform

*Salaah with that Tayammum because it is complete Tahaarat without restriction whereas the Imaam Shaafie says that it is impermissible to perform Tayammum with that Tayammum as it is a Tahaarat out of necessity and there is no necessity before the time of Salaah sets in),***to perform two Fardh Salaah with the same Tayammum** *(Imaam Abu Hanifah says that it is permissible to perform two Fardh Salaah with the same Tayammum because it is complete Tahaarat without restriction, whereas Imaam Shaafie says it is impermissible to perform two Fardh Salaah with the same Tayammum as it is Tahaarat out of necessity and the necessity ended after the performance of the first Fardh Salaah),***the Imaamat of one who performed Tayammum over those who performed Wudhu** *(Imaam Abu Hanifah says it is permissible as Tayammum is complete Tahaarat without restriction, whereas Imaam Shaafie says it is impermissible because it is Tahaarat out of necessity as opposed to Wudhu which is real Tahaarat. Thus the condition of the Musallees is above that of the Imaam, which makes it impermissible for him to make Imaamat over them),***performing Tayammum when one does not have fear for his life or (of losing) a limb** *(Imaam Abu Hanifah says that Tayammum is permissible even if one only fears that his illness will increase, whereas Imaam Shaafie says it is only permissible if he has fear for his life or of losing a limb as then only will there be a necessity and Tayammum is only Tahaarat out of necessity),***permissibility of Tayammum for Eid salaah and Janaazah Salaah** *(Imaam Abu Hanifah says that it is permissible to make Tayammum for these Salaah if one fears that he will miss the Salaah if he proceeds to perform Wudhu as there is no Qadhaa for these two Salaah, whereas Imaam Shaafie says one cannot perform Tayammum for these two Salaah but one should perform Wudhu then he should make Qadhaa),***as well as its permissibility with the intention of Tahaarat** *(since Imaam Abu Hanifah regards Tayammum as a complete Tahaarat without restriction, he says it is permissible*

to perform Tayammum with the intention of obtaining Tahaarat. Imaam Shaafie on the other hand, according to one opinion states that Tayammum is not Tahaarat at all and according to his other opinion is Tahaarat out of necessity, thus according to him Tayammum will not be valid with the intention of Tahaarat but instead one must make the intention that he is performing Tayammum to read Salaah).

Definition and ruling of Kinaayah

وَالْكِنَايَةُ هِيَ مَا اسْتَتَرَ مَعْنَاهُ وَالْمَجَازُ قَبْلُ أَنْ يَصِيرَ مُتَعَارِفًا بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْكِنَايَةِ وَحُكْمُ الْكِنَايَةِ ثُبُوتُ الْحُكْمِ بِهَا عِنْدَ وُجُودِ النِّيَّةِ أَوْ بَدَلَالَةِ الْحَالِ إِذَا لَا بُدَّ لَهُ مِنْ دَلِيلٍ يَزُولُ بِهِ التَّرَدُّدُ وَيَتَرَجَّحُ بِهِ بَعْضُ الْوُجُوهِ وَلِهَذَا الْمَعْنَى سَمِيَ لَفْظُ الْبَيِّنُونَةِ وَالتَّحْرِيمِ كِنَايَةً فِي بَابِ الطَّلَاقِ لِمَعْنَى التَّرَدُّدِ وَاسْتِثْنَاءُ الْمُرَادِ لَا أَنَّهُ يَعْمَلُ عَمَلَ الطَّلَاقِ وَ يَتَفَرَّغُ مِنْهُ حُكْمُ الْكِنَايَاتِ فِي حَقِّ عَدَمِ وَلَايَةِ الرَّجْعَةِ

Kinaayah is a word whose meaning is obscure and Majaaz, before it (its intended meaning) becomes known is the same as Kinaayah (as either the literal meaning or figurative meaning can be implied). The ruling of Kinaayah is that the apparent meaning will be applied when the (speaker's) intention (objective) was for it or (the intention is made clear) by the occasion (condition or context in which the statement was said). The reason for this (the need for the intention of the speaker to be known or the meaning determined by the occasion or context in which it was said) is that it is necessary for (such) proof to exist which will remove any doubt (with regards to its intended meaning) and one meaning be given preference (over another). As a result of this (that the meaning of Kinaayah is obscure) the words of 'Baynoonah'(by saying, "You are separated from me") and 'Tahreem' (by saying, "You are forbidden to me") are classified as Kinaayah in the chapter of Talaaq because of

doubt (*in its intended meaning*) **and because its purport** (*meaning*) **is hidden, and (it is) not** (*classified as Kinaayah because*) **that they serve the same purpose as** (*the words of*) **Talaaq** (*thus concluding that a Talaaq Raj'ie will apply as is the opinion of Imaam Shaafie*).

Punishments are not established by Kinaayah

وَلَوْ جُودَ مَعْنَى التَّرَدُّدِ فِي الْكِنَايَةِ لَا يُقَامُ بِهَا الْعُقُوبَاتُ حَتَّى لَوْ أَقَرَّ عَلَى نَفْسِهِ فِي بَابِ الزَّنا وَالسَّرِقَةِ لَا يُقَامُ عَلَيْهِ الْحَدُّ مَا لَمْ يُذَكَّرِ اللَّفْظُ الصَّرِيحُ وَلِهَذَا الْمَعْنَى لَا يُقَامُ الْحَدُّ عَلَى الْأَخْرَسِ بِالْإِشَارَةِ وَلَوْ قَذَفَ رَجُلًا بِالزَّنا فَقَالَ الْآخَرُ صَدَقْتَ لَا يَجِبُ الْحَدُّ عَلَيْهِ لِاحْتِمَالِ النَّصِيقِ لَهُ فِي غَيْرِهِ

Based upon this (*principle that words of Kinaayah are obscure and unclear*) **punishments** (*Shar'ie punishments and sentences*) **will not be executed by it** (*by Kinaayah*) **such that if one admits to committing Zinaa** (*fornication*) **or stealing the** (*Shar'ie*) **punishment will not be executed until he uses** (*admits it using*) **Sareeh** (*clear and unambiguous words*). **As a result of this** (*that Shar'ie punishments are not executed by testimonies in Kinaayah*) **the** (*Shar'ie*) **punishment will not carried out on a dumb person** (*if he confesses to a crime using sign language*). (*In the same manner*) **If a person falsely accuses another of Zinaa** (*fornication*) **and another says** (*in corroboration with the accuser*), **"You have spoken the truth"** **then the punishment** (*of false accusation*) **will not be executed on him** (*the corroborated who said, "You have spoken the truth"*) **because there is a possibility that he may be affirming something else that the accuser said** (*and not corroborating his false testimony for Zinaa*).

Lesson on Mutaqaabalaat¹

فصل

فِي الْمُنْقَابِلَاتِ نَعْنَى بِهَا الظَّاهِرَ وَالنَّصَّ وَالْمُفَسَّرَ وَالْمُحْكَمَ مَعَ يُقَابِلُهَا
مِنَ الْخَفِيِّ وَالْمُشْكِلِ وَالْمُجْمَلِ وَالْمُنْتَشَابِ

By Mutaqaabalaat we refer to the terms Thaahir, Nas, Mufassar, and Muhkam and their opposites of Khafie, Mushkil, Mujmal, and Mutashaabih.

فَالظَّاهِرُ اسْمٌ لِكُلِّ كَلَامٍ ظَهَرَ الْمُرَادُ بِهِ لِلْسَّمَاعِ بِنَفْسِ السَّمَاعِ مِنْ غَيْرِ
تَأَمُّلٍ

Thaahir is a word, which the listener understands its meaning by merely listening to it, without any reflection or contemplation.

وَالنَّصُّ مَا سِيَقَ الْكَلَامَ لِأَجْلِهِ

Nas is the crux and object of the speech.

Example one of Thaahir and Nas

وَمِثَالُهُ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى { أَحَلَّ اللَّهُ الْبَيْعَ وَحَرَّمَ الرِّبَا } فَلَايَةُ سَيَقَتْ لِبَيَانِ
التَّفْرِيقَةِ بَيْنَ الْبَيْعِ وَالرِّبَا رَدًّا لِمَا ادَّعَاهُ الْكُفَّارُ مِنَ التَّسْوِيَةِ بَيْنَهُمَا حَيْثُ
قَالُوا { إِنَّمَا الْبَيْعُ مِثْلُ الرِّبَا } وَقَدْ عَلِمَ حُلُّ الْبَيْعِ وَحُرْمَةُ الرِّبَا بِنَفْسِ
السَّمَاعِ فَصَارَ ذَلِكَ نَصَافِي التَّفْرِيقَةِ ظَاهِرًا فِي حُلِّ الْبَيْعِ وَحُرْمَةِ الرِّبَا

An example of this (of Thaahir and Nas) is the verse of

ALLAAH Ta'ala,

¹ Mutaqaabalaat refers to those terms which have opposites, such as Thaahir is the opposite of Khafie, Nas is the opposite of Mushkil, Mufassar is the opposite of Mujmal, and Muhkam is the opposite of Mutashaabih.

{أَحَلَّ اللَّهُ الْبَيْعَ وَحَرَّمَ الرِّبَا}

"ALLAAH has permitted trade and forbidden interest."

(Surah Baqarah: 275)

The crux or object of this verse is to differentiate between trade and interest, and refute the claim of the Kuffaar of them (trade and interest) being the same when they said,

{إِنَّمَا الْبَيْعُ مِثْلُ الرِّبَا}

"Trade is just like interest." (Surah Baqarah: 275)

We learn from this (verse) the permissibility of trade and the prohibition of interest by merely listening to this verse (without the need for further explanation or clarification), thus differentiation between trade and interest (which is the object of this sentence) will be Nas, and permissibility of trade and prohibition of interest (which we understand by merely listening to this verse) is Thaahir.

Example two of Thaahir and Nas

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى {فَانكِحُوا مَا طَابَ لَكُمْ مِنَ النِّسَاءِ مَثْنَى وَثُلثَ وَرُبْعٍ} سَبَقَ الْكَلَامُ لِبَيَانِ الْعَدَدِ وَقَدْ عَلِمَ الْإِطْلَاقُ وَالْإِجَازَةُ بِنَفْسِ السَّمَاعِ فَصَارَ ذَلِكَ ظَاهِرًا فِي حَقِّ الْإِطْلَاقِ نَصًّا فِي بَيَانِ الْعَدَدِ

Similarly, the verse,

{فَانكِحُوا مَا طَابَ لَكُمْ مِنَ النِّسَاءِ مَثْنَى وَثُلثَ وَرُبْعٍ}

"Then marry two, three, or four women with whom you are pleased (to have as your wives)." (Surah Nisaa: 3)

Has been mentioned with the purpose (*objective*) of explaining the number (*of wives one can be married to at one time, which is four*). We learn of the permissibility of marriage itself by merely listening to the verse (*as giving the order to marry would obviously imply that marriage is permissible*), thus permissibility to marry will be **Thaahir** and the number (*of wives one can marry at one time*) will be **Nas**.

Example Three of Thaahir and Nas

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى {لَا جُنَاحَ عَلَيْكُمْ إِن طَلَقْتُمُ النِّسَاءَ مَا لَمْ تَمْسُوهُنَّ أَوْ تَفْرِضُوا لَهُنَّ فَرِيضَةً} نَصٌّ فِي حُكْمٍ مَنْ لَمْ يُسَمِّ لَهَا الْمَهْرَ وَظَاهِرٌ فِي اسْتِبْدَادِ الزَّوْجِ بِالطَّلَاقِ وَإِشَارَةٌ إِلَى أَنَّ النِّكَاحَ بِدُونِ ذِكْرِ الْمَهْرِ يَصِحُّ

Similarly in the verse,

{لَا جُنَاحَ عَلَيْكُمْ إِن طَلَقْتُمُ النِّسَاءَ مَا لَمْ تَمْسُوهُنَّ أَوْ تَفْرِضُوا لَهُنَّ فَرِيضَةً}

"There is no sin on you if you divorce women while you have not touched them (*not yet met with them in privacy*) nor fixed a dowry for them." (*Surah Baqarah: 236*)

explaining the laws with regards to that woman whose **Mehr** (*dowry*) has not been mentioned (*and then divorced before the marriage can be consummated*) is **Nas** (*the object and purpose of the verse*) and (*since we learn*) that men have the right of issuing **Talaaq** (*by merely listening to the verse it*) is (*will be*) **Thaahir** and indicates that **Nikaah** without mentioning the **Mehr** is valid.

Example Three of Thaahir and Nas

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ ۖ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ مَنْ مَلَكَ ذَارَحِمَ مُحْرَمٍ مِنْهُ عَتَقَ عَلَيْهِ نَصٌّ فِي اسْتِحْقَاقِ الْعَتَقِ لِلْقَرِيبِ وَظَاهِرٌ فِي ثُبُوتِ الْمَلِكِ لَهُ

Similarly in the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, "Whoever becomes owner of his immediate relative (son, father, daughter, mother, etc), (the slave/immediate relative) will be set free", freedom for one's blood relative is Nas (the objective or purpose of this Hadeeth) and establishing ownership is Thaahir (we learn by merely listening to the words, "becomes owner", that ownership is first established and thereafter the slave will be set free).

The ruling of Thaahir and Nas

وَحُكْمُ الظَّاهِرِ وَالنَّصِّ وَجُوبُ الْعَمَلِ بِهِمَا عَامَّيْنِ كَأَنَّا أَوْحَايَيْنِ مَعَ اِحْتِمَالِ إِرَادَةِ الْغَيْرِ وَذَلِكَ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْمَجَازِ مَعَ الْحَقِيقَةِ

The ruling of Thaahir and Nas is that it is Waajib to practice on it whether they be Aam or Khaas with the possibility that another (meaning) could be intended. This (that another meaning could be intended) is the same as (that) Majaaz with (which has the possibility that) Haqeeqat (could be implied).

وَعَلَى هَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا اشْتَرَى قَرِيبَهُ ۖ حَتَّىٰ عَتَقَ عَلَيْهِ يَكُونُ هُوَ مُعْتَقًا وَيَكُونُ الْوَلَاءُ لَهُ

Based upon this (ruling that it is waajib to act upon Thaahir and Nas) we say; if a person purchases his blood relative such that they are set free, he (the purchaser) will be the Mu'tiq (the one who set him free) and will also have the right of Walaa' (the right to inherit if the deceased has no Dhawil Furoodh or Asabah Nasabi).

Contradiction between Thaahir and Nas

Example One

وَ إِنَّمَا يَظْهَرُ التَّفَاوُتُ بَيْنَهُمَا عِنْدَ الْمُقَابَلَةِ وَلِهَذَا لَوْ قَالَ لَهَا طَلَّقِي نَفْسَكَ فَقَالَتْ أَبْنَتْ نَفْسِي يَقَعُ الطَّلَاقُ رَجْعِيًّا لَانَ هَذَا نَصٌّ فِي الطَّلَاقِ ظَاهِرٌ فِي الْبَيِّنُونَةِ فَيَتَرَجَّحُ الْعَمَلُ بِالنَّصِّ

The difference between Thaahir and Nas becomes clear when they contradict each other (and in such a case Nas will be given preference over Thaahir). Based upon this (rule that Nas will be given preference over Thaahir when they apparently contradict each other) if a person says to his wife, "Give yourself Talaaq" and she then says, "I separate myself from you" (which is Talaaq-Kinaayah and should result in a Talaaq Baa'in- irrevocable Talaaq) then a Talaaq Raj'ie (revocable Talaaq) will fall because issuing of Talaaq is Nas (the object and purpose of this speech) and Thaahir (what we understand by merely listening) is Baynoonah (separation, i.e. Talaaq-Kinaayah), so practicing on Nas will be given preference (because Nas is the actual object and purpose of the speech).

Example two

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ لَا هَلْ عُرِيْنَةَ إِشْرَبُوا مِنْ أَبْوَالِهَا وَالْبَائِنَهَا نَصٌّ فِي بَيَانِ سَبَبِ الشِّفَاءِ وَظَاهِرٌ فِي إِجَازَةِ شُرْبِ الْبَوْلِ وَقَوْلُهُ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ اسْتَنْزَهُوا مِنَ الْبَوْلِ فَإِنَّ عَامَّةَ عَذَابِ الْقَبْرِ عَنْهُ نَصٌّ فِي وَجُوبِ الْإِحْتِرَازِ عَنِ الْبَوْلِ فَيَتَرَجَّحُ النَّصُّ عَلَى الظَّاهِرِ فَلَا يَحِلُّ شُرْبُ الْبَوْلِ أَصْلًا

Similarly in the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ to the people of Uraynah, "Drink from its (camel's) urine and milk", explaining the cure (treatment with urine) is Nas (the object

and purpose of this Hadeeth) and permissibility to drink (camel) urine is **Thaahir** (what we learn by merely listening to the speech, whereas) in another Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, "Safeguard yourself from urine for undoubtedly generally punishment in the grave is a result of it (not safeguarding oneself from urine)", abstaining from urine being **Waajib** is **Nas**, so **Nas** will be given preference over **Thaahir** and drinking urine will not be permissible at all.

Example Three

وَقَوْلُهُ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ مَا سَقَتْهُ السَّمَاءُ فَفِيهِ الْعُشْرُ نَصٌّ فِي بَيَانِ الْعُشْرِ
وَقَوْلُهُ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ لَيْسَ فِي الْخَضِرَوَاتِ صَدَقَةٌ مُؤَوَّلٌ فِي نَفْيِ الْعُشْرِ
لَأَنَّ الصَّدَقَةَ تَحْتَمِلُ وُجُوهًا فَيَتَرَجَّحُ الْأَوَّلُ عَلَى الثَّانِي

And the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, "That which has been irrigated by the sky (rainwater), **Ushr** (one tenth) is due from it" regarding giving one tenth in charity is **Nas** (the object and purpose of this Hadeeth is to state that one tenth of any produce which has been irrigated by the rain must be given as **Sadaqah**) and the Hadeeth, "There is no **Sadaqah** due on vegetables" is **Mu'awwal** (the word **Sadaqah** could refer to many things; **Zakaat**, charity, **Ushr**, etc and through **Ta'weel** it has been determined that it refers to **Ushr**) in the exclusion of **Ushr** (thus Hadeeth has been said to mean, "There is no **Ushr** due on vegetables") because **Sadaqah** has many meanings. Thus the first (**Nas**) will be given preference over the second (**Mu'awwal** and **Ushr** will be due on vegetables).

Definition of Mufassar

وَأَمَّا الْمُفَسِّرُ فَهُوَ مَا ظَهَرَ الْمُرَادُ بِهِ مِنَ اللَّفْظِ بَيَّانٍ مِنْ قَبْلِ الْمُتَكَلِّمِ بِحَيْثُ
لَا يَبْقَى مَعَهُ إِحْتِمَالُ التَّأْوِيلِ وَالتَّخْصِصِ

Mufassar is a word the meaning of which has been clarified by the speaker such that there remains no possibility of **Ta'weel** (*alternate interpretation*) or **Takhsees** (*exclusion of part of its constituents*).

Example of Mufassar

مِثْلَهُ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {فَسَجَدَ الْمَلَائِكَةُ كُلُّهُمْ أَجْمَعُونَ} فَاسْمُ الْمَلَائِكَةِ ظَاهِرٌ فِي الْعُمُومِ إِلَّا أَنَّ إِحْتِمَالَ التَّخْصِصِ قَائِمٌ فَانْسَدَّ بَابُ التَّخْصِصِ بِقَوْلِهِ كُلُّهُمْ ثُمَّ بَقِيَ إِحْتِمَالُ التَّفْرِقَةِ فِي السُّجُودِ فَانْسَدَّ بَابُ التَّأْوِيلِ بِقَوْلِهِ أَجْمَعُونَ

An example (of Mufassar) is the verse of ALLAAH Ta'ala,

{فَسَجَدَ الْمَلَائِكَةُ كُلُّهُمْ أَجْمَعُونَ}

"So (when ALLAAH issued the command to bow down) every single one of the angels bowed down to him together..."

(*Surah Saad: 73*)

The word angles is Thaahir in being general (*that all the angles are being referred to*) **but it has the possibility of Takhsees** (*such that some angels may be excluded*) **but the possibility of Takhsees was closed with the words, "كُلُّهُمْ - every single one"**. The possibility of difference in (*the manner or time they took to make*) **Sajdah still remained and so the Ta'weel** (*interpreting it that they all made Sajdah separately at different times*) **was closed by the words "أَجْمَعُونَ - together"** (*which indicates that all the angels performed Sajdah together at the same time*).

Example of Mufassar in the laws of Shari'ah

Example One

وَفِي الشَّرْعِيَّاتِ إِذَا قَالَ تَزَوَّجْتُ فَلَانَةً شَهْرًا بِكَذَا فَقَوْلُهُ تَزَوَّجْتُ ظَاهِرٌ فِي النِّكَاحِ إِلَّا أَنَّ إِحْتِمَالَ الْمُتَعَةِ قَائِمٌ فَيَقُولُهُ شَهْرًا فَسَرَّ الْمُرَادَ بِهِ فَقُلْنَا هَذَا مُتَعَةٌ وَلَيْسَ بِنِكَاحٍ

(An example of Mufassar) In (laws of) Shari'ah is when a person says, "I married a certain person for a month in lieu of this (Mehr)." His saying, "I married" is Thaahir for (clear and understood by merely listening to refer to) Nikaah except that it has the possibility of referring to Mut'aa (temporary marriage, which is Haraam) and by saying, "for a month" clarifies his meaning. We therefore say that this is Mut'aa (and Haraam) and is not Nikaah.

Example Two

وَلَوْ قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى أَلْفٍ مِنْ تَمَنٍ هَذَا الْعَبْدِ أَوْ مِنْ تَمَنٍ هَذَا الْمَتَاعِ فَقَوْلُهُ عَلَى أَلْفٍ نَصٌّ فِي لُزُومِ الْأَلْفِ إِلَّا أَنَّ إِحْتِمَالَ التَّفْسِيرِ بَاقٍ فَيَقُولُهُ مَنْ تَمَنٍ هَذَا الْعَبْدِ أَوْ مَنْ تَمَنٍ هَذَا الْمَتَاعِ بَيَّنَّ الْمُرَادَ بِهِ فَيَتَرَجَّحُ الْمَفْسَرُ عَلَى النَّصِّ حَتَّى لَا يُلْزَمُهُ الْمَالُ إِلَّا عِنْدَ قَبْضِ الْعَبْدِ أَوْ الْمَتَاعِ

If a person says to another, "A thousand is due on me for the price of this slave or price of this goods", then his saying, "A thousand is due on me" in making a thousand incumbent (as debt) upon himself is Nas (the object and purpose of this statement) although the possibility of Tafseer still remains and by saying, "for the price of this slave or price of this goods" his intention is made clear. Thus Mufassar will be given preference over Nas such that the money (thousand) will not be incumbent upon him until he takes possession of the slave or goods.

Example Three

وَقَوْلُهُ ۚ عَلَى أَلْفٍ ظَاهِرٌ فِي الْأَقْرَارِ نَصٌّ فِي نَقْدِ الْبَلَدِ فَإِذَا قَالَ مَنْ نَقْدُ
بَلَدٍ كَذَا يَتَرَجَّحُ الْمَفْسَرُ عَلَى النَّصِّ فَلَا يُلْزَمُهُ ۚ نَقْدُ الْبَلَدِ بَلْ نَقْدُ بَلَدٍ كَذَا
وَعَلَى هَذَا تَطَائُرُهُ

If a person says to another, "I owe a thousand" then this is Thaahir (what we understand by merely listening to the statement) **for confessing** (to owing a debt) **and** (making) **the currency of the town** (incumbent himself) **is Nas** (the objective of his statement). **If he were to say, "from the currency of this certain town"** (then this would be clarifying his intention and become Mufassar) **then Mufassar will be given preference over Nas**, such that the currency of the town will not be incumbent upon him but (rather) the currency of the town which was mentioned. **So too will similar scenarios be decided** (that whenever Nas or Thaahir contradicts Mufassar then Mufassar will be given preference).

Definition of Muhkam

وَأَمَّا الْمُحْكَمُ فَهُوَ مَا اِزْدَادَ قُوَّةً عَلَى الْمَفْسَرِ بِحَيْثُ لَا يَجُوزُ خِلَافُهُ
أَصْلًا

Muhkam is (a word) **which stronger then Mufassar** (in that Ta'weel, Takhsees and Naskh- Abrogation is not possible in Muhkam as opposed to Mufassar in which Ta'weel and Takhsees is not possible but the possibility of Naskh-Abrogation still remains) **such that acting contrary to it is not permissible at all.**

Example of Muhkam

مَثَلُهُ فِي الْكِتَابِ {إِنَّ اللَّهَ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَلِيمٌ} {وَإِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَظْلِمُ النَّاسَ شَيْئًا} وَفِي الْحُكْمِيَّاتِ مَا قُلْنَا فِي الْأَقْرَارِ إِنَّهُ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى أَلْفٍ مِنْ تَمَنٍ هَذَا الْعَبْدِ فَإِنَّ هَذَا اللَّفْظَ مُحْكَمٌ فِي لُزُومِهِ بَدَلًا عَنْهُ وَعَلَى هَذَا نَظَائِرُهُ

An example of Muhkam in The Quraan is (the verses), "Undoubtedly ALLAAH has knowledge over everything" (such that it is impossible to deny ALLAAH's attribute of Ilm or even limit it in the least) and "Undoubtedly ALLAAH does not oppress people in the least" (such that it is impossible to claim that ALLAAH has oppressed anyone or anything even in the slightest). An example of it (Muhkam) in Hukmiyaat (laws of Shari'ah) is what we say when a person confesses, "Undoubtedly I owe a certain person one thousand in lieu of the price of this slave". As Undoubtedly these words (in lieu of this slave) are Muhkam in it being in exchange for it (clarifies that the thousand is in exchange for the slave). So too will similar scenarios be decided.

Ruling of Mufassar and Muhkam

وَحُكْمُ الْمُفَسِّرِ وَالْمُحْكَمِ لُزُومُ الْعَمَلِ بِهِمَا لَا مُحَالَةٌ

The ruling of Mufassar and Muhkam is that it compulsory to act on it without any doubt (in its purport and application).

The opposite of Thaahir, Nas, Mufassar, and Muhkam

ثُمَّ لِهَذِهِ الْأَرْبَعَةِ أَرْبَعَةٌ أُخْرَى تُقَابِلُهَا فَضِدُّ الظَّاهِرِ الْخَفِيُّ وَضِدُّ النَّصِّ الْمُشْكِلِ وَضِدُّ الْمُفَسِّرِ الْمُجْمَلُ وَضِدُّ الْمُحْكَمِ الْمُتَشَابِهُ

Then each of these four (Thaahir, Nas, Mufassar, and Muhkam) have another four which are opposite to them.

The opposite of Thaahir is Khafie, the opposite of Nas is Mushkil, the opposite of Mufassar is Mujmal, and the opposite of Muhkam is Mutashaabih.

Definition of Khafie

فَالْخَفِيُّ مَا خَفِيَ الْمُرَادُ بِهِ بِعَارِضٍ لَّامِنٍ حَيْثُ الصِّيغَةُ

Khafie is a word whose meaning is obscured (*unclear*) because of external factors (*the intention of the speaker is unclear*) and not because of the word itself (*being unclear in its meaning and connotation*).

Example One

مَثَلُهُ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {وَالسَّارِقُ وَالسَّارِقَةُ فَاقْطَعُوا أَيْدِيَهُمَا} فَإِنَّهُ ظَاهِرٌ فِي حَقِّ السَّارِقِ خَفِيَ فِي حَقِّ الطَّرَارِ وَالنَّبَّاشِ

An example of Khafie is the verse,

{وَالسَّارِقُ وَالسَّارِقَةُ فَاقْطَعُوا أَيْدِيَهُمَا}

"As for the male and female thief, cut off their (*right*) hands." (*Surah Maa'idah: 28*)

Which is Thaahir (*clear in its implication*) with regards to a 'Saariq' (*a thief who steals quietly and in secrecy in the dead of night without being seen*) but obscure (*unclear*) with regards to a Tharraar (*pickpocket*) and Nabbaash (*grave-robber*).

Example Two

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى {الزَّانِيَةُ وَالزَّانِي} ظَاهِرٌ فِي حَقِّ الزَّانِي وَخَفِيٌّ فِي حَقِّ اللُّوَطِيِّ

Similarly (another example of Khafie) is the verse,

{الزَّانِيَةُ وَالزَّانِي}

"The (unmarried) female and male who commit fornication (should both be given a hundred lashes)." (Surah Noor: 2)
Is Thaahir (clear in its meaning) with regards to one who commits fornication but Khafie (unclear) with regards to sodomy (homosexuality).

Example Three

وَلَوْ حَلَفَ لَا يَأْكُلُ فَاكِهَةً كَانَ ظَاهِرًا فِيمَا يَتَفَكَّهُ بِهِ خَفِيًّا فِي حَقِّ الْعِنَبِ وَالرُّمَّانِ

(Another example of Khafie is) **If a person takes an oath that he will not eat fruit, then this is Thaahir (clear in its meaning) with regards to that eaten as an entrée (as a side dish or as afters) but Khafie (unclear) with regards to grapes and pomegranate (as grapes and pomegranates are eaten as a meal as well and not only as a side dish).**

Ruling of Khafie

وَحُكْمُ الْخَفِيِّ وَجُوبُ الطَّلَبِ حَتَّى يَزُولَ عَنْهُ الْخِفَاءُ

The ruling of Khafie is that it is Waajib to seek out (its implication) such that its obscurity (vagueness, uncertainty) is removed (after which its ruling will be the same as Thaahir).

Definition of Mushkil

وَأَمَّا الْمُشْكِلُ فَهُوَ مَا اِزْدَادَ خِفَاءً عَلَى الْخَفَى كَأَنَّهُ بَعْدَ مَا خَفِيَ عَلَى السَّمْعِ حَقِيقَتُهُ دَخَلَ فِي أَشْكَالِهِ وَآمَنَالِهِ حَتَّى لَا يَنَالُ الْمُرَادُ إِلَّا بِالطَّلَبِ ثُمَّ بِالتَّأَمُّلِ حَتَّى يَتَمَيَّزَ عَنِ آمَنَالِهِ

Mushkil is that (word) which is more obscure (unclear) than Khafie that is to say after its intended meaning (implication) has been obscured (because the meaning of the word itself is unclear) it resembles (other) words similar to it such that its implication cannot be ascertained except through investigation and deliberation until it (its meaning) is distinguished from others (other words) similar to it.

Example of Mushkil

وَنَظِيرُهُ فِي الْأَحْكَامِ حَلْفَ لَا يَأْتِدُمْ فَإِنَّهُ ظَاهِرٌ فِي الْخَلِّ وَالذَّبْسِ وَإِنَّمَا هُوَ مُشْكِلٌ فِي اللَّحْمِ وَالْبَيْضِ وَالْجُبْنِ حَتَّى يُطْلَبَ فِي مَعْنَى الْإِيْتِدَامِ ثُمَّ يَتَأَمَّلُ أَنْ ذَلِكَ الْمَعْنَى هَلْ يُوجَدُ فِي اللَّحْمِ وَالْبَيْضِ وَالْجُبْنِ أَمْ لَا

An example of Mushkil in Ahkaam (laws of Shari'ah) is if a person takes an oath that he will not eat 'Iedaam' (a condiment, any item or food used to improve or add flavour), which is Thaahir (clear in its implication) with regards to vinegar and juice (as they are definitely condiments used to improve or add flavour) but Mushkil (obscure and unclear) with regards to (curry prepared with) meat, eggs or cheese (as these are not condiments but rather the main course) such that the meaning of 'Iedaam' needs to be sought out and deliberated upon until one is able distinguish whether the meaning of 'Iedaam' is found in them (meat, eggs and cheese) or not.

Definition of Mujmal

ثُمَّ فَوْقَ الْمُشْكِلِ الْمُجْمَلُ وَهُوَ مَا احْتَمَلَ وَجُوهًا فَصَارَ بِحَالٍ لَا يُوقَفُ
عَلَى الْمُرَادِ بِهِ إِلَّا بَيَّانٌ مِنْ قَبْلِ الْمُتَكَلِّمِ

Then above Mushkil (more unclear and obscure) is Mujmal. Mujmal is a word having many implications such that none (no implication) can be specified except if clarified by the speaker (and in the case Shari'ah clarified or explained by ALLAAH Ta'ala in the Quraan or by Rasulullaah ﷺ).

Example of Mujmal

وَنَظِيرُهُ ۚ فِي السَّرْعَيَاتِ قَوْلُهُ ۖ تَعَالَى {حَرَّمَ الرِّبَا} فَإِنَّ الْمَفْهُومَ مِنَ
الرِّبَا هُوَ الزِّيَادَةُ الْمُطْلَقَةُ وَهِيَ غَيْرُ مُرَادٍ بَلِ الْمُرَادُ الزِّيَادَةُ الْخَالِيَةُ عَنِ
الْعَوَاضِ فِي بَيْعِ الْمُقَدَّرَاتِ الْمُتَجَانِسَةِ وَاللَّفْظُ لَا دَلَالَهَ لَهُ ۚ عَلَى هَذَا فَلَا
يَنَالُ الْمُرَادُ بِالتَّأَمُّلِ

An example of Mujmal is Shari'ah is the verse, "And prohibited Riba" as the meaning of Riba refers to any form of excess (gain or profit), which is not implied but rather that excess (gain or profit is implied) which has no item is exchange for it in the sale of like items having the same scale of measurement. The word (Riba) does not indicate (or specify) this nor can this meaning be ascertained through deliberation (instead Rasulullaah ﷺ explained its meaning to the Sahabah).

Definition of Mutashaabih

ثُمَّ فَوْقَ الْمُجْمَلِ فِي الْحِفَاءِ الْمُتَشَابِهُ مِثَالُ الْمُتَشَابِهِ الْحُرُوفُ الْمُقَطَّعَاتُ
فِي أَوَائِلِ السُّورِ

Then more obscure and unclear than Mujmal is Mutashaabih (a word that is so unclear and obscure that

there is no hope of meaning being clarified in this worldly life).
An example of Mutashaabih is the Huroof-Muqathi'aat in the beginning of (certain) Surahs.

Ruling of Mujmal and Mutashaabih

وَحُكْمُ الْمُجْمَلِ وَالْمُتَشَابِهِ إِعْتِقَادُ حَقِيقَةِ الْمُرَادِ بِهِ حَتَّى يَأْتِيَ الْبَيَانُ

The ruling of Mujmal and Mutashaabih is that we believe its meaning (and implication) is correct until it is explained.

Lesson on those instances where the meaning of Haqeeqat is abandoned

فصل

فِيمَا يُتْرَكُ بِهِ حَقَائِقُ الْأَلْفَافِ وَمَا يُتْرَكُ بِهِ حَقِيقَةُ اللَّفْظِ خَمْسَةُ أَنْوَاعٍ

There are five instances where the meaning of Haqeeqat is abandoned.

The first instance: Dalaalatul Urf

أَحَدُهَا دَلَالَةُ الْعُرْفِ وَذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ ثُبُوتَ الْأَحْكَامِ بِالْأَلْفَافِ إِنَّمَا كَانَ لِذِلَالَةِ اللَّفْظِ عَلَى مُرَادِ الْمُتَكَلِّمِ فَإِذَا كَانَ الْمَعْنَى مُتَعَارِفًا بَيْنَ النَّاسِ كَانَ ذَلِكَ الْمَعْنَى الْمُتَعَارَفُ دَلِيلًا عَلَى أَنَّهُ هُوَ الْمُرَادُ بِهِ ظَاهِرًا فَيُتْرَكُ عَلَيْهِ الْحُكْمُ

One of them (the five instances where the meaning of Haqeeqat is abandoned is) 'Dalaalatul Urf' (when a word has a common and known meaning in society) and the reason for this is that Ahkaam (laws of Shari'ah) are established by the intention with which the speaker says (or utters) the word. When a meaning is well-known (common) amongst people

then this known meaning will be proof that this was the apparent intention (or implication of the speaker) and the ruling will be based upon it (the common and known meaning).

Example of abandoning Haqeeqat for Urf

مِثْلُهُ لَوْحَلَفَ لَا يَشْتَرِي رَأْسًا فَهُوَ عَلَى مَا تَعَارَفَهُ النَّاسُ فَلَا يَحْنُثُ بِرَأْسِ الْعُصْفُورِ وَالْحَمَامَةِ

If a person takes an oath that he will not buy a head then this will refer to that which is known (and common) amongst people. Thus he will not be breaking his oath if he buys the head of a sparrow or pigeon (as head commonly refers to the head of a sheep, cow, or goat).

وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْحَلَفَ لَا يَأْكُلُ بَيْضًا كَانَ ذَلِكَ عَلَى الْمُتَعَارَفِ فَلَا يَحْنُثُ بِتَنَاوُلِ بَيْضِ الْعُصْفُورِ وَالْحَمَامَةِ

Similarly (another example of abandoning the meaning of Haqeeqat for the commonly used meaning of Urf is) if a person takes an oath that he will not eat eggs then this will be based upon the commonly used meaning (for eggs) and he will not break his oath by eating the eggs of sparrows or pigeons (if that is not the commonly used meaning of eggs in society).

وَبِهَذَا ظَهَرَ أَنَّ تَرَكَ الْحَقِيقَةَ لَا يُوجِبُ الْمَصِيرَ إِلَى الْمَجَازِ بَلْ جَازَ أَنْ تَنْبُتَ بِهِ الْحَقِيقَةُ الْقَاصِرَةُ وَمِثْلُهُ تَقْيِيدُ الْعَامِّ بِالْبَعْضِ

From this (the above mentioned examples) we learn that abandoning Haqeeqat does not make taking the meaning of Majaaz compulsory but it is permissible to award it a lesser meaning of Haqeeqat (known as Haqeeqat-Qaasirah). An example of this (Haqeeqat-Qaasirah) is applying a general

ruling on only some of its constituents (such as in the above example where the word eggs, which is general, was taken to refer to only those types of eggs which are commonly referred to by the word).

وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْ نَذَرَ حَجًّا أَوْ مَشْيًا إِلَى بَيْتِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى أَوْ أَنْ يَضْرِبَ بِتَوْبِهِ
حَظِيمَ الْكَعْبَةِ يَلْزِمُهُ الْحَجُّ بِأَفْعَالٍ مَعْلُومَةٍ لَوْجُودِ الْعُرْفِ

Similarly (another example of abandoning the meaning of Haqeeqat for the commonly used meaning of Urf is) **if a person makes a vow for Hajj or that he will walk to the Baitullaah or that he will touch the Hateem of the Ka'abah with his cloth then performing Hajj in the known manner will become incumbent upon him because of Urf** (since this is the commonly understood meaning of Hajj in society).

The second instance: Dalaalatufi nafsil Kalaam

وَالثَّانِي قَدْ تَتَرَكَ الْحَقِيقَةُ بِدَلَالَةٍ فِي نَفْسِ الْكَلَامِ

The second instance where (the meaning of) **Haqeeqat is abandoned is because of 'Dalaalatu fi nafsil Kalaam'** (wherein the words of the speaker suggest that the meaning of Haqeeqat is not implied).

Example of abandoning Haqeeqat because 'Dalaalatu fi nafsil Kalaam'

مَثَالُهُ إِذَا قَالَ كُلُّ مَمْلُوكٍ لِي فَهُوَ حُرٌّ لَمْ يُعْتَقْ مَكَاتِبُهُ وَلَا مَنْ أَعْتَقَ
بَعْضُهُ إِلَّا إِذَا نَوَى دُخُولَهُمْ لِأَنَّ لَفْظَ الْمَمْلُوكِ يَتَنَاوَلُ الْمَمْلُوكَ مِنْ كُلِّ
وَجْهِ وَالْمَكَاتِبُ لَيْسَ بِمَمْلُوكٍ مِنْ كُلِّ وَجْهِ وَلِهَذَا لَمْ يَجْزُ تَصْرِفُهُ فِيهِ
وَلَا يَحِلُّ لَهُ وَطْئُ الْمَكَاتِبَةِ وَلَوْ تَزَوَّجَ الْمَكَاتِبُ بِنْتِ مَوْلَاهُ ثُمَّ مَاتَ
الْمَوْلَى وَوَرِثَتْهُ الْبِنْتُ لَمْ يَفْسُدِ النِّكَاحُ وَإِذَا لَمْ يَكُنْ مَمْلُوكًا مِنْ كُلِّ وَجْهِ لَا
يَدْخُلُ تَحْتَ لَفْظِ الْمَمْلُوكِ الْمُطْلَقِ وَهَذَا بِخِلَافِ الْمُدَبِّرِ وَأَمَّ الْوَلَدَ فَإِنَّ

الْمَلِكُ فِيهَا كَامِلٌ وَلَذَا حَلٍّ وَطَى الْمُدَبَّرَةَ وَأَمَّ الْوَلَدِ وَإِنَّمَا النُّقْصَانُ فِي الرِّقِّ مِنْ حَيْثُ أَنَّهُ يُزُولُ بِالْمَوْتِ لَا مَحَالَةَ

If a person says, "Every slave that I own is free" then his Makaatab (slave with whom the master has made an agreement that if they pay him a stipulated amount they will be set free) and such a slave whom a part (share) has been set free will not be freed except if he made the intention for them (to be included in his statement). The reason for this (the above mentioned slaves not being included) is that the word 'Mamlook'- owned slave is Mutlaq (free from any restriction or clause) and refers to that slave who is owned entirely, and a Makaatab is not owned entirely, which is why it is not permissible for one to execute any transaction on him nor is it permissible to indulge in intercourse with a female Makaatab (because one does not have complete ownership of such a slave). (Another proof that one does not have complete ownership of a Makaatab is) If a Makaatab marries the daughter of his master and the master then dies resulting in the daughter inheriting the slave then the Nikaah will not be invalidated (as she does not have complete ownership over which would otherwise invalidate the Nikaah). Since he (the Makaatab) is not owned entirely he will not be included under the word 'Mamlook'- owned slave. This ruling is contrary to that regarding a Mudabbar (a slave whom the master has told will be free on his death) or Umie Walad (a slave who gave birth to the child of her master) as ownership in them is complete and therefore (since ownership is complete) it would be permissible to have intercourse with both a female Mudabbar and Umie Walad. The defect in reality is in her slavery as it will terminate on the death of her master without any doubt.

وَعَلَى هَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا أَعْتَقَ الْمَكَاتِبَ عَنْ كَفَّارَةِ يَمِينِهِ ۖ أَوْظَهَرَهُ ۖ جَازَ وَلَا يَجُوزُ فِيهِمَا إِعْتَاقُ الْمُدَبَّرِ وَأَمَّ الْوَلَدِ لِأَنَّ الْوَاجِبَ هُوَ التَّخْرِيرُ وَهُوَ اثْبَاتُ

الْحُرِّيَّةُ بِإِزَالَةِ الرِّقِّ فَإِذَا كَانَ الرِّقُّ فِي الْمَكَاتِبِ كَامِلًا كَانَ تَحْرِيرُهُ
تَحْرِيرًا مِّنْ جَمِيعِ الْوُجُوهِ وَفِي الْمُدَبَّرِ وَأُمُّ الْوَلَدِ لَمَّا كَانَ الرِّقُّ نَاقِصًا لَا
يَكُونُ التَّحْرِيرُ تَحْرِيرًا مِّنْ كُلِّ الْوُجُوهِ

Based upon this (*difference between a Makaatab and a Mudabbar, Umie Walad such that in the Makaatab*) **we say** that if a Makaatab is set free for his Kaffaarah for breaking an oath or for Thihaar (*when one compared his wife to a blood relative*) it is permissible (*and his Kaffaarah will be fulfilled*). However to set a Mudabbar and Umie Walad free will not be permissible because to set (*a slave*) free is Waajib, which literally means establishing freedom by removing (*the quality of*) slavery and since slavery in the Makaatab is complete, setting him free will be 'setting free' in totality whereas in the Mudabbar and Umie Walad, since the slavery is defective, setting them free will not be 'setting free' in totality.

The third instance: Dalaalatu Siyaaqil Kalaam

وَالثَّالِثُ قَدْ يُتْرَكُ الْحَقِيقَةُ بِدَلَالَةِ سِيَاقِ الْكَلَامِ

The third instance where (*the meaning of*) **Haqeeqat** is abandoned is because of '**Dalaalatul Siyaaqil Kalaam**' (*when the preceding or forthcoming speech suggests that the meaning of Haqeeqat is not implied*).

Example of abandoning Haqeeqat because of 'Dalaalatul Siyaaqil Kalaam'

قَالَ فِي السَّبْرِ الْكَبِيرِ إِذَا قَالَ الْمُسْلِمُ لِلْحَرْبِيِّ انْزِلْ فَتَزَلَ كَانَ آمِنًا وَلَوْ
قَالَ انْزِلْ إِنْ كُنْتُ رَجُلًا فَتَزَلَ لَا يَكُونُ آمِنًا وَلَوْ قَالَ الْحَرْبِيُّ الْأَمَانُ
الْأَمَانُ فَقَالَ الْمُسْلِمُ الْأَمَانُ الْأَمَانُ كَانَ آمِنًا وَلَوْ قَالَ الْأَمَانُ سَتَعْلَمُ مَا تَلْفَى
عَدَا وَلَا تَعْجَلْ حَتَّى تَرَى فَتَزَلَ لَا يَكُونُ آمِنًا

It is mentioned in 'As-Siyarul Kabeer' (of Imaam Muhammed), when a Muslim tells an enemy combatant, "Step down!" then he will be given sanctuary. (However) If he says, "Step down, if you are a man" and the enemy then steps down, he (the enemy) will not be given sanctuary (because the second statement, "If you are a man", is a threat more than a promise of sanctuary). If the enemy combatant says, "(Give me) Sanctuary! (Give me) Sanctuary!" and the Muslim replies, "(I give) Sanctuary! (I give) Sanctuary!" then he will be given sanctuary. (However) if the Muslim replies (by saying), "Sanctuary, you will see what will happen tomorrow, so do not be hasty until you see" and the enemy then steps down, he will not be given sanctuary.

وَلَوْ قَالَ اشْتَرِ لِي جَارِيَةً لَتَّخَذَ مِنِّي فَاشْتَرَى الْعَمِيَاءَ أَوْ الشَّلَاءَ لَا يَجُوزُ
وَلَوْ قَالَ اشْتَرِ لِي جَارِيَةً حَتَّى أَطَاهَا فَاشْتَرَى أُخْتَهُ مِنَ الرِّضَاعِ لَا يَكُونُ
عَنِ الْمُؤَكَّلِ

If a person says (to another), "Purchase a slave for me, who will be of service to me" and the latter (the Wakeel) then buys a blind or disabled, it will not be permissible (and the loss will be borne by the Wakeel and the slave will be his). If he said, "Purchase a slave for me, so that I may have intercourse with her" and the latter (Wakeel) purchases the foster-sister of the former (Muwakkil) then the slave will not belong to the Muwakkil (but rather the loss will be borne by the Wakeel and the slave will be his).

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا قُلْنَا فِي قَوْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ إِذَا وَقَعَ الذُّبَابُ فِي طَعَامِ أَحَدِكُمْ
فَامْقُلُوهُ ثُمَّ انْقُلُوهُ فَإِنَّ فِي أَحَدِي جُنَاحِيهِ دَاءٌ وَفِي الْأُخْرَىٰ دَوَاءٌ وَآنَهُ
لَيُقَدِّمُ الدَّاءَ عَلَى الدَّوَاءِ دَلَّ سَبَاقُ الْكَلَامِ عَلَى أَنَّ الْمُقْلَ لِدَفْعِ الْأَذَىٰ عَنَّا لَا
لِأَمْرِ تَعَبُدِي حَقًّا لِلشَّرْعِ فَلَا يَكُونُ لِلْإِجَابِ

Based upon this (that the meaning of *Haqeeqat* is abandoned because of the preceding or forthcoming speech) **we say in the Hadeeth, "If a fly falls into food, push it in** (*immerse it into the food*) **and then remove it because one of its wings carries disease and the other the cure and the disease precedes the cure"** latter statement (of *Rasulullaah* ﷺ that the wings contain a disease and cure) establishes that the order to push the fly in (*immerse it*) is to save us from harm not (that it is) an act of *Ibaadat* in *Shari'ah* and it (*to immerse the fly*) will therefore not be *Wajib*.

وَقَوْلُهُ ۖ تَعَالَىٰ إِنَّمَا الصَّدَقَاتُ لِلْفُقَرَاءِ عَقِيبَ قَوْلِهِ ۖ تَعَالَىٰ وَ مِنْهُمْ مَنْ يَلْمِزُكَ فِي الصَّدَقَاتِ يَدُلُّ عَلَى أَنَّ ذِكْرَ الْأَصْنَافِ لِقَطْعِ طَمَعِهِمْ مِنَ الصَّدَقَاتِ بَيِّنَانِ الْمَصَارِفِ لَهَا فَلَا يَتَوَقَّفُ الْخُرُوجُ عَنِ الْعُهُدَةِ عَلَى الْأَدَاءِ إِلَى الْكُلِّ

And the verse,

إِنَّمَا الصَّدَقَاتُ لِلْفُقَرَاءِ

"Alms (*Zakaah*) are only for the poor..." (*Surah Taubah: 60*)

Being mentioned after the verse,

وَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ يَلْمِزُكَ فِي الصَّدَقَاتِ

"Among them (*Munafiqeen*) are (also) those who mock you concerning (the distribution of) charity." (*Surah Taubah: 58*)

establishes that mentioning those upon whom *Zakaat* should be spent was to put end to the greed (of the *Munafiqeen*) for *Zakaat*, thus absolving oneself from (the fulfilment of) *Zakaat* is not dependant on distributing

Zakaat to all (eight categories mentioned in the verse above, as is the opinion of Imaam Shaafie).

The fourth instance: 'Dalaalatu min Qibalil Mutakalim'

وَالرَّابِعُ قَدْ تَنَزَّلَ الْحَقِيقَةُ بِدَلَالَةٍ مِّن قِبَلِ الْمُتَكَلِّمِ

The fourth instance where (the meaning of) **Haqeeqat** is abandoned is because of '**Dalaalatu min Qibalil Mutakalim**' (when the condition of the speaker suggests that the meaning of **Haqeeqat** is not implied)

Example of abandoning Haqeeqat because of 'Dalaalatu min Qibalil Mutakalim'

مِثَالُهُ ۖ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {فَمَنْ شَاءَ فَلْيُؤْمِنْ وَمَنْ شَاءَ فَلْيُكْفُرْ} وَذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى حَكِيمٌ وَالْكُفْرُ قَبِيحٌ وَالْحَكِيمُ لَا يَأْمُرُ بِهِ ۖ فَيُنْزِلُ دَلَالَةَ اللَّفْظِ عَلَى الْأَمْرِ بِحُكْمِ الْأَمْرِ

An example (where the meaning of **Haqeeqat** is abandoned because the condition of the speaker suggests that **Haqeeqat** is not implied) is the verse,

{فَمَنْ شَاءَ فَلْيُؤْمِنْ وَمَنْ شَاءَ فَلْيُكْفُرْ}

"So whoever desires, believe (bring Imaan) and whoever desires, disbelieve (make Kufr)."

The reason for this (why the meaning of **Haqeeqat**, to resort to **Kufr** if one so desires, is not implied here) is that **ALLAAH Ta'ala** is **Most Wise** (has the most perfect wisdom) and **Kufr** (disbelief) is **abhorred** (detested and disliked by **ALLAAH**), and (**ALLAAH**) the **Most Wise** will never instruct such an

act (which is abhorred and disliked by ALLAAH). Thus the Haqeeqat (literal meaning) will be disregarded here because of the Wisdom of ALLAAH.

وَعَلَىٰ هَٰذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا وَكَّلَ بِشِرَاءِ اللَّحْمِ فَإِنْ كَانَ مُسَافِرًا نَزَلَ عَلَى الطَّرِيقِ فَهُوَ عَلَى الْمَطْبُوحِ أَوْ عَلَى الْمَشْوِيِّ وَإِنْ كَانَ صَاحِبَ مَنْزِلٍ فَهُوَ عَلَى النَّيِّ

Based upon this (principle that the meaning of Haqeeqat will be abandoned because of the condition of the speaker) we say that if a person (Muwakkil) appoints another (makes another Wakeel) to purchase meat and he (i.e. the Muwakkil or speaker) is a Musaafir (traveller), who has stopped on the road, then it will refer to cooked meat (as utensils for cooking are usually not available during a journey thus the condition of the speaker; being a traveller, dictates that it refers to cooked meat) and if he (the speaker) is at home then it will refer to raw meat (as the utensils for cooking are present when one is at home).

وَمِنْ هَٰذَا النَّوعِ يَمِينُ الْفَوْرِ مِثْلُهُ إِذَا قَالَ تَعَالَى تَعَدَّ مَعِيَ فَقَالَ وَاللَّهِ لَا أَتَعَدِّي يَنْصَرِفُ ذَلِكَ إِلَى الْغَدَاءِ الْمَدْعُوِّ إِلَيْهِ حَتَّىٰ لَوْ تَعَدَّدِي بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ فِي مَنْزِلِهِ مَعَهُ أَوْ مَعَ غَيْرِهِ فِي ذَلِكَ الْيَوْمِ لَا يَحْنُثُ

Also from this category (where Haqeeqat is abandoned because of the condition of the speaker) is 'Yameenul For' (immediate oath, which refers to a situation or scenario occurring at that particular time). For example, if a person says, "Come have breakfast with me" and the latter replies, "I take an oath by ALLAAH I will not have breakfast", then this will refer to the breakfast to which he was invited (at that moment) such that if he ever has breakfast with him (the one who invited him) in his home thereafter (on another

day) or even with another person on that same day, he will not be breaking his oath.

وَكَذَآ إِذَا قَامَتِ الْمَرْأَةُ تُرِيدُ الْخُرُوجَ فَقَالَ الزَّوْجُ إِنِ خَرَجْتَ فَأَنْتِ كَذَّآ
كَانَ الْحُكْمُ مَفْصُورًا عَلَى الْحَالِ حَتَّىٰ لَوْ خَرَجْتَ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ لَا يَحْنُثُ

In the same manner (as the ruling for 'Yameenul-for') is if a woman stands to leave and her husband tells her, "If you leave then you are... (divorced, or whatever repercussion is mentioned)" then this statement will be restricted to that moment such that if she leaves later (at a later time or on another day) the decree husband will apply (a divorce, etc she will occur).

The fifth instance: Dalaalatu Mahallil Kalaam'

وَالْخَامِسُ قَدْ تَشَرَّكَ الْحَقِيقَةُ بِدَلَالَةِ مَحَلِّ الْكَلَامِ بِأَن كَانَ الْمَحَلُّ لَا يَقْبَلُ
حَقِيقَةَ اللَّفْظِ

The fifth instance where (the meaning of) Haqeeqat is abandoned is because of 'Dalaalatu Mahallil Kalaam', such that the (meaning of) Haqeeqat will does not fit on that Mahal (time, place or person).

Example of abandoning Haqeeqat because of 'Dalaalatu Mahallil Kalaam'

وَمِثَالُهُ ۖ اِنْعِقَادُ نِكَاحِ الْحُرَّةِ بِلَفْظِ الْبَيْعِ وَالْهَبَةِ وَالتَّمْلِيكِ وَالصَّدَقَةِ

An Example (of abandoning Haqeeqat because the meaning of Haqeeqat cannot apply to that person, place or time) is contracting a Nikaah with a free woman using the words of Bay'a (saying "sell yourself to me"), Hibah (saying "gift yourself to me"), Tamleek (saying, "Give ownership of

yourself to me"), or **Sadaqah** (since the literal meaning is impossible to apply here, we say that it refers to Nikaah).

وَقَوْلُهُ لِعَبْدِهِ ۖ وَهُوَ مَعْرُوفُ النَّسَبِ مِنْ غَيْرِهِ ۖ هَذَا ابْنِي

And saying to one's slave, whose lineage to another is well-known, "This is my son" (since the literal meaning is impossible to apply here, we say the slave will be set free).

وَكَذَا إِذَا قَالَ لِعَبْدِهِ ۖ وَهُوَ أَكْبَرُ سِنًا مِنَ الْمَوْلَى هَذَا ابْنِي كَانَ مَجَازًا عَنِ الْعَتَقِ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ خِلَافًا لَهُمَا بِنَاءً عَلَى مَا ذَكَرْنَا أَنَّ الْمَجَازَ خَلْفٌ عَنِ الْحَقِيقَةِ فِي حَقِّ اللَّفْظِ عِنْدَهُ ۖ وَفِي حَقِّ الْحُكْمِ عِنْدَهُمَا

Similarly if he says to a slave who is elder than him, "This is my son" it will be Majaaz for setting the slave free according to Imaam Abu Hanifah ؒ as opposed to Imaam Abu Yusuf ؒ and Imaam Muhammed ؒ as we have already discussed (in the discussion of Haqeeqat and Majaaz) that Majaaz is a substitute for Haqeeqat in speech according to Imaam Abu Hanifah ؒ and according to Imaam Abu Yusuf and Imaam Muhammed a substitute for the ruling.

Lesson on the manner in which rulings are derived

فصل في متعلقات النصوص
نَعْنِي بِهَا عِبَارَةَ النَّصِّ وَإِشَارَتَهُ ۖ وَدَلَالَتَهُ ۖ وَإِقْتِضَائَهُ

This is a lesson on the manner in which rulings are derived (by examining the meaning of words), that is by Ibaaratun Nas, Ishaaratun Nas, Dalaalatun Nas, and Iqtidha'un Nas.

Definition of Ibaaratun Nas

فَأَمَّا عِبَارَةُ النَّصِّ فَهُوَ مَا سَبَقَ الْكَلَامُ لِأَجْلِهِ ۖ وَارْتِدَّ بِهِ ۖ قَصْدًا

Ibaaratun Nas is (refers to) the purpose for which the speech was intended and (or what is) intentionally implied.

Definition of Ishaaratun Nas

وَأَمَّا إِشَارَةُ النَّصِّ فَهِيَ مَا ثَبَتَ بِنَظْمِ النَّصِّ مِنْ غَيْرِ زِيَادَةٍ وَهُوَ غَيْرُ ظَاهِرٍ مِنْ كُلِّ وَجْهِ وَلَا سَبَقَ الْكَلَامُ لِأَجْلِهِ

Ishaaratun Nas is (refers to) the ruling which a word of the speech proves without (any) addition (of text or speech), is not entirely clear (but reflection and contemplation is required), nor was it (this meaning) the purpose of the speech.

Example of Ibaaratun Nas and Ishaaratun Nas

مِثْلُهُ ۖ فِي قَوْلِهِ ۖ تَعَالَى {الْفُقَرَاءُ الْمُهَاجِرِينَ الَّذِينَ أُخْرِجُوا مِنْ دِيَارِهِمْ} الْآيَةُ فَإِنَّهُ سَبَقَ لِبَيَانِ اسْتِحْقَاقِ الْعَنِيمَةِ فَصَارَ نَصًّا فِي ذَلِكَ وَقَدْ ثَبَتَ فَقْرُهُمْ بِنَظْمِ النَّصِّ فَكَانَ إِشَارَةً إِلَى أَنْ اسْتِثْلَاءَ الْكَافِرِ عَلَى مَالِ الْمُسْلِمِ سَبَبٌ لِنُبُوتِ الْمَلِكِ لِلْكَافِرِ إِذْ لَوْ كَانَتْ الْأَمْوَالُ بَاقِيَةً عَلَى مَلِكِهِمْ لَا يَنْبُتُ فَقْرُهُمْ

An example of (Ibaaratun Nas and Ishaaratun Nas) is the verse,

{الْفُقَرَاءُ الْمُهَاجِرِينَ الَّذِينَ أُخْرِجُوا مِنْ دِيَارِهِمْ}

"(A share of the booty received without a fight is also reserved) For the poor Muhaajireen who were removed from their and their possessions." (Surah Hashar: 8)

As the purpose of this verse was to mention that those who have a right to the booty (namely the poor Muhaajireen) and is therefore the Ibaaratun Nas (the purpose intended by this speech) and them being poor is proven by a word in the speech (the word 'فُقَرَاءٌ' - poor, refers to that person who has no wealth or wealth less than the Nisaab of Zakaat) which indicates that ownership is transferred to a Kaafir if they (Kuffaar) seize the belongings of Muslims (which is Ishaaratun Nas) as (the reason for this substantiation that ownership is transferred in such a case is that) they would not be poor if their (the Muslim's) property still remained in their possession (and did not transfer to the Kuffaar).

Rulings derived from the above

يَخْرُجُ مِنْهُ الْحُكْمُ فِي مَسْئَلَةِ الْإِسْتِئْلَاءِ وَ حُكْمُ ثُبُوتِ الْمَلِكِ لِلتَّاجِرِ
بِالشَّرَاءِ مِنْهُمْ وَ تَصَرُّفَاتِهِ مِنَ الْبَيْعِ وَالْهَبَةِ وَالْأَعْتَاقِ وَ حُكْمُ ثُبُوتِ
الْإِسْتِغْنَامِ وَ ثُبُوتِ الْمَلِكِ لِلْغَارِي وَ عِزِّ الْمَالِكِ عَنْ انْتِزَاعِهِ مِنْ يَدِهِ
وَ تَفْرِيعَاتِهِ

(As a result of the Ishaaratun Nas of this verse) the ruling with regards to Kuffaar seizing the belongings of a Muslim (that the Kuffaar become owners of it), establishing ownership for the trader by purchasing it from them (since ownership has been established for the Kuffaar, if any person purchases it from them he will become the owner), his transactions of sale, Hibah, setting free (will all be correct and whoever purchases it from the trader or the person to whom it is gifted will become owner and if it was a slave and the trader set it free, the slave will become free), the right to it in booty and transfer of ownership to the Mujaahid (if the

Muslims gain that same property back as booty it will be distributed in accordance to the laws of booty and ownership will be established for the Mujaahid who gains it) **as well as the impermissibility of the first owner to reclaim it from him** (once it is given to a Mujaahid as part of the booty, the original owner cannot claim that it is and confiscate it from the Mujaahid), **including other related rulings, are derived.**

Example Two

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى { أَجَلٌ لَكُمْ لَيْلَةَ الصَّيَامِ الرَّفَثِ إِلَى نِسَائِكُمْ } إِلَى قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى { ثُمَّ أَتَمُّوا الصَّيَامَ إِلَى اللَّيْلِ } فَإِلْمَسَاكَ فِي أَوَّلِ الصُّبْحِ يَتَحَقَّقُ مَعَ الْجَنَابَةِ لِأَنَّ مِنْ ضَرُورَةِ جَلِّ الْمُبَاشَرَةِ إِلَى الصُّبْحِ أَنْ يَكُونَ الْجُزْءُ الْأَوَّلُ مِنَ النَّهَارِ مَعَ وُجُودِ الْجَنَابَةِ وَالْإِلْمَسَاكَ فِي ذَلِكَ الْجُزْءِ صَوْمٌ أَمَرَ الْعَبْدُ بِإِتْمَامِهِ فَكَانَ هَذَا إِشَارَةً إِلَى أَنَّ الْجَنَابَةَ لَا تُنَافِي الصَّوْمَ

Similarly in the verse,

{ أَجَلٌ لَكُمْ لَيْلَةَ الصَّيَامِ الرَّفَثِ إِلَى نِسَائِكُمْ }

"Permission has been granted for you to have sexual relations with your wives...

Until,

{ ثُمَّ أَتَمُّوا الصَّيَامَ إِلَى اللَّيْلِ }

Then complete the fasts until nightfall. (Surah Baqarah: 187)

Abstention (Fasting, i.e. refraining from eating, drinking and sexual relations) **began in a state of Janaabat** (higher impurity) **because permissibility of indulging in sexual relations** (which is the Ibaaratun Nas) **until dawn** (as permitted in this verse) **would mean that the first portion of**

the day would be spent in a state of Janaabat (higher impurity) and abstention in this portion (is a part) of the fast (of that day) which one has been ordered to keep. Thus this will suggest that (being in a state of) Janaabat does not nullify the fast. (A person has been ordered to fast from sunrise to sunset and when ALLAAH Ta'ala has permitted sexual relations until dawn, which would result in a person being in a state of Janaabat in the first portion, it would mean that being in a state of Janaabat when the fast begins will not invalidate the fast.)

وَلَزِمَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ أَنَّ الْمَضْمَضَةَ وَالْإِسْتِشْقَ لَا يُنَا فِي بَقَاءِ الصَّوْمِ وَ
يَتَقَرَّرُ مِنْهُ أَنَّ مَنْ ذَاقَ شَيْئاً بِفَمِهِ لَمْ يَفْسُدْ صَوْمُهُ ۖ فَإِنَّهُ ۖ لَوْ كَانَ الْمَاءُ
مَالِحاً يَجِدُ طَعْمَهُ ۖ عِنْدَ الْمَضْمَضَةِ لَا يَفْسُدُ بِهِ الصَّوْمُ

This (fasting not being invalid if one is in a state of Janaabat in the first part of the day which is the Ishaaratun Nas) necessitates that gargling and rinsing the nose will not affect the continuation of the fast. (It is further) Derived from this that if one tastes something (without swallowing) his fast will not break because if one gargles his mouth (which does not break the fast) and the water is salty such that he can taste (its saltiness) when gargling, his fast does not break (thus we can conclude that tasting something will also not break the fast).

وَعَلِمَ مِنْهُ حُكْمُ الْإِحْتِلَامِ وَالْإِحْتِجَامِ وَالْإِدِّهَانِ لِأَنَّ الْكِتَابَ لَمَّاسَمَى
الْإِمْسَاكَ اللَّازِمَ بِوَاسِطَةِ الْإِنْتِهَاءِ مِنَ الْأَشْيَاءِ الثَّلَاثَةِ الْمَذْكُورَةِ فِي أَوَّلِ
الصُّبْحِ صَوْماً فَقِيلَ أَنَّ رُكْنَ الصَّوْمِ يُتِمُّ بِالْإِنْتِهَاءِ عَنِ الْأَشْيَاءِ الثَّلَاثَةِ

We learn from this (verse, "Then complete the fasts until nightfall") the ruling of wet dreams (if a person ejaculates while sleeping), cupping (drawing blood), and applying oil (that all three are permissible while fasting and will not nullify the fast) because when abstention from (only) three things

(eating, drinking and sexual relations) **during the day has been called fasting** (in the verse, "Then complete the fasts until nightfall") **we learn that it (fasting) is complete by abstention from these three things (only).**

Rulings derived from the above

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا يُخَرَّجُ الْحُكْمُ فِي مَسْئَلَةِ التَّنْبِيْهِ فَإِنَّ قَصْدَ الْإِثْنَانِ بِالْمَا مُوَرِّ بِهِ إِنَّمَا يُلْزَمُهُ ۖ عِنْدَ تَوَجُّهِ الْأَمْرِ وَالْأَمْرُ إِنَّمَا يَتَوَجَّهُ بَعْدَ الْجُزْءِ الْأَوَّلِ لِقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَىٰ ثُمَّ أَتَمُّوا الصِّيَامَ إِلَى اللَّيْلِ

Based upon this (verse mentioned above) the ruling of having the intention for fasting from the night is derived (such that according to Imaam Abu Hanifah it is not necessary to have the intention to fast for Ramadaan from the night but can be made before midday) because the intention for what one has been ordered to fulfil (which is fasting in this case) will only become necessary when beginning the act, which only begins (in this case) in the first portion of the day (which is until midday).

Definition of Dalaalatun Nas

وَأَمَّا دَلَالَةُ النَّصِّ فَهُوَ مَا عَلِمَ مِنْهُ عِلَّةُ الْحُكْمِ الْمَنْصُوصِ عَلَيْهِ لُغَةً لَا اجْتِهَاداً وَلَا اسْتِنْبَاطاً

Dalaalatun Nas is that which is learnt to be the Illat (principal cause) for the ruling, through diction (from the meaning of the speech) and not Ijtihaad or extraction.

مِثَالُهُ ۖ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {وَلَا تَقُلْ لَهُمَا أُفٍّ وَلَا تَنْهَرْهُمَا} فَالْعَالِمُ بِأَوْضَاعِ اللُّغَةِ يَفْهَمُ بِأَوَّلِ السَّمَاعِ أَنَّ تَحْرِيمَ التَّافِيفِ لِدَفْعِ الْأَذَى عَنْهُمَا

An example of this (*Dalaalatun Nas*) is the verse,

{وَلَا تَقُلْ لَهُمَا أُفَّ وَلَا تَنْهَرْهُمَا}

"Do not even tell them "Oof!" and do not rebuke them."

(Surah Bani Israa'eel: 23)

As one who is acquainted with Arabic language and its usage will understand immediately on hearing it that the prohibition of saying "Oof!" is so that one will not cause harm to them (*thus causing harm to them will be the principal cause for the prohibition*).

Ruling for Dalaalatun Nas

وَحُكْمُ هَذَا التَّوَعُّمِ الْحُكْمُ الْمَنْصُوصِ عَلَيْهِ لِعُمُومِ عِلَّتِهِ وَلِهَذَا
الْمَعْنَى

The ruling for this category (*Dalaalatun Nas*) is the ruling will be that wherever the Illat (*principal cause*) is found the ruling will apply.

قُلْنَا بِتَحْرِيمِ الضَّرْبِ وَالشَّتْمِ وَالِاسْتِخْدَامِ عَنِ الْأَبِ بِسَبَبِ الْإِجَارَةِ
وَالْحَبْسِ بِسَبَبِ الدَّيْنِ أَوِ الْقَتْلِ قِصَاصاً

Therefore (*because the ruling will apply wherever the Illat is found*) we say that beating, swearing, to hire the service of one's father, imprisoning them for debt (*if they owe you money*) or even killing them in Qisaas (*Shar'ie penalty*) is Haraam (*forbidden*).

Dalaalatun Nas is the same as Ibaaratun Nas

ثُمَّ دَلَالَةُ النَّصِّ بِمَنْزِلَةِ النَّصِّ حَتَّى صَحَّ اثْبَاتُ الْعُقُوبَةِ بِدَلَالَةِ النَّصِّ قَالَ أَصْحَابُنَا وَجَبَتْ الْكَفَّارَةُ بِالْوُقَاعِ بِالنَّصِّ وَبِالْأَكْلِ وَالشَّرْبِ بِدَلَالَةِ النَّصِّ

Then Dalaalatun Nas is the same as Ibaaratun Nas (in its implication/ruling being absolute and having no doubt) such that it is permissible to execute punishments (penalties) based on Dalaalatun Nas. Our scholars (of the Hanafi school of thought) say (with regards to this) that Kaffaarah will be Waajib for sexual relations (while fasting as prove) by Ibaaratun Nas and for eating and drinking by Dalaalatun Nas.

Rulings derived from the above

وَعَلَى إِعْتِبَارِ هَذَا الْمَعْنَى قِيلَ يُدَارُ الْحُكْمُ عَلَى تِلْكَ الْعِلَّةِ

Based upon this (that the implication/ruling of Dalaalatun Nas is absolute and has no doubt) it is said that the ruling will be based on (the presence or absence) that Illat (whereby the ruling will apply only when that Illat is found).

وَقَالَ الْإِمَامُ الْقَاضِي أَبُو زَيْدٍ لَوْ أَنَّ قَوْمًا يَعُدُّونَ النَّافِيَةَ كَرَامَةً لَا يَحْرُمُ عَلَيْهِمْ تَأْفِيفُ الْأَبَوَيْنِ

Imaam Qaadhi Abu Zaid said, "If a nation regards the word "Oof!" as a gesture of respect then it will not be Haraam for them to say "Oof!" to their parents (since the Illat, of causing harm to one's parents is absent, the ruling of Hurmat- prohibition will not apply).

وَكَذَلِكَ قُلْنَا فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِذَا نُودِيَ} الْآيَةِ وَلَوْ فَرَضْنَا بَيْعًا لَا يَمْنَعُ الْعَاقِدِينَ عَنِ السَّعْيِ إِلَى الْجُمُعَةِ بِأَنَّ كَانَا فِي سَفِينَةٍ تَجْرِي إِلَى الْجَامِعِ لَا يَكْرَهُ الْبَيْعُ

Similarly (another example of when the Illat is absent the ruling will not apply) **is the verse,**

{يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِذَا نُودِيَ}

"O you who have Imaan! When the call (Adhaan) is made for (the Jumu'ah) salaah on the day of Jumu'ah (Friday), then hasten towards ALLAAH's remembrance (towards the Jumu'ah Salaah to take place in the Masjid) and leave trading." (Surah Jumu'ah: 9)

(The Illat for the prohibition of trade is that it hinders hastening towards Salaah) **If we were to assume (hypothetically) that trade will not prevent the parties (buyer and seller) from hastening towards Jumu'ah (for example) by them being on a ship already headed towards the Masjid then it will not be prohibited.**

وَعَلَىٰ هَٰذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا حَلَفَ لَا يَضْرِبُ امْرَأَتَهُ فَمَدَّ شَعْرَهَا أَوْ عَصَبَهَا أَوْ خَنَفَهَا يَحْنُثُ إِذَا كَانَ بِوَجْهِهِ الْإِيلَامُ وَلَوْ وَجِدَ صُورَةَ الضَّرْبِ وَمَدَّ الشَّعْرَ عِنْدَ الْمَلَأَةِ دُونَ الْإِيلَامِ لَا يَحْنُثُ

Similarly (another example of when the Illat is absent the ruling will not apply) **is if a person takes an oath that he will not hit his wife (which means that he will not inflict harm to her) and then pulls her hair, bites her or chocks her such that it causes her pain then his oath will break (even though he might not have hit her). (However) If he strikes her (gently) or pulls her hair while playing with her, without harming her, then his oath will not break (even though he appears to have struck her).**

وَمَنْ حَلَفَ لَا يَضْرِبُ فَلَانَا فَضْرَبَهُ ۖ بَعْدَ مَوْتِهِ لَا يَحْنُثُ لِانْعِدَامِ مَعْنَى الضَّرْبِ وَهُوَ الْإِيلَامُ

If a person takes an oath that he will not hit a certain person (which means that he will not harm him) and then hits him after his death, his oath will not break as the meaning of hitting, which is to cause pain, is not found here (as the deceased person cannot feel pain).

وَكَذَا لَوْ حَلَفَ لَا يَتَكَلَّمُ فَلَانَّا فَكَلَّمَهُ ۖ بَعْدَ مَوْتِهِ لَا يَحْنُثُ لِعَدَمِ الْإِفْهَامِ

Similarly if a person takes an oath that he will not talk to a certain person and then does so after his death, his oath will not break as the deceased person cannot understand him.

وَبِاعْتِبَارِ هَذَا الْمَعْنَى يُقَالُ إِذَا حَلَفَ لَا يَأْكُلُ لَحْمًا فَأَكَلَ لَحْمَ السَّمَكِ أَوِ الْجَرَادِ لَا يَحْنُثُ وَلَوْ أَكَلَ لَحْمَ الْخِنْزِيرِ أَوِ الْإِنْسَانَ يَحْنُثُ لِأَنَّ الْعَالَمَ بِاللُّغَاتِ يَعْلَمُ بِأَوَّلِ السَّمَاعِ أَنَّ الْحَامِلَ عَلَى هَذَا الْيَمِينِ إِنَّمَا هُوَ الْاِخْتِرَازُ عَنْ تَنَاوُلِ الدَّمَوِيَّاتِ فَيُذَارُ الْحُكْمُ عَلَى ذَلِكَ

Based upon this (that the ruling will apply only when the Illat is found) it has been said that if a person takes an oath that he will not eat meat and then eats fish or locust, his oath will not break but if he eats pork or human flesh, his oath will break. The reason for this is that one acquainted with the Arabic language and its usage immediately on hearing it will understand that he is taking an oath that he will not eat meat which has been created from (or made from) blood, which would mean that he is abstaining from all types of flesh and the ruling will be based on it (such that his oath will only break if he consumes meat created from blood, which is not present in fish or locusts).

Definition of Iqtidha'un Nas

وَأَمَّا الْمُفْتَضَلُ فَهُوَ زِيَادَةُ عَلَى النَّصِّ لَا يَتَحَقَّقُ مَعْنَى النَّصِّ إِلَّا بِهِ كَانَ النَّصُّ اقْتِضَاءَهُ لِيَصِحَّ فِي نَفْسِهِ مَعْنَاهُ

Iqtidha'un Nas is an addition to the speech (*a meaning beyond What is actually said*) without which the meaning of the speech will not be correct (*the implication of the speech cannot be applied without it*), that is to say the speech requires it in order for its meaning to be correct.

Example of Iqtidha'un Nas

مَثَلُهُ فِي الشَّرْعِيَّاتِ قَوْلُهُ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ فَإِنَّ هَذَا نَعْتُ الْمَرْأَةِ إِلَّا أَنْ
النَّعْتَ يَقْتَضِي الْمَصْدَرَ فَكَانَ الْمَصْدَرُ مَوْجُودٌ بِطَرِيقِ الْاِقْتِضَاءِ

An example of this (*Dalaalatun Nas*) in (the laws of) Shari'ah is the term, "You are divorced". This (being divorced) is a characteristic (*Sifat*, which is a derivative of a verb) of the woman, however in order for it (divorced) to be the characteristic (*Sifat*, which is a derivative of a verb) the Masdar (root word, or verb in this case, from which words are derived) has to be present¹. In other words it can be said that the meaning of the Masdar is present because it is required (for the meaning of the speech to be correct).

وَإِذَا قَالَ أَعْتَقَ عَبْدُكَ عَنِّي بِأَلْفِ دِرْهَمٍ فَقَالَ أَعْتَقْتُ يَفْعُ الْعِتْقُ عَنِ الْأَمْرِ
فَيَجِبُ عَلَيْهِ الْأَلْفُ وَلَوْ كَانَ الْأَمْرُ نَوَى بِهِ الْكَفَّارَةَ يَقَعُ عَمَّا نَوَى وَذَلِكَ
لِأَنَّ قَوْلَهُ أَعْتَقَهُ عَنِّي بِأَلْفِ دِرْهَمٍ يَقْتَضِي مَعْنَى قَوْلِهِ بَعْدَهُ عَنِّي بِأَلْفٍ ثُمَّ
كُنْ وَكَيْلِي بِالْاِعْتِاقِ فَأَعْتَقَهُ عَنِّي فَيَنْبُتُ الْبَيْعُ بِطَرِيقِ الْاِقْتِضَاءِ فَيَنْبُتُ
الْقَبُولُ كَذَلِكَ لِأَنَّهُ رُكْنٌ فِي بَابِ الْبَيْعِ

¹ If a *sifat* (quality, attribute or characteristic) is ascribed to a person it will necessitate that the person carry out the action or in other words was the doer of the verb, e.g. if a person is called a helper. It would mean that he carried out the action of helping. Similarly in this instance when the woman has been called divorced, it would mean that the action of being divorce was carried out on her.

(The second example of Dalaalatun Nas is) If a person tells another, "Set your slave free on my behalf in lieu of one thousand dirhams" and the owner then says that he set the slave free, the act of setting free will be attributed to the one who gave the order and a thousand Dirhams will become Waajib on him *(to give to the owner of the slave)*. If the person who gave the order had the intention of Kaffaarah *(that he is setting this slave free in payment for his Kaffaarah)* then it will be in accordance with his intention *(and his Kaffaarah will be fulfilled)*. The reason for this is that saying, "Set your slave free on my behalf in lieu of one thousand dirhams" necessitates the meaning of "Sell this slave to me for one thousand dirhams and then be my representative (Wakeel) in setting him free and set him free on my behalf.". Thus a sale *(transaction of sale between the two)* has been established by Iqtidha'un Nas *(that in order for the meaning of the speech to be correct, a sale transaction is required)* and acceptance *(of the sale)* will also be established in a similar manner *(by Dalaalatun Nas)*.

وَلِهَذَا قَالَ أَبُو يُوسُفَ إِذَا قَالَ أَعْتَقَ عَبْدَكَ عَنِّي بِغَيْرِ شَيْءٍ فَقَالَ أَعْتَقْتُ يَعْنُ
الْعَتَقُ عَنِ الْأَمْرِ وَيَكُونُ هَذَا مُقْتَضِيًا لِلْهَبَةِ وَالتَّوَكُّلِ وَلَا يَحْتَاجُ فِيهِ إِلَى
الْقَبْضِ لِأَنَّهُ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْقَبُولِ فِي بَابِ الْبَيْعِ

Because of this *(that a sale transaction has been established in the above example by Dalaalatun Nas)* Imaam Abu Yusuf says that if a person says to another, "Set your slave free on my behalf in exchange for nothing" and he *(the owner)* then says, "I set him free" the act of setting free will be ascribed to the one who gave the order and Hibah *(transferring ownership to the other by gifting it to him)* and 'Towkeel' *(appointing another as his representative to act on his behalf)* will be established Iqtidha'un Nas and taking possession will not be necessary *(for the one who gave the order)* as it *(taking possession)* is the same as acceptance in

the example of sale (mentioned above where acceptance was established also through *Dalaalatun Nas*).

وَلَكِنَّا نَقُولُ الْقَبُولُ رُكْنٌ فِي بَابِ الْبَيْعِ فَإِذَا اثْبَتْنَا الْبَيْعَ اقْتِضَاءً اثْبَتْنَا الْقَبُولَ ضَرُورَةً بِخِلَافِ الْقَبْضِ فِي بَابِ الْهَبَةِ فَإِنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِرُكْنٍ فِي الْهَبَةِ لِيَكُونَ الْحُكْمُ بِالْهَبَةِ بِطَرِيقِ الْاِقْتِضَاءِ حُكْمًا بِالْقَبْضِ

However (in disagreement to this ruling of Imaam Abu Yusuf) we say (i.e. Imaam Abu Hanifah and Imaam Muhammed) **that acceptance is a Rukan** (fundamental element) **of a sale** thus if a sale has been established (to have occurred) by **Iqtidha'un Nas** then it would dictate that acceptance also **definitely occurred** (as a sale is only complete with a proposal of sale and acceptance of the offer, thus when we say a sale took place it would naturally mean that a proposal and acceptance occurred) **as opposed to taking possession in Hibah** as it (taking possession) **is not a Rukan** (but rather a condition for the transfer of ownership) **such that we can say that when Hibah is proven by Iqtidha'un Nas, taking possession also definitely occurred** (as the act of Hibah can take place, without the other taking possession, such that ownership will only be transferred once the other takes possession of the item, even though it has already been gifted to him. This is contrary to a sale, as a sale is only complete and called a sale once both a proposal and acceptance takes place).

Ruling of Iqtidha'un Nas

وَحُكْمُ الْمُقْتَضَى أَنَّهُ يَنْبُتُ بِطَرِيقِ الضَّرُورَةِ فَيَقْدَرُ بِقَدْرِ الضَّرُورَةِ

The ruling of Iqtidha'un Nas is that it is established out of necessity and will therefore be restricted to its necessity (such that only that amount of it will be applied which can fulfill the requirement of *Iqtidha'un Nas*).

Example of Iqtidha'un Nas

وَلِهَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا قَالَ أَنْتَ طَالِقٌ وَنَوَى بِهِ الثَّلَاثَ لَا يَصِحُّ لَأَنَّ الطَّلَاقَ يُقَدَّرُ
مَذْكُورًا بِطَرِيقِ الْإِقْتِضَاءِ فَيُقَدَّرُ بِقَدَرِ الضَّرُورَةِ وَالضَّرُورَةُ تَرْتَفِعُ
بِالْوَاحِدِ فَيُقَدَّرُ مَذْكُورًا فِي حَقِّ الْوَاحِدِ

As a result of this (that Iqtidha'un Nas is restricted to its necessity) we say that if a person tells his wife "You are divorced" with the intention of three Talaaq, it will not be correct (and only one Talaaq will apply). The reason for this is that Talaaq has been regarded to have been issued by Iqtidha'un Nas (as was discussed that ascribing a sifat necessitates the occurrence of the action; being divorced necessitates that a divorce was issued) and will therefore be restricted to necessity and the necessity is fulfilled with one thus it will be established that only one Talaaq was issued.

Rulings derived from the above

وَعَلَى هَذَا يُخْرَجُ الْحُكْمُ فِي قَوْلِهِ إِنْ أَكَلْتُ وَ نَوَى بِهِ طَعَامًا دُونَ طَعَامٍ
لَا يَصِحُّ لِأَنَّ الْأَكْلَ يَقْتَضِي طَعَامًا فَكَانَ ذَلِكَ ثَابِتًا بِطَرِيقِ الْإِقْتِضَاءِ
فَيُقَدَّرُ بِقَدَرِ الضَّرُورَةِ وَ الضَّرُورَةُ تَرْتَفِعُ بِالْفَرْدِ الْمُطْلَقِ وَ لَا تَخْصِيصَ
فِي الْفَرْدِ الْمُطْلَقِ لِأَنَّ التَّخْصِيصَ يَعْتَمِدُ الْعُمُومَ

As a result of this (that Iqtidha'un Nas is restricted to necessity) the ruling is derived for the statement (if a person takes an oath saying), "If I eat...(Then my wife is divorced, slave set free, or any other condition)" whereby he makes the intention for one type of food (the intention that if I eat this specific type of food then only will the condition be fulfilled) and excludes others, it will not be correct (and his oath will break with the consumption of any type of food). The reason

for this (*why the oath breaks even though he might have been referring to a specific food*) **is that eating necessitates food, thus it (consumption of food) has been established by Iqtidha'un Nas which will be restricted to necessity and the necessity will only be fulfilled by 'Fard Mutlaq' (an unrestricted clause). 'Fard Mutlaq' cannot be specified (have its implication restricted) as 'Takhsees' (to restrict) requires Umoom (generality, which means it can only occur where an item is Aam and Iqtidha'un Nas is not Aam).**

وَلَوْ قَالَ بَعْدَ الدُّخُولِ اِعْتَدَيَّ وَتَوَى بِهِ الطَّلَاقُ فَيَقَعُ الطَّلَاقُ اِقْتِضَاءً لَانَ
الاعْتِدَادَ يَقْتَضِي وُجُودَ الطَّلَاقِ فَيَقْدَرُ الطَّلَاقُ مَوْجُوداً ضَرُورَةً وَلِهَذَا
كَانَ الْوَأَقْعُ بِهِ رَجْعِيًّا لَانَ صِفَةُ الْبَيِّنُونَةِ زَائِدَةٌ عَلَى قَدْرِ الضَّرُورَةِ فَلَا
يَتَّبْتُ بِطَرِيقِ الْاِقْتِضَاءِ وَلَا يَقَعُ اِلَّا وَاحِدٌ لِمَا ذَكَرْنَا

If a person tells his wife after consummating the marriage, "Start your Iddah (period of waiting after Talaaq)" with the intention of Talaaq the Talaaq will be applied through Iqtidha'un Nas. The reason for this is that Iddah requires the issuing of a Talaaq, thus it will be established that a Talaaq was issued (because of which he is instructing her to start her Iddah) according to necessity (will be restricted to only that amount which will fulfill the requirement of Iqtidha'un Nas), which is possible through a Raj'ie (revocable) Talaaq. The reason for this (why it will be a Talaaq Raj'ie) is that Talaaq Baa'inah (irrevocable Talaaq) exceeds the necessity and therefore cannot be established through Iqtidha'un Nas. Thus only one Talaaq (Raj'ie) will apply, as we have explained.

Lesson on Amr

Definition of Amr

Paste

فصل في الامر

الْأَمْرُ فِي اللُّغَةِ قَوْلُ الْقَائِلِ لِغَيْرِهِ "افْعَلْ"، وَفِي الشَّرْعِ تَصَرُّفُ الزَّامِ
الْفِعْلِ عَلَى الْغَيْرِ

The literal meaning of Amr is when a person orders another to do something using the words 'افعل' - Do (this)! In Shari'ah (it means), making something (an act) compulsory on another.

وَذَكَرَ بَعْضُ الْأَيِّمَّةِ أَنَّ الْمُرَادَ بِالْأَمْرِ يَخْتَصُّ بِهِذِهِ الصِّيغَةُ، وَاسْتَحَالَ أَنْ يَكُونَ مَعْنَاهُ أَنَّ حَقِيقَةَ الْأَمْرِ يَخْتَصُّ بِهِذِهِ الصِّيغَةُ فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى مُتَكَلِّمٌ فِي الْأَزَلِ عِنْدَنَا، وَكَلَامُهُ أَمْرٌ وَنَهْيٌ وَإِخْبَارٌ وَاسْتِخْبَارٌ، وَاسْتِحَالَ وَجُودُ هَذِهِ الصِّيغَةِ فِي الْأَزَلِ، وَاسْتَحَالَ أَيْضًا أَنْ يَكُونَ مَعْنَاهُ أَنَّ الْمُرَادَ بِالْأَمْرِ لِلْأَمْرِ يَخْتَصُّ بِهِذِهِ الصِّيغَةُ فَإِنَّ الْمُرَادَ لِلشَّارِعِ بِالْأَمْرِ وَجُوبُ الْفِعْلِ عَلَى الْعَبْدِ وَهُوَ مَعْنَى الْإِبْتِلَاءِ عِنْدَنَا، وَقَدْ ثَبَتَ الْوُجُوبُ بِدُونِ هَذِهِ الصِّيغَةِ، أَلَيْسَ أَنَّهُ وَجِبَ الْإِيمَانُ عَلَى مَنْ لَمْ تَبْلُغْهُ الدَّعْوَةُ بِدُونِ وَرُودِ السَّمْعِ؟ قَالَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ لَوْ لَمْ يَبْعَثِ اللَّهُ رَسُولًا لَوْجِبَ عَلَى الْعُقَلَاءِ مَعْرِفَتُهُ بِعُقُولِهِمْ، فَيَحْمِلُ ذَلِكَ عَلَى أَنَّ الْمُرَادَ بِالْأَمْرِ يَخْتَصُّ بِهِذِهِ الصِّيغَةُ فِي حَقِّ الْعَبْدِ فِي الشَّرْعِيَّاتِ حَتَّى لَا يَكُونَ فِعْلُ الرَّسُولِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ قَوْلِهِ "افْعَلُوا"، وَلَا يَلْزِمُ اعْتِقَادُ الْوُجُوبِ بِهِ، وَالْمُتَابَعَةُ فِي أَفْعَالِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ إِنَّمَا تَجِبُ عِنْدَ الْمُوَظَّيَّةِ وَانْتِفَاءُ دَلِيلِ الْإِخْتِصَاصِ

Some Aimah have mentioned that Amr is restricted to this expression (افعل). (.)It is impossible that they could have implied that the reality of Amr is restricted to this expression only because according to us ALLAAH Ta'ala is the Speaker since eternity and his speech comprises of Amr

(ordering), **Nahee** (prohibiting), **Ikhbaar** (informing), **Istikhbaar** (questioning) and it is impossible that this expression could have existed since eternity (as any expression or term is momentary because of it comprising of sound, letters and words, whereas ALLAAH's speech does not comprise of these and is therefore eternal). At the same time it is impossible that this (the statement of some Aimah that Amr is restricted to this expression only) means that the objective of the one giving the order (which is to make an act Waajib on another) can only be attained with this expression because the purpose of Amr from the Shar'ie (the one who stipulates the laws of Shari'ah) is to make an act Waajib on the servant, which gives the meaning of 'Ibti'laa' (to put to trial), and Wujoob can be established without this expression. (For example) Is Imaan not Waajib on those whom the message of Islaam has not reached? Imaam Abu Hanifah says, "Had ALLAAH Ta'ala not sent any Nabi then (too) it would be compulsory upon the intellectuals to use their intellect to recognise ALLAAH Ta'ala. Thus the statement of the Aimah (mentioned above) will mean that the Ahkaam of Shari'ah with regards to (ALLAAH's) servants is restricted to this expression such that the actions of Rasulullaah ﷺ will not have the same status as the expression of Rasulullaah ﷺ 'افعلوا' - You all Do! (this) and it will not be necessary to regard the action of Rasulullaah ﷺ as Waajib (in the same manner as his order will be regarded). Following the actions of Rasulullaah ﷺ will only be Waajib when it is proven that Rasulullaah ﷺ habitually performed that act or (it is proven) that it was not specific to Rasulullaah ﷺ only.

Lesson on Amr Mutlaq

فصل

اِخْتَلَفَ النَّاسُ فِي الْأَمْرِ الْمُطْلَقِ أَيَّ الْمَجَرَّدِ عَنِ الْقَرِينَةِ الدَّالَّةِ عَلَى
اللزومِ وَ عَدَمِ اللزومِ نَحْوُ قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {وَإِذَا قُرِئَ الْقُرْآنُ فَاسْتَمِعُوا لِي
وَأَنْصِتُوا لَعَلَّكُمْ تُرْحَمُونَ} وَ قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {وَلَا تَقْرَبَا هَذِهِ الشَّجَرَةَ فَتَكُونَا
مِنَ الظَّالِمِينَ} وَالصَّحِيحُ مِنَ الْمَذْهَبِ أَنَّ مَوْجِبَهُ الْوُجُوبُ إِلَّا إِذَا قَامَ
الدَّلِيلُ عَلَى خِلَافِهِ لِأَنَّ تَرْكَ الْأَمْرِ مَعْصِيَةٌ كَمَا أَنَّ الْإِيتِمَارَ طَاعَةٌ، قَالَ
الْحَمَاسِيُّ:

أَطَعْتَ لِأَمْرِيكَ بِصَرَمٍ حَبْلِي مُرِيهِمْ فِي أَجَبَتِهِمْ بِذَاكَ
فَهُمْ إِنْ طَاوَعُوكَ فَطَاوَعُوا عَيْنَهُمْ وَإِنْ عَاصَوْكَ فَاعَصَوْ مِنْ عَصَاكَ
وَالْعِصْيَانُ فِيمَا يَرْجِعُ إِلَى حَقِّ الشَّرْعِ سَبَبٌ لِلْعِقَابِ

The scholars have differed regarding Amr Mutlaq; i.e. (such an Amr which is) free from any indication whether it is for compulsion or not for compulsion (this means that there is a difference of opinion regarding the expression of Amr which does not indicate whether it is Waajib or not Waajib). For example, the verses, “When the Quraan is recited, then listen attentively to it (stop talking) and remain silent so that mercy may be shown to you” and “But do not approach this tree, for then (if you eat from it) you will be of the wrong-doers”(there is nothing in these verses which indicate whether the order given in these verses are for Wujoob or not). The Saheeh (correct and authentic) view is that it (Amr Mutlaq) is for Wujoob except if proof is established against it (if there is proof that Wujoob is not implied then the act will not be considered Waajib) because discarding Amr is disobedience and acting in accordance to it is obedience. Allaamah Humaasi said,

“In severing relations with me you have obeyed those who order you.

You too order them to do the same to their beloveds.

If they obey you (and sever ties with those they love), then obey them (and sever relations with me).

If they disobey you (and do not sever relations with those they love), then disobey those who disobey you (and maintain relations with me)."

Disobedience with regards to matters of Shari'ah is a cause for punishment.

وَتَحْقِيقُهُ أَنَّ لُزُومَ الْإِيْتِمَارِ إِنَّمَا يَكُونُ بِقَدْرِ وَلَايَةِ الْأَمْرِ عَلَى الْمُخَاطَبِ، وَلِهَذَا إِذَا وَجَّهْتَ صِيغَةَ الْأَمْرِ إِلَى مَنْ لَا يَلْزِمُهُ طَاعَتُكَ أَصْلًا لَا يَكُونُ ذَلِكَ مُوجِبًا لِلْإِيْتِمَارِ، وَإِذَا وَجَّهْتَهَا إِلَى مَنْ يَلْزِمُهُ طَاعَتُكَ مِنَ الْعَبِيدِ لَزِمَهُ الْإِيْتِمَارُ لَا مُحَالَةً حَتَّى لَوْ تَرَكَهٖ اخْتِيَارًا يَسْتَحِقُّ الْعِقَابَ عُرْفًا وَشَرْعًا عَلَى هَذَا عَرَفْنَا أَنَّ لُزُومَ الْإِيْتِمَارِ بِقَدْرِ وَلَايَةِ الْأَمْرِ، إِذَا ثَبَتَ هَذَا فَقَوْلُ إِنْ لِلَّهِ مَلِكًا كَامِلًا فِي كُلِّ جُزْءٍ مِنْ أَجْزَاءِ الْعَالَمِ وَلَهُ النَّصْرُفُ كَيْفَ مَا شَاءَ وَأَرَادَ، وَإِذَا ثَبَتَ أَنَّ مَنْ لَهُ الْمَلِكُ الْقَاصِرُ فِي الْعَبْدِ كَانَ تَرَكَ الْإِيْتِمَارَ سَبَبًا لِلْعِقَابِ فَمَا ظَنُّكَ فِي تَرْكِ أَمْرٍ مَنْ أَوْجَدَكَ مِنَ الْعَدَمِ وَأَدَّرَ عَلَيْكَ شَأْنِيْبَ النَّعَمِ

The rationale behind this (that disregarding Amr is disobedience) is that compulsion to perform (an Amr) is based upon the authority one has over the addressee (the one to whom the Amr is directed). As a result of this (that compulsion is based upon the authority one has over the addressee) if the expression of Amr (an order) is directed to a person upon whom it is not compulsory to obey you then it will not be Waajib (for him) to carry it (the ordered task) out and if it is directed to a person upon whom it is compulsory to obey you then it will be compulsory for him to carry it out without any doubt. If he were to disregard it intentionally then he will be deserving of punishment logically and according to Shari'ah. According to this we learn that the level of compulsion will be based upon the authority of the one issuing the order (over those being

ordered, such that if he has authority over them then it will be compulsory for them to obey it and if he has no authority over them then it will not be compulsory for them to obey it). **Once this has been established** (that the level of compulsion will be based upon the authority of the one issuing the order) **we say that ALLAAH Ta'ala is Supreme Master of every inch of the universe and can do as He so pleases and intends** (thus ALLAAH Ta'ala has authority over everything and his orders are compulsory on His creation). **When it has been established that disregarding an order of one who has a slight authority over a person** (by being his master and the latter being his slave) **is deserving of punishment, what is your opinion about disregarding the order of One who brought you into existence from nothing and showered His bounties upon you** (how much more incumbent will ALLAAH's order be)?

Lesson on Taqraar in Amr

فصل الأَمْرُ بِالْفِعْلِ لَا يَقْتَضِي التَّكْرَارَ

This lesson discusses that Amr-bil-Fi'l (ordering a specific act) does not necessitate repetition (such that carry out once will fulfil the requisite of the order).

وَلِهَذَا قُلْنَا لَوْ قَالَ "طَلَّقْ امْرَأَتِي" فَطَلَّقَهَا الْوَكِيلُ ثُمَّ تَزَوَّجَهَا الْمَوْكَلُ
لَيْسَ لِلْوَكِيلِ أَنْ يُطَلِّقَهَا بِالْأَمْرِ الْأَوَّلِ ثَانِيًا

As a result of this (that Amr does not necessitate repetition) **we say that if a person orders another saying, "Divorce my wife (on my behalf)" and the Wakeel (appointee) divorces**

her, and thereafter the Muwakkil (*the appointer*) then remarries her, the Wakeel will not have the right to divorce her a second time with the first Amr (*when he divorced her the first time he fulfilled the Amr and will not have the right to continually issue divorces*).

وَلَوْ قَالَ زَوِّجْنِي امْرَأَةً لَا يَتَنَاوَلُ هَذَا تَزْوِيجًا مَرَّةً بَعْدَ أُخْرَى، وَلَوْ قَالَ لِعَبْدِهِ «تَزَوَّجْ»، لَا يَتَنَاوَلُ ذَلِكَ إِلَّا مَرَّةً وَاحِدَةً

If a person orders another saying, “Marry me to a woman” then this will give him the right to perform his marriage again and again. If a person orders his slave, “Get married!” then this will permit him to get married only once (*and he will not be allowed to marry again*).

لَإِنَّ الْأَمَرَ بِالْفِعْلِ طَلَبُ تَحْقِيقِ الْفِعْلِ عَلَى سَبِيلِ الْإِخْتِصَارِ فَإِنَّ قَوْلَهُ اضْرِبْ مُخْتَصَرٌ مِنْ قَوْلِهِ افْعَلْ فِعْلَ الضَّرْبِ وَالْمُخْتَصَرُ مِنَ الْكَلَامِ وَالْمُطَوَّلُ سَوَاءٌ فِي الْحُكْمِ ثُمَّ الْأَمْرُ بِالضَّرْبِ أَمْرٌ بِجِنْسٍ تَصَرَّفَ مَعْلُومٌ وَحُكْمٌ إِسْمِ الْجِنْسِ أَنْ يَتَنَاوَلَ الْأَدْنَى عِنْدَ الْإِطْلَاقِ وَيَحْتَمِلَ كُلَّ الْجِنْسِ

The reason for this (*why Amr does not necessitate repetition*) is that Amr calls for that action in a concise manner (*meaning it is an abbreviation of a lengthy statement*) as ‘اضرب’- You Hit! is short for ‘Perform the action of hitting’, and the concise and extended form are both the same in its ruling. Then (*thus the above order to hit would imply that one must strike once because*) the order to hit is an order to carry out a type of action (*in this case hitting*) in a known manner and when a known type is ordered then it will refer to the bare minimum when Mutlaq (*with no clauses or restrictions*) or the maximum (*if he has the intention for it, either one can be implied and there is no in-between*).

Rulings deduced from the above

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا حَلَفَ لَا يَشْرَبُ الْمَاءَ يَحْنُثُ بِشُرْبِ أَذْنَىٰ قَطْرَةٍ مِنْهُ
وَلَوْ نَوَىٰ بِهِ جَمِيعَ مِيَاهِ الْعَالَمِ صَحَّتْ نِيَّتُهُ

As a result of this (that Amr-Mutlaq will refer to either the minimum or maximum) **we say if a person takes an oath that he will not drink water, then his oath will break even if he drinks a drop. (However) If he has the intention for the water of the entire world (meaning he takes an oath that he will not drink all the water of the entire world) then his intention will be correct (because Amr-Mutlaq can refer to the minimum or maximum, and in this case his oath will only break if he drinks all the water of the entire world and not if he drinks a drop).**

وَلِهَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا قَالَ لَهَا طَلَّقِي نَفْسَكَ فَقَالَتْ طَلَّقْتُ بَعْعُ الْوَاحِدَةِ وَلَوْ نَوَى
الثَّلَاثَ صَحَّتْ نِيَّتُهُ

As a result of this (that Amr-Mutlaq will refer to either the minimum or maximum) **we say that if a person orders his wife to divorce herself and she then says, “I divorced myself” then one Talaq will apply but if he had the intention for three then his intention will be correct (and three will apply because Amr-Mutlaq will refer to either the minimum or maximum, thus it can refer to either one Talaq or three).**

وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْ قَالَ لِأَخَرَ طَلَّقَهَا يَتَنَاوَلُ الْوَاحِدَةَ عِنْدَ الْإِطْلَاقِ وَلَوْ نَوَى الثَّلَاثَ
صَحَّتْ نِيَّتُهُ وَلَوْ نَوَى الثَّنَتَيْنِ لَا يَصِحُّ إِلَّا إِذَا كَانَتْ الْمَنْكُوحَةُ أَمَةً فَإِنَّ نِيَّةَ
الثَّنَتَيْنِ فِي حَقِّهَا نِيَّةٌ بِكُلِّ الْجِنْسِ

Similarly (Amr-Mutlaq can refer to either the minimum or maximum) **if a person orders another to divorce his wife,**

then this will refer to one when Amr is Mutlaq and if he had the intention for three then his intention will be correct (and three Talaq will apply). (However) If he had the intention for two then it will not be correct (and only one will apply) except if his wife was a female slave because the intention of two in her favour is the intention of the maximum.

وَلَوْ قَالَ لِعَبْدِهِ تَزَوَّجْ يَقَعُ عَلَى تَزَوُّجِ امْرَأَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ وَلَوْ نَوَى الثَّانِيَيْنِ
صَحَّتْ نِيَّتُهُ لِأَنَّ ذَلِكَ كُلَّ الْجِنْسِ فِي حَقِّ الْعَبْدِ

If a person tells his slave, “Get married!” then it will permit him to marry one woman but if he had the intention of (permitting him to marry) two women then his intention will be correct (and he will be permitted to marry two women) as two is the maximum (amount wives he can take at one time) for a slave.

A reply to an objection to this principle

وَلَا يَتَأْتَى عَلَى هَذَا فَصْلُ تَكَرَّرِ الْعِبَادَاتِ فَإِنَّ ذَلِكَ لَمْ يَثْبُتْ بِالْأَمْرِ بَلْ
بِتَكَرَّرِ أَسْبَابِهَا الَّتِي يَثْبُتُ بِهَا الْوُجُوبُ وَالْأَمْرُ لَطَلَبُ آدَاءٍ مَا وَجَبَ فِي
الدِّمَةِ بِسَبَبٍ سَابِقٍ لَا لِإثْبَاتِ أَصْلِ الْوُجُوبِ وَهَذَا بِمَنْزِلَةِ قَوْلِ الرَّجُلِ أَدِّ
ثَمَنَ الْمَيْعَةِ وَأَدِّ نَفَقَةَ الزَّوْجَةِ فَإِذَا وَجِبَتْ الْعِبَادَةُ بِسَبَبِهَا فَتَوَجَّهَ الْأَمْرُ لِآدَاءِ
مَا وَجَبَ مِنْهَا عَلَيْهِ ثُمَّ الْأَمْرُ لَمَّا كَانَ يَتَنَاوَلُ الْجِنْسَ يَتَنَاوَلُ جِنْسَ مَا
وَجَبَ عَلَيْهِ

Based upon this principle (that Amr does not necessitate repetition) **there will no objection to repetition in Ibaadaat** (whereby one can say that since there is no repetition in Amr it is not necessary to perform acts of Ibaadaat, such as Salaah, etc, repeatedly but merely performing them once will suffice) **because they are not established** (made Waajib repeatedly) **by Amr** (necessitating repetition) **but rather** (they become

Waajib repeatedly) because of repetition of the Asbaab (the principal cause) which causes it to become Waajib. The Amr seeks to make Waajib performance of that, which is already incumbent on a person and not to establish compulsion in essence (the Amr does not make the act Waajib but merely orders one to perform that which is Waajib on that person at that particular time). This (making performance of something incumbent, which was already Waajib on a person before this) is similar to a person telling another, "Pay the price of the goods" (the Amr to pay the price in actual fact is ordering one to pay that amount that has become Waajib on him as a result of the transaction which he contracted previously and the Amr to pay itself did not make it Waajib) or "Pay maintenance to your wife" (the Amr to pay the price in actual fact is ordering one to pay that amount that has become Waajib on him as a result of the transaction which he contracted previously and the Amr to pay itself did not make it Waajib). Thus when Ibaadaat become Waajib because of their Asbaab and the Amr will only seek performance of that which is already Waajib upon him. Then when Amr refers to a specific class (category) then it will refer to that (entire) class which is Waajib upon him (whenever Amr is used it will refer all that is Waajib upon him, for example the order to perform Salaah is an order to perform all the Salaah which is Waajib on a person in his entire life).

وَمِثْلُهُ مَا يُقَالُ إِنَّ الْوَاجِبَ فِي وَقْتِ الظُّهْرِ هُوَ الظُّهْرُ فَتَوَجَّهَ الْأَمْرُ
لِإِدَاءِ ذَلِكَ الْوَاجِبِ ثُمَّ إِذَا تَكَرَّرَ الْوَقْتُ تَكَرَّرَ الْوَاجِبُ فَتَنَاولَ الْأَمْرُ ذَلِكَ
الْوَاجِبَ الْآخَرَ ضَرُورَةً تَنَاولَهُ كُلُّ الْجِنْسِ الْوَاجِبِ عَلَيْهِ صَوْمًا كَانَ أَوْ
صَلَاةً فَكَانَ تَكَرُّارُ الْعِبَادَةِ الْمُتَكَرِّرَةِ بِهَذَا الطَّرِيقِ لَا بِطَرِيقِ أَنَّ الْأَمْرَ
يَقْتَضِي التَّكَرُّارَ

An example of this (that Amr will refer to the entire class which is Waajib on a person) **is what is said that** (all the) **Zuhr Salaah** (incumbent on a person in his life) **is what is**

Waajib in the time of Zuhr, thus the Amr will be directed to the performance of what is Waajib on him (which is the Zuhr Salaah incumbent upon him) then when the time (of Zuhr Salaah) is repeated so too will its compulsion. Thus the Amr will include whatever is Waajib upon him (such as the Zuhr of the next day as well) as it refers to the entire class of what is Waajib on him, whether it be fasting or Salaah. Thus the repetition of Ibaadaat is (Waajib) in this manner and not that Amr necessitates repetition.

Two types of Ma'moor Bihi

فصل

الْمَأْمُورُ بِهِ نَوْعَانِ مُطْلَقٌ عَنِ الْوَقْتِ وَمُقَيَّدٌ بِهِ وَحُكْمُ الْمُطْلَقِ أَنْ يَكُونَ الْأَدَاءُ وَاجِباً عَلَى النَّرَاجِ بِشَرْطِ أَنْ لَا يَفُوتَهُ فِي الْعُمُرِ

Ma'moor Bihi (the act which one has been ordered to perform) is of two types; **Mutlaq anil Waqt** (not restricted to a specific time) and **Muqayyad bil Waqt** (restricted to a specific time). The ruling of **Mutlaq anil Waqt** is that it is **Waajib with 'Taraakhee'** (even though Waajib it does not need to be performed immediately) as long as it is performed before one's death (thus once will not be regarded as sinful in delaying its performance as long as one carries it out before one's death. If one passes away without performing it then he will be sinful).

وَعَلَى هَذَا قَالَ مُحَمَّدٌ فِي الْجَامِعِ لَوْ نَذَرَ أَنْ يَعْتَكِفَ شَهْرًا لَهُ أَنْ يَعْتَكِفَ أَيَّ شَهْرٍ شَاءَ وَلَوْ نَذَرَ أَنْ يَصُومَ شَهْرًا لَهُ أَنْ يَصُومَ أَيَّ شَهْرٍ شَاءَ وَفِي الزَّكَاةِ وَصَدَقَةِ الْفِطْرِ وَالْعُسْرِ الْمَذْهَبُ الْمَعْلُومُ أَنَّهُ لَا يَصِيرُ بِالتَّأْخِيرِ مُفْرَطًا فَإِنَّهُ لَوْ هَلَكَ النَّصَابُ سَقَطَ الْوَاجِبُ وَالْحَانِثُ إِذَا ذَهَبَ مَالُهُ وَصَارَ فَقِيرًا كَفَرَ بِالصَّوْمِ

Based upon this (that the performance of Amr-Mutlaq anil Waqt can be delayed) **Imam Muhammed** □ has said in '**Al-Jaami'ul Kabeer**' that if a person vows to perform I'tetikaaf

for a month, then he may perform this I'tikaaf in any month he desires and (*in a similar manner*) if he vows to fast for a month then he may fast in any month he desires. The well-known verdict (*Shar'ie stance*) with regards to Zakaat, Sadaqaatul-Fitr and Ushr is that one does not become sinful in delaying its fulfilment because if he loses the Nisaab (*the amount on which Zakaat or Sadaqah becomes Waajib*) then it will no longer be Waajib (*to pay the Zakaat or Sadaqah*) and if one who broke his oath loses his wealth and becomes destitute then he will complete the Kaffaarah through fasting.

Mutlaq anil Waqt is Waajib Kaamil

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا لَا يَجُوزُ قَضَاءُ الصَّلَاةِ فِي الْأَوْقَاتِ الْمَكْرُوهَةِ لِأَنَّهُ لَمَّا وَجَبَ مُطْلَقًا وَجَبَ كَامِلًا فَلَا يَخْرُجُ عَنِ الْعَهْدَةِ بِإِدَاءِ النَّاقِصِ فَيَجُوزُ الْعَصْرُ عِنْدَ الْإِحْمَرَارِ آدَاءً وَلَا يَجُوزُ قَضَاءُ وَعَنِ الْكَرْخِيِّ أَنَّ مُوجِبَ الْأَمْرِ الْمُطْلَقِ الْوُجُوبِ عَلَى الْفَوْرِ وَالْخِلَافُ مَعَهُ فِي الْوُجُوبِ وَلَا خِلَافَ فِي أَنَّ الْمُسَارَعَةَ إِلَى الْإِيْتِمَارِ مَنْدُوبٌ إِلَيْهَا

Based upon this (*that one will not be sinful for delaying the performance of Amr-Mutlaq anil Waqt*) **it is not permissible to perform Qadhaa Salaah** (*the missed Salaah, which is not restricted to time and may be performed at any time*) **in the (three) forbidden times** (*sunrise, sunset, midday*) **because when it is Waajib Mutlaqan** (*without restriction*) **it is (still) Waajib Kaamil** (*perfectly*) **and one will not be absolved of it by performing it defective** (*and since these three times are defective times the Qadhaa Salaah performed in this time will be defective*). **Performance of (that days) Asr Salaah is permissible close to Sunset but Qadhaa Salaah is not** (*as the Sabab for the Wujoob of Asr performed close to sunset is defective thus performing it in a defective manner/time is also permissible*). **Imaam Karkhi** □ **is of the opinion that Amr-**

Mutlaq anil Waqt is Waajib immediately (*such that one who delays in performing it will be sinful*). **Our disagreement with him is with regards to it being Waajib** (*he regards it as Waajib immediately and we regard say that even though it is waajib it is not compulsory to perform it immediately*) **and we do not disagree that performing it as soon as possible is Mustahab.**

Types of Amr-Muqayyad bil Waqt

وَأَمَّا الْوَقْتُ فَتَوَعَّانٌ نَوْعٌ يَكُونُ الْوَقْتُ ظَرْفًا لِلْفِعْلِ حَتَّى لَا يَشْتَرِطَ
إِسْتِيعَابُ كُلِّ الْوَقْتِ بِالْفِعْلِ كَالصَّلَاةِ

Amr-Muqayyad bil Waqt is of two types; (*the first is*) **where (a specific) time is the period in which the act can be carried out** such that it is not necessary that the entire period be spent in that act, for example Salaah (*the various Salaah are compulsory in their designated times but it is not necessary for one to spend the entire time, for example the time of Zuhr, engaged in the Salaat of Zuhr*).

The ruling of the first type

وَمِنْ حُكْمِ هَذَا النَّوعِ أَنَّ وَجُوبَ الْفِعْلِ فِيهِ لَا يُنَافِي وَجُوبَ فِعْلٍ آخَرَ فِيهِ
مِنْ جَنْسِهِ حَتَّى لَوْ نَذَرَ أَنْ يُصَلِّيَ كَذَا وَكَذَا رَكْعَةً فِي وَقْتِ الظُّهْرِ لَزِمَهُ

The ruling of this type (*where a specific time is the period in which the act can be carried out*) **is that an act being Waajib in that time (period) does not oppose another act similar to it being waajib in that same time, such that if a person makes a vow to perform a certain Salaah in the time of Zuhr, it (the Salaah which one vowed to perform) will be compulsory (to perform).**

وَمِنْ حُكْمِهِ أَنَّ وُجُوبَ الصَّلَاةِ فِيهِ لَا يُنَافِي صِحَّةَ صَلَاةٍ أُخْرَى فِيهِ حَتَّى
لَوْ شَعَلَ جَمِيعَ وَقْتِ الظُّهْرِ بِغَيْرِ الظُّهْرِ يَجُوزُ

The ruling of this type (is also) that Salaah being Waajib in it will not negate the permissibility of (performing) other Salaah in it (that time period) such that if a person spends the entire time of Zuhr engaged in other Salaah it will be permissible.

وَمِنْ حُكْمِهِ أَنَّهُ لَا يَتَدَايَ الْمَأْمُورُ بِهِ إِلَّا بِنِيَّةٍ مُعَيَّنَةٍ لَأَنَّ غَيْرَهُ لَمَّا كَانَ
مَشْرُوعًا فِي الْوَقْتِ لَا يَتَعَيَّنُ هُوَ بِالْفِعْلِ وَإِنْ ضَاقَ الْوَقْتُ لِأَنَّ إِعْتِبَارَ
النِّيَّةِ بِإِعْتِبَارِ الْمَزَاجِمِ وَقَدْ بَقِيَ الْمَزَاحِمَةُ عِنْدَ ضَيْقِ الْوَقْتِ

The ruling of this type (is also) that the Ma'moor Bihi (what has been made Waajib by the Amr) will not be fulfilled except with a specific intention for it (one must make the intention to perform it before beginning, in order for it to be fulfilled) because when it is permissible to perform acts similar to it in the same time period it cannot be specified by mere action only (but intention will be necessary for specification) even if the time is short (mere action will not suffice but the Salaah will have to be specified by intention). The reason for this is that Niyyat is necessary because of the time being crowded (with the permissibility to perform any Salaah) and this crowdedness still remains when the time is short.

The second type of Amr-Muqayyad bil Waqt

وَالنَّوْعُ الثَّانِي مَا يَكُونُ الْوَقْتُ مَعْيَارًا لَهُ وَذَلِكَ مِثْلُ الصَّوْمِ فَإِنَّهُ يَتَقَدَّرُ
بِالْوَقْتِ وَهُوَ الْيَوْمُ

The second type (of *Amr-Muqayyad bil Waqt*) is where (a specific) time is the period in which the act needs to be carried out (such that the act needs to be performed in that entire period). An example of this is Fasting, which is performed throughout the day.

The ruling of this type

وَمِنْ حُكْمِهِ أَنَّ الشَّرْعَ إِذَا عَيَّنَ لَهُ وَقْتًا لَا يَجِبُ غَيْرُهُ فِي ذَلِكَ الْوَقْتِ وَلَا يَجُوزُ آدَاءُ غَيْرِهِ فِيهِ حَتَّىٰ أَنْ الصَّحِيحَ الْمُقِيمَ لَوْ أَوْقَعَ إِمْسَاكَهُ فِي رَمَضَانَ عَنْ وَاجِبٍ آخَرَ يَقَعُ عَنْ رَمَضَانَ لَا عَمَّا نَوَىٰ وَ إِذَا ائْتَفَقَ الْمُزَاجِمُ فِي الْوَقْتِ سَقَطَ إِشْتِرَاطُ التَّعْيِينِ فَإِنَّ ذَلِكَ لَقَطْعُ الْمُزَاحَمَةِ وَلَا يَسْقُطُ أَصْلُ النِّيَّةِ لِأَنَّ الْإِمْسَاكَ لَا يَصِيرُ صَوْمًا إِلَّا بِالنِّيَّةِ فَإِنَّ الصَّوْمَ شَرْعًا هُوَ الْإِمْسَاكَ عَنِ الْأَكْلِ وَالشَّرْبِ وَالْجِمَاعِ نَهَارًا مَعَ النِّيَّةِ

The ruling of this type (where a specific time is the period in which the act needs to be carried out) is that wherever the Shari'ah has specified a time (period in which the act needs to be performed) another act (similar in nature) cannot be Waajib in that time nor is it permissible to perform another (act similar in nature) in that time such that if a healthy resident makes the intention for his fast in Ramadaan for another Waajib fast, his fast will be for Ramadaan and not for what he intended. Since the time period is not crowded (by similar acts being permissible in that same time period) the condition of specifying (with intention) falls away as it (specifying with intention) was to remove the crowdedness (caused by other similar acts being permissible in that time). However Niyat (to make the intention of fasting) itself will not fall away as abstaining will only become fasting with intention (of fasting) as fasting according to Shari'ah is abstaining from eating, drinking and sexual relations during the day with intention (of fasting).

وَ إِنْ لَمْ يُعَيِّنِ الشَّرْعُ لَهُ وَقْتًا فَإِنَّهُ لَا يَتَّعَيْنُ الْوَقْتُ لَهُ بِتَعْيِينِ الْعَبْدِ حَتَّى لَوْ عَيَّنَ الْعَبْدُ أَيَّامًا لِقَضَاءِ رَمَضَانَ لَا تَتَّعَيْنُ هِيَ لِلْقَضَاءِ وَ يَجُوزُ فِيهَا صَوْمُ الْكَفَّارَةِ وَالنَّفْلِ وَ يَجُوزُ قَضَاءُ رَمَضَانَ فِيهَا وَغَيْرَهَا وَمِنْ حُكْمِ هَذَا النَّوعِ اسْتِرَاطُ تَعْيِينِ النِّيَّةِ لَوْجُودِ الْمَزَاجِمِ

If the Shari'ah has not specified a time then it cannot be specified by man such that if a person specifies a certain day for the Qadhaa fast of Ramadaan then it will not be taken to be specified and it will be permissible to keep the fasts of Kaffaarah, Nafil (optional) fasts as well as the Qadhaa fasts of Ramadaan and others. The ruling of this type (where the Shari'ah has not specified a time) is that Niyat (to specify the fast one is keeping through intention) is necessary because of it being crowded (by acts similar in nature all being permissible in that same time).

ثُمَّ لِلْعَبْدِ أَنْ يُوجِبَ شَيْئًا عَلَى نَفْسِهِ مَوْقَّتًا أَوْ غَيْرَ مَوْقَّتٍ وَلَيْسَ لَهُ تَغْيِيرُ حُكْمِ الشَّرْعِ

Then it is permissible for a person to make something Waajib upon himself, restricted to a certain time or unrestricted, but he cannot change the ruling of Shari'ah.

مِثْلُهُ إِذَا نَذَرَ أَنْ يَصُومَ يَوْمًا بِعَيْنِهِ لَزِمَهُ ذَلِكَ وَلَوْ صَامَهُ عَنْ قَضَاءِ رَمَضَانَ أَوْ عَنْ كَفَّارَةِ يَمِينِهِ جَازَ لِأَنَّ الشَّرْعَ جَعَلَ الْقَضَاءَ مُطْلَقًا فَلَا يَتِمَكَّنُ الْعَبْدُ مِنْ تَغْيِيرِهِ بِالتَّقْيِيدِ بِغَيْرِهِ ذَلِكَ الْيَوْمَ وَلَا يَلْزَمُ عَلَى هَذَا مَا إِذَا صَامَهُ عَنْ نَفْلِ حَيْثُ يَقَعُ عَنِ الْمَنْدُورِ لَا عَمَّا نَوَى لِأَنَّ النَّفْلَ حَقُّ الْعَبْدِ إِذَا هُوَ يَسْتَبِدُّ بِنَفْسِهِ مِنْ تَرْكِهِ وَتَحْقِيقِهِ فَجَازَ أَنْ يُؤَثِّرَ فِعْلُهُ فِيمَا هُوَ حَقُّهُ لَا فِيمَا هُوَ حَقُّ الشَّرْعِ

An example of this (that a person can make something Waajib upon himself but cannot change the ruling of Shari'ah) is when a person vows to fast on a specific day, making it compulsory to keep that fast. If he were to then keep a

Qadhaa fast of Ramadaan or fast for his Kaffaarah for breaking an oath then it will be permissible. The reason for this is that the Shari'ah has made keeping Qadhaa Mutlaq (not restricted to a time and can be kept or made at any time) thus it is not possible for a person to specify it to another day besides that day. This (ruling above that) does not apply to when a person keeps a Nafl fast (on the day he made a vow to keep a fast) such that it will fulfil his vow and will not be for the intention he kept it because Nafl is the right of the person as one was the choice to leave it or complete it, thus it will be permissible to give preference to his own actions (the vow he made) over his own rights (the Nafl fast) and not the rights of Shari'ah.

Rulings deduced from the above

وَعَلَىٰ إِعْتِبَارِ هَذَا الْمَعْنَى قَالِ مَشَائِخُنَا إِذَا شَرَطَا فِي الْخُلْعِ أَنْ لَا نَقْفَةَ لَهَا وَلَا سَكْنَى سَقَطَتِ النَّقْفَةُ دُونَ السَّكْنَى حَتَّى لَا يَتِمَّكَنَ الزَّوْجُ مِنْ إِخْرَاجِهَا عَنْ بَيْتِ الْعِدَّةِ لِأَنَّ السَّكْنَى فِي بَيْتِ الْعِدَّةِ حَقُّ الشَّرْعِ فَلَا يَتِمَّكَنُ الْعَبْدُ مِنْ إِسْقَاطِهِ بِخِلَافِ النَّقْفَةِ

Based upon this (that a person actions will given preference over his rights and not the rights stipulated by Shari'ah) our scholars say that if a couple stipulate the condition when making Khul'aa (when the husbands concedes to issuing a Talaaq in exchange for recompense) that no maintenance will be given nor living quarters provided(during the period of Iddah) then (the right to) maintenance will be ceded (and the husband will not need to provide maintenance) but living quarters will not such that it is not possible (not permissible) for the husband to expel her from the house during the Iddah. The reason for this (why maintenance will be ceded and not living quarters) is that the right to living quarters in the house of Iddah is a right of Shari'ah and it is not

possible for a person to cede such a right as opposed to maintenance (which is the right of the woman).

Amr necessitates Hasan in the Ma'moor Bihi

فصل
الْأَمْرُ بِالشَّيْءِ يُدُلُّ عَلَى حُسْنِ الْمَأْمُورِ بِهِ إِذَا كَانَ الْأَمْرُ حَكِيمًا لِأَنَّ الْأَمْرَ
لِبَيَانِ أَنَّ الْمَأْمُورَ بِهِ مِمَّا يَنْبَغِي أَنْ يُوجَدَ فَأَقْتَضَى ذَلِكَ حُسْنَهُ

Amr of an act necessitates that the Ma'moor Bihi (the act being ordered) is Hasan (is good/virtuous) if the one giving the Amr is Hakeem (Wise). The reason for this is that Amr is to point out that the Ma'moor Bihi is amongst those things which are appropriate to do, thus necessitating that they be Hassan (as ALLAAH Ta'ala would never order the perpetration of immorality or futility).

Two type of Hasan in Ma'moor Bihi

ثُمَّ الْمَأْمُورُ بِهِ فِي حَقِّ الْحُسْنِ نَوْعَانِ حَسَنٌ بِنَفْسِهِ وَحَسَنٌ لِّغَيْرِهِ فَالْحَسَنُ
بِنَفْسِهِ مِثْلُ الْإِيمَانِ بِاللَّهِ تَعَالَى وَ شُكْرُ الْمُنْعِمِ وَالصَّدَقِ وَالْعَدْلِ وَالصَّلَاةِ
نَحْوَهَا مِنَ الْعِبَادَاتِ الْخَالِصَةِ

Then Hasan in the Ma'moor Bihi is divided into two types; Hasan bi Nafsihi and Hasan Li-Ghairihi. Examples of Hasan bi Nafsihi (where the goodness is in the act itself) is Imaan in ALLAAH, gratitude for the bounties (ALLAAH has showered on a person), truthfulness, justice, Salaah, etc, from the acts of worship.

The ruling of Hasan bi Nafsihi

فَحُكْمُ هَذَا النَّوعِ أَنَّهُ إِذَا وَجَبَ عَلَى الْعَبْدِ أَدَائُهُ لَا يَسْقُطُ إِلَّا بِالْأَدَاءِ وَ هَذَا
فِيمَا لَا يَحْتَمِلُ السُّقُوطَ مِثْلُ الْإِيمَانِ بِاللَّهِ تَعَالَى

The ruling of this category (that Ma'moor Bihi-Hasan bi Nafsihi which never falls away and has to be performed at all times) **is that if performance is Waajib on a person then one will not be absolved from it except by fulfilling it (perpetually, acting on it at all times), this is the ruling for that Amr which never falls away such as Imaam in ALLAAH (one has to have Imaan at every moment and one is never excused or absolved from it).**

وَ أَمَّا مَا يَحْتَمِلُ السُّقُوطَ فَهُوَ يَسْقُطُ بِالْأَدَاءِ أَوْ بِاسْقَاطِ الْأَمْرِ

(The ruling for the second type of Hasan bi Nafsihi, namely) **That which does fall away (one is absolved of it after performing it) is that it falls away by performance (of the act) or if the one who issued the order cancels the order.**

Rulings deduced from the above

وَعَلَى هَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا وَجَبَتِ الصَّلَاةُ فِي أَوَّلِ الْوَقْتِ سَقَطَ الْوَاجِبُ بِالْأَدَاءِ أَوْ
بِاعْتِرَاضِ الْجُنُونِ وَ الْحَيْضِ وَ النَّفَاسِ فِي آخِرِ الْوَقْتِ بِاعْتِبَارِ أَنَّ
الشَّرْعَ اسْقَطَهَا عَنْهُ عِنْدَ هَذِهِ الْعَوَارِضِ وَ لَا يَسْقُطُ بِضَيِّقِ الْوَقْتِ وَ عَدَمِ
الْمَاءِ وَ اللَّبَاسِ وَ نَحْوِهِ

Based upon this (principle; that which does fall away, falls away by its performance or if the one who issued the order cancels the order) we say that if Salaah became Waajib when the time set in then one will be absolved of it through performance (of the Salaah) or if one went into a state of insanity, Haidh (menstruation) or Nifaas (post natal bleeding) after the time set in because (the reason for absolving a person of this Waajib because of insanity, Haidh or Nifaas) the Shari'ah has absolved one from this duty

when in such a state (*of insanity, Haidh, or Nifaas*). **(However) It will not fall away because of insufficient time, lack of water or clothing, etc** (*as Salaah can still be performed after the time has expired as Qadhaa Salaah, or with Tayammum if no water is available or naked if one does not have clothing*).

Hasan Li-Ghairihi

النَّوعُ الثَّانِي مَا يَكُونُ حَسَنًا بِوَاسِطَةِ الْغَيْرِ وَ ذَلِكَ مِثْلُ السَّعْيِ إِلَى الْجُمُعَةِ وَالْوُضُوءِ لِلصَّلَاةِ فَإِنَّ السَّعْيَ حَسَنٌ بِوَاسِطَةِ كَوْنِهِ مُفْضِيًا إِلَى آدَاءِ الْجُمُعَةِ وَالْوُضُوءِ حَسَنٌ بِوَاسِطَةِ كَوْنِهِ مِفْتَاحًا لِلصَّلَاةِ

The second type (*of Hasan in the Ma'moor Bihi*) **is that which is Hasan** (*good/virtuous*) **because of something else** (*the objective behind the act is what makes the act itself Hasan*). **An example of this** (*Hasan Li-Ghairihi*) **is hurrying towards the Jumu'ah Salaah and** (*performing*) **Wudhu for Salaah, as hurrying** (*even though it might not be considered good by itself*) **is Hasan because of it taking one towards the performance of Jumu'ah Salaah and Wudhu is Hasan because of it being the key** (*prerequisite*) **to** (*of*) **Salaah.**

The ruling of Hasan Li-Ghairihi

وَحُكْمُ هَذَا النَّوعِ أَنَّهُ يَسْقُطُ بِسُقُوطِ تِلْكَ الْوَاسِطَةِ حَتَّىٰ أَنَّ السَّعْيَ لَا يَجِبُ عَلَى مَنْ لَا جُمُعَةَ عَلَيْهِ وَلَا يَجِبُ الْوُضُوءُ عَلَى مَنْ لَا صَلَاةَ عَلَيْهِ وَلَوْ سَعَىٰ إِلَى الْجُمُعَةِ فَحُمِلَ مُكْرَهًا إِلَى مَوْضِعٍ آخَرَ قَبْلَ إِقَامَةِ الْجُمُعَةِ يَجِبُ عَلَيْهِ السَّعْيُ ثَانِيًا وَلَوْ كَانَ مُعْتَكِفًا فِي الْجَامِعِ يَكُونُ السَّعْيُ سَاقِطًا عَنْهُ وَ

كَذَلِكَ لَوْ تَوَضَّأَ فَأَخَذَتْ قَبْلَ آدَاءِ الصَّلَاةِ يَجِبُ عَلَيْهِ الْوُضُوءُ ثَانِيًا وَ لَوْ
كَانَ مُتَوَضِّيًا عِنْدَ وَجُوبِ الصَّلَاةِ لَا يَجِبُ عَلَيْهِ تَجْدِيدُ الْوُضُوءِ

The ruling of this category (Hasan Li-Ghairihi) is that it (its necessity) falls away if its cause (that which makes it Hasan) falls away such that hurrying towards Jumu'ah Salaah will not be Waajib on that person upon whom Jumu'ah Salaah is not Waajib nor will Wudhu be Waajib upon that person upon Wudhu is not Waajib. (However) If a person hurries towards Jumu'ah Salaah but is then forcefully taken elsewhere, it will Waajib upon him to hurry towards the Jumu'ah Salaah a second time (as the Jumu'ah Salaah is still Waajib on him and has not fallen away). If a person is performing I'tikaaf in a Jaamie Masjid then hurrying towards Jumu'ah Salaah will fall away (as he is already present for the Jumu'ah Salaah which is the purpose of rushing). In a similar manner (to the two rulings mentioned above) if a person performs Wudhu but his Wudhu breaks before performing Salaah, it will be Waajib for him to perform Wudhu a second time (as the Salaah is till Waajib on him) and if he already is in a state of Wudhu when Salaah begins, it will not be Waajib for him to make Wudhu a second time (as he is already in a state of purity which is the purpose of making Wudhu before Salaah).

Other acts which are Hasan Li-Ghairihi

وَ الْقَرِيبُ مِنْ هَذَا النَّوعِ الْحُدُودُ وَ الْقِصَاصُ وَ الْجِهَادُ فَإِنَّ الْحَدَّ حَسَنٌ
بِوَاسِطَةِ الرَّجْرِ عَنِ الْجَنَائَةِ وَ الْجِهَادُ حَسَنٌ بِوَاسِطَةِ دَفْعِ شَرِّ الْكُفْرَةِ
وَ إِعْلَاءِ كَلِمَةِ الْحَقِّ وَلَوْ فَرَضْنَا عَدَمَ الْوَاسِطَةِ لَا يَبْقَى ذَلِكَ مَأْمُورًا بِهِ
فَإِنَّهُ لَوْلَا الْجَنَائَةُ لَا يَجِبُ الْحَدُّ وَ لَوْ لَا الْكُفْرُ الْمُفْضِي إِلَى الْحَرْبِ لَا
يَجِبُ عَلَيْهِ الْجِهَادُ

Close to this category (of *Hasan Li-Ghairihi*) is **Hudood**, **Qisaas** (the *Shar'ie* punishments and penalties for various crimes), and **Jihaad** as punishments are good because of it preventing crime and **Jihaad** is good because it eliminates the evils of the **Kuffaar** and establishes the word (laws) of **ALLAAH**. If we were to say (hypothetically) that the reason which makes it good does not exist then it would no longer be the **Ma'moor Bihi** (that is the order to carry it out would no longer apply) because if there is no crime then punishment will not be **Wajib** and if there is no **Kufr** which leads to battle then **Jihaad** would not be **Wajib**.

Wajib established by Amr is of two types

فصل

الْوَجِبُ بِحُكْمِ الْأَمْرِ نَوْعَانِ آدَاءٌ وَقَضَاءٌ فَالْآدَاءُ عِبَارَةٌ عَنْ تَسْلِيمِ عَيْنِ الْوَجِبِ إِلَى مُسْتَحِقِّهِ وَالْقَضَاءُ عِبَارَةٌ عَنْ تَسْلِيمِ مِثْلِ الْوَجِبِ إِلَى مُسْتَحِقِّهِ

Wajib which has been established by **Amr** is of two types; **Adaa** and **Qadhaa**. **Adaa** is fulfilling the **Wajib** precisely to in the manner ordained (for example performing **Salaah** in its appropriate time). **Qadhaa** is fulfilling similar to the **Wajib** similar to what has been ordained (for example performing **Salaah** after its time has expired).

ثُمَّ الْآدَاءُ نَوْعَانِ كَامِلٌ وَقَاصِرٌ

Then **Adaa** is divided (further) into two types; **Kaamil** (to perform the act in the manner and with the same characteristics as it was made **Wajib** on a person) and **Qaasir** (to perform the act with a slight defect in the characteristics prescribed).

Examples of Adaa-Kaamil

فَالْكَامِلُ مِثْلُ آدَاءِ الصَّلَاةِ فِي وَقْتِهَا بِالْجَمَاعَةِ أَوْ الطَّوَافِ مُتَوَضِّئًا
وَتَسْلِيمِ الْمَبِيعِ سَلِيمًا كَمَا اقْتَضَاهُ الْعَقْدُ إِلَى الْمُشْتَرِي وَتَسْلِيمِ الْغَاصِبِ
الْعَيْنَ الْمَغْصُوبَةَ كَمَا غَصَبَهَا

An example of Adaa-Kaamil is performing Salaah in its proper time with Jamaat or performing Tawaaf with Wudhu and handing over the purchased item undamaged as was contracted with the buyer and a bandit handing over the seized property in the very same condition it was seized.

The ruling of Adaa-Kaamil

وَحُكْمُ هَذَا النَّوعِ أَنْ يُحْكَمَ بِالْخُرُوجِ عَنِ الْعُهُدَةِ بِهِ

The ruling of this category (Adaa-Kaamil) is that one will be absolved (entirely) of his duty (responsibility) by performing it (in a perfect manner).

Rulings derived from the above

وَعَلَى هَذَا قُلْنَا الْغَاصِبُ إِذَا بَاعَ الْمَغْصُوبَ مِنَ الْمَالِكِ أَوْ رَهْنَهُ عَنْدَهُ أَوْ
وَهَبَهُ لَهُ وَسَلَّمَهُ إِلَيْهِ يَخْرُجُ عَنِ الْعُهُدَةِ وَيَكُونُ ذَلِكَ آدَاءً لِحَقِّهِ وَيَلْغُو مَا
صَرَّحَ بِهِ مِنَ الْبَيْعِ وَالْهَبِ وَلَوْ غَصَبَ طَعَامًا فَأَطْعَمَهُ مَالِكُهُ وَهُوَ لَا
يَذَرِي أَنَّهُ طَعَامُهُ أَوْ غَصَبَ ثَوْبًا فَأَلْبَسَهُ مَالِكُهُ وَهُوَ لَا يَذَرِي أَنَّهُ ثَوْبُهُ
يَكُونُ ذَلِكَ آدَاءً لِحَقِّهِ

Based upon this (principle mentioned above that one will be absolved entirely by performing it in a perfect manner) **we say** that if the person who forcefully seized another's property sells it back to the owner or left it as guarantee (for payment) with him (known as *Rahan*) or gifted it to him (the owner) and then hands it over to him then he will no longer be liable for it and this (handing over of the property) will be taken as **Adaa- Kaamil** (fulfilling his right perfectly). The conditions stipulated by the sale or gift (as well as *Rahan*) will be void (and the original owner can take possession of it without recompense). (Similarly) **If a person forcefully seizes food and feeds the owner such that the owner does not know that it is the food that was taken from him, or clothes are seized and given to the owner to wear such that he does not know that it is his clothes, then this will be taken to be Adaa- Kaamil** (fulfilling his right perfectly and in all the cases mentioned above nothing further will be levied upon the one who seized the items).

وَالْمُشْتَرَىٰ فِي الْبَيْعِ الْفَاسِدِ لَوْ أَعَارَ الْمَبِيعَ مِنَ الْبَائِعِ أَوْ رَهْنَهُ عِنْدَهُ أَوْ
أَجْرَهُ مِنْهُ أَوْ بَاعَهُ مِنْهُ أَوْ وَهَبَ لَهُ وَسَلَّمَهُ يَكُونُ ذَلِكَ أَذَاءً لِحَقِّهِ وَيُلْغُو مَا
صَرَخَ بِهِ مِنَ الْبَيْعِ وَالْهَبَةِ وَنَحْوِهِ

(Similarly) **If the purchaser in an illegitimate sales transaction** (in which it is compulsory for the purchaser to return the goods back to the seller) **lends the seller the purchased item, leaves it as guarantee with the buyer, rents it to him, sells it (back) to him, or gifts it to him and then hands it over to the buyer then this will be considered to be Adaa-Kaamil** (fulfilling the right perfectly) and the conditions (of sale, rent, lending, etc) will all be void.

Definition of Adaa- Qaasir

وَأَمَّا الْإِدَاءُ الْقَاصِرُ فَهُوَ تَسْلِيمُ عَيْنِ الْوَاجِبِ مَعَ النُّقْصَانِ فِي صِفَتِهِ نَحْوُ الصَّلَاةِ بِدُونِ تَعْدِيلِ الْأَرْكَانِ أَوِ الطَّوَافِ مُحْدَثًا وَرَدَّ الْمَبِيعِ مَشْغُولًا بِالذِّينِ أَوْ بِالْجِنَايَةِ وَرَدَّ الْمَغْصُوبِ مُبَاحِ الدِّمِّ بِالْقَتْلِ مَشْغُولًا بِالذِّينِ أَوِ الْجِنَايَةِ بِسَبَبٍ عِنْدَ الْغَاصِبِ وَإِدَاءُ الزَّيُوفِ مَكَانَ الْجِيَادِ إِذَا لَمْ يَعْلَمْ الدَّائِنُ ذَلِكَ

Adaa- Qaasir is to perform the act with a slight defect in the characteristics prescribed such as (for example) performing Salaah hastily (rushing thus abandoning Ta'adeel) or performing Tawaaf without Wudhu or handing over the purchased item (such as a slave) such that it is deep in debt or has been sentenced for punishment (whereas this was not the state when the transaction was made) or returning the seized item (such as a slave) such that it has been sentenced to death (for having committed murder) or is deep in debt or sentenced for punishment for something it did while in the possession of the one who seized it (in all the above cases the act has been performed or item returned with defect). (Another example of Adaa- Qaasir is) Paying with defective currency in place of genuine when the creditor is unaware of it.

The ruling of Adaa- Qaasir

وَحُكْمُ هَذَا النَّوعِ أَنَّهُ إِنْ أَمَكَنَ جَبُرَ النُّقْصَانُ بِالْمِثْلِ يَنْجَبِرُ بِهِ وَإِلَّا يَسْقُطُ حُكْمُ النُّقْصَانِ إِلَّا فِي الْأَثَمِ

The ruling of this category (Adaa- Qaasir) is that if it is possible to compensate for the fault in a like manner then it will be offset by it (the compensation) and if not (it cannot be compensated for in a like manner) then the fault will be excused but not the sin (even though one will not have to compensate for the fault, he will still be regarded as sinful).

Rulings deduced from the above

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا إِذَا تَرَكَ تَعْدِيلَ الْأَرْكَانِ فِي بَابِ الصَّلَاةِ لَا يُمَكِّنُ تَدَارُكُهُ بِالْمِثْلِ إِذْ لَا مِثْلَ لَهُ عِنْدَ الْعَبْدِ فَيَسْقُطُ وَلَوْ تَرَكَ الصَّلَاةَ فِي أَيَّامِ التَّشْرِيقِ فَقَضَاهَا فِي غَيْرِ أَيَّامِ التَّشْرِيقِ لَا يُكَبِّرُ لِأَنَّهُ لَيْسَ لَهُ التَّكْبِيرُ بِالْجَهْرِ شَرْعًا وَفَلْنَا فِي تَرْكِ قِرَاءَةِ الْفَاتِحَةِ وَالْقَنُوتِ وَالتَّشَهُدِ وَتَكْبِيرَاتِ الْعِيدَيْنِ أَنَّهُ يَنْجَبِرُ بِالسَّهْوِ وَلَوْ طَافَ طَوَافَ الْفَرَضِ مُحْدَثًا يَنْجَبِرُ ذَلِكَ وَهُوَ بِالْذَّمِّ وَهُوَ مِثْلُ لَهُ شَرْعًا

Based upon this (that in Adaa-Qaasir, if the fault can be compensated for in a like manner then it will be offset by it and if not then the fault will be excused) **we say** since there is no like compensation if a person performs Salaah hastily (without Ta'adeel) there will be no compensation for it and it (the fault caused by performing Salaah hastily) will be excused (but he will still be sinful for doing so). If a person did not perform his Salaah during the days of Tashreek and then performed Qadhaa of those (missed) Salaah on some other day, then he will not make Takbeer (Takbeer-Tashreek) as according to Shari'ah there is Takbeer Tashreek on those days (since there is no compensation for the missed Takbeer it will be excused). We say that not reciting Surah Faatihah, Dua-Qunoot, Tashahud and the Takbeeraat of the two Eid Salaah will be compensated for with Sajdah Sahw and if one performed Fardh Tawaaf without Wudhu then it will be compensated for with sacrifice (of a sheep) as this is the like compensation (for these faults) as stipulated by Shari'ah.

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا لَوْ أَدَّى زَيْفًا مَكَانَ جَيِّدٍ فَهَلَّاكَ عِنْدَ الْقَابِضِ لَا شَيْءَ لَهُ عَلَى الْمَدْيُونِ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ لِأَنَّهُ لَا مِثْلَ لِصِفَةِ الْحَوْدَةِ مُنْفَرِدَةً حَتَّى يُمَكِّنَ جَبْرُهَا بِالْمِثْلِ وَلَوْ سَلَّمَ الْعَبْدَ مُبَاحَ الدَّمِّ بِحِنَايَةِ عِنْدَ الْعَاصِبِ أَوْ عِنْدَ الْبَائِعِ بَعْدَ الْبَيْعِ فَإِنْ هَلَكَ عِنْدَ الْمَالِكِ أَوْ الْمُشْتَرَى قَبْلَ الدَّفْعِ لَزِمَهُ الثَّمَنُ وَبَرِيَ

الْغَاصِبُ بِاعْتِبَارِ أَصْلِ الْإِدَاءِ وَإِنْ قُتِلَ بِتِلْكَ الْجَنَائَةِ اسْتَنَّذَ الْهَلَاكُ إِلَى
أَوَّلِ سَبَبِهِ فَصَارَ كَأَنَّهُ لَمْ يُوجَدْ الْإِدَاءُ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى
وَالْمَغْضُوبَةُ إِذَا رُدَّتْ حَامِلًا بِفِعْلِ عِنْدَ الْغَاصِبِ فَمَاتَتْ بِالْوِلَادَةِ عِنْدَ
الْمَالِكِ لَا يَزِرُ الْغَاصِبُ عَنِ الضَّمَانِ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى

Based upon this (that in Adaa-Qaasir, if the fault can be compensated for in a like manner then it will be offset by it and if not then the fault will be excused)**if a person pays with counterfeit currency in place of genuine and the currency is then lost by the one who took possession of it (the creditor losses it) then according to Imaam Abu Hanifah** nothing (no compensation) **will be incumbent upon the debtor as there is no like compensation for the counterfeit currency itself such that the fault may be overcome with a like compensation.**

(Similarly another ruling derived from the above is)**If the slave who has been sentenced to death (for committing murder) for a crime committed while in the possession of the one who seized him is returned (back to the original owner) or (the slave who has been sentenced to death for committing murder for a crime committed) while in the possession the seller after the sale was concluded is handed over to the buyer, and the slave dies after being returned to the owner or after being handed over to the buyer then the price will be incumbent (upon the buyer to pay the seller) and the one who seized it will be free from his obligation as Adaa has occurred (even though Qaasir, and compensation in a like manner is impossible since the slave has died). (However) If the slave is killed because of that crime (which he committed while in the possession of the seller or the one who seized it) then the loss (death) will be assigned to the cause of death (the death will be said to have occurred when the crime was committed, which would mean that the slave died while in the possession of the seller or seizer), thus it would be as if Adaa did not take**

place at all, according to the opinion of Imaam Abu Hanifah □.

If a female slave is returned pregnant to her owner, when she conceived while in the possession of the one who seized her, and then later dies during childbirth in the possession of her owner, then the one who seized will not be absolved of recompense according to Imaam Abu Hanifah □ (and he will have to pay the owner for the loss of his slave).

Adaa is the primary choice

ثُمَّ الْأَصْلُ فِي هَذَا الْبَابِ هُوَ الْأَدَاءُ كَامِلًا كَانَ أَوْ نَاقِصًا وَإِنَّمَا يُصَارُ إِلَى الْقَضَاءِ عِنْدَ تَعَذُّرِ الْأَدَاءِ

The primary choice in this section (*the first method of fulfilling the Ma'moor Bihi*) **is Adaa, whether it be Kaamil or Qaasir. Qadhaa will only be resorted to when Adaa is not possible.**

وَلِهَذَا يَتَعَيَّنُ الْمَالُ فِي الْوَدِيعَةِ وَالْوَكَالَةِ وَالْعَصَبِ وَلَوْ أَرَادَ الْمُودَعُ وَالْوَكِيلُ وَالْعَاصِبُ أَنْ يُمْسِكَ الْعَيْنَ وَيُدْفَعَ مَا يُمَاتِلُهُ لَيْسَ لَهُ ذَلِكَ وَلَوْ بَاعَ شَيْئًا وَسَلَّمَهُ فَظَهَرَ بِهِ عَيْبٌ كَانَ الْمُشْتَرِي بِالْخِيَارِ بَيْنَ الْأَخْذِ وَالتَّرْكِ فِيهِ

Based upon this (*that Adaa is the primary choice*) **the merchandise** (*which was left in trust, seized or one deputed to purchase*) **will be fixed when placing something in trust, appointing someone to purchase on one's behalf, or when an item is unlawfully seized** (*and the exact same item has to be returned or handed over because Adaa is resorted to first*). **If the trustee, Wakeel or seizer desires to keep the original merchandise and pay in kind, it will be impermissible to do so.**

If a person a person sells something, hands it over and thereafter a fault is seen in the item, then the buyer has the choice to either keep it as is or return it (*and be refunded*).

وَبِاعْتِبَارِ أَنَّ الْأَصْلَ هُوَ الْأَدَاءُ يَقُولُ الشَّافِعِيُّ الْوَاجِبُ عَلَى الْغَاصِبِ رَدُّ الْعَيْنِ الْمَغْصُوبَةِ وَإِنْ تَغَيَّرَتْ فِي يَدِ الْغَاصِبِ تَغْيِيرًا فَاجْشًا وَ يَجِبُ الْإِرْشُ بِسَبَبِ النُّقْصَانِ وَعَلَى هَذَا لَوْ غَصَبَ حِنْطَةً فَطَحَنَهَا أَوْ سَاجَةً فَبَنَى عَلَيْهَا دَارًا أَوْ شَاءَ فَذَبَحَهَا وَشَوَّاهَا أَوْ عَنَبًا فَعَصَّرَهَا أَوْ حِنْطَةً فَزَرَعَهَا وَنَبَتَ الزَّرْعُ كَانَ ذَلِكَ مِلْكًا لِلْمَالِكِ عِنْدَهُ وَقُلْنَا جَمِيعَهَا لِلْغَاصِبِ وَيَجِبُ عَلَيْهِ رَدُّ الْقِيَمَةِ

Based upon this principle that the first choice is that of Adaa (*and Qadhaa is only permitted when Adaa is impossible*)

Imaam Shaafie □ says that it is Waajib for the one who (*unlawfully*) seized another's property to return the very same seized item, even if it has been changed (*or damaged*) drastically while in the hands of the seizer, and compensation for the damage will be Waajib upon one who seized it. Based upon this (*that Imaam Shaafie says it is Waajib to return the very same seized item*) if a person seizes wheat and grinds it, (*seizes*) property and builds a house on it, (*seizes*) a sheep, slaughters it and cooks it, (*seizes*) grapes and squeezes it (*extracts its juice*) or (*seizes*) wheat, planting it and causing it to grow then according to Imaam Shaafie □ this all (*the grounded wheat, house, cooked meat, grape juice, etc*) is the property of the (*original*) owner. We say (*scholars of the Hanafi School of jurisprudence*) that it all belongs to the one who seized it and (*in such instances*) he will have to pay the price of the seized item.

وَلَوْ غَصَبَ فِصَّةً فَضْرَبَهَا دَرَاهِمَ أَوْ تَبْرًا فَاتَّخَذَهَا دَنَابِيرَ أَوْ شَاءَ فَذَبَحَهَا لَا يَنْقَطِعُ حَقُّ الْمَالِكِ فِي ظَاهِرِ الرَّوَايَةِ وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْ غَصَبَ قُطْنًا فَغَزَلَهُ أَوْ غَزَلَ لَا فَنَسَجَهُ لَا يَنْقَطِعُ حَقُّ الْمَالِكِ فِي ظَاهِرِ الرَّوَايَةِ

(However) If a person seizes silver and makes Dirhams (silver coins) with it, (seizes) gold and makes Dinaars (gold coins) with it or (seizes) a sheep and (only) slaughters it then according to the favoured opinion (preferred ruling in the Hanafi Madhab) the right of the owner will not be lost (and it will still belong to him). Similarly if a person seizes cotton and spins it into yarn or (seizes) yarn and sows it into cloth then according to the favoured opinion (preferred ruling in the Hanafi Madhab) the right of the owner will not be lost (and it will still belong to him).

وَيَتَفَرَّغُ مِنْ هَذَا مَسْئَلَةُ الْمَضْمُونَاتِ وَ لَدَا قَالَ لَوْ ظَهَرَ الْعَبْدُ الْمَغْصُوبُ
بَعْدَ مَا أَخَذَ الْمَالُكَ ضَمَانَهُ مِنَ الْغَاصِبِ كَانَ الْعَبْدُ مِلْكًا لِلْمَالِكِ وَالْوَاجِبُ
عَلَى الْمَالِكِ رَدُّ مَا أَخَذَ مِنْ قِيَمَةِ الْعَبْدِ

The ruling of recompense is derived from the above (mentioned difference of opinion) that if the unlawfully seized slave is discovered after the owner has been compensated for its loss by the one who seized it, the slave will still belong to the owner and it will be Waajib for the owner to return the price of the slave which he claimed from the one who seized it (according to Imaam Shaafie).

Types of Qadhaa

وَأَمَّا الْقَضَاءُ فَتَوَعَّانَ كَامِلٌ وَقَاصِرٌ فَأَلْكَامِلُ مِنْهُ تَسْلِيمٌ مِثْلُ الْوَاجِبِ
صُورَةً وَمَعْنَى كَمَنْ غَصَبَ قَفِيرَ حِنْطَةٍ فَاسْتَهْلَكَهَا ضَمِنَ قَفِيرَ حِنْطَةٍ
وَيَكُونُ الْمُؤَدَى مِثْلًا لِلأَوَّلِ صُورَةً وَمَعْنَى وَكَذَلِكَ الْحُكْمُ فِي جَمِيعِ
الْمِثْلِيَّاتِ

Qadhaa is of two types; Kaamil and Qaasir. Qadhaa Kaamil is to present that which is similar to what is Waajib (on a person) in both composition (meaning that it is exactly the same in its make-up and structure) and meaning (the

price/value is the same as what is Waajib, in other words Qadhaa Kaamil is when the exact act cannot be performed or exact item cannot be returned but an act or item resembling and identical to it, but another, is performed or handed over) **such as when a person forcefully seizes a bag of wheat and then loses (it is destroyed or used up) then a (another) bag of wheat (similar to the one which was lost will be Waajib upon him) thus (in this manner) what is handed over will resemble the first in both composition and meaning. The ruling is the same in all those items which resemble each other.**

Qadhaa Qaasir

وَأَمَّا الْقَاصِرُ فَهُوَ مَا لَا يُمَاتِلُ الْوَاجِبَ صُورَةً وَيُمَاتِلُ مَعْنَى كَمَنْ غَصَبَ شَاةً فَهَلَكَتْ ضَمِنَ قِيمَتَهَا وَالْقِيَمَةُ مِثْلُ الشَّاةِ مِنْ حَيْثُ الْمَعْنَى لَا مِنْ حَيْثُ الصُّورَةُ

Qadhaa Qaasir is that which is not similar to what is **Waajib** in composition but similar in meaning (it has the same value as what is **Waajib**) such as when a person forcefully seizes a sheep which he then loses (slaughters, cooks and consumes it); the price of it will be **Waajib** (upon the seizer). (Handing over) **The price is the same as the sheep in meaning but is not the same in composition (the value of the Sheep and the price paid for seizing it is the same but they are not the same in composition as the money obviously differs greatly from that of a sheep it its make up).**

Kaamil is the primary choice in Qadhaa

وَالْأَصْلُ فِي الْقَضَاءِ الْكَامِلُ وَعَلَى هَذَا قَالَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ إِذَا غَصَبَ مِثْلًا فَهَلَكَ فِي يَدِهِ وَانْقَطَعَ ذَلِكَ عَنْ أَيْدِي النَّاسِ ضَمِنَ قِيمَتَهُ يَوْمَ الْخُصُومَةِ لِأَنَّ الْعَجْزَ عَنْ تَسْلِيمِ الْمِثْلِ الْكَامِلِ إِنَّمَا يَظْهَرُ عِنْدَ الْخُصُومَةِ فَأَمَّا قَبْلَ الْخُصُومَةِ فَلَا لِتَصَوُّرِ حُصُولِ الْمِثْلِ مِنْ كُلِّ وَجْهِ

The primary choice in Qadhaa is Qadhaa-Kaamil (and *Qadhaa-Qaasir* will only be resorted to when *Qadhaa-Kaamil* is not possible). **Based upon this** (that the primary choice in *Qadhaa* is *Qadhaa-Kaamil*) **Imaam Abu Hanifah** ﷺ **says that if a person seizes something which has its equivalent** (items which are all identical in structure and make-up) **and then loses it but that** (item which has an equivalent) **is unattainable from people** (at that time as it is out of stock or inaccessible) **then its price on the day of the court case will be made Waajib** because his inability to perform *Qadhaa Kaamil* **was made apparent on that day** (thus the value of the item on the day that it became apparent he is unable to handover its equivalent will be considered) **but not before the court case** (such that we can say that the value of the item on the day it was stolen is *Waajib* as is the opinion of Imaam Yusuf) **as the possibility existed** (before the court case) **to hand over its equivalent completely** (*Qadhaa-Kaamil* could have been possible then and the value of the item would not be made *Waajib* on him then, as *Qadhaa-Qaasir* is only resorted to when *Qadhaa-Kaamil* is not possible).

Qadhaa of that which has no equivalent

فَأَمَّا مَالًا مِثْلَ لَهُ لَا صُورَةً وَلَا مَعْنَى لَا يُمَكِّنُ إِيْجَابُ الْقَضَاءِ فِيْهِ بِالْمِثْلِ وَلِهَذَا الْمَعْنَى قُلْنَا إِنَّ الْمَنَافِعَ لَا تُضْمَنُ بِالْأَثْلَافِ لِأَنَّ إِيْجَابَ الضَّمَانِ بِالْمِثْلِ مُنْعَدَّرٌ وَ إِيْجَابُهُ بِالْعَيْنِ كَذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ الْعَيْنَ لَا تُمَاتِلُ الْمُنْفَعَةَ لَا صُورَةً وَلَا مَعْنَى كَمَا إِذَا غَصَبَ عَبْدًا فَاسْتَحْدَمَهُ شَهْرًا أَوْ دَارًا فَسَكَنَ فِيْهَا شَهْرًا ثُمَّ رَدَّ الْمَغْصُوبَ إِلَى الْمَالِكِ لَا يَجِبُ عَلَيْهِ ضَمَانُ الْمَنَافِعِ خِلَافًا لِلشَّافِعِيِّ فَبَقِيَ الْاِثْمُ حُكْمًا لَهُ وَانْتَقَلَ جَزَاؤُهُ إِلَى دَارِ الْآخِرَةِ

As far as that which has no equivalent, neither in composition nor meaning, it is not possible to make Qadhaa Waajib by its equivalent. And because of this (that *Qadhaa*

is not Waajib on that which has no equivalent) **we say that recompense for benefit** (which was derived from an item) **will not be Waajib** if the item is lost because (in this case) **making recompense Waajib with its equivalent is not possible** (since there is no equivalent for benefit, thus *Qadhaa-Qaasir* is not possible) **and making the exact same** (the equivalent value of the benefit) **Waajib is also not possible** because the exact same (equivalent value of the benefit) is neither the same as benefit in composition nor in meaning. For example if a person seizes a slave and takes service (derives benefit) from him for one month or (seizes) a house and stays in it (derives benefit from it) for a month and thereafter returns the seized items to its owner, recompensing (the owner) for the benefit derived will not be **Waajib** (according to *Ahnaaf*) as opposed to *Imaam Shaafie* □ (who says recompense is Waajib). The sin of his crime will remain (the sin of deriving benefit from the slave unlawfully will remain) and its penalty will be decided in the *Aakhirah*.

Rulings derived from the above

وَلِهَذَا الْمَعْنَى قُلْنَا لَا تُضْمَنُ مَنَافِعُ الْبُضْعِ بِالشَّهَادَةِ الْبَاطِلَةِ عَلَى الطَّلَاقِ وَلَا يَقْتُلُ مَنْكُوحَةَ الْغَيْرِ وَلَا بِالْوَطْئِ حَتَّى لَوْ وَطِئَ زَوْجَةً إِنْسَانٍ لَا يَضْمَنُ لِلزَّوْجِ شَيْئاً

Based upon this (that if an item has no equivalent, neither in composition or meaning, then it is not possible to make *Qadhaa Waajib*) **we say that there is no recompense for the benefit of sexual relations** (which was lost) **by a false testimony of Talaaq** (if two people falsely testify that he issued Talaaq to his wife, resulting in the *Qaadhi* separating them, and then later they confess to giving false testimony and the couple is reunited, then the witnesses will be punished for giving false testimony but recompense for the benefit which he lost from his wife during their period of separation will not be

*made Waajib on them), **nor** (will recompense be made Waajib) **for killing the wife of another** (if a person kills another's wife then the Shar'ie punishment will be meted out but recompense for the benefit which he lost from his wife by her death will not be made Waajib on him) **nor will recompense be taken for sexual relations, such that if a person commits adultery with another person wife then the adulterer will not recompense the husband for anything** (as in all of the above cases there is no equivalent for the benefit of sexual relations such that it can be made Waajib, thus the perpetrator will be sinful and its penalty decided in the Aakhirah).*

An exception to the rule

الْأَ إِذَا وَرَدَ الشَّرْعُ بِالْمِثْلِ مَعَ أَنَّهُ لَا يُمَاتِلُهُ صُورَةً وَلَا مَعْنَى فَيَكُونُ مِثْلًا
لَهُ شَرْعًا فَيَجِبُ قَضَاؤُهُ بِالْمِثْلِ الشَّرْعِيِّ وَ نَظِيرُهُ مَا قُلْنَا إِنَّ الْفِدْيَةَ فِي
حَقِّ الشَّيْخِ الْفَانِي مِثْلُ الصَّوْمِ وَالْدِّيَّةِ فِي الْقَتْلِ خَطَاءً مِثْلُ النَّفْسِ مَعَ أَنَّهُ
لَا مُشَابَهَةٌ بَيْنَهُمَا

(If an item has no equivalent, neither in composition nor meaning, then it is not possible to make Qadhaa Waajib)
Except if the Shari'ah has stipulated an equivalent for it despite it having no equivalent in composition or meaning. Thus this will be considered its Shar'ie equivalent and it will be Waajib to fulfil it (the usurped right or benefit) with the Shar'ie equivalent.

An example of this is what we say that Fidyah in respect of a Sheikh Faani (a person who is incapable of fasting) is the equivalent of fasting and the Diyyah (monetary compensation) in inadvertent murder is the same as a life (is the equivalent of the life taken) even though they ((the missed fasts with Fidyah and the life taken with Diyyah) have no similarity whatsoever.

Lesson on Nahy

Types of Nahy

فصل فى النهى
النَّهْيُ نَوْعَانِ نَهَى عَنِ الْأَفْعَالِ الْحَسِيَّةِ كَالزَّيْنِ وَشُرْبِ الْخَمْرِ وَالْكَذِبِ
وَالظُّلْمِ وَ نَهَى عَنِ التَّصَرُّفَاتِ الشَّرْعِيَّةِ كَالنَّهْيِ عَنِ الصَّوْمِ فِي يَوْمِ
النَّحْرِ وَالصَّلَاةِ فِي الْأَوْقَاتِ الْمَكْرُوهَةِ وَبَيْعِ الدَّرْهَمِ بِالدَّرْهَمَيْنِ

Nahy (is to prohibit or forbid something) is of two types; **Nahy of Af'aalil Hissiyah** (those acts, the meaning and evil of which was known before the coming of revelation) such as **Zinaa** (fornication), **consuming wine, deceit, and oppression** (the meaning of these acts was known even before the revelation of Shari'ah). (The second type of Nahy is) **Nahy of Tasarrufaatish Shari'ah** (those acts, the meaning and evil of which only became known after revelation) such as **the prohibition of fasting on the Day of Nahr (10 Dhul-Hijjah), Salaah in the forbidden times (sunrise, midday, sunset), and selling one dirham for two dirhams (which is termed as Riba and forbidden by Shari'ah).**

The ruling of Nahy of Af'aalil Hissiyah

وَحُكْمُ النَّوعِ الْأَوَّلِ أَنْ يَكُونَ الْمَنْهَى عَنْهُ هُوَ عَيْنُ مَا وَرَدَ عَلَيْهِ النَّهْيُ
فَيَكُونُ عَيْنُهُ قَبِيحًا فَلَا يَكُونُ مَشْرُوعًا أَصْلًا

The ruling of the first category (Nahy of Af'aalil Hissiyah) is that the prohibition is a result of the act itself, thus it (the

prohibited act) will be evil itself (Qabeeh-Li-Ainihi) and never permitted (in any circumstances, as ALLAAH Ta'ala will never permit or instruct evil and wickedness).

The ruling of Nahy of Tasarrufaatish Shari'ah

وَحُكْمُ النَّوعِ الثَّانِي أَنْ يَكُونَ الْمَنْهُيُّ عَنْهُ غَيْرَ مَا أُضِيفَ إِلَيْهِ النَّهْيُ
فَيَكُونُ حَسَنًا بِنَفْسِهِ قَبِيحًا لِعَظَمَةِ غَيْرِهِ وَيَكُونُ الْمُبَاشِرُ مُرْتَكِبًا لِلْحَرَامِ لِعَظَمَةِ
لِنَفْسِهِ

The ruling of the second category (Nahy of Tasarrufaatish Shari'ah) is that the prohibit is a result of exterior factors and not the act itself, thus it (the prohibited act) good in itself but evil because of exterior factors (Hasan bi-Nafsihi but Qabeeh Li-Ghairihi). The one who perpetrates such an act (an act falling under Nahy of Tasarrufaatish Shari'ah) perpetrates Haraam because of exterior factors (governing the prohibition at that time) and not because of the act itself.

وَعَلَى هَذَا قَالَ أَصْحَابُنَا النَّهْيُ عَنِ التَّصَرُّفَاتِ الشَّرْعِيَّةِ يَفْتَضِي تَقْرِيرَهَا
وَيُرَادُ بِذَلِكَ أَنَّ التَّصَرُّفَاتِ بَعْدَ النَّهْيِ يَبْقَى مَشْرُوعًا كَمَا كَانَ لِأَنَّهُ لَوْ لَمْ
يَبْقَ مَشْرُوعًا كَانَ الْعَبْدُ عَاجِزًا عَنْ تَحْصِيلِ الْمَشْرُوعِ وَحِينَئِذٍ كَانَ ذَلِكَ
نَهْيًا لِلْعَاجِزِ وَذَلِكَ مِنَ الشَّارِعِ مَحَالٌّ وَبِهِ فَارَقَ الْأَفْعَالُ الْحَسِيَّةُ لِأَنَّهُ
لَوْ كَانَ عَيْنُهَا قَبِيحًا لَا يُودَى ذَلِكَ إِلَى نَهْيِ الْعَاجِزِ لِأَنَّهُ بِهَذَا الْوَصْفِ لَا
يَعْجِزُ الْعَبْدُ عَنِ الْفِعْلِ الْحَسِيِّ

Based upon this (that Nahy of Tasarrufaatish Shari'ah is Hasan bi Nafsihi but Qabeeh Li-Ghairihi) our scholars (of the Hanafi school of thought) say that Nahy of Tasarrufaatish Shari'ah requires that it (the prohibited act) still be valid (after the prohibition in the same manner as before its prohibition). What is meant by this (that Nahy of Tasarrufaatish Shari'ah requires the prohibited act still to be valid) is that the act itself will still remain permissible after the prohibition as it was before being prohibited. The

reason for this (*why it is permissible after the prohibition as it was before the prohibition*) **is because if it is not valid** (*after the prohibition*) **then a person would be incapable of performing it and in this case the prohibition would be directed towards one who is incapable of performing it** (*making the Nahy redundant as one can only be prohibited from something he is capable of doing*), **which is impossible for the one creating the laws of Shari'ah to do.** This differentiates it (*Tasarrufaatish Shari'ah*) from Af'aalil Hissiyah because even if it is evil itself it would not necessitate the prohibition being directed towards one who is incapable of doing it, as an act being evil does not make one incapable of perpetrating it.

Rulings derived from the above

وَيَتَقَرَّعُ مِنْ هَذَا حُكْمُ الْبَيْعِ الْفَاسِدِ وَالْإِجَارَةِ الْفَاسِدَةِ وَالنَّذْرِ بِصَوْمِ يَوْمِ
النَّحْرِ وَجَمِيعِ صُورِ التَّصَرُّفَاتِ الشَّرْعِيَّةِ مَعَ وَرُودِ النَّهْيِ عَنْهَا فَقُلْنَا
الْبَيْعُ الْفَاسِدُ يُفِيدُ الْمَلِكَ عِنْدَ الْقَبْضِ بِإِعْتِبَارِ أَنَّهُ بَيْعٌ وَيَجِبُ نَقْضُهُ
بِإِعْتِبَارِ كَوْنِهِ حَرَامًا لِغَيْرِهِ

Derived from this (*principle that Nahy of Tasarrufaatish Shari'ah requires the prohibited act still to be valid*) **is the ruling of invalid sales transactions** (*Bay'a Faasid*), **invalid rental transactions** (*Ijaarah Faasidah*), **vowing to fast on the day of Nahr** (*10 Dhul-Hijjah*), **and all those acts of Shari'ah** (*that are normally permitted*) **which have been prohibited** (*due to external factors*). We say that an invalid sales transaction (*Bay'a Faasid*) **will cause the transfer ownership to take place** (*from the seller to the buyer*) **when the buyer takes possession of the item because of it being a sales transaction which is Waajib to reverse because of it being Haraam due to external factors** (*and it can only be reversed if it was completed in the first place by ownership being transferred*).

A reply to an objection

وَهَذَا بِخِلَافِ نِكَاحِ الْمُشْرِكَاتِ وَمَنْكُوحَةِ الْأَبِ وَمُعْتَدَةِ الْغَيْرِ وَمَنْكُوحَتِهِ
وَنِكَاحِ الْمَحَارِمِ وَالنِّكَاحِ بِغَيْرِ شُهُودٍ لِأَنَّ مُوجِبَ النِّكَاحِ حُلُّ التَّصْرِفِ
وَمُوجِبُ النَّهْيِ حُرْمَةُ التَّصْرِفِ فَاسْتَحَالَ الْجَمْعُ بَيْنَهُمَا فَيَحْمِلُ النَّهْيُ
عَلَى النَّفْيِ فَأَمَّا مُوجِبُ الْبَيْعِ ثُبُوتُ الْمَلِكِ وَمُوجِبُ النَّهْيِ حُرْمَةُ
التَّصْرِفِ وَقَدْ أُمِكنَ الْجَمْعُ بَيْنَهُمَا بِأَنَّ يَنْبُتَ الْمَلِكُ وَيَحْرُمَ التَّصْرِفُ
أَلَيْسَ أَنَّهُ لَوْ تَخَمَّرَ الْعَصِيرُ فِي مَلِكِ الْمُسْلِمِ يَبْقَى مَلِكُهُ فِيهَا وَيَحْرُمُ
التَّصْرِفُ

(If someone were to object saying that marriage to a Mushrikah, father's wife, etc, which is prohibited by Shari'ah should also remain valid after the prohibition as in the case of Bay'a Faasid then we would say) **This** (principle that Nahy of Tasarrufaatish Shari'ah requires the prohibited act still to be valid) **is different from marrying a Mushrikah, fathers wife, another's wife still in Iddah, wife of another, one's blood relatives as well as marrying without witnesses because Nikaah dictates the permissibility of action (such as sexual relations, etc) and the Nahy dictates the impermissibility of action, making reconciliation between the two impossible (as both require the total opposite), so the Nahy (of the above mentioned Nikaah) will have the meaning of Nafee¹. Whereas a sales transaction dictates that ownership be transferred (from the seller to the buyer) and the Nahy (of invalid sales transactions) dictates that action (transacting in the purchased item) is impermissible, and (in this scenario) reconciliation between the two is possible by establishing the transfer of ownership and transacting**

¹ The difference between Nahy and Nafee: In Nahy a person has the choice to either abstain or perpetrate the act, whereby he will be rewarded for abstaining and punished for perpetrating it; in Nafee a person does not have the choice to abstain or perpetrate it, but instead has to abstain from it absolutely.

being Haraam. (A scenario similar to this whereby ownership remains but transacting is Haraam) **Is it not such that if grape juice ferments and turns into wine while in the possession of a Muslim it still remains in his ownership but transacting with it is Haraam.**

Rulings

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا قَالَ أَصْحَابُنَا إِذَا نَذَرَ بِصَوْمٍ يَوْمِ النَّحْرِ وَأَيَّامِ التَّشْرِيقِ يَصِحُّ نَذْرُهُ لِأَنَّهُ نَذَرَ بِصَوْمٍ مَشْرُوعٍ وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْ نَذَرَ بِالصَّلَاةِ فِي الْأَوْقَاتِ الْمَكْرُوهَةِ يَصِحُّ لِأَنَّهُ نَذَرَ بِعِبَادَةٍ مَشْرُوعَةٍ لِمَا ذَكَرْنَا أَنَّ اللَّهَ يُوجِبُ بَقَاءَ التَّصَرُّفِ مَشْرُوعاً وَلِهَذَا قُلْنَا لَوْ شَرَعَ فِي النَّفْلِ فِي هَذِهِ الْأَوْقَاتِ لَزِمَهُ بِالشَّرْوعِ وَارْتِكَابُ الْحَرَامِ لَيْسَ بِإِلْزَامٍ لِلزُّومِ الْإِنْتِمَاءِ فَإِنَّهُ لَوْ صَبَرَ حَتَّى حَلَّتِ الصَّلَاةُ بِارْتِفَاعِ الشَّمْسِ وَغُرُوبِهَا وَذُلُوكِهَا أَمَكَنَهُ الْإِتْمَامَ بِدُونِ الْكَرَاهَةِ وَبِهِ فَرَاقَ صَوْمُ يَوْمِ الْعِيدِ فَإِنَّهُ لَوْ شَرَعَ فِيهِ لَا يُلْزَمُهُ الْإِتْمَامُ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ وَمُحَمَّدٍ رَجِمَهُمَا اللَّهُ تَعَالَى لِأَنَّ الْإِتْمَامَ لَا يَنْفَكُ عَنِ ارْتِكَابِ الْحَرَامِ

Based upon this (principle that *Nahy of Tasarrufaatish Shari'ah* requires the prohibited act still to be valid) **our scholars** (of the Hanafi school of thought) **say that if a person makes o vow to fast on the Day of Nahr (10 Dhul-Hijjah) or the days of Tashreek (11, 12, 13 Dhul-Hijjah) then his vow is correct as it is a vow to fast, which is permitted in Shari'ah.** In a similar manner (as vowing to fast on the Day of Nahr is) if a person makes a vow to perform Salaah in the prohibited times, then it will be correct as he has made a vow to perform an Ibaadat permitted by Shari'ah as we have mentioned previously that the *Nahy* requires the prohibited act still to be valid. As a result of this (that the act is still valid after it has been prohibited) **we say that if a person begins performing Nafil Salaah in these (prohibited) times then it will be incumbent upon him (to perform this Salaah) by beginning it. Perpetration of Haraam will not**

become inevitable by making completion of the Nafil Salaah incumbent as he can wait until Salaah is permissible after sunrise, sunset or midday and then complete it. This (*not perpetrating Haraam in its completion*) is what differentiates the fast on the day of Eid (*from Nafil Salaah*) as completion is not incumbent upon one who begins fasting (*on the day of Eid*) according to Imaam Abu Hanifah rahimahullah and Imaam Muhammed rahimahullah as completion (*of the fast*) will not be free from the perpetration of Haraam.

وَمِنْ هَذَا النَّوعِ وَطِئُ الْحَائِضِ فَإِنَّ النَّهْيَ عَنْ قَرْبَانِهَا بِإِعْتِبَارِ الْأَدَى لِقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {يَسْأَلُونَكَ عَنِ الْمَحِيضِ قُلْ هُوَ أَدَى فَأَعْتَزَلُوا النَّسَاءَ فِي الْمَحِيضِ وَلَا تَقْرُبُوهُنَّ حَتَّى يَطْهُرْنَ} وَلِهَذَا قُلْنَا يَتَرْتَّبُ الْأَحْكَامُ عَلَى هَذَا الْوَطِئِ فَيَنْبُتُ بِهِ إِحْصَانُ الْوَأْطِئِ وَتَحِلُّ الْمَرْأَةُ لِلزَّوْجِ الْأَوَّلِ وَيَنْبُتُ بِهِ حُكْمُ الْمَهْرِ وَالْعِدَّةِ وَالنَّفَقَةِ وَلَوْ اِمْتَنَعَتْ عَنِ التَّمَكُّينِ لِأَجْلِ الصَّدَاقِ كَانَتْ نَاشِزَةً عِنْدَهُمَا فَلَا تَسْتَحِقُّ النَّفَقَةَ

Also from this category (*of acts which are Qabeeh Li-Ghairihi*) is sexual relations with one's wife while she is menstruating as the prohibition is a result of the (*state of*) impurity (*she is in*) in accordance with the verse,

"They ask you (O Muhammed ﷺ) concerning menstruation. Say, "It is impure so leave (*intercourse with*) women during (*their period of*) menstruation and do not go unto them (*do not have sexual relations with your wives*) until they are cleansed (*their menstrual cycle is complete*)."

(*Surah Baqarah: 222*)

As a result of this (*that sexual relations with one's wife during menstruation is Qabeeh Li-Ghairihi*) we say that the laws of Shari'ah will apply to this sexual relations (*during menstruation*) such that the marriage will be consummated, she will become Halaal for her first husband (*Halalah will valid with this*), the laws of Mehr, Iddah, and maintenance will apply. If she refuses him permission for sexual

intercourse (after indulging in sexual relations while menstruating) **because of her Mehr¹** then she will be regarded as **Naashizah** (disobedient) and she will not be entitled to maintenance (because of her disobedience).

Prohibition does not prevent the laws from applying

وَحُرْمَةُ الْفِعْلِ لَا تُنَافِي تَرْتَّبَ الْأَحْكَامَ كَطَّلَاقِ الْحَائِضِ وَ الْوُضُوءِ بِالْمِيَاهِ الْمَغْصُوبَةِ وَ الْإِصْطِيَادَ بِقَوْسٍ مَغْصُوبَةٍ وَ الذَّبْحَ بِسِكِّينٍ مَغْصُوبَةٍ وَ الصَّلَاةَ فِي الْأَرْضِ الْمَغْصُوبَةِ وَ الْبَيْعَ فِي وَقْتِ النَّدَاءِ فَإِنَّهُ يَتَرْتَّبُ الْحُكْمُ عَلَى هَذِهِ التَّصَرُّفَاتِ مَعَ اسْتِمَالِهَا عَلَى الْحُرْمَةِ

An act being Haraam does not prevent its laws from applying such as **issuing of Talaaq** while a woman is **menstruating** (even though it is Haraam to do so the Talaaq will still apply), **performing Wudhu with illegally seized water** (even though usage of that water is Haraam, the Wudhu will still be valid), **hunting with an illegally seized bow** (even though it is Haraam to use that bow the animal hunted with it will be Halaal when Tasmiyyah is recited), **slaughtering with an illegally seized knife** (even though usage of that knife is Haraam the animal slaughtered with it will be Halaal when Tasmiyyah is recited), **performance of Salaah on illegally seized land** (even though usage of that land is Haraam the Salaah performed on it will be valid) **and trade during the time of Jumu'ah** (even though trade is Haraam during this time, the transaction will still be valid), **as the ruling of these actions will still apply despite them being prohibited.**

¹ The law is that a woman has the right to refuse her husband sexual intercourse until he hands over her Mehr. However if she indulges in intercourse with him once without demanding her Mehr then she does not have the right to deny him thereafter.

Rulings deduced from the above

وَبِاعْتِبَارِ هَذَا الْأَصْلِ قُلْنَا فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {وَلَا تَقْبَلُوا لَهُمْ شَهَادَةً أَبَدًا} إِنَّ الْفَاسِقَ مِنْ أَهْلِ الشَّهَادَةِ فَيَنْعَقِدُ النِّكَاحُ بِشَهَادَةِ الْفَاسِقِ لِأَنَّ النَّهْيَ عَنْ قَبُولِ الشَّهَادَةِ بِدُونِ الشَّهَادَةِ مَحَالٌّ وَ إِنَّمَا لَمْ تُقْبَلْ شَهَادَتُهُمْ لِفَسَادِ فِي الْأَدَاءِ لَا لِعَدَمِ الشَّهَادَةِ أَصْلًا وَ عَلَى هَذَا لَا يَجِبُ عَلَيْهِمُ اللَّعْنُ لِأَنَّ ذَلِكَ آدَاءُ الشَّهَادَةِ وَلَا آدَاءُ مَعَ الْفِسْقِ

Based upon this principle (*that prohibition does not prevent the laws from applying and Nahy of Tasarrufaatish Shari'ah requires the prohibited act still to be valid*)) **we say from the verse,**

{وَلَا تَقْبَلُوا لَهُمْ شَهَادَةً أَبَدًا}

"And never accept their testimony (in a court hearing) ever again." (Surah Noor: 4)

That a Faasiq (open sinner) can be a witness and a Nikaah will be valid with the Fussaaq (open sinners) as witnesses as the Nahy of accepting their testimony is impossible without them being witnesses (*in order for their testimony not to be accepted we will have to accept that they have the right to be a witness, only their testimony will not be accepted*). **The reason why we will not accept their testimony is because of its defect** (*there is doubt in their testimony because of their perpetration of sin*) **and not because they are not eligible as witnesses. Based upon this** (*that the testimony of open sinners is not accepted because of doubt in their testimony and not that they are not eligible as witnesses*) **Li'aan¹ will not be Waajib**

¹ When a husband accuses his wife of unfaithfulness and she denies it, the Qaadhi will order Li'aan to be performed whereby the husband will take an oath four times that he is true in what he says and then say the curse (*La'nat from which the word Li'aan is derived*) of ALLAAH be upon me if I am lying. Thereafter the wife will say four times that his accusation is false and then say the curse of ALLAAH be upon me if he is speaking the truth. The Qaadhi will then order them to be separated and a Talaq Baa'inah will apply.

upon them, as this is to give testimony and one cannot give testimony if (*deemed*) a Faasiq.

Lesson on the method in which the implication of speech is recognised

If a word has the meaning of Haqeeqat and Majaaz

فصل فى تعريف طريق المراد بالنصوص
إِعْلَمَ أَنَّ لِمَعْرِفَةِ الْمُرَادِ بِالنُّصُوصِ طَرِيقاً مِنْهَا أَنَّ اللَّفْظَ إِذَا كَانَ حَقِيقَةً
لِمَعْنَى وَ مَجَازاً لِأَخَرٍ فَالْحَقِيقَةُ أَوْلَى مِثْلُهُ مَا قَالَ عَلَمَانَا أَلْبَنَتْ الْمَخْلُوقَةَ
مِنْ مَاءِ الزَّانِ يَحْرُمُ عَلَى الزَّانِي نِكَاحُهَا وَقَالَ الشَّافِعِيُّ يَحِلُّ وَالصَّحِيحُ
مَا قُلْنَا لِأَنَّهَا بِنْتُهُ حَقِيقَةً فَتَدْخُلُ تَحْتَ قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {حُرِّمَتْ عَلَيْكُمْ أُمَّهَاتُكُمْ
وَبَنَاتُكُمْ} وَيَتَفَرَّغُ مِنْهُ الْأَحْكَامُ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبَيْنِ مِنْ جِلِّ الْوَطْئِ وَوُجُوبِ
الْمَهْرِ وَلِزُومِ النِّفَقَةِ وَجِرْيَانِ التَّوَارِثِ وَ لَوْلَايَةِ الْمَنْعِ عَنِ الْخُرُوجِ
وَالْبُرُوزِ

The method in which the implication of speech is recognised are many, of which (*the first method is*) if a word has one meaning of Haqeeqat and another of Majaaz then it is better to practice on the meaning of Haqeeqat.

An example of this is what our Ulama (*of the Hanafi School*) say that an illegitimate daughter (*conceived by Zinaa*) is Haraam for the fornicator (*illegitimate father*) to marry, whereas Imaam Shaafie □ says it is permissible (*for the father to marry his illegitimate daughter*). The correct view is what we (*the scholars of the Hanafi Madhab*) have said because she is his daughter in reality and will therefore be included under the (*prohibition of the*) verse,

{حُرِّمَتْ عَلَيْكُمْ أُمَّهَاتُكُمْ وَبَنَاتُكُمْ}

"Forbidden for you are (it is Haraam for you to marry) your mothers (and your grandmothers), your daughters (and your granddaughters)." (Surah Nisaa: 23)

(Since an illegitimate daughter is still one's daughter in reality it would be Haraam to marry her.) **Based upon the verdict, rulings are derived according to both Madhaahib** (as a result of the opposing verdicts of the Hanafi Madhab and Shaafie Madhab the rulings differ) **with regards to permissibility of sexual relations** (The Hanafi scholars say it is impermissible because the Nikaah is invalid on account of her being his daughter whereas Imaam Shaafie says that since the Nikaah is valid, sexual relations will be permissible), **incumbency of Mehr and maintenance** (the Hanafi scholars say that Mehr and maintenance is not Waajib as the Nikaah is invalid on account of her being his daughter whereas Imaam Shaafie says it is Waajib as the Nikaah is valid), **the right to inherit** (Imaam Shaafie says she will inherit as she is his wife whereas Imaam Abu Hanifah says that she will not inherit because she is not his wife as the Nikaah was invalid on account of her being his daughter) **and the right to prevent her from leaving the home** (Imaam Shaafie says he will have the right to do so as she is his wife whereas Imaam Abu Hanifah says that he will not have the right as the Nikaah is invalid on account of her being his daughter).

If one meaning requires Takhsees and not the other

وَمِنْهَا أَنْ أَحَدَ الْمُحْتَمَلَيْنِ إِذَا أُوجِبَ تَخْصِيصًا فِي النَّصِّ دُونَ الْآخَرِ
فَالْحَمْلُ عَلَى مَا لَا يَسْتَلْزِمُ التَّخْصِيصَ أَوَّلَى مِثَالُهُ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {أَوَّلًا
مَسْنُومِ النِّسَاءِ} فَالْمُلاَمَسَةُ لَوْ حُمِلَتْ عَلَى الْوُقَاعِ كَانَ النَّصُّ مَعْمُولًا بِهِ فِي
جَمِيعِ صُورِ وُجُودِهِ وَ لَوْ حُمِلَتْ عَلَى الْمَسِّ بِالْيَدِ كَانَ النَّصُّ مَخْصُوصًا
بِهِ فِي كَثِيرٍ مِنَ الصُّورِ فَإِنَّ مَسَّ الْمَحَارِمِ وَالطِّفْلِ الصَّغِيرَةِ جِدًّا غَيْرُ

نَاقِضٌ لِلْوُضُوِّ فِي أَصَحِّ قَوْلِي الشَّافِعِيِّ وَيَتَفَرَّغُ مِنْهُ الْأَحْكَامُ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبَيْنِ مِنْ إِبَاحَةِ الصَّلَاةِ وَمَسِّ الْمُصْحَفِ وَدُخُولِ الْمَسْجِدِ وَصِحَّةِ الْإِمَامَةِ وَلُزُومِ النِّيُّمِ عِنْدَ عَدَمِ الْمَاءِ وَتَذَكُّرِ الْمَسِّ فِي أَثْنَاءِ الصَّلَاةِ

(The second method is) **If a word which has two possible meanings, with one requiring Takhsees (a part of its constituents to be excluded) and not the other then it is better to use the meaning of that which does not require Takhsees.**

An example of this is the verse,

{أَوْ لَا مَسْنَمُ النِّسَاءِ}

"Or from touching (cohabiting) your wives." (Surah Nisaa: 43)

If the words 'Malaamasah' (touching) is said to refer to sexual relations (cohabiting) then the verse can be practiced upon in all instances it occurs but if we say 'Malaamasah' refers to touching by hand then many instances will be excluded (from this ruling) as touching one's female blood relatives and infant girls will not break Wudhu according to the more accurate view of Imaam Shaafie □.

Based upon the verdict, rulings are derived according to both Madhaahib (as a result of the opposing verdicts of the Hanafi Madhab and Shaafie Madhab the rulings differ) with regards to permissibility(after having touched a woman by hand) of Salaah (Imaam Abu Hanifah says that Salaah is permissible as he is still in a state of Wudhu whereas Imaam Shaafie says it is impermissible as touching a woman by hand breaks Wudhu), touching the Quraan (Imaam Abu Hanifah says that it is permissible as he is still in a state of Wudhu whereas Imaam Shaafie says it is impermissible as touching a woman by hand breaks Wudhu),entering the Masjid(Imaam Abu Hanifah says that entering the Masjid will be permissible without any Karaahat as he is still in a state of Wudhu whereas

Imaam Shaafie says it will be Makruh to enter the Masjid as touching a woman by hand breaks Wudhu), permissibility of Imaamat (Imaam Abu Hanifah says that it will be permissible for him to be Imaam as he is still in a state of Wudhu whereas Imaam Shaafie says it is impermissible as touching a woman by hand breaks Wudhu), compulsion of Tayammum if water is not available (Imam Abu Hanifah says that Tayammum will not be compulsory on him if water is not available as he is still in a state of Wudhu whereas Imaam Shaafie says that Tayammum will be compulsory on him if water is not available as his Wudhu has broken by touching a woman by hand) and remembering touching the woman during Salaah (if a person remembers during Salaah or after Salaah that he touched a woman by hand earlier the according to Imaam Shaafie he needs to perform Wudhu again and repeat that Salaah as Wudhu breaks when touching a woman by hand whereas Imaam Abu Hanifah says since wudhu does not break by touching there is no need to repeat the Salaah).

If a word has two different forms of recitation

وَمِنْهَا أَنْ النَّصَّ إِذَا قُرِئَ بِقِرَائَتَيْنِ أَوْ رُويَ بِرَوَاتَيْنِ كَانَ الْعَمَلُ بِهِ عَلَى وَجْهِ يَكُونُ عَمَلًا بِالْوَجْهَيْنِ أَوَّلَى مَثَالُهُ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {وَأَرْجُلُكُمْ} قُرِئَ بِالنَّصْبِ عَطْفًا عَلَى الْمَغْسُولِ وَبِالْخَفْضِ عَطْفًا عَلَى الْمَمْسُوحِ فَحُمِلَتْ قِرَاءَةُ الْخَفْضِ عَلَى حَالَةِ التَّخَفُّفِ وَقِرَاءَةُ النَّصْبِ عَلَى حَالَةِ عَدَمِ التَّخَفُّفِ وَبِاعْتِبَارِ هَذَا الْمَعْنَى قَالَ الْبَعْضُ جَوَازُ الْمَسْحِ ثَبَتَ بِالْكِتَابِ

If a word is recited in two different forms of recitation or (a Hadeeth) reported in two different chains of narration (such that they differ slightly) then practicing on it in a manner whereby both recitations or chains of narration is practised upon is best.

An example of this is the verse,

"(and wash) your feet up to (and including) your ankles."
(Surah Maa'idah: 6)

The word "feet" is reported (in one form of recitation) with a Nasab (أَرْجُلُكُمْ) attached to Ghusal (meaning one should wash one's feet up to the ankles) and (in another recitation it is reported) with a Kasra (أَرْجُلُكُمْ) attached to Masah (meaning that one should make Masah of one's feet up to the ankles). Thus the recitation with a Kasra applies when one is wearing Khuffain (leather socks) and the recitation with Nasab applies when one is not wearing Khuffain (and in this manner we practice on both forms of recitation). As a result of this (interpretation) some (scholars) have said that the permissibility of Masah (on leather socks) is proven by the Quraan.

Example Two

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى {حَتَّى يَطْهُرْنَ} قُرِئَ بِالتَّشْدِيدِ وَ التَّخْفِيفِ فَيَعْمَلُ بِقِرَاءَةِ التَّخْفِيفِ فِيمَا إِذَا كَانَ أَيَّامُهَا دُونَ الْعَشْرَةِ وَ بِقِرَاءَةِ التَّشْدِيدِ فِيمَا إِذَا كَانَ أَيَّامُهَا دُونَ الْعَشْرَةِ

In a similar manner (as the example mentioned above) the verse,

{حَتَّى يَطْهُرْنَ}

"(and do not have sexual relations with your menstruating wives) until they are cleansed." *(Surah Baqarah: 222)*

The word "Cleansed" is recited with a Tashdeed (يَطْهَرْنَ) and a Saakin¹(يَطْهَرْنَ), thus we will act upon the recitation

¹ The recitation with Tashdeed implies complete purification and would mean that sexual relations with one's wife after her period of menstruation is only permissible after she performs Ghusal and the recitation with Saakin merely implies to become purified and would mean that

with Saakin if her period of menstruation was ten days (*making sexual relations permissible with her even if she has not yet performed Ghusal*) **and we will act upon the recitation with Tashdeed if her period of menstruation was less than ten days** (*such that sexual relations will only be permissible after she performs Ghusal*).

Rulings derived from the above

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا قَالَ أَصْحَابُنَا إِذَا انْقَطَعَ دَمُ الْحَيْضِ لِأَقَلِّ مِنْ عَشْرَةِ أَيَّامٍ لَمْ يَجُزْ وَطِيُّ الْحَائِضِ حَتَّى تَغْتَسِلَ لِأَنَّ كَمَالَ الطَّهَارَةِ يَثْبُتُ بِالْإِغْتِسَالِ وَلَوْ انْقَطَعَ دَمُهَا لِعَشْرَةِ أَيَّامٍ جَازَ وَطْنُهَا قَبْلَ الْغُسْلِ لِأَنَّ مُطْلَقَ الطَّهَارَةِ ثَبَتَ بِانْقِطَاعِ الدَّمِ وَلِهَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا انْقَطَعَ دَمُ الْحَيْضِ لِعَشْرَةِ أَيَّامٍ فِي آخِرِ وَقْتِ الصَّلَاةِ تَلَزَمَهَا فَرِيضَةُ الْوَقْتِ وَإِنْ لَمْ يَبْقَ مِنَ الْوَقْتِ مِقْدَارٌ مَا تَغْتَسِلُ فِيهِ وَلَوْ انْقَطَعَ دَمُهَا لِأَقَلِّ مِنْ عَشْرَةِ أَيَّامٍ فِي آخِرِ وَقْتِ الصَّلَاةِ إِنْ بَقِيَ مِنَ الْوَقْتِ مِقْدَارٌ مَا تَغْتَسِلُ فِيهِ وَتُحْرِمُ لِلصَّلَاةِ لَزِمَتْهَا الْفَرِيضَةُ وَالْأَقْلَى

Based upon this (*that we will act upon the recitation with Saakin if her period of menstruation was ten days and we will act upon the recitation with Tashdeed if her period of menstruation was less than ten days*) **our scholars** (*of the Hanafi Madhab*) **say that if her period of menstruation is less than ten days, sexual relations will not be permissible unless she performs Ghusal because complete purification is attained with Ghusal; and if her period of menstruation is ten days then sexual relations will be permissible without Ghusal because coming pure is established when her period** (*of menstruation*) **ends.**

Because of this we say that if her period of menstruation is ten days and ends in the last portion of the Salaah time, the

sexual relations with one's wife after her period of menstruation is permissible even if she has not yet performed Ghusal.

Salaah (of that time) will be Fardh upon her even if there is not sufficient time to perform Ghusal (as she has attained purity in accordance with the recitation with Saakin) but if her period of menstruation is less than ten days and ends in the last portion of Salaah time then if there is sufficient time for her to perform Ghusal and say the Takbeer Tahreemah the Salaah will be Fardh upon her, if not (if there is not sufficient time to perform Ghusal and say the Takbeer Tahreemah) then it (the Salaah of that time) will not (be Fardh on her).

Weak methods in which the implication of speech is recognised

ثُمَّ نَذْكُرُ طَرِيقًا مِّنَ التَّمَسُّكَاتِ الضَّعِيفَةِ لِيَكُونَ ذَلِكَ تَنْبِيْهُاً عَلَى مَوَاضِعِ الْخَلَلِ فِي هَذَا النَّوعِ مِنْهَا أَنَّ التَّمَسُّكَ بِمَا رَوَى عَنِ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ أَنَّهُ قَاءَ فَلَمْ يَتَوَضَّأْ لِإِتْبَاتِ أَنَّ الْقِيَّ غَيْرُ نَاقِضٍ ضَعِيفٌ لِأَنَّ الْأَثَرَ يَدُلُّ عَلَى أَنَّ الْقِيَّ لَا يُوجِبُ الْوُضُوءَ فِي الْحَالِ وَلَا خِلَافَ فِيهِ وَ إِنَّمَا الْخِلَافُ فِي كَوْنِهِ نَاقِضاً

We will now discuss weak methods (i.e. it is considered weak according to the Hanafi school of thought) in which the implication of speech was recognised so that the flaws of this method of deduction can be recognised.

(The first example is) **Deducing from what has been reported that Rasulullaah ﷺ vomited and did not perform Wudhu that vomiting does not break Wudhu is weak because the narration (only) establishes that Wudhu is not Waajib immediately, in which there is no difference of opinion, but the difference of opinion is in whether vomiting breaks Wudhu (and this narration does not establish that it does not break Wudhu as it is possible that it did break Wudhu and Rasulullaah ﷺ made Wudhu much later).**

Example Two

وَكَذَلِكَ التَّمَسُّكُ بِقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى حُرِّمَتْ عَلَيْكُمْ الْمَيْتَةُ لِاثْبَاتِ فَسَادِ الْمَاءِ
بِمَوْتِ الذُّبَابِ ضَعِيفٌ لِأَنَّ النَّصَّ يُثْبِتُ حُرْمَةَ الْمَيْتَةِ وَلَا خِلَافَ فِيهِ وَإِنَّمَا
الْخِلَافُ فِي فَسَادِ الْمَاءِ

In a similar manner (to the weak deduction mentioned above) is deducing from the verse,

"Forbidden for you (to eat) is Mayta (carrion)."

(Surah Maa'idah: 3)

that water becomes impure by a fly dying in it is weak because the verse (only) establishes that Mayta is Haraam, in which there is no difference of opinion, but the difference of opinion is in the impurity of water (which is not proven by this verse).

Example Three

وَكَذَلِكَ التَّمَسُّكُ بِقَوْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ حُتِّيهِ ثُمَّ أَقْرُصِيهِ ثُمَّ اغْسِلِيهِ بِالْمَاءِ
لِاثْبَاتِ أَنَّ الْخَلَ لَا يُزِيلُ النَّجَسَ ضَعِيفٌ لِأَنَّ الْخَبَرَ يَفْتَضِي وَجُوبَ غَسْلِ
الدَّمِّ بِالْمَاءِ فَيَنْقُيُ بِحَالٍ وَجُودِ الدَّمِّ عَلَى الْمَحَلِّ وَلَا خِلَافَ فِيهِ وَإِنَّمَا
الْخِلَافُ فِي طَهَارَةِ الْمَحَلِّ بَعْدَ زَوَالِ الدَّمِّ بِالْخَلِّ

In a similar manner (to the weak deduction mentioned above) is deducing from the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, "Rub it (the clothes soiled with blood of menstruation), then scratch it, then wash it with water" that vinegar does not purify impurity is weak because the Hadeeth (only) establishes

that it is Waajib to wash the blood with water and applies as long as the blood still remains on the item, in which there is no difference of opinion. The difference of opinion is whether the item will be purified after the blood is removed with vinegar (*regarding which the Hadeeth makes no mention*).

Example Four

وَكَذَلِكَ التَّمَسُّكُ بِقَوْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ فِي أَرْبَعِينَ شَاةً شَاةً لَا ثَبَاتَ عَدَمَ جَوَازِ دَفْعِ الْقِيَمَةِ ضَعِيفٌ لَّأَنَّهُ يَقْتَضِي وَجُوبَ الشَّاةِ وَلَا خِلَافَ فِيهِ وَ إِنَّمَا الْخِلَافُ فِي سُقُوطِ الْوَاجِبِ بِإِدَاءِ الْقِيَمَةِ

In a similar manner (*to the weak deduction mentioned above*) is deducing from the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, "For every forty sheep (owned), a sheep (is waajib as Zakaat)" that it is impermissible to give the price of the sheep (as Zakaat) is weak because it (only) establishes that a sheep is Waajib (as Zakaat for every forty sheep one owns) in which there is no difference of opinion, but the difference of opinion is in whether one will be absolved of the Waajib (*will the Zakaat be fulfilled*) if the price is given (*regarding which the Hadeeth makes no mention*).

Example Five

وَكَذَلِكَ التَّمَسُّكُ بِقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {وَاتِمُوا الْحَجَّ وَالْعُمْرَةَ لِلَّهِ} لَا ثَبَاتَ وَجُوبِ الْعُمْرَةِ ابْتِدَاءً ضَعِيفٌ لِأَنَّ النَّصَّ يَقْتَضِي وَجُوبَ الْإِتِمَامِ وَكَذَلِكَ إِنَّمَا يَكُونُ بَعْدَ الشَّرُوعِ وَلَا خِلَافَ فِيهِ وَ إِنَّمَا الْخِلَافُ فِي وَجُوبِهَا ابْتِدَاءً

In a similar manner (*to the weak deduction mentioned above*) is deducing from the verse,

"Complete the Hajj and Umrah for (the pleasure of)

ALLAAH" (*Surah Baqarah: 196*)

That Umrah is Waajib from the beginning (*that it is Waajib upon a person to perform Umrah once in his lifetime*) **is weak** because this verse (*only*) establishes that it is Waajib to complete Umrah which only applies after one has begun (*performing Umrah*), in which there is no difference of opinion, the difference is in whether it is Waajib from the beginning (*regarding which the Hadeeth makes no mention*).

Example six

وَكَذَلِكَ التَّمَسُّكُ بِقَوْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: لَا تَبِيعُوا الدَّرْهَمَ بِالْدَّرْهَمَيْنِ وَلَا الصَّاعَ بِالصَّاعَيْنِ لَا تُبَيِّنَ أَنَّ الْبَيْعَ الْفَاسِدَ لَا يُفِيدُ الْمَلَكَ ضَعِيفٌ لِأَنَّ النَّصَّ يَقْتَضِي تَحْرِيمَ الْبَيْعِ الْفَاسِدِ وَلَا خِلَافَ فِيهِ وَ إِنَّمَا الْخِلَافُ فِي ثُبُوتِ الْمَلَكَ وَعَدَمِهِ

In a similar manner (*to the weak deduction mentioned above*) deducing from the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah, "Do not sell one dirham for two dirhams or (*the contents of*) one Sa'a (*measuring utensil*) for (*the contents of*) two Sa'a that Bay'a Faasid (*invalid sales transaction*) does not cause transfer of ownership is weak because the Hadeeth (*only*) establishes the prohibition of Bay'a Faasid, in which there is no difference of opinion, whereas the difference of opinion is in whether ownership is established (*for the buyer*) or not (*regarding which the Hadeeth makes no mention*).

Example Seven

وَكَذَلِكَ التَّمَسُّكُ بِقَوْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ إِلَّا لَا تَصُومُوا فِي هَذِهِ الْأَيَّامِ فَإِنَّهَا أَيَّامٌ أَكْلٌ وَشُرْبٌ وَبَعَالٌ لَا ثَبَاتَ أَنَّ النَّذْرَ بِصَوْمِ يَوْمِ النَّحْرِ لَا يَصِحُّ ضَعِيفٌ لِأَنَّ النَّصَّ يَقْتَضِي حُرْمَةَ الْفِعْلِ وَلَا خِلَافَ فِي كَوْنِهِ حَرَامًا

In a similar manner (to the weak deduction mentioned above) deducing from the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah , "Verily, do not fast in these days (10, 11, 12, 13 Dhul-Hijjah) as they are days of eating, drinking and intimacy" that making a vow to fast on the day of Nahr (10 Dhul-Hijjah) is invalid, is weak because the verse (only) establishes prohibition of fasting, in which there is no difference of opinion, whereas the difference of opinion is whether the laws (which govern that act) will still apply even though an act is Haraam (regarding which the Hadeeth makes no mention).

وَ إِنَّمَا الْخِلَافُ فِي إِفَادَةِ الْأَحْكَامِ مَعَ كَوْنِهِ حَرَامًا وَ حُرْمَةُ الْفِعْلِ لَا تَنَافِي تَرْتَبُ الْأَحْكَامُ فَإِنَّ الْأَبَ لَوْ اسْتَوْلَدَ جَارِيَةً ابْنِهِ يَكُونُ حَرَامًا وَيَثْبُتُ بِهِ الْمِلْكُ لِلْأَبِ وَ لَوْ ذَبَحَ شَاةً بِسِكِّينٍ مَغْصُوبَةٍ يَكُونُ حَرَامًا وَ بِحِلِّ الْمَذْبُوحِ وَ لَوْ غَسَلَ الثَّوْبَ النَّجَسَ بِمَاءٍ مَغْصُوبٍ يَكُونُ حَرَامًا وَ يَطْهَرُ بِهِ الثَّوْبُ وَ لَوْ وَطِئَ امْرَأَةً فِي حَالَةِ الْحَيْضِ يَكُونُ حَرَامًا وَيَثْبُتُ بِهِ إِحْصَانُ الْوِطْئِ وَيَثْبُتُ الْحِلُّ لِلزَّوْجِ الْأَوَّلِ

An act being Haraam does not prevent the laws (which govern that act) from applying. (For example) If a father impregnates the female slave of his son, the act is Haraam but ownership will be established for the father (and he will pay the price of the slave to his son). (Another example is) If a person slaughters a sheep with an unlawfully seized knife then using the knife will be Haraam but the animal will be Halaal (if he recited Tasmiyyah when slaughtering). (Another example is) If a person washes his clothes with unlawfully seized water then the using the knife will be Haraam but the clothes will be purified. (Another example is) If a person has sexual relations with his wife while she is menstruating,

then the act will be Haraam but *(the laws related to sexual relations will still apply such as)* **the marriage will be considered as consummated and permissibility** *(to marry)* **will be established for the first husband** *(who gave her three Talaq).*

Lesson on Huroof-Ma'aani

The letter 'و'

فصل في تقرير الحروف المعاني
الْوَاوُ لِلْجَمْعِ الْمُطْلَقِ وَقِيلَ إِنَّ الشَّافِعِيَّ جَعَلَهُ لِلتَّرْتِيبِ وَعَلَى هَذَا أُوجِبَ
التَّرتِيبَ فِي بَابِ الْوُضُوءِ

The letter 'و' is used for Mutlaq Jam'a (to link or connect various words together to the same ruling without any sequence or order) and it has been said that **Imaam Shaafie** رحمة الله عليه says it denotes **Tarteeb** (sequence, which would mean that the sequence in which the word were connected needs to be observed) **because of which Tarteeb in Wudhu** (to make wudhu in the same sequence as mentioned in the Quraan) **is Waajib** (according to Imaam Shaafie as opposed to Imaam Abu Hanifah who says it is Sunnat).

Rulings derived from the above

قَالَ عُلَمَاؤُنَا إِذَا قَالَ لَامْرَأَتِهِ إِنَّ كَلِمَتِي زَيْدًا وَعَمْرًا فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ فَكَلِمَتُ عَمْرٍاءُ ثُمَّ زَيْدًا طَلَّقَتْ وَلَا يَشْتَرِطُ فِيهِ مَعْنَى التَّرْتِيبِ وَالْمُقَارَنَةِ وَلَوْ قَالَ إِنَّ دَخَلْتَ هَذِهِ الدَّارَ وَهَذِهِ الدَّارَ فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ فَدَخَلْتَ الثَّانِيَةَ ثُمَّ دَخَلْتَ الْأُولَى طَلَّقَتْ قَالَ مُحَمَّدٌ إِذَا قَالَ إِنَّ دَخَلْتَ الدَّارَ وَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ تُطَلِّقُ فِي الْحَالِ وَلَوْ اقْتَضَى ذَلِكَ تَرْتِيبًا لَتَرْتَّبَ الطَّلَاقُ بِهِ عَلَى الدُّخُولِ وَيَكُونُ ذَلِكَ تَعْلِيقًا لَا تَنْجِيزًا

Our Ulama (of the Hanafi Madhab) say that if a person tells his wife, "If you talk to Zaid and Amr then you are divorced" and she talks to Amr first then to Zaid, the Talaaq will apply and the meaning of Tarteeb (sequence) Maqaaranah (simultaneity) will not apply (thus the Talaaq will apply whether she talks to Amr first then Zaid and even if she talks to them separately and not together simultaneously). (Similarly) If a person says (to his wife) "If you enter this house and this house, then you are divorced" and she then enters the second house (which he indicated) first and then the first house, the Talaaq will apply (regardless of which house was entered first and even if it they were not entered consecutively). Imaam Muhammed رحمته الله says that if a person says (to his wife) "If you enter this house and you are divorced" then a Talaaq will apply immediately (even if she

does not enter the house). If the letter 'و' denoted Tarteeb then the Talaq would depend on entrance (into that house) making it conditional and not immediate (and no one is of the opinion that it has been used here to denote condition).

The letter 'و' sometimes denotes Haal

وَقَدْ يَكُونُ الْوَاوُ لِلْحَالِ فَتَجْمَعُ بَيْنَ الْحَالِ وَذِي الْحَالِ وَحِينَئِذٍ تُفِيدُ مَعْنَى الشَّرْطِ مِثْلُهُ مَا قَالَ مُحَمَّدٌ فِي الْمَأْذُونِ إِذَا قَالَ لِعَبْدِهِ أَدِّ إِلَيَّ الْفَأْ وَأَنْتَ حُرٌّ يَكُونُ الْأَدَاءُ شَرْطاً لِلْحُرِّيَّةِ وَقَالَ مُحَمَّدٌ فِي السَّيْرِ الْكَبِيرِ إِذَا قَالَ الْإِمَامُ لِلْكَفَّارِ افْتَحُوا الْبَابَ وَ أَنْتُمْ أَمْنُونَ لَا يَأْمَنُونَ بِدُونِ الْفَتْحِ وَ لَوْ قَالَ لِلْحَرَبِيِّ أَنْزِلْ وَأَنْتَ أَمِنٌ لَا يَأْمَنُ بِدُونِ النُّزُولِ

Sometimes the letter 'و' denotes Haal (situation or state) such that it (the letter 'و') will combine the Haal (situation or state) with the Dhil Haal (the person or object whose situation or state is being described) and then (when the 'و' denotes Haal) it will support the meaning of condition (in this case the 'و' will denote that the subsequent clause is a precondition for the application of the ruling). An example of this (where 'و' denotes Haal and will support the meaning of condition) is a Ma'thoon (a slave who has been given permission to trade by his master) when his master says to him, "Pay me one thousand and you are free". Payment of the thousand will be a condition for his freedom (and he will not be set free immediately).

Imaam Muhammed has written in 'As-Siyarul Kabeer', "If the leader of the Muslims says to the Kuffaar, "Open the door and you are granted sanctuary", they will not be granted sanctuary without opening the door (as opening the door is a condition for sanctuary). If he says to an enemy combatant, "Come down and you are granted sanctuary",

he will only be granted sanctuary he comes down (as coming down is a condition for sanctuary).

Two conditions for the letter 'و' to denote Haal

وَ إِنَّمَا تُحْمَلُ الْوَاوُ عَلَى الْحَالِ بِطَرِيقِ الْمَجَازِ فَلَا بُدَّ مِنْ إِحْتِمَالِ اللَّفْظِ ذَلِكَ وَ قِيَامِ الدَّلَالَةِ عَلَى ثَبُوتِهِ كَمَا فِي قَوْلِ الْمَوْلَى لِعَبْدِهِ أَدِّ إِلَيَّ أَلْفًا وَ أَنْتَ حُرٌّ فَإِنَّ الْحُرِّيَّةَ يَتَحَقَّقُ حَالَ الْأَدَاءِ وَقَامَتِ الدَّلَالَةُ عَلَى ذَلِكَ فَإِنَّ الْمَوْلَى لَا يَسْتَوْجِبُ عَلَى عَبْدِهِ مَالًا مَعَ قِيَامِ الرِّقِّ فِيهِ وَقَدْ صَحَّ التَّعْلِيقُ بِهِ فَحُمِلَ عَلَيْهِ

The letter 'و' denotes Haal as Majaaz (i.e. it is not the literal meaning of 'و') thus it is necessary (two conditions are necessary) that the word must support the meaning (the meaning of Haal) and proof must exist that the meaning of Majaaz is implied, as in the statement of the master to his servant, "Pay me one thousand and you are free" where freedom is acquired when payment is made. (The two conditions are present here as) Proof exists that Majaaz is implied as the master cannot make a thousand incumbent upon the slave while he is in his ownership (which proves that it is a condition for his freedom) and attachment to it is correct (it is correct to attach or link his freedom to the payment of one thousand), thus it (the meaning of Haal) will be conferred to the statement.

وَلَوْ قَالَ أَنْتَ طَالِقٌ وَأَنْتَ مَرِيضَةٌ أَوْ مُصَلِّيَةٌ تُطَلِّقُ فِي الْحَالِ وَلَوْ نَوَى التَّعْلِيقَ صَحَّتْ نِيَّتُهُ فِيمَا بَيْنَهُ وَ بَيْنَ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى لِأَنَّ اللَّفْظَ وَ إِنْ كَانَ يَحْتَمِلُ مَعْنَى الْحَالِ إِلَّا أَنَّ الظَّاهِرَ خِلَافُهُ وَ إِذَا تَأَيَّدَ ذَلِكَ بِقَصْدِهِ ثَبَّتَ

(An example where these two conditions are not met and the literal meaning of 'و' will be implied is) **If a person (tells his wife), "You are divorced and you are sick or (he tells her, "You are divorced) and you are performing Salaah" then**

the Talaah will apply immediately (*and the meaning of Haal will not be implied here*). **If he had the intention of attachment** (*whereby he intended to attach or link the Talaah to her getting sick or performance of Salaah*) **then his intention will be correct between him and ALLAAH** (*but since Shar'ie rulings are based on what is apparent, we will rule that Talaah was issued immediately as is apparent*). **The reason for this** (*ruling that Talaah was issued immediately*) **is that even though the word does support that meaning** (*Talaah can be attached to performance of Salaah or getting sick*) **the apparent state opposes it** (*there is no proof to support that the meaning of Haal was implied thus its literal meaning will be taken*). **If the contrary to the apparent meaning is supported** (*that he meant it to be conditional*) **by his intention then it will be established** (*that it is conditional and the Talaah will apply only when that condition is fulfilled between him and ALLAAH*). However we will still rule that the Talaah was issued immediately as our ruling is based on apparent conditions which support Talaah being issued immediately).

An example when 'و' cannot denote Haal

وَلَوْ قَالَ خُذْ هَذِهِ الْأَلْفَ مُضَارَبَةً وَاعْمَلْ بِهَا فِي الْبَزِّ لَا يَتَقَيَّدُ الْعَمَلُ فِي الْبَزِّ وَ يَكُونُ الْمُضَارَبَةُ عَامَّةً لِأَنَّ الْعَمَلَ فِي الْبَزِّ لَا يَصْلُحُ حَالًا لِأَخْذِ الْأَلْفِ مُضَارَبَةً فَلَا يَتَقَيَّدُ صَدْرُ الْكَلَامِ بِهِ

If a person tells another, "Take this thousand for Madharabah¹ and use it for trade in textiles (fabric, cloth)" then the act of Madharabah will not be restricted to trade in textiles (*in other words the letter 'و' will not denote Haal and trade in textiles will not be a condition for taking of the*

¹ Madharabah is where one person provides the capital for trade; the other provides the labour and the profits shared between them.

thousand) but **Madharabah** will be general (one may use the money to trade in anything). The reason for this (why *Mudharabah* will not be restricted to trade in textiles only) is that trade in textiles cannot be the **Haal** for taking this thousand for **Mudharabah** (as they are in two different time periods; he cannot take the money and be trading in textiles at the same time but will first take the money and then later trade in textiles causing them to trade in two different periods, whereas the **Haal** and **Dhul-Haal** need to be in the same time period), thus it will not be restricted by the subsequent sentence (of "use it for trade in textiles").

Ruling derived from the above

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا قَالَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَىٰ إِذَا قَالَتْ لِزَوْجِهَا طَلَّقْنِي وَلَكَ أَلْفٌ فَطَلَّقَهَا لَا يَجِبُ لَهُ عَلَيْهَا شَيْءٌ لِأَنَّ قَوْلَهَا وَلَكَ أَلْفٌ لَا يُفِيدُ حَالَ وَجُوبِ الْأَلْفِ عَلَيْهَا وَقَوْلُهَا طَلَّقْنِي مُفِيدٌ بِنَفْسِهِ فَلَا يُثَرِّكُ الْعَمَلُ بِهِ بَدُونَ الدَّلِيلِ بِخِلَافِ قَوْلِهِ إِحْمَلْ هَذَا الْمَتَاعَ وَلَكَ دِرْهَمٌ لِأَنَّ دَلَالَةَ الْإِجَارَةِ يَمْنَعُ الْعَمَلَ بِحَقِيقَةِ اللَّفْظِ

Based upon this (that the letter 'و' will not denote **Haal** if the statement does not have the ability to be so) **Imaam Abu Hanifah** ع says, "If a woman tells her husband, "Divorce me and you have a thousand" after which he divorces her, then (the **Talaaq** will apply but) nothing will be **Waajib** upon her (she will not owe him a thousand) because her statement, "You have a thousand" does not have the ability to be **Haal** (or a condition) for making a thousand **Waajib** upon her (since it is merely additional information and actual **Talaaq** has no recompense, thus there is no proof that it is a condition

for Talaah) and her request, "Divorce me" is sufficient in itself (for requesting Talaah and is not dependent on any further clause), thus we will not abandon practicing on it (her request, "Divorce me") without proof (we will not take the meaning of Haal if there is no proof that it is implied) as opposed to someone saying, "Lift these goods and you have a dirham" (where the 'و' will denote Haal) because proof of Ijaarah (that the person labour is being employed or leased) prevents practicing upon the literal meaning (there is proof that the meaning of Ijaarah is implied here thus the literal meaning will be abandoned).

The letter 'ف'

فصل

أَفَاءُ لِلتَّعْقِيبِ مَعَ الْوَصْلِ وَلِهَذَا تُسْتَعْمَلُ فِي الْأَجْزِيَةِ لِمَا أَنَّهَا تَتَعَقَّبُ الشَّرْطَ قَالَ أَصْحَابُنَا: إِذَا قَالَ: بَعْتُ مِنْكَ هَذَا الْعَبْدَ بِأَلْفٍ، فَقَالَ الْآخَرُ: فَهُوَ حُرٌّ يَكُونُ ذَلِكَ قُبُولًا لِلْبَيْعِ ۖ اِقْتِضَاءً وَيَشْتَبُ الْعَقْدُ مِنْهُ عَقِيبُ الْبَيْعِ بِخِلَافِ مَا لَوْ قَالَ: وَهُوَ حُرٌّ أَوْهُوَ حُرٌّ فَإِنَّهُ يَكُونُ رَدًّا لِلْبَيْعِ

The letter 'ف' denotes subsequence with conjunction (will denote the subsequent action occurred after the statement made prior to it), **which is why it is used in the Jazaa** (consequence of a condition, the letter 'ف' will denote that the sentence subsequent to it is a consequence of the condition prior to it) **because it (Jazaa) is subsequent to a Sharth** (condition). Our scholars (of the Hanafi Madhab) say if a person says to another, "I am selling this slave to you in lieu of a thousand" and the other (the buyer) replies, "Then he is free"; this will be acceptance of the sale through Iqtidha'un Nas (setting the slave free would require him to own the slave first thus his statement would necessitate that he accepts and sets the slave free) **and freedom** (for the slave) will be established after the transaction as opposed to if he

says "**And** he is free" (with the letter 'و') or "He is free" (without any prefix before it) as this will be refusal of the sale (as the statement "and he is free" as well as "he is free" would be additional information pointing out the slave to be free because of which the sale is invalid and not like in the letter 'ف' which indicates that the subsequent action occurred after the statement made prior to it).

Example Two

وَ إِذَا قَالَ لِلْخَيَّاطِ: أَنْظِرْ إِلَى هَذَا الثَّوْبِ أَيَكْفِينِي قَمِيصًا؟ فَظَرَّ فَقَالَ: نَعَمْ! فَقَالَ صَاحِبُ الثَّوْبِ: فَأَقْطَعُهُ فَقَطَّعَهُ فَإِذَا هُوَ لَا يَكْفِيهِ كَانَ الْخَيَّاطُ ضَامِنًا لِأَنَّهُ إِنَّمَا أَمَرَهُ بِالْقَطْعِ عَقِيبَ الْكَفَايَةِ بِخِلَافِ مَا لَوْ قَالَ: اقْطَعُهُ فَقَطَّعَهُ فَإِنَّهُ لَا يَكُونُ الْخَيَّاطُ ضَامِنًا

If a person says to a tailor, "Look at this cloth, will it be sufficient for (to sow) a shirt" and the tailor replies that it is (sufficient), on which he instructs the tailor, "**Then** cut it". The tailor then cuts it but it is insufficient (to sow a shirt), the tailor will be responsible for it because he ordered the tailor to cut it subsequent to the tailor informing him it is sufficient (thus his instruction, "Then cut it" means "cut it if it is sufficient"). This ruling is opposed to when he says "Cut it" or "And cut it" after which it is cut because the tailor will not be responsible (as in this case his instruction to cut will not be subsequent and attached to the tailor informing him it is sufficient).

Example Three

وَلَوْ قَالَ: بَعْتُ مِنْكَ هَذَا الثَّوْبَ بِعَشْرَةِ فَاقْطَعُهُ فَقَطَّعَهُ وَلَمْ يَقُلْ شَيْئًا كَانَ الْبَيْعُ تَامًا

If a person says to another, "I am selling this cloth to you in lieu of ten (dirhams), then cut it (if you accept the sale) and he (the buyer) cuts it, without saying anything (without verbally consenting) then the sale is complete.

Example Four

وَلَوْ قَالَ: إِنْ دَخَلْتُ هَذِهِ الدَّارَ فَهَذِهِ الدَّارُ فَأَنْتَ طَالِقٌ فَالشَّرْطُ دُخُولُ
الثَّانِيَةِ عَقِيبَ دُخُولِ الْأُولَى مُتَّصِلًا بِهِ حَتَّى لَوْ دَخَلْتَ الثَّانِيَةَ أَوَّلًا أَوْ آخِرًا
لَكِنَّهُ بَعْدَ مُدَّةٍ لَا يَقَعُ الطَّلَاقُ

If a person says (to his wife), "If you enter this house then this house, you are divorced" the condition (for Talaaq to apply) is to enter the second house immediately after entering the first house such that if a person entered the second house first and then the first house, or entered the first house but then entered the second house after a lengthy period, the Talaaq will not apply.

'ف' sometimes describes the Illat

وَقَدْ يَكُونُ الْفَاءُ لِبَيَانِ الْعِلَّةِ مِثْلَهُ: إِذَا قَالَ لِعَبْدِهِ: أَدِّ إِلَيَّ أَلْفًا فَأَنْتَ
حُرٌّ كَأَنَّ الْعَبْدَ حُرًّا فِي الْحَالِ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يُؤَدِّ شَيْئًا وَلَوْ قَالَ لِلْحَرَبِيِّ: أَنْزِلْ
فَأَنْتَ أَمِنٌ كَأَنَّ أَمِنًا، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَنْزِلْ

Sometimes the 'ف' describes the Illat (it will be used to denote a property or characteristic found in that person or item). An example of this (how 'ف' describes the Illat) is if a person tells his slave, "Pay me one thousand because you are free" (in this case) the slave will be set free immediately and will not have to pay (his master) anything. (Another example) If a person tells an enemy combatant, "Come

down because you have sanctuary", he will be given sanctuary immediately even if he does not come down.

'ف' is sometimes attached to the ruling of the Illat

وَفِي الْجَامِعِ مَا إِذَا قَالَ: أَمْرُ امْرَأَتِي بِيَدِكَ فَطَلَّقَهَا فَطَلَّقَهَا فِي الْمَجْلِسِ طَلَّقْتُ تَطْلِيقَةً بَائِنَةً وَلَا يَكُونُ الثَّانِي تَوْكِيدًا بِطَلَّاقٍ غَيْرِ الْأَوَّلِ فَصَارَ كَأَنَّهُ قَالَ: طَلَّقَهَا بِسَبَبِ أَنْ أَمَرَهَا بِبَيْدِكَ وَلَوْ قَالَ طَلَّقَهَا فَجَعَلْتُ أَمْرَهَا بِيَدِكَ وَطَلَّقَهَا فِي الْمَجْلِسِ طَلَّقْتُ تَطْلِيقَةً رَجْعِيَّةً

In 'Jaamie Kabeer' it is mentioned that if a person says to another, "My wife's affairs are in your hands so give her Talaaq (on my behalf)" and he then divorces her in the same sitting, then one Talaaq Baa'inah (irrevocable Talaaq) will apply (as the statement "My wife's affairs are in your hands" is ambiguous because of which Talaaq Baa'inah would apply) and the second sentence (the instruction "So divorce her") will not be permission to issue another Talaaq besides the first. It is as if he said (the meaning of his two statements will be) "Divorce her because her affairs are in your hands". If he were to have said, "Divorce her then I will hand her affairs over to you" after which he divorced her in the same sitting then a Talaaq Raj'ie (revocable Talaaq) will apply (as the statement "Divorced her" is clear and unambiguous because of which Talaaq Raj'ie would apply).

وَلَوْ قَالَ طَلَّقَهَا وَجَعَلْتُ أَمْرَهَا بِيَدِكَ فَطَلَّقَهَا فِي الْمَجْلِسِ طَلَّقْتُ تَطْلِيقَتَيْنِ وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْ قَالَ طَلَّقَهَا وَابْنَهَا أَوْ ابْنَهَا وَطَلَّقَهَا فَطَلَّقَهَا فِي الْمَجْلِسِ وَقَعَتْ تَطْلِيقَتَانِ

If he were to have said, "Divorce her and I hand her affairs over to you" after which he divorced her in the same sitting, then two Talaaq Baa'inah will apply (as the letter 'و' was used here which indicates that he authorised him to give

two separate Talaaq). Similarly if he said, "Divorced her and separate her (from me)", or (he says) "Separate her (from me) and divorce her", after which he divorces her in the same sitting, two Talaaq Baa'inah will apply.

Rulings derived from the above

وَعَلَى هَذَا قَالَ أَصْحَابُنَا إِذَا أُعْتِقَتِ الْأَمَةُ الْمَنْكُوحَةُ ثَبَّتَ لَهَا الْخِيَارُ سَوَاءً كَانَ زَوْجُهَا عَبْدًا أَوْ حُرًّا لِأَنَّ قَوْلَهُ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ لِبَرِيرَةَ حِينَ أُعْتِقَتْ مَلَكَتْ بُضْعُكَ فَاخْتَارِي أَثَبَّتَ الْخِيَارَ لَهَا بِسَبَبِ مِلْكِهَا بُضْعُهَا بِالْعِتْقِ وَهَذَا الْمَعْنَى لَا يَتَّفَقُونَ بَيْنَ كَوْنِ الزَّوْجِ عَبْدًا أَوْ حُرًّا

Based upon this (that the letter 'ف' is sometimes attached to the ruling of the Illat) **our scholars** (of the Hanafi Madhab) **that if a married female slave is set free then she will have Khiyaar** (the right to withdraw from the marriage) **whether her husband is a slave or free because the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah** ﷺ **to Hadhrat Bareerah** .. when she was set free, "You have become master of yourself so decide for yourself (you have the right to withdraw so decide whether you wish to remain in his wedlock or not)", establishes Khiyaar for her because of her becoming her own master by being set free, which is attained whether her husband is a slave or free.

Rulings derived from the above

وَيَتَفَرَّعُ مِنْهُ مَسْأَلَةٌ إِعْتِبَارِ الطَّلَاقِ بِالنِّسَاءِ فَإِنَّ بُضْعَ الْأَمَةِ الْمَنْكُوحَةِ مِلْكُ الزَّوْجِ وَلَمْ يَزَلْ عَنْ مِلْكِهِ بِعِتْقِهَا فَدَعَتْ الضَّرُورَةَ إِلَى الْقَوْلِ بِإِزْدِيَادِ الْمِلْكِ بِعِتْقِهَا حَتَّى يَنْتَبِتَ لَهُ الْمِلْكُ فِي الزِّيَادَةِ وَيَكُونُ ذَلِكَ سَبَبًا لِنُبُوتِ

الْخِيَارُ لَهَا وَازْدِيَادُ مَلِكِ الْبُضْعِ بِعِتْقِهَا مَعْنَى مَسْأَلَةِ إِعْتِبَارِ الطَّلَاقِ
بِالنِّسَاءِ فَيُدَارُ حُكْمُ مَالِكِيَّةِ الثَّلَاثِ عَلَى عِتْقِ الزَّوْجَةِ دُونَ عِتْقِ الزَّوْجِ
كَمَا هُوَ مَذْهَبُ الشَّافِعِيِّ

Derived from the Hadeeth mentioned above ("You have become master of yourself so decide for yourself") is the law of considering (the number of) Talaaq on (the condition of) women(whether the husband has the right to issue three Talaaq or two Talaaq will be based on the state of the woman, such that if she is a slave the husband will the right to issue only two Talaaq regardless of whether he is a slave or not and if she is free then he will have the right to issue three Talaaq regardless of whether he is a slave or not), **the reason for this is that the right (to sexual relations) over the wife belongs to the husband and this was not taken away from him by her being set free (as he still has the same right), thus necessity dictates that by her being set free his right (over her) also increased, which is the reason for giving her Khiyaar (in other words the reason for giving her Khiyaar is that the right of the husband over the wife increased, which is only possible by the husband gaining the right to three Talaqs and in the Hadeeth it was the wife who was set free, making the condition of the woman the reason for considering the number of Talaaq). The increase of the right of the husband by her being set free is the Illat (principle cause) for considering (the number of) Talaaq on (the condition of) women, thus the ruling of gaining right to three Talaaq will be based upon the condition of the wife and not the husband as is the opinion of Imaam Shaafie □.**

ثُمَّ is for suspension

فصل

ثُمَّ لِلتَّرَاخِي لِكِنَّهُ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ يُفِيدُ التَّرَاخِي فِي اللَّفْظِ وَالْحُكْمِ وَعِنْدَهُمَا يُفِيدُ التَّرَاخِي فِي الْحُكْمِ وَبَيَانِهِ فِيمَا إِذَا قَالَ لِعَبْرِ الْمَدْخُولِ بِهَا إِنْ دَخَلْتَ الدَّارَ فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ ثُمَّ طَالِقٌ ثُمَّ طَالِقٌ فَعِنْدَهُ يَتَعَلَّقُ الْأُولَى بِالْمَدْخُولِ وَتَقَعُ الثَّانِيَّةُ فِي الْحَالِ وَلَعْتَ الثَّلَاثَةُ وَعِنْدَهُمَا يَتَعَلَّقُ الْكُلُّ بِالْمَدْخُولِ ثُمَّ عِنْدَ الْمَدْخُولِ يَظْهَرُ التَّرْتِيبُ فَلَا يَقَعُ إِلَّا وَاحِدَةٌ وَلَوْ قَالَ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ ثُمَّ طَالِقٌ ثُمَّ طَالِقٌ إِنْ دَخَلْتَ الدَّارَ فَعِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ وَقَعَتِ الْأُولَى فِي الْحَالِ وَلَعْتَ الثَّانِيَّةُ وَالثَّلَاثَةُ وَعِنْدَهُمَا يَقَعُ الْوَاحِدَةُ عِنْدَ الْمَدْخُولِ لِمَا ذَكَرْنَا

'ثُمَّ' is for suspension (it indicates a delay between the sentence before and after it) **however** (there is a difference of opinion whether it indicates a delay in speech and ruling or only in the ruling and) **according to Imaam Abu Hanifah** □ **it indicates a delay in speech and ruling** (a delay in speech means that 'ثُمَّ' indicates that the speaker literally paused before making the next statement and a delay in ruling means that 'ثُمَّ' indicates that the statement after it applies after the first statement) **and according to Imaam Abu Yusuf** □ **and Imaam Muhammed** □ **it indicates a delay in ruling only.** The result of this (difference of opinion) **becomes apparent in the example, if a person tells his wife, with whom he has not consummated the marriage, "If you enter the house, you are divorced then divorced then divorced". According to Imaam Abu Hanifah** □ (it indicates a delay in speech and ruling and his statement would be the same as saying "If you enter the house, you are divorced...then divorced... then divorced", thus) **the first (Talaaq) will apply on entry** (will only apply when she enters the house), **the second will apply immediately** (as it will not be attached to the condition of entry since it was said later) **and the third will be void** (because an unconsummated marriage terminates with one Talaaq and will be inapplicable).

Whereas according to Imaam Abu Yusuf □ **and Imaam Muhammed** □ (it indicates a delay in ruling only and) **all**

three Talaq will only apply when she enters the house and when she enters the house they will apply in sequence such that only one will apply (as the marriage will terminate with it and the other two will be inapplicable).

If he said (to his wife), "You are divorced then divorced then divorced, if you enter this house" then according to Imaam Abu Hanifah ؑ (it indicates a delay in speech and ruling and his statement would be the same as saying "You are divorced...then divorced... then divorced, if you enter this house", thus) the first will apply immediately and the second and third will be void (as the marriage will terminate with it and the other two will be inapplicable) whereas according to Imaam Abu Yusuf ؑ and Imaam Muhammed ؑ only one apply when she enters as we have mentioned (that all three will be dependent on entry and will apply in sequence when she enters the house and since the marriage will terminate with the first the other two will be inapplicable).

وَأِنْ كَانَتْ الْمَرْأَةُ مَدْخُولًا بِهَا فَإِنْ قَدَّمَ الشَّرْطَ تَعَلَّقَتْ الْأُولَى بِالدُّخُولِ
وَيَقَعُ ثِنْتَانِ فِي الْحَالِ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى وَإِنْ أَخَّرَ الشَّرْطَ
وَقَعَ ثِنْتَانِ فِي الْحَالِ وَتَعَلَّقَتْ الثَّالِثَةُ بِالدُّخُولِ وَعِنْدَهُمَا يَتَعَلَّقُ الْكُلُّ
بِالدُّخُولِ فِي الْفَصْلَيْنِ

If the marriage was consummated and the condition mentioned first (that is he said, "If you enter the house, you are divorced then divorced then divorced") then the first will be dependent on entry and the last two will apply immediately according to Imaam Abu Hanifah ؑ (as according to him it is as if he said, "If you enter the house, you are divorced...then divorced... then divorced") and if the condition was mentioned last (that is he said, "You are

divorced then divorced then divorced, if you enter this house", according to Imaam Abu Hanifah) the first two will apply immediately and (only) the last will be dependent on entry (as according to him it is as if he said, "You are divorced... then divorced... then divorced, if you enter this house").

(However) According to Imaam Abu Yusuf and Imaam Abu Muhammed in both instances the all three Talaaq will depend on entry."

'بَلْ' for correction

فصل

بَلْ لَتَذَارُكَ الْعَلَطُ بِإِقَامَةِ الثَّانِي مَقَامَ الْأَوَّلِ فَإِذَا قَالَ لِغَيْرِ الْمَدْخُولِ بِهَا أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ وَاحِدَةً لَا بَلْ ثِنْتَيْنِ وَقَعَتْ وَاحِدَةً لَأَنَّ قَوْلَهُ لَا بَلْ ثِنْتَيْنِ رُجُوعٌ عَنِ الْأَوَّلِ بِإِقَامَةِ الثَّانِي مَقَامَ الْأَوَّلِ وَلَمْ يَصِحَّ رُجُوعُهُ فَيَقَعُ الْأُولَى فَلَا يَبْقَى الْمَحْلُ عِنْدَ قَوْلِهِ ثِنْتَيْنِ وَلَوْ كَانَتْ مَدْخُولاً بِهَا يَقَعُ الثَّلَاثُ

'بَلْ' is to correct an error by replacing the first (sentence before 'بَلْ') with the second (after 'بَلْ'). (For example) If a person says to his wife, with whom he has not yet consummated the marriage, "You are divorced once, no but rather twice" then only one Talaaq will apply because his statement "No but rather twice" is correction of the first statement by replacing it with the second but

retraction of the first statement is incorrect¹ (because it is *Jumla Insha'iyah*) so the first **Talaaq** will apply and the two will be **inapplicable** (because a wife with whom the marriage has not been consummated comes out of his *Nikaah* with one **Talaaq**). If the marriage was consummated then three **Talaaq** would apply (since the first cannot be retracted the second statement will be a further two **Talaaq**).

وَهَذَا بِخِلَافِ مَا لَوْ قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى أَلْفٍ لَا بَلَّ أَلْفَانٍ حَيْثُ لَا يَجِبُ ثَلَاثَةُ أَلْفٍ عِنْدَنَا وَقَالَ زُفَرٌ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى: يَجِبُ ثَلَاثَةُ أَلْفٍ لِأَنَّ حَقِيقَةَ اللَّفْظِ لِنَدَارِكِ الْعَلْطِ بِاثْنَاتِ الثَّانِي مَقَامِ الْأَوَّلِ وَلَمْ يَصِحَّ عِنْدَ إِبْطَالِ الْأَوَّلِ فَيَجِبُ تَصْحِيحُ الثَّانِي مَعَ بَقَاءِ الْأَوَّلِ وَذَلِكَ بِطَرِيقِ زِيَادَةِ الْأَلْفِ عَلَى الْأَلْفِ الْأَوَّلِ بِخِلَافِ قَوْلِهِ: أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ وَاحِدَةً بَلَّ ثِنْتَيْنِ لِأَنَّ هَذَا إِنْشَاءٌ وَذَلِكَ إِبْخَارٌ وَالْعَلْطُ إِنَّمَا يَكُونُ فِي الْإِخْبَارِ دُونَ الْإِنْشَاءِ فَأَمَّا تَصْحِيحُ اللَّفْظِ بِنَدَارِكِ الْعَلْطِ فِي الْأَقْرَارِ دُونَ الطَّلَاقِ حَتَّى لَوْ كَانَ الطَّلَاقُ بِطَرِيقِ الْإِخْبَارِ بِأَنْ قَالَ كُنْتُ طَلَقْتُكَ أَمْسٍ وَاحِدَةً لَا بَلَّ ثِنْتَيْنِ يَقَعُ ثِنْتَانِ لِمَا ذَكَرْنَا

This ruling (that three **Talaaq** will apply as mentioned above) **is different from him saying, "I owe a certain person one thousand no but rather two thousand"** (as this is *Jumla Khabariya*, wherein retraction of the first statement and correcting it with 'بَلَّ' is permissible) such that according to us (Hanafi scholars) three thousand will not be **Waajib** on him. **Imaam Zufar** is of the opinion that three thousand will be **Waajib**. The reason for this (our proof) is that the actual purpose of 'بَلَّ' is correction of the error (the statement prior to it) by replacing it with the second (statement after 'بَلَّ') and (complete) retraction of the first is not possible (as he cannot retract his admission of debt) so the second will be put into effect while keeping the first (admission of debt) intact, and this is possible by making

¹Correcting the previous statement using 'بَلَّ' is only possible when the sentence is *Jumla Khabariya* (a sentence which has the possibility of being false) and not in *Jumla Insha'iyah* (a sentence which cannot be false).

another thousand Waajib upon the first thousand. This ruling is opposed to his saying, "You are divorced once, no, but rather twice" because that is Insha'iyah and the example above is Khabariya and an error can be corrected in Khabariya and not Insha'iyah, so correcting the word by retracting the error is possible in Iqraar (*admission*) and not in Talaaq (*as it is Insha'iyah*) such that if the Talaaq was issued in a manner of Ikhbaar (*informing*) by saying, "I gave you one Talaaq yesterday, no but rather two", then two will apply in the manner mentioned above (*that 'لكن' will correct the previous statement of one Talaaq being issued and replace it with the second that two was issued, as it is Jumla Khabariya*).

'لكن' is for clarification

فصل

لَكِنْ لِلْإِسْتِدْرَاكِ بَعْدَ النَّفْيِ فَيَكُونُ مُوجِبُهُ اثْبَاتٌ مَا بَعْدَهُ ۚ فَأَمَّا نَفْيُ مَا قَبْلَهُ فَتَأْبِيتٌ بِدَلِيلِهِ

'لكن' is for clarification after negation (*when something is negated then a doubt might arise as to whether certain aspects have been negated as well thus 'لكن' will establish that it has not been negated*). Thus it will affirm what comes after it (*that it is has not been negated*). As far as the negation before it (*before 'لكن'*) is concerned, it will still apply by it (*whatever has been negated before the 'لكن' will still be negated*).

Preconditions for it to serve the purpose of clarification

وَالْعَطْفُ بِهَذِهِ الْكَلِمَةِ إِنَّمَا يَتَحَقَّقُ عِنْدَ اتِّسَاقِ الْكَلَامِ فَإِنْ كَانَ الْكَلَامُ مُتَّصِفًا بِتَعَلُّقِ النَّفْيِ بِاثْبَاتِ الَّذِي بَعْدَهُ وَإِلَّا فَهُوَ مُسْتَأْنَفٌ

Conjunction with 'لكن' (*such that it clarifies the level of negation by excluding what comes after it from being negated*)

only applies when the speech is concurrence ¹(there is no pause between the first and second statement). If the speech is in concurrence then the negation will be attached to the affirmation that comes after it (whereby whatever comes after 'لكن' will not be negated) and if not (if the speech is not in concurrence) then it will be a new sentence (and will have no relation to the negation before it).

Example One

مَثَلُهُ مَا ذَكَرَهُ مُحَمَّدٌ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى فِي الْجَامِعِ: إِذَا قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى أَلْفٍ قَرْضٌ فَقَالَ فُلَانٌ: لَا وَلَكِنَّهُ عَصَبٌ لَزِمَهُ الْمَالُ لِأَنَّ الْكَلَامَ مُتَّسِقٌ فَظَهَرَ أَنَّ النَّفْيَ كَانَ فِي السَّبَبِ دُونَ نَفْسِ الْمَالِ

An example of this (where 'لكن' is said in concurrence) is what was mentioned by Imaam Muhammed ؑ in 'Al-Jaamiul Kabeer', when a person says to another, "I owe a thousand as debt" and the other person says "No (you do not owe the money as debt) however (you owe the money) because of illegal seizure ("you illegally seized it from me)" the amount (thousand) will be incumbent upon him to pay because the speech (the statement, "however because of illegal seizure") was said in concurrence after negation clarifying that the negation was of the manner in which it is owed and not (negation) of owing the money itself.

¹In order for 'لكن' to act as a conjunction, whereby it clarifies the level of negation by excluding whatever comes after it from being negated, the speech needs to be in concurrence, and in order for speech to be in concurrence two conditions need to be met. These two conditions are;

1) The speech must be uninterrupted such that there is no pause or break in the speech but rather the statement after 'لكن' is said consecutively and immediately after the first.

2) What is being excluded from negation after 'لكن' must not be the very same aspect which is being negated before it. The same thing which is being negated first cannot be affirmed thereafter using 'لكن', in this case 'لكن' will not act as a conjunction but will denote a new sentence having no relation to the negation before it.

وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْ قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ: عَلَى أَلْفٍ مِنْ تَمَنٍ هَذِهِ الْجَارِيَةُ فَقَالَ فُلَانٌ: لَا
الْجَارِيَةُ جَارِيَتُكَ وَلَكِنْ لِي عَلَيْكَ أَلْفٌ يُلْزِمُهُ الْمَالُ فَظَهَرَ أَنَّ النَّفْيَ كَانَ
فِي السَّبَبِ لَا فِي أَصْلِ الْمَالِ

Similarly (another example of 'لكن') is if a person says to another, "I owe you a thousand in lieu of this slave" and the other person replies, "No, the slave is yours however you owe me one thousand (as a debt)". The amount (thousand) will be incumbent upon him to pay as it is clear that the negation was of the manner in which it is owed and not (negation) of owing the money itself.

وَلَوْ كَانَ فِي يَدِهِ عَبْدٌ فَقَالَ: هَذَا لِفُلَانٍ فَقَالَ فُلَانٌ: مَا كَانَ لِي قَطُّ وَلَكِنَّهُ
لِفُلَانٍ آخَرَ فَإِنْ وَصَلَ الْكَلَامَ كَانَ الْعَبْدُ لِلْمَقْرَّ لَهُ الثَّانِي لِأَنَّ النَّفْيَ يَتَعَلَّقُ
بِالْإِثْبَاتِ وَإِنْ فَصَلَ كَانَ الْعَبْدُ لِلْمَقْرَّ لَهُ الْأَوَّلِ فَيَكُونُ قَوْلُ الْمَقْرَّ لَهُ رَدًّا
لِلْإِقْرَارِ

If a person (e.g. Ali) has a slave in his possession and says, "This slave belongs to a certain person (e.g. Zaid)" on which the other person (Zaid) says, "This slave never belonged to me however it belongs to so and so (e.g. Amr)"; if his statement, ("This slave never belonged to me but it belongs to so and so") is said in concurrence then the slave will belong to the other (Amr) because his negation (of the slave being his) will be attached to the affirmation (of the slave belonging to Amr). (However) If he delays or pauses (before saying, "But it belongs to Amr") then the slave will belong to the one who admitted it belonged to another (i.e. Ali) and the statement of the person who it was claimed to be (Zaid) will be denial of the omission (when he paused before saying, "but it is Amr's" this will be a new sentence, separating it from his previous statement of denial, and will be testimony that it is Amr's and since testimony of one person is not valid, the slave will still belong to Ali).

وَلَوْ أَنَّ أَمَةً تَزَوَّجَتْ نَفْسَهَا بِغَيْرِ إِذْنِ مَوْلَاهَا بِمِائَةِ دِرْهَمٍ فَقَالَ الْمَوْلَى لَا أُجِيزُ الْعَقْدَ بِمِائَةِ دِرْهَمٍ وَلَكِنْ أُجِيزُهُ بِمِائَةٍ وَخَمْسِينَ بَطَلَ الْعَقْدُ لِأَنَّ الْكَلَامَ غَيْرُ مُتَّسِقٍ فَإِنَّ نَفْيَ الْإِجَازَةِ وَإِثْبَاتَهَا بِعَيْنِهَا لَا يَتَحَقَّقُ فَكَانَ قَوْلُهُ لَكِنْ أُجِيزُهُ إِثْبَاتُهُ بَعْدَ رَدِّ الْعَقْدِ وَكَذَلِكَ لَا أُجِيزُهُ وَلَكِنْ أُجِيزُهُ إِنْ زِدْتَنِي خَمْسِينَ عَلَى الْمِائَةِ يَكُونُ فَسْخًا لِلنِّكَاحِ لِعَدَمِ إِحْتِمَالِ الْبَيَانِ لِأَنَّ مِنْ شَرْطِهِ الْإِتِّسَاقُ وَلَا إِتِّسَاقُ

If a female slave marries without the permission of her master (making the validity of her marriage dependent on his permission) for Mehr of one hundred Dirhams (which would belong to the master) and the master says, "I do not permit the contract (of Nikaah) for one hundred Dirhams however I permit it for one hundred and fifty Dirhams", the contract (of Nikaah) will be invalidated because the speech is not in concurrence (which is a condition for 'لكن' to act as a conjunction) since negation of permission and then affirmation thereafter cannot be concurred (coincide). Thus his statement "However I permit it" was said after he (just) negated the contract. Similarly if he says, "I do not permit it however I permit it if you give me fifty more Dirhams including the hundred" the contract of Nikaah will be invalidated as it cannot be regarded as clarification (of doubt after negation) as its precondition (to act as a conjunction clarifying the doubt caused by the negation prior to it) is that it must be in concurrence and it is not in concurrence here (as the second condition of concurrence has not been met, namely what is affirmed after 'لكن' must not be what has been negated before it.)

'أو' is to grant choice

فصل

أَوْ لِتَنَازُلِ أَحَدِ الْمَذْكُورَيْنِ

'أَوْ' is to include either one of the two mentioned (*choices in the ruling*).

Example One

وَلِهَذَا لَوْ قَالَ هَذَا حُرٌّ وَهَذَا كَانَ بِمَنْزِلَةِ قَوْلِهِ أَحَدُهُمَا حُرٌّ حَتَّى كَانَ لَهُ
وَلَايَةُ النَّيَّانِ

Therefore (*since 'أَوْ' will include either one of the two mentioned choices in the ruling*) **if a person says** (*regarding his slaves*), **"This one is free or this one"**, then this will be the same as him saying, **"One of them is free"** such that he will have the right to clarify which one of them is free.

Example Two

وَلَوْ قَالَ وَكَأَلْتُ بِبَيْعِ هَذَا الْعَبْدِ هَذَا أَوْ هَذَا كَانَ الْوَكِيلُ أَحَدَهُمَا وَيُبَاحُ الْبَيْعُ
لِكُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمَا وَلَوْ بَاعَ أَحَدُهُمَا ثُمَّ عَادَ الْعَبْدُ إِلَى مَلِكِ الْمُوَكَّلِ لَا يَكُونُ
لِلْآخَرِ أَنْ يَبِيعَهُ

If a person says (*regarding his slave*), **"I have appointed this person or this person to sell this slave"**, then either of them will be his representative (*in this sale*) and it will be permissible for either one of them to sell the slave. (*However*) **If one of them sells the slave and the slave (eventually) comes back into the ownership of the Muwakkil (the one who appointed the others as his representatives) then the other (representative) will not have the right to sell the slave again** (*as the Muwakkil granted one of them the right to sell the slave and when one of them does so, the other will no longer have the right to sell the slave*).

Example Three

وَلَوْ قَالَ: لثَلَاثَ نِسْوَةٍ لِهَ هَذِهِ طَالِقٌ أَوْ هَذِهِ وَهَذِهِ طَلَّقْتُ إِحْدَى الْأُولَيَيْنِ وَطَلَّقْتُ الثَّلَاثَةَ فِي الْحَالِ لَانْعِطَافُهَا عَلَى الْمُطَلَّاقَةِ مِنْهُمَا وَيَكُونُ الْخِيَارُ لِلزَّوْجِ فِي بَيَانِ الْمُطَلَّاقَةِ مِنْهُمَا بِمَنْزِلَةِ مَا لَوْ قَالَ إِحْدَكُمَا طَالِقٌ وَهَذَا

If a person, who has three wives, says, "This one or this one is divorced and this one", then either one of the first two (which he specifies) will be divorced and the third will be divorced immediately because it is in conjunction with the divorced one of the two. The husband will have the right to clarify which one of them is divorced as in when he says, "One of you two is divorced and this one" (whereby he will have to specify which of the first two has been divorced and the third will be divorced instantly).

Example Four

وَعَلَى هَذَا قَالَ زُفَرٌ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى: إِذَا قَالَ لَا أَكَلِّمُ هَذَا أَوْ هَذَا أَوْ هَذَا كَانَ بِمَنْزِلَةِ قَوْلِهِ لَا أَكَلِّمُ أَحَدَ هَذَيْنِ وَهَذَا فَلَا يَحْنُثُ مَا لَمْ يُكَلِّمْ أَحَدَ الْأُولَيْنِ وَالثَّلَاثِ وَعِنْدَنَا لَوْ كَلَّمَ الْأَوَّلَ وَحْدَهُ يَحْنُثُ وَلَوْ كَلَّمَ أَحَدَ الْآخِرَيْنِ لَا يَحْنُثُ مَا لَمْ يُكَلِّمَهُمَا

Based upon this (ruling of Talaaq mentioned above) Imaam Zufar □ says that if a person says, "I will not speak to this person or this person and this person" it will be the same as him saying, "I will not speak to one of these two and this person" such that he will not break his oath until he speaks to one of the first two as well as the third. According to us (the majority of scholars of the Hanafi Madhab) if he speaks to the first only then his oath will break and if he speaks to the last two then his oath will only break when he speaks to them together (as it is the same as him saying "I will not speak to this person or I will not talk to this person and this person").

Example Five

وَلَوْ قَالَ بَعْ هَذَا الْعَبْدَ أَوْ هَذَا كَانَ لَهُ أَنْ يَبِيعَ أَحَدَهُمَا أَيُّهُمَا شَاءَ

If he says, "Sell this slave or this slave" then the person will have the choice to sell any of the two he wishes.

Example six

وَلَوْ أَدْخَلَ أَوْ فِي الْمَهْرِ بَيَانَ تَزَوَّجَهَا عَلَى هَذَا أَوْ عَلَى هَذَا يُحْكَمُ مَهْرُ الْمَثَلِ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى لِأَنَّ اللَّفْظَ يَتَنَاوَلُ أَحَدَهُمَا وَالْمَوْجِبُ الْأَصْلِيُّ مَهْرُ الْمَثَلِ فَيَتَرَجَّحُ مَا يُشَابِهُهُ

If a person adds 'أو' to Mehr by marrying her with this (Mehr) or this (Mehr), then according to Imaam Abu Hanifah □ Mehr Mithal (the Mehr commonly given in the area) will be used to decide the matter as his statement includes both of the two mentioned and Mehr Mithal is what should be Waajib (as when the Mehr is not stipulated or unclear then Mehr Mithal is Waajib), thus that which is closest to it will be specified (that amount of the two which is closest to Mehr Mithal will be specified to be the Mehr).

Rulings derived from the above

وَعَلَى هَذَا قُلْنَا أَلْتَشْهَدُ لَيْسَ بِرُكْنٍ فِي الصَّلَاةِ لِأَنَّ قَوْلَهُ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ إِذَا قُلْتَ هَذَا أَوْ فَعَلْتَ هَذَا فَقَدْ تَمَّتْ صَلَاتُكَ عَقَبَ الْإِثْمَامِ بِأَحَدِهِمَا فَلَا يَشْتَرِطُ كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمَا وَقَدْ شَرِطْتَ الْعَقْدَةَ بِالِاتِّفَاقِ فَلَا يَشْتَرِطُ قِرَاءَةُ التَّشْهِيدِ

Based upon this (that 'أو' will include either one of the two mentioned choices in the ruling) we say that Tashahud is not Fardh in Salaah because the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah □, "If you say this (recite Tashahud)or do this (sit in the final

Qa'adah) then undoubtedly your Salaah is complete" has made completion of Salaah dependent on either one of them (i.e. Salaah will be complete by either the recitation of Tashahud or sitting in the final Qa'adah) such that both (Tashahud and the final Qa'adah) cannot be a requisite (Fardh at the same time because 'أَوْ' will include only one of the two in the ruling and not both) and the final Qa'adah is already unanimously (according to all schools of thought) Fardh, thus recitation of Tashahud will not be Fardh (as according to this Hadeeth one of the two is a condition for the completion of Salaah and it has already been established that the final Qa'adah is Fardh and a condition for the completion of Salaah, thus the recitation of Tashahud cannot be).

When 'أَوْ' is used in negation

ثُمَّ هَذِهِ الْكَلِمَةُ فِي مَقَامِ النِّفْيِ يُوجِبُ نَفْيَ كُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِنَ الْمَذْكُورَيْنِ حَتَّى لَوْ قَالَ لَا أَكَلِمُ هَذَا أَوْ هَذَا يَحْنُثُ إِذَا كَلَّمَ أَحَدَهُمَا وَفِي الْأَثْبَاتِ يَتَنَاوَلُ أَحَدَهُمَا مَعَ صِفَةِ التَّخْيِيرِ كَقَوْلِهِمْ خُذْ هَذَا أَوْ ذَلِكَ

Then (another important rule which one should remember with regards to the usage of 'أَوْ' is) **if this word ('أَوْ')** is used in **negation** (used in a sentence where something is being negated) then it necessitates the negation of both objects mentioned such that if a person says, "I will not talk to this person or this person", he will break his oath if he talks to anyone of them (and he will not have the choice to specify who he will not talk to). (However) **When it is used for affirmation it will apply to both objects with the right to specify** (he may clarify which of the two he is referring to) as

in when he says, "Take this or that" (one will have the choice to specify which to take).

The necessity of having choice

وَمِنْ ضَرُورَةِ التَّخْيِيرِ عُمُومُ الْإِبَاحَةِ قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى: {فَكَفَّارَتُهُ إِطْعَامُ عَشْرَةِ مَسَاكِينَ مِنْ أَوْسَطِ مَا تُطْعَمُونَ أَوْ كِسْوَتُهُمْ أَوْ تَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ}

Amongst the necessities of having choice (the right to choose any of the specified objects) **is general permissibility** (to choose any one of them). (As in) **The verse,**

"The Kaffaarah for this (for breaking a deliberate oath) **is to either feed ten poor persons with food of average quality with which you feed your families, or to clothe them** (the ten poor persons with clothing that at least covers a major portion of the body), **or to free a** (Muslim or non-Muslim) **slave"** (in this verse one is permitted to adopt any of the above as the method of paying his Kaffaarah and even all three if he is able and so desires).

'أو' comes with the meaning of "unless"

وَقَدْ يَكُونُ أَوْ بِمَعْنَى حَتَّى، قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى {لَيْسَ لَكَ مِنَ الْأَمْرِ شَيْءٌ أَوْ يَتُوبَ عَلَيْهِمْ} قِيلَ: مَعْنَاهُ حَتَّى يَتُوبَ عَلَيْهِمْ قَالَ أَصْحَابُنَا: لَوْ قَالَ لَا أَدْخُلُ هَذِهِ الدَّارَ أَوْ أَدْخُلُ هَذِهِ الدَّارَ يَكُونُ أَوْ بِمَعْنَى حَتَّى حَتَّى لَوْ دَخَلَ الْأَوَّلَى أَوْ لَا حَنْتَ وَلَوْ دَخَلَ الثَّانِيَةَ أَوْ لَا بَرَّ فِي يَمِينِهِ

Sometimes 'أو' comes with the meaning of unless (which is a meaning of 'حَتَّى'). (As in) **The verse,**

You have no choice in the matter unless He forgives them"

(Surah Aal-Imraan: 123)

in which 'أَوْ' has the meaning of unless ('حَتَّى'). (Based upon this) Our scholars say that if a person takes an oath saying, "I will not enter this house or this house", 'أَوْ' will have the meaning of "Unless" (making his oath actually mean, "I will not enter this house unless I enter this house") such that if he first enters the house mentioned first then his oath will break but if he first enters the house mentioned second then he will be absolved from his oath (as he fulfilled his vow by not entering the first house unless he first enters in the second house).

Example Two

وَبِمِثْلِهِ لَوْ قَالَ لَا أَفَارِقُكَ أَوْ تَقْضِيَ دَيْنِي يَكُونُ بِمَعْنَى حَتَّى تَقْضِيَ دَيْنِي

Another example (of the above, where 'أَوْ' has the meaning of unless) is if a person says (to one who owes him money), "I will not separate from you or you pay my debt (the money you owe me)" which means, "Unless you pay my debt (the money you owe me)".

'حَتَّى' indicates limit

حَتَّى لِلْعَايَةِ كَالِي فَادَا كَانَ مَا قَبْلَهَا قَابِلًا لِلِامْتِدَادِ وَمَا بَعْدَهَا يَصْلُحُ غَايَةً لَهُ كَانَتْ الْكَلِمَةُ عَامِلَةً بِحَقِيقَتِهَا مِثْلَهُ مَا قَالَ مُحَمَّدٌ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى إِذَا قَالَ عَبْدِي حُرٌّ إِنْ لَمْ أَضْرِبْكَ حَتَّى يَشْفَعَ فَلَانٌ أَوْ حَتَّى تَصِيحَ أَوْ تَشْتَكِيَ بَيْنَ يَدَيَّ أَوْ حَتَّى يَدْخُلَ اللَّيْلُ كَانَتْ الْكَلِمَةُ عَامِلَةً بِحَقِيقَتِهَا لِأَنَّ الضَّرْبَ بِالتَّكْرَارِ يَحْتَمِلُ الْإِمْتِدَادَ وَشَفَاعَةُ فَلَانٍ وَأَمَّا هَذَا تَصْلُحُ غَايَةً لِلضَّرْبِ فَلَوْ إِمْتَنَعَ عَنِ الضَّرْبِ قَبْلَ الْعَايَةِ حَنْثٌ

('حَتَّى') indicates limit just as 'إلى'. If what precedes it ('حَتَّى') can be prolonged and what comes after it can be its limit then 'حَتَّى' will be used for its literal meaning (to indicate limit). An example of this ('حَتَّى' indicating the limit) is what Imaam Muhammed rahimahullah has said when a person says (to his slave), "My slave is free if I do not hit you until a certain person intercedes" or "My slave is free if I do not hit you until you scream" or "My slave is free if I do not hit you until you complain" or "My slave is free if I do not hit you until the night sets in" then ('حَتَّى') will be used for its literal meaning (to indicate limit) because to hit repeatedly can be prolonged (until the specified limit) and the intercession of a certain person and others alike it (screaming, complaining, night setting in) can be limit for hitting, thus if he stops hitting before the specified limit, his oath will break (and the slave will be set free).

Example Two

وَلَوْ حَلَفَ لَا يُفَارِقُ غَرِيمَهُ حَتَّى يَقْضِيَهُ دَيْنَهُ فَفَارَقَهُ قَبْلَ قَضَاءِ الدَّيْنِ
حَنْثًا

If a person takes an oath that he will not separate from his debtor until he pays his debt but then leaves him before the debt is paid, his oath will break.

If 'Urf' opposes the literal meaning of 'حَتَّى'

فَإِذَا تَعَدَّرَ الْعَمَلُ بِالْحَقِيقَةِ لِمَانَعٍ كَالْعُرْفِ كَمَا لَوْ حَلَفَ أَنْ يَضْرِبَهُ حَتَّى
يَمُوتَ أَوْ حَتَّى يَقْتُلَهُ حُمْلٌ عَلَى الضَّرْبِ الشَّدِيدِ بِإِعْتِبَارِ الْعُرْفِ

If practising upon the literal meaning (of 'حَتَّى') is impeded by some hindrance such as 'Urf' (then the meaning of 'Urf' will be considered), as in taking an oath that he will hit him

until he dies or until he is killed, this will be taken to imply a severe hiding based upon 'Urf' (the common usage of this term implies a severe hiding thus it will be given preference over the literal meaning).

If the verb cannot be prolonged

وَأِنْ لَّمْ يَكُنْ الْأَوَّلُ قَابِلًا لِلِامْتِدَادِ وَالْآخِرُ صَالِحًا لِلْغَايَةِ وَصَلَحَ الْأَوَّلُ سَبَبًا وَالْآخِرُ جَزَاءً يُحْمَلُ عَلَى الْجَزَاءِ مِثْلَهُ مَا قَالَ مُحَمَّدٌ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى إِذَا قَالَ لِغَيْرِهِ: عَبْدِي حُرٌّ إِنْ لَمْ أَتِكَ حَتَّى تُغْدِيَنِي فَأَتَاهُ فَلَمْ يُعِدَّهُ لَا يَحْنُثُ لَأَنَّ التَّغْدِيَةَ لَا يَصْلُحُ غَايَةً لِلْإِثْنَانِ بَلْ هُوَ دَاعٍ إِلَى زِيَادَةِ الْإِثْنَانِ وَصَلَحَ جَزَاءً فَيُحْمَلُ عَلَى الْجَزَاءِ فَيَكُونُ بِمَعْنَى لَأَمْ كَيَّ فَصَارَ كَمَا لَوْ قَالَ إِنْ لَمْ أَتِكَ إِثْنَانًا جَزَاءًهُ التَّغْدِيَةُ

If what precedes it ('حَتَّى') cannot be prolonged and what comes after it cannot be a limit but the first (what precedes 'حَتَّى') has the ability to be a condition (Sharth) and the second (what comes after 'حَتَّى') has the ability to be the result (consequence of the condition), then it (what comes after 'حَتَّى') will be the result (consequence of the condition). An example of this (where the verb which precedes cannot be prolonged and what comes after cannot be a limit) is what Imaam Muhammed ﷺ has said that when a person says to another, "My slave is free, if I do not come to you so that you can give me breakfast" after which he goes to him but does not receive breakfast, then his vow will not break (and the slave will not be set free). The reason for this is that "breakfast" cannot be a limit for coming to him but rather serves more as an incentive for coming to him and (breakfast) has the ability to be the result (consequence of the condition) because of which it will be made into the result (consequence of the condition) having the meaning of 'لِكَى' (so that), thus it will be as if he said, "If I do not come to you because of which you will give me breakfast (then my slave is free)" (and since

the master fulfilled the condition of coming to him for breakfast, his slave will not be set free, even though the host did not serve him breakfast).

وَإِذَا تَعَدَّرَ هَذَا بَأْنَ لَا يَصْلُحُ الْآخِرُ جَزَاءً لِلأَوَّلِ حُمْلَ عَلَى الْعُطْفِ
الْمَحْضِ مِثْلَهُ مَا قَالَ مُحَمَّدٌ رَحِمَهُ اللهُ تَعَالَى إِذَا قَالَ عَبْدِي حُرٌّ إِنْ لَمْ أَتَكَ
حَتَّى أَتَعْدِيَ عِنْدَكَ الْيَوْمَ وَإِنْ لَمْ تَأْتِنِي حَتَّى تَعْدِيَ عِنْدِي الْيَوْمَ فَاتَّاهُ فَلَمْ
يَتَعَدَّ عِنْدَهُ فِي ذَلِكَ الْيَوْمِ حَنْتٌ وَذَلِكَ لِأَنَّهُ لَمَّا أُضِيفَ كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مِنَ الْفَعْلَيْنِ
إِلَى ذَاتِ وَاحِدٍ لَا يَصْلُحُ أَنْ يَكُونَ فِعْلُهُ جَزَاءً لِفِعْلِهِ فَيُحْمَلُ عَلَى الْعُطْفِ
الْمَحْضِ فَيَكُونُ الْمَجْمُوعُ شَرْطًا لِلْبَرِّ

If this (making what precedes it condition and what comes after the result) is not possible because what is last (after 'حتى') cannot be the result of what is first (before 'حتى') then it ('حتى') will be only for conjunction. An example of this is what Imaam Muhammed □ has said that if a person says, "My slave is free if I do not come to you then eat breakfast with you today" or he says, "My slave is free if you do not come to me and eat breakfast with me today" after which he comes but does not eat breakfast with him on that day, then his oath will break (and the slave will be set free). The reason for this is that when he ascribed both actions (of coming and eating breakfast) to himself, his own action cannot be a result (consequence of the condition) of his own action (as the second action is not in his control) then it will be merely for conjunction, making (fulfilment of) all (both coming and eating breakfast) a condition to be absolved (of the oath).

'إِلَى' denotes the extremity of the limit

فصل

إِلَى لَانْتِهَاءِ الْعَايَةِ ثُمَّ هُوَ فِي بَعْضِ الصُّوَرِ يُفِيدُ مَعْنَى إِمْتِدَادِ الْحُكْمِ وَفِي بَعْضِ الصُّوَرِ يُفِيدُ مَعْنَى الاسْقَاطِ فَإِنْ أَفَادَ الْإِمْتِدَادَ لَا تَدْخُلُ الْعَايَةُ فِي الْحُكْمِ وَإِنْ أَفَادَ الْاسْقَاطَ تَدْخُلُ

'إِلَى' denotes the extremity (*farthest point*) of the limit. At times it indicates the action is prolonged (*until the limit*) and in some instances it indicates that the action terminates (*at the limit*). If it indicates that the action is prolonged then the limit will not be included in the action (*whatever has been ordered will be carried out until the limit and will not include or surpass that limit*) and if it indicates that the action is terminates (*at the limit*) then it will be included (*whatever has been ordered will be carried out until the limit and the limit will include and at times even surpass that limit*).

If 'إِلَى' indicates that the action is prolonged

نَظِيرُ الْأَوَّلِ اسْتَرَيْتُ هَذَا الْمَكَانَ إِلَى هَذَا الْحَائِطِ لَا يَدْخُلُ الْحَائِطُ فِي الْبَيْعِ وَنَظِيرُ الثَّانِي بَاعَ بِشَرْطِ الْخِيَارِ إِلَى ثَلَاثَةِ أَيَّامٍ وَبِمِثْلِهِ لَوْ حَلَفَ لَا أَكَلَمُ فَلَانَا إِلَى شَهْرٍ كَانَ الشَّهْرُ دَاخِلًا فِي الْحُكْمِ وَقَدْ أَفَادَ فَايِدَةَ الْاسْقَاطِ هَهُنَا

An example of the first (where it indicates that the action has been prolonged until the limit) is (if a person says,) "I purchased this building until this wall" whereby the wall will not be included in the sale (as 'إِلَى' indicates that the area which has been purchased extends/stretches/ prolongs until the wall and will therefore not be included in the sale).

An example of the second (where it indicates that the action terminates at the limit) is (if a person) purchases something with the right to cancel the transaction until three days (by

saying, "I purchase this from you on condition that I have the right to cancel the transaction until three days" whereby the third day will be included and on the third day he will still have the right to cancel, as 'إلى' indicates that the right to cancel the transaction terminates after three days and the right to cancel will still be valid on the third day).

An example of this is if a person takes an oath, "I will not talk to a person until a month" whereby the entire month will be included in the ruling, as it indicates termination here (it indicates the period in which he will not talk to him terminates after one month).

Rulings derived from the above

وَعَلَىٰ هَٰذَا قُلْنَا الْمَرْفَقُ وَالْكَعْبُ دَاخِلَانِ تَحْتَ حُكْمِ الْغُسْلِ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى: {إِلَى الْمَرَافِقِ} لِأَنَّ كَلِمَةَ إِلَى هُنَا لِلْإِسْقَاطِ فَإِنَّهُ لَوْلَاهَا لَا سَتَوْعَبَتِ الْوُطِيفَةُ جَمِيعَ الْيَدُولِ هَٰذَا قُلْنَا الرُّكْبَةُ مِنَ الْعَوْرَةِ لِأَنَّ كَلِمَةَ إِلَى فِي قَوْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ عَوْرَةُ الرَّجُلِ مَا تَحْتَ السُّرَّةِ إِلَى الرُّكْبَةِ تُفِيدُ فَائِدَةَ الْإِسْقَاطِ فَتَدْخُلُ الرُّكْبَةُ فِي الْحُكْمِ

Based upon this (that at times 'إلى' will indicate that the action terminates at the limit) we say that the elbows and ankles are included in the order of Ghusal in the verse,

"Wash your faces, your arms up to(and including)the elbows, pass wet hands over your heads and (wash)your feet up to(and including)your ankles." (Surah Maa'idah: 6)

The reason for this is that 'إلى' here indicates termination (of the action of washing) because if it does not indicate termination then washing would extend to the entire arm (one would have to then wash the entire arm if the limit of washing had not been specified and in accordance with the

rule that when 'إلى' indicates the termination of an action the limit will be included in the action, we say the elbow and ankles are included in the act of washing).

This (because at times 'إلى' will indicate that the action terminates at the limit) **is why we say the knees are a part of the 'Aurah'** (private area which is compulsory to conceal) because 'إلى' in the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, "The 'Aurah' of a man is from his navel up to (and including) the knee", indicates termination (as the 'Aurah' would have extended up to the feet had its limit not been defined, i.e. the point of termination not indicated) **because of which the knee is included in the ruling** (of being part of the 'Aurah').

'إلى' can indicate postponement

وَقَدْ تُفِيدُ كَلِمَةُ إِلَى تَاخِيرِ الْحُكْمِ إِلَى الْغَايَةِ وَلِهَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا قَالَ لَامْرَأَتِهِ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ إِلَى شَهْرٍ وَلَا نِيَّةَ لَهُ لَا يَقَعُ الطَّلَاقُ فِي الْحَالِ عِنْدَنَا خِلَافًا لِرُفْرُ رَحْمَةِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى لِأَنَّ ذِكْرَ الشَّهْرِ لَا يَصْلُحُ لِمَدِّ الْحُكْمِ وَالِاسْقَاطِ شَرْعًا وَالطَّلَاقُ يَحْتَمِلُ التَّأخِيرَ بِالتَّعْلِيقِ فَيَحْتَمِلُ عَلَيْهِ

At times 'إلى' will indicate the postponement of the action to limit indicated (that the action will only apply when that limit is reached) **because of which we say that if a person tells his wife, "You are divorced up to a month", without any (specific) intention then the Talaaq will not apply immediately** (but will be postponed to the end of the month and will only apply then) **as opposed to Imaam Zufar** ﷺ (who says the Talaaq will apply immediately and the clause of "up to a month" will be futile). **The reason for this (our proof) is that "up to a month" cannot indicate prolonging the action** (of Talaaq as it is not an act which can continue repeatedly) **nor can it indicate termination** (when the act cannot be prolonged there is no need to indicate its limit) **but Talaaq can be**

postponed by affixing it to the occurrence of something (i.e. it can be made conditional, whereby it only applies on the occurrence of something), thus this is what it will be said to imply.

'على' is for obligation

فصل

كَلِمَةُ عَلَى لِلإِزَامِ وَأَصْلُهُ لافَادَةِ مَعْنَى النَّفْثُوقِ وَالتَّعَلَّى وَلِهَذَا لَوْ قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى أَلْفٍ يُحْمَلُ عَلَى الدَّيْنِ بِخِلَافِ مَا لَوْ قَالَ عِنْدِي أَوْ مَعِيَ أَوْ قَبْلِي وَعَلَى هَذَا قَالَ فِي السِّيَرِ الْكَبِيرِ: إِذَا قَالَ رَأْسُ الْحِصْنِ أَمُونِي عَلَى عَشْرَةٍ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْحِصْنِ فَقَعَلْنَا فَالْعَشْرَةُ سِوَاهُ وَخِيَارُ التَّعْيِينَ لَهُ، وَلَوْ قَالَ: أَمُونِي وَعَشْرَةً أَوْ فَعَشْرَةً أَوْ ثُمَّ عَشْرَةً فَقَعَلْنَا فَكَذَلِكَ وَخِيَارُ التَّعْيِينَ لِلْأَمِينِ

'على' is for obligation (i.e. to make something obligatory) and in reality it gives the meaning of superiority and elevation. Based on this (that 'على' makes something obligatory while providing the meaning of superiority) if a person says, "For a certain person, upon me is one thousand" (which is the equivalent of saying, "For a certain person, one thousand is obligatory on me"), it will incumbent upon him as a debt (and not as a trust as 'على' denotes superiority as well indicating that the other person is superior to him, in that he is his creditor) as opposed to having said 'عِنْدِي' - in my possession ("For a certain person, one thousand is in my possession"), 'مَعِيَ' - with me ("For a certain person, one thousand is with me") 'قَبْلِي' - towards me ("For a certain person, one thousand is towards me." Whereby in all three instances the thousand will be incumbent upon him as a trust and not as a debt).

Based upon this (that 'على' adds the meaning of superiority) it is mentioned in 'As-Siyarul Kabeer' that when the leader of

the fort says, "Give me sanctuary upon ten of those residing in the fort" and we do then ten in addition to him (*the leader*) will be given sanctuary and the leader will have the right to choose which ten will be given sanctuary (*so as to fulfil the dictates of 'على' granting him superiority over the other ten*). (However) If he were to say, "Give me sanctuary and ten others from the fort" or "Give me sanctuary then ten others from the fort" or "Give me sanctuary thereafter ten others from the fort" and we do then it will be the same (*sanctuary will be for ten people in addition to the leader*) and the right to choose (*which ten will be given sanctuary*) will be for the one giving sanctuary (*the Muslim leader*).

At times 'على' will have the meaning of the letter

'ب'

وَقَدْ يَكُونُ عَلَى بِمَعْنَى الْبَاءِ مَجَازًا حَتَّىٰ لَوْ قَالَ بِعُتُكَ هَذَا عَلَىٰ أَلْفٍ
يَكُونُ عَلَىٰ بِمَعْنَى الْبَاءِ لِقِيَامِ دَلَالَةِ الْمُعَاوَضَةِ

Sometimes 'على' will have the meaning of the letter 'ب' as Majaaz such that if a person says, "I sell this to you on a thousand", 'على' will have the meaning of 'ب' (*it will be the same as saying, "I sell this to you in lieu of a thousand"*) because of proof being present that it is a transaction of exchange (*the words "I sell" indicate this*).

At times 'على' will indicate a condition

وَقَدْ يَكُونُ عَلَىٰ بِمَعْنَى الشَّرْطِ قَالَ اللَّهُ تَبَارَكَ وَتَعَالَىٰ {يُبَايِعُكَ عَلَىٰ أَنْ
لَّا يَشْرِكَ بِاللَّهِ شَيْئًا} وَلِهَذَا قَالَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَىٰ: إِذَا قَالَتْ
لِزَوْجِهَا طَلَّقْنِي ثَلَاثًا عَلَىٰ أَلْفٍ فَطَلَّقَهَا وَاحِدَةً لَا يَجِبُ الْمَالُ لَأَنَّ الْكَلِمَةَ
هَهُنَا تُفِيدُ مَعْنَى الشَّرْطِ فَيَكُونُ الثَّلَاثُ شَرْطًا لِلزُّوْمِ الْمَالِ

At times 'على' will indicate a condition, (such as in) the verse,

"Accept the pledge of allegiance from the Mu'mineen women and seek forgiveness from ALLAAH on their behalf when they come to you on condition that they pledge not to ascribe any partner to ALLAAH." (Surah Maa'idah: 12)

Based on this (that 'على' sometimes indicates a condition) Imaam Abu Hanifahؒ says that if a woman tells her husband, "I will give you one thousand on condition you give me three Talaaq" and he gives her one Talaaq then the thousand will not be Waajib (for her to give to her husband) because 'على' here indicates a condition, thus the issuing three Talaaq will be necessary for the money to be Waajib.

'فِي' indicates containment

فصل
كَلِمَةُ فِي لِلظَّرْفِ وَيَاغْتَبَارُ هَذَا الْأَصْلُ قَالَ أَصْحَابُنَا: إِذَا قَالَ غَصَبْتُ
تَوْبًا فِي مَنَدِيلٍ أَوْ تَمْرًا فِي قَوْصَرَةٍ لَزِمَهُ جَمِيعًا

The word 'فِي' is used for Tharf (to indicate that the item before it is contained within the item after it). Based upon this principle (that 'فِي' is used for Tharf) our scholars (of the Hanafi Madhab) that if a person says, "I (illegally) seized cloth in a scarf" or "I (illegally) seized dates in a basket" then all will be Waajib (it will be Waajib to return the cloth along with the scarf it was taken in and the dates along with the basket it was taken in).

'فِي' is also used to denote place or time

ثُمَّ هَذِهِ الْكَلِمَةُ تُسْتَعْمَلُ فِي الزَّمَانِ وَالْمَكَانِ وَالْفِعْلِ أَمَّا إِذَا اسْتُعْمِلَتْ فِي الزَّمَانِ بَأَنْ يَقُولَ أَنْتَ طَالِقٌ غَدًا فَقَالَ أَبُو يُوسُفَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى وَمُحَمَّدٌ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى يَسْتَوِي فِي ذَلِكَ حَدْفُهَا وَإِظْهَارُهَا حَتَّى لَوْ قَالَ أَنْتَ طَالِقٌ فِي غَدٍ كَانَ بِمَنْزِلَةِ قَوْلِهِ أَنْتَ طَالِقٌ غَدًا يَقَعُ الطَّلَاقُ كَمَا طَلَعَ الْفَجْرُ فِي الصُّورَتَيْنِ جَمِيعًا وَذَهَبَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى إِلَى أَنَّهَا إِذَا حُدِفَتْ يَقَعُ الطَّلَاقُ كَمَا طَلَعَ الْفَجْرُ وَإِذَا أُظْهِرَتْ كَانَ الْمُرَادُ وَقُوعَ الطَّلَاقِ فِي جُزْءٍ مِنَ الْعَدِّ عَلَى سَبِيلِ الْإِبْهَامِ فَلَوْلَا وُجُودُ النِّيَّةِ يَقَعُ الطَّلَاقُ بِأَوَّلِ الْجُزْءِ لَعَدِمَ الْمُرَاجِمُ لَهُ وَلَوْ نَوَى آخِرَ النَّهَارِ صَحَّتْ نِيَّتُهُ وَمِثَالُ ذَلِكَ فِي قَوْلِ الرَّجُلِ إِنْ صُمْتُ الشَّهْرَ فَأَنْتَ كَذَا فَإِنَّهُ يَقَعُ عَلَى صَوْمِ الشَّهْرِ وَلَوْ قَالَ إِنْ صُمْتُ فِي الشَّهْرِ فَأَنْتَ كَذَا يَقَعُ ذَلِكَ عَلَى الْأَمْسَاكِ سَاعَةً فِي الشَّهْرِ

Then 'فِي' is (also) used to denote time (that the verb occurred in a specific time) and place (that the verb occurred in a specific place). If it is used to denote time such that if a person says, "You are divorced in tomorrow" then according to Imaam Abu Yusuf ؒ and Imaam Muhammed ؒ the ruling (of when Talaaq will occur) will be the same if 'فِي' is mentioned or if it is omitted such that if he says, "You are divorced in tomorrow" it will be the same as saying, "You are divorced tomorrow", whereby the Talaaq, in both instances, will apply at first dawn (the next day). (On the other hand) Imaam Abu Hanifah ؒ is of the opinion that if 'فِي' is omitted (by saying, "You are divorced tomorrow") then the Talaaq will apply at first dawn (as this indicates the onset of the next day) and if 'فِي' is mentioned then it would imply that the Talaaq will apply in an unspecified time tomorrow and if he has no intention for a specific time then (only) will the Talaaq apply at first dawn as there is nothing else to dispute it (as when he does not have an intention of a

specific time there is nothing to imply that the Talaaq was meant to apply on another time) and if he has the intention of the evening (of tomorrow) then his intention will be correct (and the Talaaq will only apply on the intended time).

An example of this (how the ruling differs when 'فِي' is mentioned and omitted) is when a man says (to his wife), "If you fast a month then you are divorced", whereby the Talaaq will only apply if she fasts for a (complete) month as opposed to if he says, "If you fast in the month then you are divorced", whereby the Talaaq will apply if one fasts for even a brief period in the month.

When 'فِي' denotes place

وَأَمَّا فِي الْمَكَانِ فَمِثْلُ قَوْلِهِ أَنْتَ طَالِقٌ فِي الدَّارِ أَوْ فِي مَكَّةَ يَكُونُ ذَلِكَ طَلَاقًا عَلَى الْإِطْلَاقِ فِي جَمِيعِ الْأَمَاكِينِ وَبِاعْتِبَارِ مَعْنَى الظَّرْفِيَّةِ قُلْنَا إِذَا حَلَفَ عَلَى فِعْلٍ وَأَصَافَهُ إِلَى زَمَانٍ أَوْ مَكَانٍ فَإِنْ كَانَ الْفِعْلُ مِمَّا يَتِمُّ بِالْفَاعِلِ يَشْتَرِطُ كَوْنُ الْفَاعِلِ فِي ذَلِكَ الزَّمَانِ أَوْ الْمَكَانِ وَإِنْ كَانَ الْفِعْلُ يَتَعَدَّى إِلَى مَحَلٍّ يَشْتَرِطُ كَوْنُ الْمَحَلِّ فِي ذَلِكَ الزَّمَانِ أَوْ الْمَكَانِ لِأَنَّ الْفِعْلَ إِنَّمَا يَتَحَقَّقُ بِأَثَرِهِ وَأَثَرُهُ فِي الْمَحَلِّ قَالَ مُحَمَّدٌ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى فِي الْجَامِعِ الْكَبِيرِ: إِذَا قَالَ إِنْ شَتَمْتُكَ فِي الْمَسْجِدِ فَكَذَا فَشَتَمَهُ وَهُوَ فِي الْمَسْجِدِ وَالْمَشْتُومُ خَارِجَ الْمَسْجِدِ يَحْنُثُ وَلَوْ كَانَ الشَّاتِمُ خَارِجَ الْمَسْجِدِ وَالْمَشْتُومُ فِي الْمَسْجِدِ لَا يَحْنُثُ وَلَوْ قَالَ: إِنْ ضَرَبْتُكَ أَوْ سَجَّجْتُكَ فِي الْمَسْجِدِ فَكَذَا يَشْتَرِطُ كَوْنُ الْمَضْرُوبِ وَالْمَسْجُوجِ فِي الْمَسْجِدِ وَلَا يَشْتَرِطُ كَوْنُ الضَّارِبِ وَالشَّاجِّ فِيهِ وَلَوْ قَالَ: إِنْ قَتَلْتُكَ فِي يَوْمِ الْخَمِيسِ فَكَذَا فَجَرَحَهُ قَبْلَ يَوْمِ الْخَمِيسِ وَمَاتَ يَوْمَ الْخَمِيسِ يَحْنُثُ وَلَوْ جَرَحَهُ يَوْمَ الْخَمِيسِ وَمَاتَ يَوْمَ الْجُمُعَةِ لَا يَحْنُثُ

If it is used to denote place, for example when a person says (to his wife), "You are divorced in the house" or "You are divorced in Makkah" then the Talaaq will apply unrestrictedly in any place (where it was issued even if not in the house or Makkah). In consideration that 'فِي' comes for

Tharf (to indicate that the verb before is occurring within the time or place specified after it) **we say that if person takes an oath to do something and ascribes it to a time or place (that he will do it in a certain time or in a certain place) then if the action is such that it can be accomplished by the doer himself (and the presence of another is not required for it to be executed, known as 'F'il Laazim') then it is incumbent for the doer to be present in that time or place. If the action is such that it is executed on another (whereby the presence of another is required for it to be executed, known as 'F'il Muta'ddie') then it is incumbent for the one on whom the action will be done (Maf'ool) to be present in that time or place. The reason for this is that an action materialises when its effects become apparent and (in 'F'il Muta'die) its effects will become apparent on another (thus the presence of the other will be required in that time or place in order for the action to materialise).**

(An example of 'F'il Laazim' is what) **Imaam Muhammed** has said in 'Al-Jaami'ul Kabeer' that if a person says, "If I swear you in the Masjid then you are like this (divorced, free, etc)" and he then swears such that the one who swore (the doer) is in the Masjid and the one who was sworn at (Maf'ool) was out of the Masjid, his oath will break (and the Talaaq, freedom, etc will be in effect as swearing is an action which can be accomplished by the doer himself ('F'il Laazim') and requires the doer to be present in the Masjid when the action occurs) and if the one who swore (the doer) was outside the Masjid and the one who was sworn at (Maf'ool) was inside the Masjid then his oath will not break (because 'F'il Laazim' requires the doer to be present in the time or place when the action was carried out and since the doer was outside the Masjid when swearing his oath will not break).

(An example of 'F'il Muta'ddie' whereby the action was ascribed to a place is) **If a person says, "If I hit you in the Masjid then you are like this (divorced, free, etc)" or (he says) "If I wound you in the Masjid then you are like this (divorced, free, etc)" then it would be necessary for the one who was struck or wounded to be in the Masjid (when the action of hitting or wounding is carried out for the oath to break) and it is not necessary for the one who hit or the one who wounded him (the doer) to be in the Masjid (at the time when the action was carried out)¹.**

(An example of 'F'il Muta'ddie' whereby the action was ascribed to a place is) **If a person says, "If I kill you in a Thursday then this will happen (my slave will be free, etc)" and he then attacks him the day before (Wednesday) but dies on Thursday, then his oath will break (as 'F'il Muta'ddie' requires that the one on whom the action is done must be present in the place or time when the action is carried out, and when the victim died on Thursday, it is established that he was killed on Thursday) and if he attacks him on Thursday but he dies on Friday, then his oath will not break (because when the victim died on Friday, it is established that he was killed on Friday).**

'فِي' sometimes indicates a condition

وَلَوْ دَخَلْتَ الْكَلِمَةَ فِي الْفِعْلِ تُفِيدُ مَعْنَى الشَّرْطِ قَالَ مُحَمَّدٌ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى: إِذَا قَالَ أَنْتَ طَالِقٌ فِي دُخُولِكَ الدَّارِ فَهُوَ بِمَعْنَى الشَّرْطِ فَلَا يَقَعُ الطَّلَاقُ قَبْلَ دُخُولِ الدَّارِ وَلَوْ قَالَ: أَنْتَ طَالِقٌ فِي حَيْضَتِكَ إِنْ كَانَتْ فِي

¹ The scenarios and rulings of the above are as follows;

- 1) If the one who was hit or wounded was inside the Masjid when the act of hitting or wounding occurred and the doer, i.e. the one who did the hitting or wounding, was out of the masjid, then his oath will break.
- 2) If the one who was hit or wounded was outside the Masjid when the act of hitting or wounding occurred and the doer, i.e. the one who did the hitting or wounding, was inside the masjid, then his oath will not break.

الْحَيْضُ وَقَعَ الطَّلَاقُ فِي الْحَالِ وَ إِلَّا يَتَعَلَّقُ الطَّلَاقُ بِالْحَيْضِ، وَفِي الْجَامِعِ لَوْ قَالَ: أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ فِي مَجِيَّ يَوْمٍ لَمْ تُطَلَّقِ حَتَّى يَطْلُعَ الْفَجْرُ وَلَوْ قَالَ: فِي مُضَيَّ يَوْمٍ إِنْ كَانَ ذَلِكَ فِي اللَّيْلِ وَقَعَ الطَّلَاقُ عِنْدَ غُرُوبِ الشَّمْسِ مِنَ الْعَدْلِ لَوْجُودِ الشَّرْطِ وَإِنْ كَانَ فِي الْيَوْمِ تُطَلَّقُ حِينَ تَجِيَّ مِنْ الْعَدْلِ تِلْكَ السَّاعَةِ وَفِي الزِّيَادَاتِ لَوْ قَالَ: أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ فِي مَشِيَةِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى أَوْ فِي إِرَادَةِ اللَّهِ كَانَ ذَلِكَ بِمَعْنَى الشَّرْطِ حَتَّى لَا تُطَلَّقَ

If 'فِي' is attached to an action it will indicate that it (what follows) is a condition (for the ruling to apply). **Imaam Muhammed** ﷺ says that if a person says (to his wife), "You are divorced in your entrance to the house" then this has the meaning of a condition (it is the same as saying, "You are Divorced if you enter the house") and the Talaaq will not apply before entrance into the house.

If a person says (to his wife), "You are divorced in your menstruation" (which is the same as saying, "You are divorced if you menstruate") then the Talaaq will apply immediately if she is already menstruating and if she is not menstruating (at that time) then it will apply when her (next period of) menstruation begins.

It is mentioned in 'Al-Jaami'ul Kabeer' it is mentioned that if a person says (to his wife), "You are divorced in the coming of day" (which is the same as saying, "You are divorced if the day comes") then the Talaaq will not apply until the coming of dawn (as this will establish the coming of day). If he said, "You are divorced in the passing of a day" (which is the same as saying, "You are divorced if a day passes"), if this is said at night, then the Talaaq will apply at sunset the next day because of the condition being met (the passing of the day has been established). If this ("You are divorced in the passing of a day") was said during the day, then the Talaaq will apply at the same time the next day (as

this will establish that a day, which is twenty-four hours, has passed).

It is mentioned in 'Ziyaadaat' that if a person says (to his wife), "You are divorced in the Will of ALLAAH" or "You are divorced in the Wish of ALLAAH" then this will have the meaning of a condition (it will be the same as saying, "You are divorced if ALLAAH wills" or "You are divorced if ALLAAH wishes") such that the Talaaq will not apply (at all).

The letter 'ب' is for correlation

فصل

حَرْفُ الْبَاءِ لِلْأَصَاقِ فِي وَضْعِ اللَّغَةِ وَلِهَذَا تَصَحَّبُ الْأَثْمَانُ وَتَحْقِيقُ هَذَا أَنَّ الْمَبِيعَ أَصْلٌ فِي الْبَيْعِ وَالْتِمَنُّ شَرْطٌ فِيهِ وَلِهَذَا الْمَعْنَى هَلَاكَ الْمَبِيعِ يُوجِبُ إِرْتِفَاعَ الْبَيْعِ دُونَ هَلَاكَ التَّمَنِ إِذَا تَبَيَّنَ هَذَا فَتَقُولُ الْأَصْلُ أَنَّ يَكُونُ التَّبَعُ مُلَصَّقًا بِالْأَصْلِ لَا أَنْ يَكُونَ الْأَصْلُ مُلَصَّقًا بِالتَّبَعِ فَإِذَا دَخَلَ حَرْفُ الْبَاءِ فِي الْبَدَلِ فِي بَابِ الْبَيْعِ دَلَّ ذَلِكَ عَلَى أَنَّهُ تَبَعٌ مُلَصَّقٌ بِالْأَصْلِ فَلَا يَكُونُ مَبِيعًا فَيَكُونُ تَمَنًا

The letter 'ب' is for correlation (to link or associate that on which it is attached with something else). **This is why it usually accompanies** (is attached to) **the price** (in a sales transaction, known as the 'Thaman'). **This**(the reason why 'ب' will be attached to the price) **is because the item on sale** (Mabee'a) **is the primary entity in a transaction and the price** (Thaman) **is merely a condition** (for exchange) **in the transaction because**(the reason why the Mabee'a is the primary entity is because) **if the item on sale is lost** (or destroyed) **the transaction will have to be cancelled as opposed to when the price is lost** (whereby another may be given in its place, thus establishing that the Mabee'a is the primary entity). **Once this has been established we say the**

secondary object (*Thaman*) will be attached to the primary object (the letter 'ب' will be attached to the *Thaman*) and not that the primary object will be attached to the secondary. Thus if the letter 'ب' is attached to an item in a sales transaction this will prove that it is the secondary object which is attaché to the primary, making it the price (*Thaman*) and not the item on sale (*Mabee'a*).

Rulings derived from the above

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا قَالَ بَعْتُ مِنْكَ هَذَا الْعَبْدَ بِكُرٍّ مِنَ الْحِنْطَةِ وَوَصَفَهَا يَكُونُ الْعَبْدُ مَبِيعًا وَالْكُرُّ ثَمَنًا فَيَجُوزُ الْأَسْتِئْذَالُ بِهِ قَبْلَ الْقَبْضِ وَلَوْ قَالَ بَعْتُ مِنْكَ كُرًّا مِنَ الْحِنْطَةِ وَوَصَفَهَا بِهَذَا الْعَبْدِ يَكُونُ الْعَبْدُ ثَمَنًا وَالْكُرُّ مَبِيعًا وَيَكُونُ الْعَقْدُ سَلَمًا لَا يَصِحُّ إِلَّا مُوجَلًّا

Based upon this (that the letter 'ب' will be attached to the *Thaman*) we say that when a person says, "I sell this slave to you for a Kur (a specified measurement) of wheat" and describes it (clarifies the quality, type, and class of wheat), the slave will be the item on sale (primary object of the transaction, i.e. *Mabee'a*) and the wheat will be the price (secondary object of the transaction, i.e. *Thaman*), thus it will be permissible to change it (the wheat) with another before the other party takes possession of it. If he were to have said, "I sell this Kur of wheat to you (while mentioning the quality, type, and class of wheat) for this slave" then the slave would be the price (*Thaman*) and the wheat the item on sale (*Mabee'a*), making the transaction that of Salam, which is only permissible on credit.

وَقَالَ عُلَمَاؤُنَا إِذَا قَالَ لِعَبْدِهِ إِنَّ أَخْبَرْتَنِي بِقُدُومِ فُلَانٍ فَأَنْتَ حُرٌّ فَذَلِكَ عَلَى الْخَبَرِ الصَّادِقِ لِيَكُونَ الْخَبَرُ مُلَصِّقًا بِالْقُدُومِ فَلَوْ أَخْبَرَ كَاذِبًا لَا يُعْتَقُ وَلَوْ قَالَ إِنَّ أَخْبَرْتَنِي أَنَّ فُلَانًا قَدِمَ فَأَنْتَ حُرٌّ فَذَلِكَ عَلَى مُطْلَقِ الْخَبَرِ فَلَوْ أَخْبَرَهُ كَاذِبًا عَتِقَ وَلَوْ قَالَ لَامْرَأَتِهِ: إِنَّ خَرَجْتَ مِنَ الدَّارِ إِلَّا بِإِذْنِي فَأَنْتَ كَذَا

تَحْتَاجُ إِلَى الْأَذْنِ كُلَّ مَرَّةٍ إِذِ الْمُسْتَتْنَى خُرُوجُ مُلْصَقٍ بِالْأَذْنِ فَلَوْ خَرَجَتْ فِي الْمَرَّةِ الثَّانِيَةِ بِدُونِ الْأَذْنِ طَلَّقَتْ وَلَوْ قَالَ: إِنْ خَرَجْتَ مِنَ الدَّارِ إِلَّا أَنْ أَدْنِ لَكَ فَذَلِكَ عَلَى الْأَذْنِ مَرَّةً حَتَّى لَوْ خَرَجْتَ مَرَّةً أُخْرَى بِدُونِ الْأَذْنِ لَا تُطَلِّقُ وَفِي الزِّيَادَاتِ إِذَا قَالَ: أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ بِمَشِيَّةِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى أَوْ بِإِرَادَةِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى أَوْ بِحُكْمِهِ لَمْ تُطَلِّقْ

Our Ulama (of the Hanafi Madhab) says that if a person tells his slave, "If you inform me of the arrival of a certain person, then you are free" this will refer to true information because informing has been correlated (linked of associated) with the arrival (of that person make it the same as saying, "If you inform me when that person arrives, then you are free"), thus if he gives him false information (of the arrival) he will not be set free.

If he were to have said, "If you inform me that a certain person has arrived then you are free"(without the letter 'ل'), then this will permit any information such that if he gives him false information (of the person's arrival), he will be set free (as he was only asked to be informed and did not attach it to the arrival of that person).

If a person tells his wife, "If you leave this house except with my permission then you are divorced", then permission will be required each time she leaves the house because the exception to leaving has been attached to permission (meaning that the only time she is allowed to leave the house is if she has his permission) such that if she leaves the house the second time without his permission she will be divorced.

If he were to have said, "If you leave this house except if I have permitted you then you are divorced" (without the letter 'ل') then permission will only be required once such

that if she leaves the second time without permission she will not be divorced.

It is mentioned in 'Ziyaadaat' that if a person says (to his wife), "You are divorced with the will of ALLAAH" or "You are divorced with the wish of ALLAAH" or "You are divorced with the order of ALLAAH" then the Talaaq will not apply (as the Talaaq has been correlate to the will, wish and order of ALLAAH and since the will, wish and order of ALLAAH in this regard cannot be ascertained, the Talaaq will not apply)

Lesson on the methods of clarification

فصل فِي وُجُوهِ الْبَيَانِ
الْبَيَانُ عَلَى سَبْعَةِ أَنْوَاعٍ: بَيَانُ تَقْرِيرٍ، وَبَيَانُ تَفْسِيرٍ وَبَيَانُ تَغْيِيرٍ، وَبَيَانُ
ضَرُورَةٍ وَبَيَانُ حَالٍ وَبَيَانُ عَطْفٍ وَبَيَانُ تَبْدِيلٍ

The methods of clarification (the manner in which the implication and purport of the speaker is clarified) are seven types;

- 1) 'Bayaanut Taqreer'
- 2) 'Bayaanut Tafseer'
- 3) 'Bayaanut Taghyeer'
- 4) 'Bayaanudh Dharoorah'
- 5) 'Bayaanul Haal'
- 6) 'Bayaanul Athaf'
- 7) 'Bayaanut Tabdeel'

'Bayaanut Taqreer'

أَمَّا الْأَوَّلُ فَهُوَ أَنْ يَكُونَ مَعْنَى اللَّفْظِ ظَاهِرًا لَكِنَّهُ يَحْتَمِلُ غَيْرَهُ فَيَبَيِّنُ الْمُرَادَ بِمَا هُوَ الظَّاهِرُ فَيَتَقَرَّرُ حُكْمُ الظَّاهِرِ بَيَانِهِ وَمِثَالُهُ إِذَا قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى قَفِيزٍ حِنْطَةً بِقَفِيزِ الْبَلَدِ أَوْ أَلْفٍ مِنْ نَقْدِ الْبَلَدِ فَإِنَّهُ يَكُونُ بَيَانٌ تَقْرِيرٌ لِأَنَّ الْمُطْلَقَ كَانَ مَحْمُولًا عَلَى قَفِيزِ الْبَلَدِ وَنَقْدِهِ مَعَ إِحْتِمَالِ إِرَادَةِ الْغَيْرِ فَإِذَا بَيَّنَّ ذَلِكَ فَقَدْ قَرَّرَهُ بَيَانِهِ وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْ قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عِنْدِي أَلْفٌ وَدِيعَةٌ فَإِنَّ كَلِمَةَ عِنْدِي كَانَتْ بِاطْلَاقِهَا تُفِيدُ الْأَمَانَةَ مَعَ إِحْتِمَالِ إِرَادَةِ الْغَيْرِ فَإِذَا قَالَ وَدِيعَةٌ فَقَدْ قَرَّرَ حُكْمَ الظَّاهِرِ بَيَانِهِ

As for the first ('Bayaanut Taqreer'), when the meaning of a word is clear but has the possibility of referring to another meaning besides the literal meaning it ('Bayaanut Taqreer') will clarify that the literal meaning is implied, thus establishing the implication of the clear meaning. An example of this ('Bayaanut Taqreer') is when a person says, "I owe a certain person a Kafeez (unit of measurement) of wheat; the Kafeez of this town" or "I owe a person one thousand from the currency of this town". This (clarifying the Kafeez and the currency of a that particular town is implied) will be 'Bayaanut Taqreer' because if it were not mentioned then the Kafeez and currency of that town would be considered with the possibility of another being implied and when it was clarified (by the speaker himself) then it is established (that the Kafeez and currency of that town is implied).

Similarly (another example of 'Bayaanut Taqreer') is if a person says, "A thousand belonging to a certain person is in my possession as trust" because if he were to only say, "A thousand belonging to a certain person is in my possession" then it could imply that it is with him as a trust or through some other means (he owes him the money as a

debt, or he illegally seized the money from him, etc) and by saying, "as trust" the implication of the apparent meaning is established.

'Bayaanut Tafseer'

فصل

وَأَمَّا بَيَانُ التَّفْسِيرِ فَهُوَ مَا إِذَا كَانَ اللَّفْظُ غَيْرَ مَكْشُوفِ الْمُرَادِ فَكُشِفَ
بَيَانُهُ مِثْلَهُ إِذَا قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى شَيْءٍ ثُمَّ فَسَّرَ الشَّيْءَ بِتَوْبٍ أَوْ قَالَ عَلَى
عَشْرَةِ دَرَاهِمٍ وَنَيْفٍ ثُمَّ فَسَّرَ النِّيفَ أَوْ قَالَ عَلَى دَرَاهِمٍ وَفَسَّرَهَا بِعَشْرَةٍ
مِثْلًا

As for 'Bayaanut Tafseer', it is when the implication of a word which is unclear is clarified. An example of this ('Bayaanut Tafseer') is when a person says, "I owe a certain person something" after which he clarifies what that something is; (for example) a cloth, or he says, "I owe a certain person ten dirhams and something additional" after which he clarifies what that additional item is (e.g. a slave, etc) or he says, "I owe a certain person Dirhams" after which he clarifies that he owes ten dirhams.

The ruling of 'Bayaanut Taqreer' and 'Bayaanut Tafseer'

وَحُكْمُ هَذَيْنِ التَّوَعَيْنِ مِنَ الْبَيَانِ أَنْ يَصِحَّ مَوْصُولًا وَ مَفْصُولًا

The ruling of these two types of clarification ('Bayaanut Taqreer' and 'Bayaanut Tafseer') is that they are valid (it will be considered as clarification of the ambiguity) whether made immediately after the initial statement or after an interval.

'Bayaanut Taghyeer'

فصل

وَأَمَّا بَيَانُ التَّغْيِيرِ فَهُوَ أَنْ يَتَغَيَّرَ بَيَانُهُ مَعْنَى كَلَامِهِ وَ نَظِيرُهُ التَّعْلِيقُ وَ
الْإِسْتِثْنَاءُ وَ قَدْ اخْتَلَفَ الْفُقَهَاءُ فِي الْفَصْلَيْنِ فَقَالَ أَصْحَابُنَا الْمُعْلَقُ بِالشَّرْطِ
سَبَبٌ عِنْدَ وُجُودِ الشَّرْطِ لَا قَبْلَهُ وَ قَالَ الشَّافِعِيُّ التَّعْلِيقُ سَبَبٌ فِي الْحَالِ
إِلَّا أَنْ عَدَمَ الشَّرْطِ مَانِعٌ مِنَ الْحُكْمِ

As for 'Bayaanut Taghyeer', it is when clarification changes the implication of the (*initial*) speech. This is possible in two ways; making the previous statement **conditional** (that the initial speech will only apply if the aforementioned condition is fulfilled) or **exclusion** (if part of the initial amount or constituents are excluded thereafter). The Fugahaa have differed with regards to both (when the change is caused by making the statement conditional or by exclusion). Our scholars (of the Hanafi Madhab) say that a conditional statement will only apply when the condition is fulfilled and not before it and Imaam Shaafie □ says the conditional statement applies immediately except that that the condition will prevent it from taking effect (until the condition is fulfilled).

The outcome of this difference of opinion

وَفَائِدَةُ الْخِلَافِ تَطْهَرُ فِيمَا إِذَا قَالَ لِأَجْنَبِيَّةٍ أَنْ تَرْوِجْتِكِ فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ أَوْ
قَالَ لِعَبْدٍ أَلْغَيْرِ أَنْ مَلَكَتْكِ فَأَنْتِ حُرٌّ يَكُونُ التَّعْلِيقُ بَاطِلًا عِنْدَهُ لِأَنَّ حُكْمَ
التَّعْلِيقِ انْعِقَادُ صَدْرِ الْكَلَامِ عَلَيْهِ وَ الطَّلَاقُ وَالْعِتَاقُ هَهُنَا لَمْ يَنْعَقِدْ عَلَيْهِ
لِعَدَمِ إِضَافَتِهِ إِلَى الْمَحَلِّ فَبَطَلَ حُكْمُ التَّعْلِيقِ فَلَا يَصِحُّ التَّعْلِيقُ وَعِنْدَنَا
كَانَ التَّعْلِيقُ صَحِيحًا حَتَّى لَوْ تَرَوَّجَهَا يَقَعُ الطَّلَاقُ لِأَنَّ كَلَامَهُ إِنَّمَا يَنْعَقِدُ
عَلَيْهِ عِنْدَ وُجُودِ الشَّرْطِ وَالْمَلِكُ ثَابِتٌ عِنْدَ وُجُودِ الشَّرْطِ فَيَصِحُّ التَّعْلِيقُ
وَلِهَذَا الْمَعْنَى قُلْنَا شَرْطُ صِحَّةِ التَّعْلِيقِ لِلْوُقُوعِ فِي صُورَةِ عَدَمِ الْمَلِكِ أَنْ

يَكُونُ مُضَافًا إِلَى الْمَلِكِ أَوْ إِلَى سَبَبِ الْمَلِكِ حَتَّى لَوْ قَالَ لَا جُنْيَةَ إِنَّ
دَخَلْتُ الدَّارَ فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ ثُمَّ تَزَوَّجَهَا وَوُجِدَ الشَّرْطُ لَا يَفْعُ الطَّلَاقُ

The outcome of this difference of opinion becomes apparent in the example when a person tells an unrelated woman (*a woman to whom he is not married*), "If I marry you, then you are divorced" or he says to the slave belonging to another, "If I become your master, then you are free". According to Imaam Shaafie □ the condition of these statements are baseless (*and the statement will be meaningless*) because the ruling of making something conditional is that the initial speech ("You are divorced" and "You are free") must be able to be the Illat (*principle cause for the ruling of Talaaq and freedom to apply*) and both Talaaq and freedom (*the statements "You are divorced" and "You are free"*) cannot be an Illat (*principle cause for the ruling of Talaaq and freedom to apply*) here as they have not been attributed to individuals upon whom it can apply (*as she is not in his wedlock nor the slave in his ownership*), thus the requirements for making something conditional are absent and making the statement conditional is incorrect.

According to us (*Hanafi scholars*) making the statement conditional is correct such that if he marries her the Talaaq will apply (*or if he purchases the slave he will be set free*) because his statement ("You are divorced" or "You are free") only becomes an Illat (*principle cause for the ruling of Talaaq and freedom to apply*) when the condition is fulfilled and ownership (*being in his wedlock and in his ownership*) is present at the time when the condition is fulfilled (*thus the Talaaq and freedom will apply*), thus making the statement conditional is correct.

Due to this meaning (*that a conditional statement will only apply when the condition is fulfilled*) we say that the

requirement for making a statement conditional when one does not have ownership is that the condition (which will cause the ruling to apply) must be gaining ownership (the condition for the Talaaq to apply can only made to be gaining ownership by saying, "If you become my wife, then you are divorced") or that which leads to ownership ("If I marry you, then you are divorced", as marriage is what leads to "ownership") such that if a person says to an unrelated woman, "If you enter this house then you are divorced", then marries her and the condition fulfilled thereafter (i.e. she enters the house after they are married), the Talaaq will not apply (as the condition for the Talaaq to apply was not gaining ownership or what leads to ownership, which is a requirement for the validity of such conditional statements).

وَكَذَلِكَ طَوْلُ الْحُرَّةِ يَمْنَعُ جَوَازَ نِكَاحِ الْأَمَةِ عِنْدَهُ لَأَنَّ الْكِتَابَ عَلَّقَ نِكَاحَ الْأَمَةِ بِعَدَمِ الطُّوْلِ فَعِنْدَ وُجُودِ الطُّوْلِ كَانَ الشَّرْطُ عَدَمًا وَعَدَمُ الشَّرْطِ مَانِعٌ مِنَ الْحُكْمِ فَلَا يَجُوزُ وَكَذَلِكَ قَالَ الشَّافِعِيُّ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى لَا نَفَقَةَ لِلْمَبْنُوتَةِ إِلَّا إِذَا كَانَتْ حَامِلًا لَأَنَّ الْكِتَابَ عَلَّقَ الْإِنْفَاقَ بِالْحَمْلِ لِقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى: {وَإِنْ كُنَّ أُولَاتٍ حَمْلٌ فَأَنْفِقُوا عَلَيْهِنَّ حَتَّى يَضَعْنَ حَمْلَهُنَّ} فَعِنْدَ عَدَمِ الْحَمْلِ كَانَ الشَّرْطُ عَدَمًا فَيَجُوزُ نِكَاحُ الْأَمَةِ وَيَجِبُ الْإِنْفَاقُ بِالْعُمُومَاتِ

Similarly having the means to marry a free woman prevents the permissibility of marrying a female slave, according to Imaam Shaafie, because the Quraan (in the verse, "Those of you who do not have the means to marry free Mu'min women, then (they should marry) one of your Mu'min slave girls") has made permissibility of marrying a free woman conditional on not having the means to marry a free woman, thus when one has the ability (it would mean that) the condition is not present and when the condition is not present the ruling (of permissibility to marry a female slave) will not apply, thus it will not be permissible (to

marry a female slave when one has the means to marry a free woman).

Similarly Imaam Shaafie says there is no maintenance for a woman who has received Talaaq Baa'inah except if she is expecting (pregnant) because the Quraan has made the incumbency of maintenance (on the husband) conditional on pregnancy in the verse "If they (your wives) are expecting, then (you are obliged to) provide for them (maintain and house them) until they deliver", thus when she is not pregnant (it would mean that) the condition is not present and when the condition is not present the ruling (of maintenance being Waajib) will not apply, according to Imaam Shaafie.

According to us (scholars of the Hanafi Madhab) when the condition not being present does not prevent the ruling from applying, it is permissible to establish the ruling from other proof, thus marriage to a female slave (despite having the ability to marry a free woman) and maintenance will be compulsory because of the general nature of the verses.

When the ruling is affixed to adjective

وَمِنْ تَوَابِعِ هَذَا النَّوعِ تَرْتَبُ الْحُكْمُ عَلَى الْإِسْمِ الْمَوْصُوفِ بِصِفَةٍ فَإِنَّهُ بِمَنْزِلَةِ تَعْلِيلِ الْحُكْمِ بِذَلِكَ الْوَصْفِ عِنْدَهُ وَعَلَى هَذَا قَالَ الشَّافِعِيُّ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى لَا يَجُوزُ نِكَاحُ الْأَمَةِ الْكِتَابِيَّةِ لَأَنَّ النَّصَّ رَتَّبَ الْحُكْمَ عَلَى أَمَةِ مُؤْمِنَةٍ لِقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى: {مِنْ فِتْيَانِكُمُ الْمُؤْمِنَاتِ} فَيَتَقَيَّدُ بِالْمُؤْمِنَةِ فَيَمْتَنِعُ الْحُكْمُ عِنْدَ عَدَمِ الْوَصْفِ فَلَا يَجُوزُ نِكَاحُ الْأَمَةِ الْكِتَابِيَّةِ

Also from this category is when a ruling is affixed to an adjective (the ruling is mentioned with an adjective describing the one on whom the ruling will apply) which is the same as making the ruling conditional on that characteristic

according to Imaam Shaafie (*according to Imaam Shaafie the ruling will only apply if that quality is present. Ahnaaf say that the quality being absent will not prevent the ruling from applying as it is possible for the ruling to be established by other proof*). **Based upon this Imaam Shaafie says that marriage to a female slave from the Ahlul-Kitaab (a Christian or Jewish female slave) is not permissible because the Quraan has applied the ruling to a Muslim female slave in the verse "Then (they should marry) one of your Mu'min slave girls" thus the ruling will be restricted to a Muslim female slave only and the ruling (of permissibility to marry a female slave) will not apply when the characteristic (of being a female slave) is not present, therefore marriage to a female slave from the Ahlul-Kitaab is impermissible (and according to us it is permissible as the absence of the quality will not prevent the ruling from applying as it can be established by other proof; namely verse) .**

The second method of Taghyeer; Exception

وَمِنْ صُورِ بَيَانِ التَّغْيِيرِ الْإِسْتِثْنَاءُ ذَهَبَ أَصْحَابُنَا إِلَى أَنَّ الْإِسْتِثْنَاءَ تَكْلَمُ
بِالْبَاقِي بَعْدَ التَّنْيَا كَأَنَّهُ لَمْ يَتَكَلَّمْ إِلَّا بِمَا بَقِيَ وَعِنْدَهُ صَدْرُ الْكَلَامِ يَنْعَقِدُ عَلَيْهِ
لِوُجُوبِ الْكُلِّ إِلَّا أَنَّ الْإِسْتِثْنَاءَ يَمْنَعُهَا مِنَ الْعَمَلِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ عَدَمِ الشَّرْطِ فِي
بَابِ التَّعْلِيقِ

The second manner in which 'Bayaanut Taghyeer' is possible is exception ('Istithnaa'). Our scholars (of the Hanafi Madhab) are of the opinion that exception means discussing what is left after the exception as if he only spoke about what was not excluded (it is as if the excluded items were never mentioned in the first place and only what remains was discussed from the beginning). According to Imaam Shaafie
□ **the initial speech (before the exclusion) results in all (the entire amount or all the items mentioned prior to the**

exception) becoming Waajib except that the exclusion prevents the action from being carried out on it (the initial items were all Waajib at first but the exclusion later prevented the action from being carried out on them), in the same manner as the condition not being fulfilled when a statement is made conditional (according to Imaam Shaafie the conditional statement applies immediately except that that the condition will prevent it from taking effect).

An example of 'Bayaanut Taghyeer' by way of exception

وَمَثَلُ هَذَا فِي قَوْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ لَا تَبِيعُوا الطَّعَامَ إِلَّا سَوَاءً بِسَوَاءٍ فَعِنْدَ الشَّافِعِيِّ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى صَدَرُ الْكَلَامِ ائْتَفَقَ عَلَيْهِ لِحُرْمَةِ بَيْعِ الطَّعَامِ بِالطَّعَامِ عَلَى الْإِطْلَاقِ وَخَرَجَ عَنْ هَذِهِ الْجُمْلَةِ صُورَةُ الْمُسَاوَاةِ بِالِاسْتِثْنَاءِ فَبَقِيَ الْبَاقِي تَحْتَ حُكْمِ الصَّدْرِ وَتَتَبِعُهُ هَذَا حُرْمَةُ بَيْعِ الْحَفَنَةِ مِنَ الطَّعَامِ بِالْحَفَنَتَيْنِ مِنْهُ وَعِنْدَنَا بَيْعُ الْحَفَنَةِ لَا يَدْخُلُ تَحْتَ النَّصِّ لِأَنَّ الْمُرَادَ بِالْمَنْهَى يَفْقِدُ بِصُورَةِ بَيْعٍ يَتِمَّكُنُ الْعَبْدُ مِنَ اثْبَاتِ التَّسَاوِي وَالنَّفَاضِلُ فِيهِ كَى لَا يُودَى إِلَى نَهْيِ الْعَاجِزِ فَمَالَا يَدْخُلُ تَحْتَ الْمَعْيَارِ الْمُسَوَّى كَانَ خَارِجًا عَنْ قَضِيَةِ الْحَدِيثِ

An example of this (which illustrates the outcome of this difference of opinion) **is the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, "Do not sell one (type of) food in exchange for another (type of) food except in equal quantities".** According to Imaam Shaafie ﷺ the initial speech becomes the principle cause for the impermissibility of selling (any type of) food in exchange for another (type of) food in whichever manner (it prohibits the sale of food in exchange for food whether it be in equal quantities or different) and the sale of it in equal quantities is then excluded from it (the prohibition) but the remainder (i.e. sale of food for food in other manners) still falls under the prohibition. The result of this is that the sale of one handful of (a type of) food for two handfuls of (a type of)

food is prohibited according to Imaam Shaafie □ (by the Hadeeth mentioned above). (However) According to us the sale of a handful of food (for two handfuls of food) is not included in this Hadeeth because the prohibition is restricted to that instance wherein a person is able to establish equality (between the two items), so that it will not be ordering a person to perform that which he is incapable of performing, thus those items in which equality cannot be established will be excluded from the implication of this Hadeeth.

Another form of 'Bayaanut Taghyeer'

وَمِنْ صُورِ بَيَانِ التَّغْيِيرِ مَا إِذَا قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى أَلْفٍ وَدَيْعَةً فَقَوْلُهُ عَلَى يُفِيدُ الْوُجُوبَ وَقَوْلُهُ وَدَيْعَةً غَيْرَهُ إِلَى الْحِفْظِ وَقَوْلُهُ أَعْطَيْتَنِي أَوْ أَسْلَفْتَنِي فَلَمْ أَقْبِضْهَا مِنْ جُمْلَةِ بَيَانِ التَّغْيِيرِ وَكَذَا لَوْ قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى أَلْفٍ زَيْوْفٌ

Also of the types of 'Bayaanut Taghyeer' is when a person says, "Upon me for a certain person is one thousand, as trust" as the statement "Upon me" makes it Waajib (as debt) and the statement "as trust" changes it (from a debt) to safekeeping (trust). (Another example is) The statements "You have given me one thousand but I have not collected it" or "You have given me one thousand for Salam (a credit transaction) but I have not collected it yet" are both examples of 'Bayaanut Taghyeer'. Similarly (another example of 'Bayaanut Taghyeer') is if a person says, "I owe a certain person one thousand, counterfeit."

The ruling of 'Bayaanut Taghyeer'

وَحُكْمُ بَيَانِ التَّغْيِيرِ أَنَّهُ يَصِحُّ مَوْصُولًا وَلَا يَصِحُّ مَفْصُولًا ثُمَّ بَعْدَ هَذَا مَسَائِلُ اِخْتَلَفَ فِيهَا الْعُلَمَاءُ أَنَّهَا مِنْ جُمْلَةِ بَيَانِ التَّغْيِيرِ فَتَصِحُّ بِشَرْطِ

الْوَصْلِ أَوْ مِنْ جُمْلَةِ بَيَانِ التَّبْدِيلِ فَلَا تَصِحُّ وَسَيَأْتِي طَرَفٌ مِنْهَا فِي بَيَانِ التَّبْدِيلِ

The ruling of Bayaanut Taghyeer is that it is valid (it will be considered as clarification of the ambiguity) when made immediately (after the initial statement) a not after an interval.

Then after these examples (mentioned previously) of 'Bayaanut Taghyeer' there are some examples regarding which Ulama have differed as to whether they fall under 'Bayaanut Taghyeer', which is correct if mentioned immediately or of 'Bayaanut Tabdeel' which is not correct (whether immediate or after an interval). A few of them will be discussed in 'Bayaanut Tabdeel'.

'Bayaanudh Dharoorah'

فصل

وَأَمَّا بَيَانُ الضَّرُورَةِ فَمِثَالُهُ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {وَوَرَّثَهُ أَبَوَاهُ فَلِأُمِّهِ
الثُّلُثُ} أَوْجَبَ الشَّرْكَاءَ بَيْنَ الْأَبَوَيْنِ ثُمَّ بَيَّنَّ نَصِيبَ الْأُمِّ فَصَارَ ذَلِكَ بَيَانًا
لِنَصِيبِ الْأَبِ وَعَلَى هَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا بَيَّنَّ نَصِيبَ الْمُضَارِبِ وَسَكَتَا عَنْ
نَصِيبِ رَبِّ الْمَالِ صَحَّتِ الشَّرْكَاءُ وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْ بَيَّنَّا نَصِيبَ رَبِّ الْمَالِ
وَسَكَتَا عَنْ نَصِيبِ الْمُضَارِبِ كَانَ بَيَانًا وَعَلَى هَذَا حُكْمُ الْمَزَارَعَةِ
وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْ أَوْصَى لِفُلَانٍ وَفُلَانٍ بِأَلْفٍ ثُمَّ بَيَّنَّ نَصِيبَ أَحَدِهِمَا كَانَ ذَلِكَ
بَيَانًا لِنَصِيبِ الْآخَرِ

As far as 'Bayaanudh Dharoorah' is concerned ('Bayaanudh Dharoorah' is clarification from the obvious conclusion one can deduce from a statement), an example of this is the verse, "If he (or she) does not have any children and his parents are his only heirs, then the mother gets a third", which (first) mentions that the parents will share the estate between them and then mentions that the mother (of the

deceased) **will get a third and in so doing indicates the share of the father** (of the deceased to be the remainder as this is the unmistakable conclusion one can deduce from the above, known as 'Bayaanudh Dharoorah'). **Based upon this** (that if the share of one party is stated then the obvious conclusion will be that the remainder will belong to the other partner) **we say that if the share of one of the partners in Mudharabah** (a partnership wherein one partner provides the capital and the other provides the labour) **is stated and the share of the partner providing the capital is not stated then the partnership will be correct** (as the obvious conclusion is that the remaining share will belong to him). **Similarly if the share of the partner providing the capital is stated but the share of the other partner is not** (the partnership will be correct and the obvious conclusion will be that the remaining share belongs to him). **Based upon this** (same ruling mentioned above for Mudharabah) **is the ruling of Muzaara'ah** (a partnership in farming whereby one person provides the land and the other the labour, whereby if the share of only one person is mentioned the partnership will be correct and obvious conclusion will be that the remainder will belong to other partner). **Similarly if a person makes a bequest of a thousand for two people and then only states the share of one of them it will also clarify the share of the other** (by means of 'Bayaanudh Dharoorah').

وَلَوْ طَلَّقَ إِحْدَى امْرَأَتَيْهِ ثُمَّ وَطِئَ إِحْدَاهُمَا كَانَ ذَلِكَ بَيَانًا لِلطَّلَاقِ فِي
الْأُخْرَى بِخِلَافِ الْوُطْئِ فِي الْعَتَقِ الْمُبْهِمِ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى
لَإِنَّ جِلَّ الْوُطْئِ فِي الْإِمَاءِ يَنْبُتُ بِطَرِيقَيْنِ فَلَا يَتَعَيَّنُ جِهَةُ الْمَلِكِ بِاعْتِبَارِ
جِلِّ الْوُطْئِ

If a person gives Talaaq to one of his two wives (without specifying by saying, "I divorced one of my wives") **and thereafter he indulges in sexual relations with one of them this will clarify that the Talaaq was for the other** (and not

for the wife with whom he indulged in sexual relations) as opposed to indulging in sexual relations (with one of his slaves) in unspecified freedom (when he sets one of them free without specifying by saying, "I set one of you free" and then indulges in sexual relations with one of them then this will not clarify that other is free) according to Imaam Abu Hanifah

□ **because permissibility of sexual relations in slaves is permissible in two ways** (*by ownership; sexual relations is permissible with a female slave because of one having ownership of her, and by Nikaah; sexual relations is permissible because of her being in his wedlock*), **thus ownership cannot be established by the permissibility of sexual relations** (*we cannot deduce that sexual relations with her proves that he owns her, thus clarifying that the other is free, because it is possible that she could have been set free and sexual relations is permissible with her because she is in his wedlock*).

'Bayaanul Haal'

فصل

وَأَمَّا بَيَانُ الْحَالِ فَمَثَلُهُ فِيمَا إِذَا رَأَى صَاحِبُ الشَّرْعِ أَمْرًا مُعَايَنَةً فَلَمْ يَنْهَ عَنْ ذَلِكَ كَانَ سُكُوتُهُ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْبَيَانِ أَنَّهُ مَشْرُوعٌ وَالشَّفِيعُ إِذَا عَلِمَ بِالْبَيْعِ وَسَكَتَ كَانَ ذَلِكَ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْبَيَانِ بِأَنَّهُ رَاضٍ بِذَلِكَ وَالْبَكْرُ الْبَالِغَةُ إِذَا عَلِمَتْ بِتَرْوِيجِ الْوَلِيِّ وَسَكَتَتْ عَنْ الرَّدِّكَانَ ذَلِكَ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْبَيَانِ بِالرِّضَاءِ وَالْإِذْنِ وَالْمَوْلَى إِذَا رَأَى عَبْدَهُ يَبِيعُ وَيَشْتَرِي فِي السُّوقِ فَسَكَتَ كَانَ ذَلِكَ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْإِذْنِ فَيَصِيرُ مَاذُونًا فِي التَّجَارَاتِ وَالْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ إِذَا نَكَلَ فِي مَجْلِسِ الْقَضَاءِ يَكُونُ الْإِمْتِنَاعُ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الرِّضَاءِ بِلِزُومِ الْمَالِ بِطَرِيقِ الْأَقْرَارِ عِنْدَهُمَا وَبِطَرِيقِ الْبَدَلِ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ فَالْحَاصِلُ أَنَّ السُّكُوتَ فِي مَوْضِعِ الْحَاجَةِ إِلَى الْبَيَانِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْبَيَانِ وَبِهَذَا الطَّرِيقِ قُلْنَا الْإِجْمَاعُ يَنْعَقِدُ بِنَصِّ الْبَعْضِ وَسُكُوتِ الْبَاقِينَ

As far as 'Bayaanul Haal' is concerned ('Bayaanul Haal' is clarification which is attained by the condition or state of the speaker), for example if Rasulullaah ﷺ saw a specific action (being carried out in his presence) and he did not prohibit it then Rasulullaah's ﷺ silence is the same as Rasulullaah ﷺ clarifying its permissibility. (Based on this that principle that silence when speech is required is equivalent to speech we say) **If the Shafee'a** (the person who has the first right of purchase) **learns of the sale** (of the house or land in which he has the first right to purchase) **and he remains silent then this** (silence) **is the same as him clarifying that he approves of the transaction** (to the other person and waves his right to purchase it). (Another example of silence being equivalent to speech is) **If a mature girl learns that her Shar'ie representative** (Walie, such as her father) **arranged her Nikaah** (to a certain person) **and she remains silent, not refusing, then this will be the same as her announcing her satisfaction and consenting** (to the marriage). (In the same manner as the examples above) **If the master sees his slave**

buying and selling in the marketplace and remains silent then this will be the same as granting him permission to trade. *(In the same manner as the examples above)* If the defendant refuses to take an oath *(in refutation of the allegation against him)* then his denial *(of taking the oath, or in other words silence)* will be the same as clarifying his satisfaction *(with the amount or charge against him)* but according to Imaam Abu Yusuf □ and Imaam Muhammed □ it will be the same as a confession and according to Imaam Abu Hanifah □ it will be *(Waajib upon him)* as an act of generosity. The summary of the above is that silence when speech is required is the same as the same as speech *(and clarification)*. Based upon this *(principle that silence when speech is required is equivalent to speech)* we say that Ijmaa *(consensus)* is established by the clarification of some and the silence of the few.

'Bayaanul Athaf'

فَصْلٌ

وَأَمَّا بَيَانُ الْعَطْفِ فَمِثْلُ أَنْ تَعْطِفَ مَكِيلًا أَوْ مَوْزُونًا عَلَى جُمْلَةٍ مُجْمَلَةٍ يَكُونُ ذَلِكَ بَيَانًا لِلْجُمْلَةِ الْمُجْمَلَةِ مِثْلَهُ إِذَا قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى مِائَةٍ وَدِرْهَمٍ أَوْ مِائَةٍ وَقَفِيزٍ كَانَ الْعَطْفُ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْبَيَانِ أَنَّ الْكُلَّ مِنْ ذَلِكَ الْجِنْسِ وَكَذَا لَوْ قَالَ مِائَةٍ وَثَلَاثَةُ أَثْوَابٍ أَوْ مِائَةٍ وَثَلَاثَةُ دَرَاهِمٍ أَوْ مِائَةٍ وَثَلَاثَةُ أَعْدٍ فَإِنَّهُ بَيَانٌ أَنَّ الْمِائَةَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ الْجِنْسِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ قَوْلِهِ أَحَدٌ وَعَشْرُونَ دِرْهَمًا بِخِلَافِ قَوْلِهِ مِائَةٍ وَتَوْبٌ أَوْ مِائَةٍ وَشَاةٌ حَيْثُ لَا يَكُونُ ذَلِكَ بَيَانًا لِلْمِائَةِ وَاخْتِصَّ ذَلِكَ فِي عَطْفِ الْوَاحِدِ بِمَا يَصْلُحُ دَيْنًا فِي الدِّمَةِ كَالْمَكِيلِ وَالْمَوْزُونِ وَقَالَ أَبُو يُوسُفٍ يَكُونُ بَيَانًا فِي مِائَةٍ وَشَاةٍ وَمِائَةٍ وَتَوْبٍ عَلَى هَذَا الْأَصْلِ

As far as 'Bayaanul Athaf' (whereby the ambiguity caused by the abbreviation of speech, is clarified by a conjunction; i.e. a word or sentence attached to it) is concerned it is like when a measurement or weight is affixed to a vague sentence making that (affixed measurement or weight) clarification of the vagueness. An example of this is if a person says, "I owe a certain person one hundred and a dirham" or he says, "I owe a certain person one hundred and a Kafeez of wheat", whereby the conjunction ("and one dirham" or "and one Kafeez of wheat") clarifies that they are all of that class (that he owes 101 dirhams and 101 Kafeez of wheat). Similarly when a person says, "I owe a certain person one hundred and three cloths" or "I owe a certain person one hundred and three dirhams" or "I owe a certain person one hundred and three slaves" it (the conjunction "and three cloths", "and three dirhams" and "and three slaves") clarifies that the entire amount is of that class (it clarifies that the one hundred mentioned initially in the statement also refers to cloth, dirhams or slaves respectively) the same as saying , "I owe a certain person twenty-one dirhams". This ruling does not apply¹ to when a person says, "I owe a certain

¹ This form of clarification is only applies when the affixed sentence is an item which is classified as 'Makeeli' or 'Mowzooni'. Makeeli refers to items such as wheat, etc which were sold using her measuring utensil. Mowzooni refers to gold and silver which is sold in weight. If the item is not 'Makeeli' or 'Mowzooni' then it must be preceded by a numerical figure, such as in the example, "I owe a certain person one hundred and three cloth".

person one hundred and cloth" or "I owe a certain person one hundred and a sheep" such that this will not clarify what the one hundred is. This *(to affix something to a vague sentence)* is only when something is affixed to that which can be a debt on him such as items which are measured by a measuring utensil or weight. Imaam Abu Yusuf \square *(disagrees with the rule mentioned above and)* says that it will act as clarification in "One hundred and a sheep" and "one hundred and a cloth" as well *(despite it not being 'Makeeli' or Mowzooni')* based upon this principle *(that the ambiguity caused by the abbreviation of speech can be clarified by a conjunction)*.

'Bayaanut Tabdeel'

فَصْلٌ
وَأَمَّا بَيَانُ التَّبْدِيلِ وَهُوَ النَّسْخُ فَيَجُوزُ ذَلِكَ مِنْ صَاحِبِ الشَّرْعِ وَلَا يَجُوزُ
ذَلِكَ مِنَ الْعِبَادِ

As far as 'Bayaanut Tabdeel' is concerned, it is *(actually)* **Abrogation** *(Naskh, where the previous law or declaration is cancelled and replaced by another)*, which is only permissible for ALLAAH Ta'ala to do and not man.

Exception of all is impermissible

وَعَلَى هَذَا بَطْلُ إِسْتِثْنَاءِ الْكُلِّ لِأَنَّهُ نَسْخُ الْحُكْمِ وَلَا يَجُوزُ الرُّجُوعُ عَنِ
الْإِقْرَارِ وَالطَّلَاقِ وَالْعِتَاقِ لِأَنَّهُ نَسْخٌ وَلَيْسَ لِلْعَبْدِ ذَلِكَ

Based upon this *(that abrogation is only permissible for ALLAAH)* exception of all from the stipulated amount is not valid *(for example a person says, "I owe him ten dirhams except ten", whereby he excluded the entire amount which he confessed to)* because this is abrogation of the ruling. It is

not permissible to retract (and thereby abrogate) one's confession, Talaaq, setting free as this (retraction) is Abrogation and it is not permissible for man to abrogate.

Rulings derived from the above

وَلَوْ قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى أَلْفٍ قَرْضٌ أَوْ تَمَنُّ الْمَبِيعِ وَقَالَ هِيَ زِيُوفٌ كَانَ ذَلِكَ بَيَانُ التَّغْيِيرِ عِنْدَهُمَا فَيَصِحُّ مَوْصُولاً وَبَيَانُ التَّبْدِيلِ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى فَلَا يَصِحُّ وَ إِنْ وَصَلَ وَلَوْ قَالَ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى أَلْفٍ مِنْ تَمَنُّ الْجَارِيَةِ بَاعَئِنَهَا وَلَمْ أَقْبِضْهَا وَالْجَارِيَةُ لَا أَثَرَ لَهَا كَانَ ذَلِكَ بَيَانُ التَّبْدِيلِ عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى لِأَنَّ الْإِقْرَارَ يُلْزِمُ التَّمَنُّ إِقْرَارًا بِالْقَبْضِ عِنْدَ هَلَكَ الْمَبِيعِ إِذَا لَوْ هَلَكَ قَبْلَ الْقَبْضِ يَنْفَسَخُ الْبَيْعُ فَلَا يَبْقَى التَّمَنُّ لَأَزْمًا

If a person says, "I owe a certain person one thousand as debt" or (he says) "I owe a certain person one thousand as price of this item (which is purchased)" and thereafter he says, "counterfeit (i.e. one thousand counterfeit)" then according to Imaam Abu Yusuf □ and Imaam Muhammed □ this is 'Bayaanut Taghyeer' and only correct if mentioned immediately (without an interval) and according to Imaam Abu Hanifah □ this is 'Bayaanut Tabdeel' and is not correct even if mentioned immediately (as abrogation of a confession is impermissible).

If a person says, "I owe a certain person one thousand as the price for this slave which I purchased but did not take possession of" and there is no sign of the slave, then this will be 'Bayaanut Tabdeel'(and is impermissible resulting in the thousand still being incumbent upon him) according to Imaam Abu Hanifah □ (as opposed to Imaam Abu Yusuf and Imaam Muhammed who regard this as 'Bayaanut Taghyeer') because confessing to owing the money (as price of the slave) is confessing to having possession at the time the purchased

Section Two

item was lost (as the price can only be *Wajib* if he had taken possession) **and if it had been lost before taking possession** (while still in the possession of the seller) **then the price would not have been *Wajib*** (upon him, thus his statement, "but did not take possession of it" is in actual fact an attempt to abrogate the incumbency of the thousand he confessed to owing previously, which is impermissible to do).

Sunnat

الْبَحْثُ الثَّانِي

الْبَحْثُ الثَّانِي فِي سُنَّةِ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ وَهِيَ أَكْثَرُ مِنْ عَدَدِ الرَّمْلِ وَالْحَصَى

The section concerns the Sunnat (*Ahaadeeth*) of Rasulullaah ﷺ, which are more than the grains of sand and stones.

The types of Ahaadeeth

فَصَلِّ فِي أَقْسَامِ الْخَبَرِ: خَبَرُ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ ﷺ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْكِتَابِ فِي حَقِّ لُزُومِ الْعِلْمِ وَالْعَمَلِ بِهِ فَإِنْ مَنْ أَطَاعَهُ فَقَدْ أَطَاعَ اللَّهَ فَمَا مَرَّ ذِكْرُهُ مِنْ بَحْثِ الْخَاصِّ وَالْعَامِّ وَالْمُشْتَرَكِ وَالْمُجْمَلِ فِي الْكِتَابِ فَهُوَ كَذَلِكَ فِي حَقِّ السُّنَّةِ إِلَّا أَنَّ الشُّبْهَةَ فِي بَابِ الْخَبَرِ فِي ثُبُوتِهِ مِنْ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ ﷺ وَاتِّصَالِهِ بِهِ وَلِهَذَا الْمَعْنَى صَارَ الْخَبَرُ عَلَى ثَلَاثَةِ أَقْسَامٍ قِسْمٌ صَحَّ مِنْ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ ﷺ وَثُبَّتْ مِنْهُ بِلاَ شُبْهَةٍ وَهُوَ الْمُتَوَاتِرُ وَقِسْمٌ فِيهِ ضَرْبُ شُبْهَةٍ وَهُوَ الْمَشْهُورُ وَقِسْمٌ فِيهِ إِحْتِمَالٌ وَشُبْهَةٌ وَهُوَ الْإِحَادُ

The Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ is the same as the Quraan in that it is compulsory to believe in it (*that it is the true*) and act upon it, as whoever has obeyed Rasulullaah ﷺ has in actual fact obeyed ALLAAH. The same sections of Khaas, Aam, Mushtarak, and Mujmal, which were discussed in the section regarding the Quraan apply to Hadeeth as well. The only difference (*between the Quraan and Sunnat*) is doubt with regards to Hadeeth as to whether it is proven from Rasulullaah ﷺ and links up to him. Due to this (*that there is doubt as to whether a Hadeeth is proven to be the words of Rasulullaah ﷺ or not*) Hadeeth has been divided into three categories;

The first category is that which has been authentically proven to be said by Rasulullaah ﷺ without any doubt (*as to its authenticity*), which is called Mutawaatir.

The second category is that in which there is a slight amount of uncertainty, which is called Mashoor.

The third category is that which contains the possibility and doubt (*of not being the words of Rasulullaah ﷺ*), which is called **Khabar Wahid**.

Khabar Mutawaatir

فَالْمُتَوَاتِرُ مَا نَقَلَهُ جَمَاعَةٌ عَنْ جَمَاعَةٍ لَا يُتَصَوَّرُ تَوَافُقُهُمْ عَلَى الْكِذْبِ لِكَثْرَتِهِمْ وَ اتَّصَلَ بِكَ هَكَذَا مِثْلُهُ نَقْلُ الْقُرْآنِ وَأَعْدَادُ الرِّكَعَاتِ وَمَقَادِيرُ الزَّكَاةِ

Mutawaatir is that Hadeeth which has been narrated in every generation by such a large group of (*reliable*) people that it is logically impossible for all of them to be unanimous on a lie, due to their numbers and reaches one in this very manner. An example of Hadeeth Mutawaatir is the narration of the Quraan, the number of Raqaats of Salaah and amounts for Zakaat.

Khabar Mashoor

وَالْمَشْهُورُ مَا كَانَ أَوَّلُهُ كَالْأَحَادِ ثُمَّ اشْتَهَرَ فِي الْعَصْرِ، الثَّانِي وَالثَّالِثِ وَ تَلَقَّتْهُ الْأُمَّةُ بِالْقَبُولِ فَصَارَ كَالْمُتَوَاتِرِ حَتَّى اتَّصَلَ بِكَ وَ ذَلِكَ مِثْلُ حَدِيثِ الْمَسْحِ عَلَى الْخُفِّ وَالرَّجَمِ فِي بَابِ الزَّنَا ثُمَّ الْمُتَوَاتِرُ يُوجِبُ الْعِلْمَ الْقَطْعِيَّ وَ يَكُونُ رَدُّهُ كُفْرًا وَالْمَشْهُورُ يُوجِبُ عِلْمَ الطَّمَانِينَةِ وَ يَكُونُ رَدُّهُ بِدْعَةً وَلَا خِلَافَ بَيْنَ الْعُلَمَاءِ فِي لُزُومِ الْعَمَلِ بِهِمَا وَ إِنَّمَا الْكَلَامُ فِي الْأَحَادِ

A **Mashoor Hadeeth** is that Hadeeth which was **Khabar Wahid** in the beginning (*in the initial chain of narration, of the Sahabah, it was only reported by one or two individuals*) but in the second (*the age of the Taabi'een*) and third generations (*the Taba-Taabi'een*) it became more well-

known (and was then narrated by a large number of people) and then accepted by the Ummat becoming like **Mutawaatir** (in the second and third generations) and reaching one in this manner (that from the second or third generation onwards it continued to be narrated by a large number of people as in Mutawaatir). An example of **Mashoor** is the Hadeeth regarding Masah on leather socks and (the punishment of) **pelting the adulterer in the chapter of Zinaa** (fornication). (The ruling of Khabar Mutawaatir and Khabar Mashoor is that) the **authenticity** (and veracity) of **Mutawaatir** is unquestionable such that rejection of it is **Kufr** (and renders one out of the fold of Islaam) and one can have confidence in **Mashoor** (which is slightly weaker than that of Mutawaatir, which is unquestionable) and rejection of it is **Bid'ah** (innovation). There is no difference of opinion amongst the Ulama that it is compulsory to practice on them both (Mutawaatir and Mashoor) but there is a difference of opinion regarding Khabar Wahid.

Khabar Wahid

فَنَقُولُ خَبْرُ الْوَاحِدِ هُوَ مَا نَقَلَهُ وَاحِدٌ عَنْ وَاحِدٍ أَوْ وَاحِدٌ عَنْ جَمَاعَةٍ أَوْ جَمَاعَةٌ عَنْ وَاحِدٍ وَلَا عِبْرَةَ لِلْعَدَدِ إِذَا لَمْ يَتَّبَعْ حَدَّ الْمَشْهُورِ وَهُوَ يُوجِبُ الْعَمَلَ بِهِ فِي الْأَحْكَامِ الشَّرْعِيَّةِ بِشَرْطِ إِسْلَامِ الرَّاَوِي وَعَدَالَتِهِ وَضَبْطِهِ وَعَقْلِهِ وَاتِّصَالِهِ بِكَ ذَلِكَ مِنْ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ □ بِهَذَا الشَّرْطِ

We say that Khabar Wahid is that Hadeeth which one individual has reported from another individual or an individual from a group or a group from an individual. Their numbers are of no consequence (many people narrating it does not matter) when their numbers do not reach that of Mashoor. It is Waajib to practice upon it in Ahkaam on condition that the narrators are Muslim, pious, have strong memory, of sound intellect and these

requirements are found in all the narrators from Rasulullaah ﷺ (to the time it reached us).

Conditions of narrators

ثُمَّ الرَّاَوِيُّ فِي الْأَصْلِ قِسْمَانِ مَعْرُوفٌ بِالْعِلْمِ وَالْإِجْتِهَادِ كَالْخُلَفَاءِ
الْأَرْبَعَةِ وَ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ مَسْعُودٍ وَ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ عَبَّاسٍ وَ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ عُمَرَ وَ زَيْدُ
بْنُ ثَابِتٍ وَ مُعَاذُ بْنُ جَبَلٍ وَ أَمْثَالُهُمْ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى عَنْهُمْ فَإِذَا صَحَّتْ
عِنْدَكَ رِوَايَتُهُمْ عَنْ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ ﷺ يَكُونُ الْعَمَلُ بِرِوَايَتِهِمْ أَوْلَى مِنْ الْعَمَلِ
بِالْقِيَاسِ وَلِهَذَا رَوَى مُحَمَّدٌ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى حَدِيثَ الْأَعْرَابِيِّ الَّذِي كَانَ فِي
عَيْنِهِ سُوءٌ فِي مَسْأَلَةِ الْفَهْقَةِ وَ تَرَكَ الْقِيَاسَ بِهِ وَ رَوَى حَدِيثَ تَأْخِيرِ
النِّسَاءِ فِي مَسْأَلَةِ الْمُحَازَاتِ وَ تَرَكَ الْقِيَاسَ بِهِ وَ رَوَى عَنْ عَائِشَةَ حَدِيثَ
الْفَيْ وَ تَرَكَ الْقِيَاسَ بِهِ وَ رَوَى عَنْ ابْنِ مَسْعُودٍ حَدِيثَ السَّهْوِ بَعْدَ السَّلَامِ
وَ تَرَكَ الْقِيَاسَ بِهِ

Then the narrators in the first generation (of Sahabah) are of two types. The first type are those narrators who were well-known for their knowledge and their ability to extract religious rulings such as the four Khulafaa (Hadhrat Abu Bakr .., Hadhrat Umar .., Hadhrat Uthmaan .., Hadhrat Ali ..), Hadhrat Abdullaah bin Mas'ood .., Hadhrat Abdullaah bin Abbaas .., Hadhrat Abdullaah bin Umar .., Hadhrat Zaid

bin Thaabit .., Hadhrat Muaadh bin Jabal .. and other Sahabah like them, may ALLAAH be pleased with them. Thus if the narrations of these Sahabah reach you with an authentic chain then practicing upon these narrations will be better than practicing on Qiyaas (we will disregard Qiyaas and practice upon these narrations).

Based on this (that if the narrations of these Sahabah are authentically proven, Qiyaas will be disregarded for it) Imaam Muhammed ؑ has narrated the Hadeeth of the villager who an ailment in his eyes¹ in the law regarding laughing(aloud) in Salaah and disregarded Qiyaas for it (saying that Wudhu breaks if one laughs aloud in Salaah).

Imaam Muhammed ؑ also narrated the Hadeeth of deferring women²(to place them at the back in the last row) in the law of a man and woman reading Salaah next to each other and disregarded Qiyaas for it (saying the Salaah of the man breaks only not the woman).

Imaam Muhammed also narrated the Hadeeth of Hadhrat Aisha .. regarding vomiting³(a mouthful) and disregarded Qiyaas for it (saying that vomiting a mouthful breaks wudhu).

¹Rasulullaah ؐ was once performing Salaah and the Sahabah were reading behind him, when a villager who an ailment in his eyes passed by and fell into a hole, which he did not see. Seeing this some of the Sahabah laughed, on which Rasulullaah ؐ remarked after the Salaah had completed, "Whomsoever amongst you laughed loudly (while in Salaah) should repeat his Wudhu and Salaah as well."

²Hadhrat Abdullaah bin Mas'ood ؓ narrates that Rasulullaah ؐ said, "Defer the woman (place them at the back) just as ALLAAH Ta'ala deferred their creation (created them second after Hadhrat Aadam) ". Since this instruction is to the men we say the Salaah of the man is broken if a woman reads next to him, as he is the one who did not fulfill what was required of him.

³Hadhrat Aisha .. has narrated that Rasulullaah ؐ said, "Whoever vomits or his nose bleeds in Salaah, he should return, perform Wudhu and continue with his Salaah (from where it broke) as long as he does not talk (between making wudhu and returning to Salaah)."

Imaam Muhammed also narrated the Hadeeth of Hadhrat Abdullaah Ibn Mas'ood .. of Sajdah-Sahw¹ being after Salaam and disregarded Qiyaas for it."

The second type of narrators

وَالْقِسْمُ الثَّانِي مِنَ الرُّوَاةِ هُمُ الْمَعْرُوفُونَ بِالْحِفْظِ وَالْعَدَالَةِ دُونَ الْإِجْتِهَادِ وَالْفَتْوَى كَأَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ وَ أَنَسِ بْنِ مَالِكٍ فَإِذَا صَحَّتْ رِوَايَةُ مِثْلِهِمَا عِنْدَكَ فَإِنْ وَافَقَ الْخَبَرُ الْقِيَاسَ فَلَا خِفَاءَ فِي لُزُومِ الْعَمَلِ بِهِ وَ إِنْ خَالَفَهُ كَانَ الْعَمَلُ بِالْقِيَاسِ أَوْلَى مِثْلَهُ مَا رَوَى أَبُو هُرَيْرَةَ الْوَضُوءُ مِمَّا مَسَّنَهُ النَّارُ فَقَالَ لَهُ ابْنُ عَبَّاسٍ أَرَأَيْتَ لَوْ تَوَضَّأْتَ بِمَاءٍ سَخِينٍ أَكُنْتَ تَتَوَضَّأُ مِنْهُ فَسَكَتَ وَ إِنَّمَا رَدَّهُ بِالْقِيَاسِ إِذْ لَوْ كَانَ عِنْدَهُ خَبَرٌ لَرَوَاهُ وَعَلَى هَذَا تَرَكَ أَصْحَابُنَا رِوَايَةَ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ فِي مَسْأَلَةِ الْمَصْرَاةِ بِالْقِيَاسِ

The second type of narrators (*from the generation of the Sahabah*) are those who were well-known for their (*excellent*) memory, piety but not for their ability to extract religious rulings such as Hadhrat Abu Hurairah .., Hadhrat Anas bin Maalik .., etc. Thus if one of their narrations reach you authentically and it corresponds with Qiyaas then there is no doubt that it is Waajib to practice upon it but if it contradicts Qiyaas then it would be better to practice upon Qiyaas. An example of this (*wherein their narrations contradict Qiyaas*) is what has been narrated from Hadhrat Abu Hurairah .., "Wudhu is incumbent

¹Hadhrat Ibn Mas'ood .. narrates that Rasoolullaah .. said, "For any error in Salaah there are two Sajdahs after Salaam".

because (of usage) of that which is touched by the fire (cooked or prepared with fire, such as meat, etc)" on which Hadhrat Abdullaah Ibn Abbaas .. asked him(to refute his deduction), "Will your Wudhu be complete if you perform Wudhu with hot water (which is heated by the fire)" on which Hadhrat Abu Hurairah .. remained silent. Thus Hadhrat Ibn Abbaas .. refuted this by Qiyaas because if Hadhrat Ibn Abbaas .. has a Hadeeth (in contradiction to this), he would have narrated it. Based upon this (that the Qiyaas will be given preference when these types of Hadeeth contradict it) our scholars (of the Hanafi Madhab) disregard the narration of Hadhrat Abu Hurairah .. regarding 'Musarraat'¹(not milking an animal for a number of days to give the impression that it produces a lot of milk) because of Qiyaas (because it contradicts Qiyaas).

A condition for practicing on Khabar Wahid

وَبِإِعْتِبَارِ اخْتِلَافِ أَحْوَالِ الرُّوَاةِ قُلْنَا شَرَطُ الْعَمَلِ بِخَبَرِ الْوَاحِدِ أَنْ لَا يَكُونَ مُخَالَفًا لِلْكِتَابِ وَالسُّنَّةِ الْمَشْهُورَةِ وَأَنْ لَا يَكُونَ مُخَالَفًا لِلظَّاهِرِ قَالَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ تَكْثُرُ لَكُمْ الْأَحَادِيثُ بَعْدِي فَإِذَا رَوَى لَكُمْ عَنْ حَدِيثٍ فَأَعْرِضُوهُ عَلَى كِتَابِ اللَّهِ فَمَا وَافَقَ فَاقْبَلُوهُ وَمَا خَالَفَ فَرُدُّوهُ

Based upon the varying conditions of the narrators (of Hadeeth) we say that the condition for practicing upon Khabar Wahid is that it must not contradict the Quraan and the well-known (established) Sunnah (of Rasulullaah ﷺ) and that it must not contradict the apparent (the common practice of the general masses). Rasulullaah ﷺ has said, "The number of Ahaadeeth will increase after me, thus if any of

¹ The Hadeeth of Hadhrat Abu Hurairah in this regard is, "Do not leave the milk in the udders of the camels and goats (i.e. not milk it for days), whoever sells it after this, he (the buyer) will have one of two choices after he milks it (and discovers that it does not produce abundant milk as he was led to believe); if he desires he may keep it (for the original price agreed upon) and if he desires then he should return it along with a Saa'a of dates (for the milk he extracted)."

you learns of a Hadeeth he should compare it to the Quraan, if it concurs with it then accept and that which contradicts it should be rejected.

The substantiation that the conditions of the narrators differ

وَتَحْقِيقُ ذَلِكَ فِيمَا رُوِيَ عَنْ عَلِيٍّ بْنِ أَبِي طَالِبٍ أَنَّهُ قَالَ كَانَتْ الرُّوَاةُ عَلَى ثَلَاثَةِ أَقْسَامٍ مُؤْمِنٌ مُخْلِصٌ صَحِبَ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ ﷺ وَعَرَفَ مَعْنَى كَلَامِهِ وَأَعْرَابِيٌّ جَاءَ مِنْ قَبِيلَةٍ فَسَمِعَ بَعْضَ مَا سَمِعَ وَلَمْ يَعْرِفْ حَقِيقَةَ كَلَامِ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ ﷺ فَرَجَعَ إِلَى قَبِيلَتِهِ فَرَوَى بِغَيْرِ لَفْظِ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ ﷺ فَتَغَيَّرَ الْمَعْنَى وَهُوَ يَظُنُّ أَنَّ الْمَعْنَى لَا يَتَفَاوَتْ وَ مُنَافِقٌ لَمْ يَعْرِفْ نِفَاقَهُ فَرَوَى مَا لَمْ يَسْمَعْ وَافْتَرَى فَسَمِعَ مِنْهُ أَنَسٌ فَظَنَّهُ مُؤْمِنًا مُخْلِصًا فَرَوَا ذَلِكَ وَ اشْتَهَرَ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ فَلِهَذَا الْمَعْنَى وَجَبَ عَرْضُ الْخَبَرِ عَلَى الْكِتَابِ وَالسُّنَّةِ الْمَشْهُورَةِ

The substantiation for this (*that the conditions of the narrators vary*) is what has been narrated from Hadhrat Ali .. that he said, "The conditions of the narrators are of three categories; the first is a true Mu'min who accompanied Rasulullaah ﷺ (*is amongst his close Sahabah*) and understood the meaning of his speech, the second is a Bedouin who came from his tribe and heard some of the speech of Rasulullaah ﷺ but did not understand the reality of Rasulullaah's ﷺ speech and returns to his tribe and reports the narration in different words to what Rasulullaah ﷺ said, such that it changes its meaning but he thinks that it has not changed (*and it is what Rasulullaah ﷺ had meant when in reality the meaning has changed*), the third is a Munaafiq whose Nifaaq (*hypocrisy*) is unknown, who narrates what Rasulullaah he did not hear and fabricates (*narrations*)

which people hear from him and thinking him to be a sincere Mu'min report these narrations to others, resulting in that narration becoming famous amongst people." This is why it is necessary to compare these Ahaadeeth to the Quraan and the well-known (*established*) Sunnah (of Rasulullaah).

An example of comparing a Hadeeth to the Quraan

وَنَظِيرُ الْعَرَضِ عَلَى الْكِتَابِ فِي حَدِيثِ مَسِّ الذَّكْرِ فِيمَا يُرَوَّى عَنْهُ مِنْ مَسِّ ذَكَرِهِ فَلْيَتَوَضَّاءَ فَعَرَضْنَاهُ عَلَى الْكِتَابِ فَخَرَجَ مُخَالَفًا لِقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {فِيهِ رِجَالٌ يُحِبُّونَ أَنْ يَتَّطَهَّرُوا} فَإِنَّهُمْ كَانُوا يَسْتَنْجُونَ بِالْأَحْجَارِ ثُمَّ يَغْسِلُونَ بِالْمَاءِ وَلَوْ كَانَ مَسُّ الذَّكْرِ حَدَثًا لَكَانَ هَذَا تَنْجِيسًا لَا تَطْهِيرًا عَلَى الْإِطْلَاقِ وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ أَيُّمَا امْرَأَةٍ نَكَحَتْ نَفْسَهَا بِغَيْرِ إِذْنٍ وَلَيْيَها فَنِكَاحُها بَاطِلٌ بَاطِلٌ خَرَجَ مُخَالَفًا لِقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {فَلَا تَعْضُلُوهُنَّ أَنْ يَنْكِحْنَ أَزْوَاجَهُنَّ} فَإِنَّ الْكِتَابَ يُوجِبُ تَحْقِيقَ النِّكَاحِ مِنْهُنَّ

An example of comparing Khabar Wahid to the Quraan is in the Hadeeth of touching one's private path, namely what has been narrated from Rasulullaah ﷺ, "Whoever touches his private parts should perform Wudhu". Therefore we compared it to the Quraan and found it to contradict the verse, "In it (referring to the Masjid Rasulullaah ﷺ built in Qubaa) are men who love to be extremely pure" as (it has been reported that they were praised by ALLAAH because) they used to make Istinjaah with stones and then follow it by washing (their private parts) with water. Thus if touching the private parts did break Wudhu then this (method of Istinjaah) would have been impurifying (a means of rendering one into a state of impurity) and not purification (as stated in the verse).

In a similar manner (as the Hadeeth mentioned above) the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, "Whichever women will perform her Nikaah without the permission of her Walie (father or Shar'ie representative) then her Nikaah is invalid, invalid, invalid" contradicts the verse, "Do not prevent them (the divorced women) from marrying their husbands" because the Quraan necessitates that the Nikaah of a women is valid (even if without the permission of her Walie).

When Khabar Wahid contradicts Khabar Mashoor

وَمِثَالُ الْعَرَضِ عَلَى الْخَبَرِ الْمَشْهُورِ رَوَايَةُ الْقَضَاءِ بِشَاهِدٍ وَ يَمِينٍ فَإِنَّهُ خَرَجَ مُخَالَفًا لِقَوْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: الْبَيِّنَةُ عَلَى الْمُدَّعَى وَالْيَمِينُ عَلَى مَنْ أَنْكَرَ

An example of comparing the Khabar Wahid to Khabar Mashoor is the narration¹ of verdict being passed (by Rasulullaah ﷺ) with one witness and (the accuser taking) an oath (in place of the second witness) which contradicts the (Mashoor) Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, "The accuser must bring a witness and the defendant must take an oath (if he denies the accusation).

¹ The Hadeeth is, "Rasulullaah ﷺ passed a verdict with an oath and one witness".

When Khabar Wahid contradicts the common practice

وَبِإِعْتِبَارِ هَذَا الْمَعْنَى قُلْنَا خَبَرُ الْوَاحِدِ إِذَا خَرَجَ مُخَالِفًا لِلظَّاهِرِ لَا يُعْمَلُ بِهِ وَمِنْ صُورِ مُخَالَفَةِ الظَّاهِرِ عَدَمُ اسْتِثْهَارِ الْخَبَرِ فِيمَا يَعُمُّ بِهِ الْبُلُوَى فِي الصَّدْرِ الْأَوَّلِ وَالثَّانِي لِإِنَّهُمْ لَا يَتَّهَمُونَ بِالنَّقْصِيرِ فِي مُتَابَعَةِ السُّنَّةِ فَإِذَا لَمْ يَشْتَهَرْ الْخَبَرُ مَعَ شِدَّةِ الْحَاجَةِ وَعُمُومِ الْبُلُوَى كَانَ ذَلِكَ عَلَامَةً عَدَمِ صِحَّتِهِ

Based upon this (*that the conditions of narrators vary*) we say that if Khabar Wahid contradicts the apparent it will not be practiced upon. An example of Khabar Wahid contradicting the apparent is when it is not the common practice of those residing in the first (*i.e. of the Sahabah*) and second generation (*i.e. of the Taabi'een*) because they cannot be accused of being deficient in practicing upon a Sunnat. Thus when a Hadeeth is not well-known amongst them, despite there being a dire necessity for it and the common practice (*of people being contradictory to it*), it will a sign of it not being correct.

An example of Khabar Wahid contradicting the apparent

وَمَثَالُهُ فِي الْحُكْمِيَّاتِ إِذَا أَخْبَرَ وَاحِدٌ أَنَّ امْرَأَتَهُ حَرُمَتْ عَلَيْهِ بِالرَّضَاعِ الطَّارِئِ جَازَ أَنْ يَعْتَمِدَ عَلَى خَبَرِهِ وَ يَتَزَوَّجَ أُخْتَهَا وَلَوْ أَخْبَرَ أَنَّ الْعَقْدَ كَانَ بَاطِلًا بِحُكْمِ الرِّضَاعِ لَا يُقْبَلُ خَبَرُهُ وَكَذَلِكَ إِذَا أُخْبِرَتِ الْمَرْأَةُ بِمَوْتِ زَوْجِهَا أَوْ طَلَاقِهِ إِيَّاهَا وَ هُوَ غَائِبٌ جَازَ أَنْ تَعْتَمِدَ عَلَى خَبَرِهِ وَ تَتَزَوَّجَ بغيرِهِ وَلَوْ اسْتَدْبَهَتْ عَلَيْهِ الْقَبِيلَةُ فَأَخْبَرَهُ وَاحِدٌ عَنْهَا وَجَبَ الْعَمَلُ بِهِ وَلَوْ وَجَدَ مَاءً لَا يَعْلَمُ حَالَهُ فَأَخْبَرَهُ وَاحِدٌ عَلَى النَّجَاسَةِ لَا يَتَوَضَّأُ بِهِ بَلْ تَيْمَمُ

An example of Khabar Wahid contradicting the apparent in the laws of Shari'ah is when a person informs him that his wife has become Haraam upon him through fostering, during the period she is still being nursed, then it is permissible to rely upon his information and it will be permissible to marry her sister (as it will not result in having two sisters in his wedlock). (However) If he were to inform him that his Nikaah was invalid because of her being his foster sister (at the time when the Nikaah occurred) then this information will be rejected (as it contradicts the apparent, which is that she is not his foster sister as it is impossible that this information could not have been known by anyone else at the time of the Nikaah).

Similarly if a woman is informed of the death of her husband or that he divorced her, when he is not present, then it will be permissible to rely upon his information and remarry (but if he is present then it will not be permissible to rely on his information because it contradicts the apparent as it impossible for to be unaware of his death or Talaaq if he is present).

If a person is in doubt as to which direction is the Qiblah (and is unable to ascertain its direction) and one person informs him (of the direction of the Qiblah) then it is Waajib upon him to act upon it (and perform Salaah in that direction as it does not contradict the apparent).

If a person comes across water and is uncertain as to whether it is pure or not and one person informs him that it is impure then he will not make Wudhu with it and will perform Tayammum *(as this does not contradict the apparent as opposed to if he is unsure about the water and one person informs him that it is impure but that water is commonly used by everyone then his information will not be accepted and it will be Waajib upon him to make Wudhu with that water).*

Khabar Wahid can be mentioned four instances

فَصْلٌ

خَبَرُ الْوَاحِدِ حُجَّةٌ فِي أَرْبَعَةِ مَوَاضِعَ خَالِصُ حَقِّ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى مَا لَيْسَ بِعُقُوبَةٍ وَ خَالِصُ حَقِّ الْعَبْدِ مَا فِيهِ الزَّامُ مَحْضٌ وَ خَالِصُ حَقِّهِ مَا لَيْسَ فِيهِ الزَّامُ مِنْ وَجْهِ أَمَّا الْأَوَّلُ فَيُقْبَلُ فِيهِ خَبَرُ الْوَاحِدِ فَإِنَّ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ ﷺ قِيلَ

شَهَادَةُ الْأَعْرَابِيِّ فِي هِلَالِ رَمَضَانَ وَ أَمَّا الثَّانِي فَيُشْتَرَطُ فِيهِ الْعَدَدُ وَ
الْعَدَالَةُ وَ نَظِيرُهُ الْمُنَازَعَاتُ وَ أَمَّا الثَّالِثُ فَيَقْبَلُ فِيهِ خَبَرُ الْوَاحِدِ عَدْلًا كَانَ
أَوْ فَاسِقًا وَ نَظِيرُهُ الْمُعَامَلَاتُ أَمَّا الرَّابِعُ فَيُشْتَرَطُ فِيهِ إِمَّا الْعَدَدُ أَوْ الْعَدَالَةُ
عِنْدَ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ وَ نَظِيرُهُ الْعَزْلُ وَالْحَجْرُ

Khabar Wahid can be mentioned in four instances;

The first is regarding that which is purely the right of ALLAAH but not a (Shar'ie) punishment (such as Salaah, Zakaah, etc).

The second is regarding that which is purely the right of man which entails making something incumbent upon another (such as a debt, etc).

The third is regarding that which is purely the right of man which does not entail making something incumbent upon another (such as informing someone that he has been anointed as a representative of another, etc).

The fourth is regarding that which is purely the right of man which to an extent entails making something incumbent upon another (revoke the right for one to act as his representative, etc).

As far as the first is concerned (that which is purely the right of ALLAAH but not a Shar'ie punishment) Khabar Wahid is accepted in it as Rasulullaah ﷺ accepted the testimony of one Bedouin regarding the sighting of the crescent of Ramadaan.

As far as the second is concerned (that which is purely the right of man which entails making something incumbent upon another) quantity and faithfulness is required (there must be two or more witnesses in order for the testimony to be accepted) an example of which is monetary disputes.

**Section
Three**

As far as the third is concerned (*that which is purely the right of man which does not entail making something incumbent upon another*) **Khabar Wahid is accepted in it whether it be from one who is pious or a sinner. An example of this is transactions** (*such as appointing someone as your representative in a sales transaction*).

As far as the fourth is concerned (*that which is purely the right of man which to an extent entails making something incumbent upon another*) **according to Imaam Abu Hanifah** □ **either piety or quantity is required** (*if one pious person provides the information then it is accepted and if they are not pious but are two or more than it will be accepted*) **an example of this is revoking the right for one to act as one's representative and revoking the right for one's slave to trade.**

Ijmaa

الْبَحْثُ الثَّالِثُ فِي الْإِجْمَاعِ
فَصَلَ إِيْجْمَاعُ هَذِهِ الْأُمَّةِ بَعْدَ مَا تَوَفَّى رَسُولُ اللَّهِ ﷺ فِي فُرُوعِ الدِّينِ حُجَّةٌ
مَوْجِبَةٌ لِلْعَمَلِ بِهَا شَرْعًا كَرَامَةً لِهَذِهِ الْأُمَّةِ

The Ijmaa (consensus) of this Ummat after the demise of Rasulullaah ﷺ regarding laws of Deen is a proof which is Waajib to practice upon according to Shari'ah, as an honour to this Ummat.

Ijmaa is of four types

ثُمَّ الْإِجْمَاعُ عَلَى أَرْبَعَةِ أَقْسَامٍ إِيْجْمَاعُ الصَّحَابَةِ ۖ عَلَى حُكْمِ الْحَادِثَةِ
نَصًّا ثُمَّ إِيْجْمَاعُهُمْ بِنَصِّ الْبَعْضِ وَسُكُوتِ الْبَاقِيْنَ عَنِ الرَّدِّ ثُمَّ إِيْجْمَاعُ مَنْ
بَعْدَهُمْ فِيمَا لَمْ يُوْجَدْ فِيهِ قَوْلُ السَّلَفِ ثُمَّ الْإِجْمَاعُ عَلَى أَحَدِ أَقْوَالِ السَّلَفِ
أَمَّا الْأَوَّلُ فَهُوَ بِمَنْزِلَةِ آيَةٍ مِنْ كِتَابِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى ثُمَّ إِيْجْمَاعُ الْبَعْضِ
وَسُكُوتُ الْبَاقِيْنَ فَهُوَ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْمُتَوَاتِرِ ثُمَّ إِيْجْمَاعُ مَنْ بَعْدَهُمْ بِمَنْزِلَةِ
الْمَشْهُورِ مِنَ الْأَخْبَارِ ثُمَّ إِيْجْمَاعُ الْمُتَأَخِّرِيْنَ عَلَى أَحَدِ أَقْوَالِ السَّلَفِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ
الصَّحِيحِ مِنَ الْإِحَادِ

Then Ijmaa is of four types;

1- Ijmaa of the Sahabah on the ruling of an incident with clarification from all (that is they all voiced their approval of the ruling passed).

2- Ijmaa of the Sahabah by clarification from some and the silence of the rest from any refutation (a few of the Sahabah voiced their approval and the remaining Sahabah did not refute it, which indicates that they agree with the ruling passed).

3- Ijmaa of those that came after them (*the Taabi'een and Mujtahideen*) **on those laws regarding which they did not find any clarification from the predecessors** (*i.e. the Sahabah*).

4- Ijmaa of the later scholars on one of the (*from the diverse*) **opinions of the predecessors** (*Sahabah*).

The ruling of the first (*Ijmaa of the Sahabah on the ruling of an incident with clarification from all*) **is that it is similar to a verse from the Quraan** (*it will be practiced upon without any doubt and denial of it is Kufr*).

Then the ruling of the Ijmaa of the Sahabah by clarification from some and silence of the rest from refutation is that it is similar to Khabar Mutawaatir (*it will be practised upon without any doubt but denial of it will not result in Kufr*).

Then the Ijmaa of those that came after them (*the Taabi'een and Mujtahideen on those laws regarding which they did not find any clarification from the predecessors*) **is similar to Khabar Mashoor** (*it will be practised upon with conviction*).

Then Ijmaa of the latter scholars on one of the (*from the diverse*) **opinions of the predecessors is similar to the authentic Ahaadeeth of Khabar Wahid** (*it will be practiced upon with the possibility of it being incorrect but will be given precedence over Qiyaas*).

Whose Ijmaa will be considered

وَالْمُعْتَبَرُ فِي هَذَا الْبَابِ إجماعُ أَهْلِ الرَّأْيِ وَ الإِجْتِهَادِ فَلَا يُعْتَبَرُ بِقَوْلِ الْعَوَامِّ وَالْمُتَكَلِّمِ وَ الْمُحَدِّثِ الَّذِي لَا بَصِيرَةَ لَهُ فِي أَصُولِ الْفِقْهِ

The Ijmaa which is considered in this chapter is the Ijmaa of those being expert in the fields of Fiqh (jurisprudence) and Ijtihad (deriving rulings), thus the opinions (or consensus) of the general masses, Mutakalimeen (those who deliberate over Aqaaid) and those Muhadditheen who lack competency in Fiqh will not be considered.

Ijmaa is divided into two categories

ثُمَّ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ الْإِجْمَاعُ عَلَى نَوْعَيْنِ مُرَكَّبٍ وَغَيْرِ مُرَكَّبٍ فَأَلْمُرَكَّبُ مَا اجْتُمِعَ عَلَيْهِ الْأَرْاءُ عَلَى حُكْمِ الْحَادِثَةِ مَعَ وُجُودِ الْإِخْتِلَافِ فِي الْعِلَّةِ وَمِثَالُهُ الْإِجْمَاعُ عَلَى وُجُودِ الْإِنْتِقَاضِ عِنْدَ الْقَيِّ وَمَسَّ الْمَرْأَةِ أَمَّا عِنْدَنَا فَبِنَاءٌ عَلَى الْقَيِّ وَأَمَّا عَنْدهُ ۖ فَبِنَاءٌ عَلَى الْمَسِّ ثُمَّ هَذَا النَّوعُ مِنَ الْإِجْمَاعِ لَا يَبْقَى حُجَّةٌ بَعْدَ ظُهُورِ الْفَسَادِ فِي أَحَدِ الْمَأْخَذَيْنِ حَتَّى لَوْ ثَبَتَ أَنَّ الْقَيِّ غَيْرُ نَاقِضٍ فَأَبُو حَنِيفَةَ لَا يَقُولُ بِالْإِنْتِقَاضِ فِيهِ وَلَوْ ثَبَتَ أَنَّ الْمَسَّ غَيْرُ نَاقِضٍ فَالشَّافِعِيُّ لَا يَقُولُ بِالْإِنْتِقَاضِ فِيهِ لِفَسَادِ الْعِلَّةِ الَّتِي بُنِيَ عَلَيْهَا الْحُكْمُ

Then Ijmaa is divided into two categories; Murakkab and Ghair Murakkab.

Ijmaa Murakkab¹ is that Ijmaa in which there is consensus regarding the ruling (*the ruling is the same according to all*) but there is difference in opinion regarding the Illat (*each differs in the manner that the ruling is derived*). An example of this (Ijmaa Murakkab) is the Ijmaa of the nullification of Wudhu when a person vomits (*a mouthful*) and touches a woman (*there is Ijmaa on the ruling that his Wudhu is nullified but there is difference of opinion regarding the manner in which it broke*). According to us (Hanafi scholars) his wudhu breaks because of vomiting (*a mouthful*) whereas according to Imaam Shaafie □ it breaks because of him touching a woman. Thus this Ijmaa will no longer remain when one of the Illat (*on which either Imaam based his ruling*) no longer remains such that if it is established that the vomiting did not break his wudhu (*in that he vomited less than a mouthful*) then Imaam Abu Hanifah □ will no longer rule that his Wudhu is nullified and if it is established that his touching did not break wudhu (*in that he did not touch her skin to skin*) then Imaam Shaafie □ will no longer rule that his wudhu is nullified because the Illat on which the ruling was based no longer remains.

A reply to an objection

وَالْفَسَادُ مَتَوَهَّمٌ فِي الطَّرْقَيْنِ لِحَوَازِ أَنْ يَكُونَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ مُصَيَّبًا فِي مَسْئَلَةِ الْمَسِّ مُخْطِئًا فِي مَسْئَلَةِ الْقَيِّ وَالشَّافِعِيُّ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى مُصَيَّبًا فِي مَسْئَلَةِ الْقَيِّ مُخْطِئًا فِي مَسْئَلَةِ الْمَسِّ فَلَا يُودَىٰ هَذَا إِلَىٰ بِنَاءِ وَجُودِ الْإِجْمَاعِ عَلَى الْبَاطِلِ بِخِلَافِ مَا تَقَدَّمَ مِنَ الْإِجْمَاعِ فَالْحَاصِلُ أَنَّهُ جَازِ ارْتِفَاعِ هَذَا الْإِجْمَاعِ لِظُهُورِ الْفَسَادِ فِيمَا بُنِيَ هُوَ عَلَيْهِ

¹ Ijmaa Ghair Murakkab is the opposite of Ijmaa Murakkab wherein there is consensus regarding the ruling and the Illat, such that there is no possibility of the Ijmaa not remaining.

(If one were to object by saying that this form of Ijmaa is invalid because each Imaam has a totally opposite view wherein only one can be right thus opposing the very meaning of consensus, we would say) **The likelihood of error is possible from both sides as it is possible that Imaam Abu Hanifah ؓ is correct (in his view) on touching a woman (that in reality it does not break Wudhu) and in error regarding vomiting (that in reality it does not break Wudhu) and Imaam Shaafie could be correct in the ruling of vomiting (that in reality it does not break Wudhu) and in error regarding touching a woman (that in reality it does not break Wudhu). Thus this (possibility of each being in error) will not establish that this form of Ijmaa is baseless (because the possibility of error is mere speculation and doubt). (Ijmaa Murakkab will no longer remain when one of the Illat on which either Imaam based his ruling no longer remains) As opposed to what was mentioned previously of (the categories) Ijmaa (referring to Ijmaa Ghair Murakkab, which does not have the possibility of not remaining because of a difference of opinion in Illat).**

The conclusion is that it is permissible for this Ijmaa to no longer remain by the Illat on which the rulings are based no longer remaining.

Examples of the above

وَلِهَذَا إِذَا قَضَى الْقَاضِي فِي حَادِثَةٍ ثُمَّ ظَهَرَ رُقُّ الشُّهُودِ أَوْ كَذِبُهُمْ بِالرُّجُوعِ بَطَلَ قَضَاؤُهُ وَإِنْ لَمْ يَظْهَرْ ذَلِكَ فِي حَقِّ الْمُدَّعَى وَبِاعْتِبَارِ هَذَا الْمَعْنَى سَقَطَتِ الْمُؤَلَّفَةُ قُلُوبُهُمْ عَنِ الْأَصْنَافِ الثَّمَانِيَةِ لِانْقِطَاعِ الْعِلَّةِ وَسَقَطَ سَهْمُ ذَوِي الْقُرْبَى لِانْقِطَاعِ عِلَّتِهِ وَعَلَى هَذَا إِذَا غَسَلَ الثَّوْبَ النَجَسَ بِالْخَلِّ فَزَالَتِ النَّجَاسَةُ بِحُكْمِ طَهَارَةِ الْمَحَلِّ لِانْقِطَاعِ عِلَّتِهَا وَبِهَذَا ثَبَّتَ الْفَرْقُ بَيْنَ الْحَدَثِ وَالْخَبَثِ فَإِنَّ الْخَلَّ يُزِيلُ النَّجَاسَةَ عَنِ الْمَحَلِّ فَأَمَّا الْخَلُّ لَا يُفِيدُ طَهَارَةَ الْمَحَلِّ وَإِنَّمَا يُفِيدُهَا الْمُطَهَّرُ وَهُوَ الْمَاءُ

Therefore (since *Ijmaa Murakkab* will no longer remain if the *Illat* no longer remains) **when the Qaadhi makes a decision in a case** (based on testimony of witnesses) **and thereafter it is discovered that the witnesses were slaves or that they were lying as they retracted their testimony then the decision of the Qaadhi will be invalid**(as the *Illat* on which the ruling was based has changed), **even though this will not affect the right of the claimant** (and the decision made in his favour will remain and the result of this invalidation will affect the witnesses and defendant in that the witnesses will now be responsible for repayment to the defendant).

Based upon this (that the ruling will change if the *Illat* changes) **when impure clothing is washed with vinegar and the Impurity is removed then it will be declared to be pure as the Illat** (which makes it impure) **no longer remains.**

This establishes the difference between Hadath (being in a state of lesser impurity) **and Impurity** (such as urine, stool, etc) **as vinegar removes the impurity from the object but vinegar does aid in purification of the object** (the object will be ruled to be pure because of the impurity, which caused it to be ruled as impure, being removed and not that it has been purified). **That which benefits purification is water.**

Sub-division of Ijmaa

ثُمَّ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ نَوْعٌ مِنَ الْإِجْمَاعِ وَهُوَ عَدَمُ الْقَائِلِ بِالْفَصْلِ وَذَلِكَ نَوْعَانِ أَحَدُهُمَا مَا إِذَا كَانَ مَنَشَأُ الْخِلَافِ فِي الْفَصْلَيْنِ وَاحِدًا وَالثَّانِي مَا إِذَا كَانَ الْمَنَشَأُ مُخْتَلَفًا وَالْأَوَّلُ حُجَّةٌ وَالثَّانِي لَيْسَ بِحُجَّةٍ مِثَالُ الْأَوَّلِ فِيمَا خَرَجَ الْعُلَمَاءُ مِنَ الْمَسَائِلِ الْفَقْهِيَّةِ عَلَى أَصْلٍ وَاحِدٍ وَنَظِيرُهُ إِذَا أَثْبَتْنَا أَنَّ النَّهْيَ عَنِ النَّصْرِفَاتِ الشَّرْعِيَّةِ يُوجِبُ تَقْرِيرَهَا قُلْنَا يَصِحُّ النَّذْرُ بِصَوْمِ يَوْمِ النَّحْرِ وَ النَّبْيُ الْعَاسِدُ يُفِيدُ الْمَلِكَ لِعَدَمِ الْقَائِلِ بِالْفَصْلِ وَ لَوْ قُلْنَا إِنَّ التَّغْلِيْقَ

سَبَبٌ عِنْدَ وُجُودِ الشَّرْطِ قُلْنَا تَعْلِيْقُ الطَّلَاقِ وَ الْعِتَاقِ بِالْمَلِكِ أَوْ سَبَبِ الْمَلِكِ صَحِيحٌ

After this (explanation of the categories of *Ijmaa* explained above) **is another type of *Ijmaa* and that is 'Adamul Qaa'il bil Fasl'** (wherein each of the *Fuqahaa* do not differ in their rulings regarding the laws of *Shari'ah* which they derive from a certain principle), **which is of two types. One type is that in which the method of disagreement in both (or a number of) rulings is the same and the second type is that in which the method of disagreement is different. The first (that in which the method of disagreement in both rulings is the same) is a valid Shar'ie proof and the second (that in which the method of disagreement is different) is not a valid Shar'ie proof.**

An example of the first (that in which the method of disagreement in both rulings is the same) **is all those Fiqhi rulings which the Ulama derived based on one principle, for example when we established that the prohibition of an act necessitates that the act be valid, we said a vow to fast on the day of Eid is correct (and will be valid) and an invalid sales transaction will establish ownership (for the buyer) with 'Adamu Qaa'il bil Fasl'** (those Ulama who state that the prohibition of an act necessitates that the act be valid, state that the vow is correct and the sale will establish ownership and do not differentiate between the two. The same goes for those who say that that a prohibition of an act does not necessitate that it be valid, i.e. they say that the vow is incorrect and the sale does not establish ownership).

(Another example of 'Adamu Qaa'il bil Fasl' is) **When we said that making something conditional will cause the ruling to apply (only) when the condition is fulfilled, we (also) said that making (the issuing of) Talaaq and setting (a slave) free conditional on ownership or that which leads to ownership**

(such as Nikaah) **is correct** (those Ulama who state that the ruling will only apply when the condition is fulfilled, state that the Talaaq and freedom will only apply when the condition to which it was attached is fulfilled, as long as the condition was such an act which establishes ownership, that is the right to issue Talaaq or set the slave free and do not differentiate between the two. The same goes for those who say that the ruling will apply immediately but will be postponed until the condition is fulfilled, i.e. they say the Talaaq and freedom will not be valid since it applies immediately but is postponed due to the condition and at the time when the Talaaq applied he did not have the authority to issue Talaaq or set the slave free).

وَ كَذَا لَوْ أَثْبَتْنَا أَنَّ تَرْتُبَ الْحُكْمِ عَلَى إِسْمٍ مَوْصُوفٍ بِصِفَةٍ لَا يُوجِبُ تَعْلِيلَ الْحُكْمِ بِهِ فَلْنَا طَوَّلَ الْحُرَّةِ لَا يَمْنَعُ جَوَازَ نِكَاحِ الْأُمَةِ إِذْ صَحَّ بِنَقْلِ السَّلَفِ أَنَّ الشَّافِعِيَّ فَرَّغَ مَسْأَلَةَ طَوَّلِ الْحُرَّةِ عَلَى هَذَا الْأَصْلِ وَلَوْ أَثْبَتْنَا جَوَازَ نِكَاحِ الْأُمَةِ الْمُؤْمَنَةِ مَعَ الطَّوْلِ جَازَ نِكَاحِ الْأُمَةِ الْكِتَابِيَّةِ بِهَذَا الْأَصْلِ وَعَلَى هَذَا مِثَالُهُ مِمَّا ذَكَرْنَا فِيمَا سَبَقَ

In a similar manner (as the two examples mentioned above of 'Adamu Qaa'il bil Fasl' is) **when we established that a ruling affixed to an adjective** (when the ruling is mentioned with an adjective describing the one on whom the ruling will apply) **does not make the ruling conditional on that characteristic** (it is not incumbent for that characteristic to be present in order for the ruling to apply), **we said that having the ability to marry a free woman does not prohibit one from marrying a female slave whilst it has been authenticated by the predecessors that Imaam Shaafie** □ **has derived his ruling of having the ability to marry a free woman (prohibits one from marrying a female slave) from this very principle** (that the ruling has been affixed to an adjective and will thus make the ruling conditional on that characteristic, according to Imaam Shaafie). **Once we have established the**

permissibility of marrying a Mu'min female slave (even though one has the ability to marry a free woman) on this principle then it is (also) permissible to marry a female slave from the Ahlul-Kitaab (Jews and Christians) based on this same principle. And all the examples we have mentioned previously are of the same category.

The second type of 'Adamu Qaa'il bil Fasl'

وَنَظِيرُ الثَّانِي إِذَا قُلْنَا أَنَّ الْقَيَّ نَاقِضٌ فَيَكُونُ الْبَيْعُ الْفَاسِدُ مُفِيدًا لِلْمَلِكِ
لِعَدَمِ الْقَائِلِ بِالْفَصْلِ أَوْ يَكُونُ مُوجِبُ الْعَمْدِ الْقَوْدَ لِعَدَمِ الْقَائِلِ بِالْفَصْلِ
وَبِمِثْلِ هَذَا الْقَيِّ غَيْرُ نَاقِضٍ فَيَكُونُ الْمَسُّ نَاقِضًا وَ هَذَا لَيْسَ بِحُجَّةٍ لِأَنَّ
صِحَّةَ الْفَرَعِ وَإِنْ دَلَّتْ عَلَى صِحَّةِ أَصْلِهِ وَلَكِنَّهَا لَا تُوجِبُ صِحَّةَ أَصْلِ
آخَرَ حَتَّى تَقَرَّ عَتَّ عَلَيْهِ الْمَسْئَلَةُ الْآخَرَى

An example of the second (that in which the method of disagreement is different) is if we were to say; if vomiting a mouthful breaks Wudhu then an invalid sales transaction will establish ownership or (if one were to say) vomiting a mouthful breaks Wudhu then the punishment of intentional murder is the death penalty, because of 'Adamu Qaa'il bil Fasl' (this will not be a valid Shar'ie proof because even though all the Fuqahaa who say that Wudhu breaks if one vomits a mouthful also say that an invalid sales transaction establishes ownership or that the punishment for intentional murder is the death penalty, because the bases of each of these rulings is different).

Or in a similar manner if one were to say that since vomiting a mouthful does not break Wudhu then touching a woman breaks Wudhu (because of 'Adamu Qaa'il bil Fasl', that all the Fuqahaa who say that vomiting a mouthful does not break Wudhu say that touching a woman breaks Wudhu).

This (second type of 'Adamu Qaa'il bil Fasl') is not a valid Shar'ie proof because even though a ruling being correct will establish that its principle (through which it is derived) is correct, it will not establish the accuracy of another principle such that another ruling can be derived from it.

Duties of the Mujtahid

الْوَاجِبُ عَلَى الْمُجْتَهِدِ طَلَبُ حُكْمِ الْحَادِثَةِ مِنْ كِتَابِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى ثُمَّ مِنْ سُنَّةِ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ ﷺ بِصَرِيحٍ أَوْ دَلَالَةٍ عَلَى مَا مَرَدُّكَرُهُ فَإِنَّهُ لَا سَبِيلَ إِلَى الْعَمَلِ بِالرَّأْيِ مَعَ إِمْكَانِ الْعَمَلِ بِالنَّصِّ وَلِهَذَا إِذَا اشْتَبَهَتْ عَلَيْهِ الْقَبْلَةُ فَأَخْبَرَهُ وَاحِدٌ عَنْهَا لَا يَجُوزُ لَهُ التَّحَرُّيُّ وَلَوْ وَجَدَ مَاءً فَأَخْبَرَهُ ۖ عَدَلَ أَنَّهُ نَجَسٌ لَا يَجُوزُ لَهُ التَّوَضُّعُ بِهِ بَلْ يَتَيَمَّمُ

It is Waajib upon the Mujtahid to search for the relevant ruling (firstly) from the Quraan, then (secondly) from the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, which must be clear or substantiates the ruling, as we have already discussed (in the previous sections of Quraan and Hadeeth). The reason for this (why the ruling must first be sought from the Quraan and Hadeeth) is there is no room for personal opinion when it is possible to act on narration (of either Quraan or Hadeeth). As a result of this (that personal opinion is not permissible when narration is present) if one is in doubt as to the direction of Qiblah and a person informs him of the direction of Qiblah then it is not permissible for him to use his own discretion. (Similarly) If a person finds water and a trustable person informs him that it is impure then it will not be permissible (for him to use his own discretion and) to make Wudhu from it but should perform Tayammum.

Discretion is weaker than narration

وَعَلَىٰ إِعْتِبَارِ أَنَّ الْعَمَلَ بِالرَّأْيِ دُونَ الْعَمَلِ بِالنَّصِّ قُلْنَا إِنَّ الشُّبْهَةَ بِالْمَحَلِّ أَقْوَىٰ مِنَ الشُّبْهَةِ فِي الظَّنِّ حَتَّىٰ سَقَطَ إِعْتِبَارُ ظَنِّ الْعَبْدِ فِي الْفَصْلِ الْأَوَّلِ وَمِثَالُهُ فِيمَا إِذَا وَطِئَ جَارِيَةً ابْنَهُ لَا يُحَدُّ وَإِنْ قَالَ عَلِمْتُ أَنَّهَا حَرَامٌ عَلَىٰ وَ يَنْبُتُ نَسَبُ الْوَلَدِ مِنْهُ لِأَنَّ شُبْهَةَ الْمَلِكِ لَهُ تَنْبُتُ بِالنَّصِّ فِي مَالِ الْإِبْنِ قَالَ عَلَيْهِ الصَّلَاةُ وَالسَّلَامُ ، “ أَنْتَ وَمَالُكَ لِأَبِيكَ ” فَسَقَطَ إِعْتِبَارُ ظَنِّهِ فِي الْحَلِّ وَالْحُرْمَةِ فِي ذَلِكَ وَلَوْ وَطِئَ الْإِبْنُ جَارِيَةً أَبِيهِ يُعْتَبَرُ ظَنُّهُ فِي الْحَلِّ وَالْحُرْمَةِ حَتَّىٰ لَوْ قَالَ ظَنَنْتُ أَنَّهَا عَلَىٰ حَرَامٍ يَجِبُ الْحَدُّ وَلَوْ قَالَ ظَنَنْتُ أَنَّهَا عَلَىٰ حَلَالٍ لَا يَجِبُ الْحَدُّ لِأَنَّ شُبْهَةَ الْمَلِكِ فِي مَالِ الْأَبِ لَمْ يَنْبُتْ لَهُ بِالنَّصِّ فَاعْتَبِرَ رَأْيُهُ وَلَا يَنْبُتُ نَسَبُ الْوَلَدِ وَ إِنْ ادَّعَاهُ

Based upon this that acting on one's own discretion is weaker than narration, we say that a doubt caused by narration ('*Shubhah bil Mahal*') is stronger than a doubt caused by misunderstanding ('*Shubhah fith Than*') such that the discretion of a person will not be considered in the first instance (if there is doubt caused by narration then the doubt will remain despite the discretion of the individual). An example of this is when a person has sexual relations with the female slave of his son, whereby he will not be punished (the punishment of fornication will not be meted out on him), even if he states that he knew that the slave was Haraam upon him, and the lineage of the child born from this union will attributed to him (the father of the owner). The reason for this is that the doubt of him (the father) having ownership is established by narration; Rasulullaah ﷺ said, "You and your wealth belong to your father" thus his discretion of lawfulness and unlawfulness will be not be considered in this (as the doubt caused by narration is greater and will remain despite his discretion).

(However) If the son has sexual relations with the female slave of his father then his discretion of lawfulness and unlawfulness will be considered such that if he says that he thought that she might be Haraam on him (but still proceeded to indulge in sexual relations despite this) then the punishment (for fornication) will be Waajib and if he says that he thought she was lawful for him, then the punishment will not be Waajib. The reason for this is that the doubt of having (a share of) ownership in the wealth of the father is not caused by narration, thus his discretion in the matter will be considered, and the lineage of the child born from this union will not be attributed to him (the son) even if he claims the child (to be his).

When two proofs contradict each other

ثُمَّ إِذَا تَعَارَضَا الدَّلِيلَانِ عِنْدَ الْمُجْتَهِدِ فَإِنْ كَانَ التَّعَارُضُ بَيْنَ الرَّوَايَتَيْنِ
يَمِيلُ إِلَى السُّنَّةِ

Then if two proofs contradict each other according to the Mujtahideen; if the (apparent) contradiction is between two verses then one will resort to Hadeeth (and the verse which is supported by Hadeeth will be taken).

Contradiction of two Ahaadeeth

وَ إِنْ كَانَ بَيْنَ السُّنَنِ يَمِيلُ إِلَى آثَارِ الصَّحَابَةِ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى عَنْهُمْ وَ الْقِيَاسِ الصَّحِيحِ ثُمَّ إِذَا تَعَارَضَ الْقِيَاسَانِ عِنْدَ الْمُجْتَهِدِ يَتَحَرَّى وَيَعْمَلُ بِأَحَدِهِمَا لِأَنَّهُ لَيْسَ دُونَ الْقِيَاسِ دَلِيلٌ شَرْعِيٌّ يُصَارُ إِلَيْهِ

If the contradiction is between two Ahaadeeth (and one cannot be given preference over the other) then the opinions of the Sahabah will be resorted to and thereafter (if still a decision cannot be made) authentic Qiyaas (will be resorted to). Then if two Qiyaas of the Mujtahideen contradict each other one should use his own discretion and practice on one of them (of the two Qiyaas) as there is no other proof after Qiyaas which one can resort to.

Practising one one's discretion

وَعَلَى هَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا كَانَ مَعَ الْمُسَافِرِ إِنَاءَانِ طَاهِرٌ وَنَجَسٌ لَا يَتَحَرَّى بَيْنَهُمَا بَلْ يَتَيَمَّمُ وَلَوْ كَانَ مَعَهُ تَوْبَانِ طَاهِرٌ وَنَجَسٌ يَتَحَرَّى بَيْنَهُمَا لِأَنَّ لِلْمَاءِ بَدَلًا وَهُوَ التُّرَابُ وَ لَيْسَ لِلتُّوبِ بَدَلٌ يُصَارُ إِلَيْهِ فَتَبَّتْ بِهِذَا أَنَّ الْعَمَلَ بِالرَّأْيِ إِنَّمَا يَكُونُ عِنْدَ انْعِدَامِ دَلِيلٍ سِوَاهُ شَرْعًا ثُمَّ إِذَا تَحَرَّى وَتَأَكَّدَ تَحْرِيهِ بِالْعَمَلِ لَا يَنْتَقِضُ ذَلِكَ بِمَجَرَّدِ التَّحَرَّى وَبَيَانِهِ فِيمَا إِذَا تَحَرَّى بَيْنَ التَّوْبَيْنِ وَصَلَّى الظُّهْرَ بِأَحَدِهِمَا ثُمَّ وَقَعَ تَحْرِيهِ عِنْدَ الْعَصْرِ عَلَى التُّوبِ الْآخِرِ لَا يَجُوزُ أَنْ يُصَلَّى الْعَصْرَ بِالْآخِرِ لِأَنَّ الْأَوَّلَ تَأَكَّدَ بِالْعَمَلِ فَلَا يَبْطُلُ بِمَجَرَّدِ التَّحَرَّى وَ هَذَا بِخِلَافِ مَا إِذَا تَحَرَّى فِي الْقِبْلَةِ ثُمَّ تَبَدَّلَ رَأْيُهُ وَوَقَعَ تَحْرِيهِ عَلَى جِهَةٍ أُخْرَى تَوَجَّهَ إِلَيْهِ لِأَنَّ الْقِبْلَةَ مِمَّا يَحْتَمِلُ الْإِنْتِقَالَ فَأَمَّا نَقْلُ الْحُكْمِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ نَسْخِ النَّصِّ وَعَلَى هَذَا مَسَائِلُ جَامِعِ الْكَبِيرِ فِي تَكْبِيرَاتِ الْعِيدَيْنِ وَتَبَدُّلِ رَأْيِ الْعَبْدِ كَمَا عُرِفَ

Based upon this (that one will practice on one's own discretion when and only there is no other proof to resort to) we say that if a traveller has two bottles of water; one containing pure water and one containing impure water, then he will not use his own discretion (and make Wudhu with whichever he thinks is pure) but will make Tayammum.

(However) If a traveller has two sets of clothes; one pure and one impure, then he will use his discretion (to determine which is pure and wear that set when performing Salaah). The reason for this (difference in the ruling of the above two rulings) is that water has a substitute one can resort to, which is Tayammum but there is no substitute for the clothing to which he can resort (thus he will use his own discretion). Thus it is established from this that practising on one's own discretion is only permitted when no other Shar'ie proof is present besides it.

Then once his own discretion is reinforced by action (he practices upon the ruling derived from his discretion) it will not be invalidated by a mere change in discretion thereafter.

An explanation of this is when a person uses his discretion to determine which set of clothing is pure and then performs Zuhr Salaah in it then later at the time of Asr his discretion changes to the other set of clothing (he now feels that the other is pure), it will not be permissible for him to perform Asr Salaah in the other set of clothing. The reason for this is that the (purity of the) first has been reinforced by action (he performed Salaah in it) and will therefore not be invalidated by (a mere change) in discretion.

This (ruling mentioned above) is opposed to when he uses his discretion to ascertain the direction of the Qiblah and his opinion changes to another direction thereafter, whereby he will face towards that (the second) direction. The reason (for this difference in ruling) is that the Qiblah is of those things which can change thus it is possible for its ruling to change as well such as its abrogation by the Quraan.

In the same manner are the laws of the Takbeeraat of Eid, as mentioned in 'Al-Jaami'ul Kabeer', and when the

Section Four

opinion of a person changes, as is commonly known (*if a person begins performing Eid Salaah adhering to the Madhab of Imaam Shaafie, whereby he performs the first Raaqat reciting five additional Takbeer but then his discretion changes in the second Raaqat to the Madhab of Imaam Abu Hanifah such that he will now only recite three additional Takbeer in the second Raaqat*).

الْبَحْثُ الرَّابِعُ فِي الْقِيَاسِ

فصل: الْقِيَاسُ حُجَّةٌ مِنْ حِجَجِ الشَّرْعِ يَجِبُ الْعَمَلُ بِهِ عِنْدَ انْعِدَامِ مَا فَوْقَهُ مِنَ الدَّلِيلِ فِي الْحَادِثَةِ وَقَدْ وَرَدَ فِي ذَلِكَ الْأَخْبَارُ وَالْإِثَارُ قَالَ عَلَيْهِ الصَّلَاةُ وَالسَّلَامُ لِمُعَاذِ بْنِ جَبَلٍ حِينَ بَعَثَهُ إِلَى الْيَمَنِ بِمَ تَقْضِي يَا مُعَاذُ؟ قَالَ بِكِتَابِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى قَالَ فَإِنْ لَمْ تَجِدْ؟ قَالَ بِسُنَّةِ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ ﷺ قَالَ فَإِنْ لَمْ تَجِدْ؟ قَالَ أَجْتَهِدُ بِرَأْيِي فَصَوَّبَهُ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ ﷺ فَقَالَ الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ الَّذِي وَفَّقَ رَسُولَ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ عَلَى مَا يُحِبُّ وَيَرْضَاهُ

Qiyaas is a proof from the proofs of Shari'ah, which is Waajib to practise upon when none of the other proofs mentioned above (*Quraan, Sunnat, Ijmaa*) are present. This (that *Qiyaas* is a valid Shar'ie proof) has been reported in Hadeeth and Aathaar (narrations of the Sahabah). Rasulullaah ﷺ asked Hadhrat Muaadh bin Jabal .. when sending him to Yemen (as governor), "With what will you pass judgement?" Hadhrat Muaadh .. replied, "By the Quraan." Rasulullaah then asked, "And if you do not find it (the answer) in the Quraan?" Hadhrat Muaadh replied, "By the Sunnat of Rasulullaah ﷺ." Rasulullaah ﷺ again asked, "And if you do not find it (the answer) in the Sunnat?" Hadhrat Muaadh .. then replied, "I will then use my discretion." Rasulullaah ﷺ approved of this and said, "All praise belongs to ALLAAH who has inspired the messenger of Rasulullaah ﷺ with that which pleases him and brings him pleasure."

وَرَوَى أَنَّ امْرَأَةً خَنْعَمِيَّةً آتَتْ إِلَى رَسُولِ اللَّهِ ﷺ فَقَالَتْ إِنَّ أَبِي كَانَ شَيْخًا كَبِيرًا أَدْرَكَهُ الْحَجُّ وَلَا يَسْتَمْسِكُ عَلَى الرَّاحِلَةِ فَيُجْزئُنِي أَنْ أُحْجَّ عَنْهُ قَالَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ أَرَأَيْتَ لَوْ كَانَ عَلَى أَبِيكَ دَيْنٌ فَقَضَيْتَهُ أَمَا كَانَ يُجْزئُكَ فَقَالَتْ بَلَى فَقَالَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ فَذَيْنُ اللَّهِ أَحَقُّ وَأَوْلَى الْحَقِّ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ ﷺ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ الْحَجُّ فِي حَقِّ الشَّيْخِ الْفَانِي بِالْحَقُوقِ الْمَالِيَةِ وَأَشَارَ إِلَى عِلَّةٍ مُؤَثَّرَةٍ فِي الْجَوَارِ وَهِيَ الْقَضَاءُ وَهَذَا هُوَ الْقِيَاسُ

It has been reported that a woman from the tribe of Banu Khath'am came to Rasulullaah ﷺ and asked, "My father is an elderly man, upon whom Hajj has become Fardh but he is incapable of riding (he is so aged that he is incapable of even mounting the conveyance), will it suffice for me to perform Hajj on his behalf?" Rasulullaah ﷺ replied, "If your father was in debt and you paid it on his behalf, would this suffice?" when she replied in the affirmative Rasulullaah ﷺ said, "The debt of ALLAAH (i.e. Hajj) is more deserving and better (to be paid)." (In this Hadeeth) Rasulullaah ﷺ associated (compared) Hajj of the incapable to monetary rights (that just as it is permissible for another to fulfil your monetary rights on our behalf so too can another perform Hajj on your behalf) and pointed out the Illat (principle cause) which makes it permissible and that (illat was) Qadhaa (payment or fulfilment). (In essence) This is Qiyaas (to derive a ruling by comparing it to another ruling using a common feature between them).

وَرَوَى ابْنُ الصَّبَّاحِ وَهُوَ مِنْ سَادَاتِ أَصْحَابِ الشَّافِعِيِّ فِي كِتَابِهِ الْمُسَمَّى بِالشَّامِلِ عَنْ قَيْسِ بْنِ طَلْقٍ بْنِ عَلِيٍّ أَنَّهُ قَالَ جَاءَ رَجُلٌ إِلَى رَسُولِ اللَّهِ ﷺ كَأَنَّهُ بَدَوِيٌّ فَقَالَ يَا نَبِيَّ اللَّهِ مَا تَرَى فِي مَسِّ الرَّجُلِ ذَكَرَهُ بَعْدَ مَا تَوَضَّأَ فَقَالَ هَلْ هُوَ إِلَّا بَضْعَةٌ مِنْهُ وَهَذَا هُوَ الْقِيَاسُ وَ سَيَّلَ ابْنُ مَسْعُودٍ عَمَّنْ تَزَوَّجَ امْرَأَةً وَلَمْ يُسَمِّ لَهَا مَهْرًا وَ قَدْ مَاتَ عَنْهَا زَوْجُهَا قَبْلَ الدُّخُولِ فَاسْتَمَهَلَ شَهْرًا ثُمَّ قَالَ أَجْتَهُ فِيهِ بِرَأْيِي فَإِنْ كَانَ صَوَابًا فَمِنْ اللَّهِ وَإِنْ كَانَ خَطَاءً فَمِنْ ابْنِ أُمِّ عَبْدِ فَقَالَ أَرَى لَهَا مَهْرٌ مِثْلَ نِسَائِهَا لَا وَكَسَ فِيهَا وَلَا شَطَطَ

Ibnus Sabbaagh has narrated, who is amongst the esteemed students of Imaam Shaafie رحمه الله , in his book entitled 'Ash-Shaamil' from Qais bin Thalaq bin Ali that a person, who seemed to be a Bedouin, came to Rasulullaah ﷺ and asked, "O Rasulullaah ﷺ! What is the ruling if a person touches his private part after having performed Wudhu?" Rasulullaah ﷺ

□ replied, "Is it not but a limb of the body (*thus Wudhu will not break by touching it just as wudhu does not break by touching other limbs of the body*)."
(In essence) **This is Qiyaas.**

Hadhrat Ibn Mas'ood .. was asked about a man who married a woman but did not stipulate her Mehr and the husband then passed away before the marriage could be consummated, on which Hadhrat Ibn Mas'ood requested some time (*to research the answer*) saying, "I will deliberate over the ruling, if my verdict is correct then it is from ALLAAH and if it is incorrect then it is from myself (*it is due to my own inability*)" **Thereafter** (*after some time had passed*) he replied, "I am of the opinion that she will receive Mehr Mithal of her fellow womenfolk (*the Mehr commonly given to women in that town*), no less and no more."

Conditions for the validity of Qiyaas

فَصْلٌ

شُرُوطُ صِحَّةِ الْقِيَاسِ خَمْسَةٌ أَحَدُهَا أَنْ لَا يَكُونَ فِي مُقَابَلَةِ النَّصِّ وَالْثَانِي أَنْ لَا يَتَضَمَّنَ تَغْيِيرَ حُكْمٍ مِنْ أَحْكَامِ النَّصِّ وَالْثَالِثُ أَنْ لَا يَكُونَ الْمُعَدَّى حُكْمًا لَا يَعْقِلُ مَعْنَاهُ وَالرَّابِعُ أَنْ يَقَعَ التَّغْلِيلُ لِحُكْمٍ شَرْعِيٍّ لَا لِأَمْرِ لُغَوِيٍّ وَالْخَامِسُ أَنْ لَا يَكُونَ الْفَرْعُ مَنْصُوصًا عَلَيْهِ

There are five conditions for the validity of Qiyaas;

- 1) Qiyaas must not contradict Nas** (*the Quraan and Hadeeth*).
- 2) Qiyaas must not alter any ruling already established by Nas.**

3) The Qiyaas must not be based on a ruling contrary to reason (*the ruling which one is using to derive a verdict from must not be contrary to reason, i.e. Khilaaf Qiyaas*).

4) The method in which the Illat (principle cause of the ruling) is identified is in accordance with the principles of Shari'ah and not based upon diction (*the Illat must not be ascertained by analysing the literal meaning of a word*).

5) The Qiyaas must not seek a ruling for that which is mentioned in Nas.

Example of Qiyaas contradicting Nas

وَمَثَلُ الْقِيَاسِ فِي مُقَابَلَةِ النَّصِّ فِيمَا حُكِيَ أَنَّ الْحَسَنَ بْنَ زِيَادٍ سُئِلَ عَنِ الْفَهْقَةِ فِي الصَّلَاةِ فَقَالَ إِنْتَقَضَتْ الطَّهَارَةُ بِهَا قَالَ السَّائِلُ لَوْ قَذَفَ مُحْصَنَةً فِي الصَّلَاةِ لَا يَنْتَقِضُ بِهِ الْوُضُوءُ مَعَ أَنَّ قَذْفَ الْمُحْصِنَةِ أَكْثَرُ جُنَايَةً فَكَيْفَ يَنْتَقِضُ بِالْفَهْقَةِ وَ هِيَ دُونَهُ فَهَذَا قِيَاسٌ فِي مُقَابَلَةِ النَّصِّ وَ هُوَ حَدِيثُ الْإِعْرَابِيِّ الَّذِي فِي عَيْنِهِ سُوءٌ وَكَذَلِكَ إِذَا قُلْنَا جَارَ حَجِّ الْمَرْأَةِ مَعَ الْمَحْرَمِ فَيَجُوزُ مَعَ الْأَمِينَاتِ كَانَ هَذَا قِيَاسًا بِمُقَابَلَةِ النَّصِّ وَ هُوَ قَوْلُهُ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ لَا يَحِلُّ لِمَرْأَةٍ تُؤْمِنُ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ أَنْ تُسَافِرَ فَوْقَ ثَلَاثَةِ أَيَّامٍ وَلِيَالِيهَا إِلَّا وَمَعَهَا أَبُوهَا أَوْ زَوْجُهَا أَوْ ذُو رَحِمٍ مَحْرَمٍ مِنْهَا

An example of the first, that is Qiyaas contradicting Nas (*and will therefore be invalid*), is what has been reported that Hasan bin Ziyaad was asked about laughing (*loud*) in Salaah to which he replied that it breaks Wudhu. The person then asked, "If a person falsely accuses a chaste woman of fornication while in Salaah then his Wudhu will not break even though false accusation is a greater crime

(than laughing aloud in Salaah), so how is it possible that Wudhu breaks by laughing aloud in Salaah when it is lesser." This is an example of Qiyaas contradicting Nas; that is (it contradicts) the Hadeeth of the Bedouin who had an ailment in his eyes (and fell into a hole which he did not see, causing some of the Sahabah to laugh in their Salaah and after which Rasulullaah ﷺ said "Whomsoever amongst you laughed loudly (while in Salaah) should repeat his Wudhu and Salaah as well.")

Similarly (Qiyaas will be invalid) if we were to say that since a woman can perform Hajj when accompanied by her Mahram (blood relative) it is permissible for her to perform Hajj when accompanied by a group of trustable women, it would be Qiyaas in contradiction to Nas; and that is the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, "It is not permissible for a woman to travel (to a distance) further than three days and nights except if accompanied by her father, husband, or Mahram (blood relative)."

Example of Qiyaas altering a ruling established by Nas

وَمِثْلُ الثَّانِي وَهُوَ مَا يَتَضَمَّنُ تَغْيِيرَ حُكْمٍ مِنْ أَحْكَامِ النَّصِّ مَا يُقَالُ
النِّيَّةُ شَرْطٌ فِي الْوُضُوءِ بِالْقِيَاسِ عَلَى التَّيَمُّمِ فَإِنَّ هَذَا يُوجِبُ تَغْيِيرَ آيَةِ
الْوُضُوءِ مِنَ الْإِطْلَاقِ إِلَى التَّقْيِيدِ وَكَذَلِكَ إِذَا قُلْنَا الطَّوَافُ بِالْبَيْتِ صَلَوةٌ
بِالْخَبَرِ فَيَشْتَرِطُ لَهُ الطَّهَّارَةُ وَسَتْرُ الْعَوْرَةِ كَالصَّلَاةِ كَانَ هَذَا قِيَاسًا يُوجِبُ
تَغْيِيرَ نَصِّ الطَّوَافِ مِنَ الْإِطْلَاقِ إِلَى الْقَيْدِ

An example of the second, that is Qiyaas altering the ruling established by Nas (and will therefore be invalid) is what has been said (by Imaam Shaafie) that intention is a condition for (the validity of) Wudhu by making Qiyaas on Tayammum (wherein intention is a condition for its validity)

because this (*qiyaas*) will alter the verse of Wudhu from being **Mutlaq**(*having no restrictive clauses*) to **Muqayyad** (*which is impermissible as has been discussed under the section of Mutlaq in the Quraan*).

Similarly (*Qiyaas will be invalid*) if we were to say that **Tawaaf** of the Ka'abah is **Salaah** because of what has been stated in **Hadeeth** ("*Tawaaf is Salaah except that ALLAAH Ta'ala has made talking permissible in Tawaaf*") and therefore **Tahaarat** (*Wudhu*) and concealing the **Aurah** (*private area which must be concealed*) is compulsory in **Tawaaf**, just as (*it is compulsory*) in **Salaah**, it will result in altering the **Nas** of **Tawaaf** from being **Mutlaq** to **Muqayyad**.

Example of Qiyaas based on a ruling contrary to reason

وَمَثَلُ الثَّالِثِ هُوَ مَا لَا يُعْقَلُ مَعْنَاهُ فِي حَقِّ جَوَازِ التَّوَضُّعِ بِبَيْبِذِ التَّمْرِ فَإِنَّهُ لَوْ قَالَ جَازَ بغيرِهِ مِنَ الْأُنْبِيَةِ بِالْقِيَاسِ عَلَى نَبِيذِ التَّمَرِ أَوْ قَالَ لَوْ شَجَّ فِي صَلَوَتِهِ أَوْ احْتَلَمَ يَبْنِي عَلَى صَلَوَتِهِ بِالْقِيَاسِ عَلَى مَا إِذَا سَبَقَهُ الْخَدَثُ لَا يَصِحُّ لَأَنَّ الْحُكْمَ فِي الْأَصْلِ لَمْ يُعْقَلْ مَعْنَاهُ فَاسْتَحَالَ تَعْدِيتهُ إِلَى الْفَرْعِ وَبِمِثْلِ هَذَا قَالَ أَصْحَابُ الشَّافِعِيِّ قُلْتَانِ نَجَسَتَانِ إِذَا اجْتَمَعَا صَارَتَا طَاهِرَتَيْنِ فَإِذَا افْتَرَقَا بَقِيَّتَا عَلَى الطَّهَارَةِ بِالْقِيَاسِ عَلَى مَا إِذَا وَقَعَتِ النَّجَاسَةُ فِي الْفُلْتَيْنِ لَأَنَّ الْحُكْمَ لَوْ ثَبَّتَ فِي الْأَصْلِ كَانَ غَيْرُ مَعْقُولٍ مَعْنَاهُ

An example of the third, that is Qiyaas based on a ruling contrary to reason (*and will therefore be invalid*) is with regards to the permissibility of performing Wudhu with date juice (*water sweetened by leaving dates to soak in it*) in the sense that if a person were to say that Wudhu is permissible with other juices as well by making **Qiyaas** on date juice (*when permissibility of performing Wudhu with date juice is established contrary to reason*).

Or(*Qiyaas will be invalid*) **if a person were to say that if a person is inflicted with a head injury or has a wet-dream in Salaah then he may continue with his Salaah** (*from the point that his Wudhu broke after attaining purity*) **by making Qiyaas on that person whose Wudhu broke while in Salaah** (*whereby he will perform Wudhu and continue with his Salaah from the point that his Wudhu broke*), **this Qiyaas will be incorrect because the ruling of the original law** (*on which the derived ruling is based*) **is contrary to reason** (*Khilaaf Qiyaas*) **and it is therefore impossible to apply the same ruling** (*of the that which is Khilaaf Qiyaas*)**to that for which a ruling is being sought.**

In a similar manner(*Qiyaas will be invalid*) **the students of Imaam Shaafie** □ **have said if two impure jars of water are collected together** (*in one jar*) **then they become pure and if separated thereafter** (*into two separate jars*) **will still remain pure by making Qiyaas on the Hadeeth of impurity falling into that amount of water which can fill two jars** (*such that it will not become pure*), (*this Qiyaas is incorrect*) **because even if it** (*purity*) **is established in the original** (*from the Hadeeth in that amount of water that fills two jars*) **it is contrary to reason** (*Khilaaf Qiyaas and another ruling cannot be derived from it*).

Example of Qiyaas whereby the Illat was identified by diction

وَمِثَالُ الرَّابِعِ وَهُوَ مَا يَكُونُ التَّغْلِيلُ لِأَمْرٍ شَرْعِيٍّ لَا لِأَمْرٍ لُغَوِيٍّ فِي قَوْلِهِمُ الْمَطْبُوحُ الْمُتَصَفُّ خَمْرٌ لِأَنَّ الْخَمْرَ إِنَّمَا كَانَ خَمْرًا لِأَنَّهُ يُخَامَرُ الْعَقْلُ أَيْضًا فَيَكُونُ خَمْرًا بِالْقِيَاسِ وَالسَّارِقُ إِنَّمَا كَانَ سَارِقًا لِأَنَّهُ أَخَذَ مَالَ الْغَيْرِ بِطَرِيقِ الْخُفْيَةِ وَقَدْ سَارَكَهُ النَّبَاشُ فِي هَذَا الْمَعْنَى فَيَكُونُ سَارِقًا بِالْقِيَاسِ وَهَذَا قِيَاسٌ فِي اللَّغَةِ مَعَ اعْتِرَافِهِ أَنَّ الْإِسْمَ لَمْ يُوضَعْ لَهُ فِي اللَّغَةِ

وَالدَّلِيلُ عَلَى فَسَادِ هَذَا النَّوْعِ مِنَ الْقِيَاسِ أَنَّ الْعَرَبَ يُسَمِّي الْفَرَسَ أَذْهَمَ لِسَوَادِهِ وَكُمَيَّتًا لِحُمْرَتِهِ ثُمَّ لَا يُطْلَقُ هَذَا الْإِسْمُ عَلَى الزَّنَجِيِّ وَالتَّوْبِ الْأَحْمَرِ وَلَوْ جَرَتْ الْمُقَابِسَةُ فِي الْأَسْمَاءِ الْعُتُوبَةِ لَجَازَ ذَلِكَ لَوْجُودِ الْعِلَّةِ وَلِأَنَّ هَذَا يُؤَدِّي إِلَى إِبْطَالِ الْأَسْبَابِ الشَّرْعِيَّةِ وَذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ الشَّرْعَ جَعَلَ السَّرْقَةَ سَبَبًا لِنَوْعٍ مِنَ الْأَحْكَامِ فَإِذَا عَلَقْنَا الْحُكْمَ بِمَا هُوَ أَعْمُ مِنَ السَّرْقَةِ وَهُوَ أَخْذُ مَالِ الْغَيْرِ عَلَى طَرِيقِ الْخُفْيَةِ تَبَيَّنَ أَنَّ السَّبَبَ كَانَ فِي الْأَصْلِ مَعْنَى هُوَ غَيْرُ السَّرْقَةِ وَكَذَلِكَ جَعَلَ شُرْبُ الْخَمْرِ سَبَبًا لِنَوْعٍ مِنَ الْأَحْكَامِ فَإِذَا عَلَقْنَا الْحُكْمَ بِأَمْرٍ أَعْمُ مِنَ الْخَمْرِ تَبَيَّنَ أَنَّ السَّبَبَ كَانَ فِي الْأَصْلِ مَعْنَى هُوَ غَيْرُ السَّرْقَةِ وَكَذَلِكَ جَعَلَ شُرْبُ الْخَمْرِ سَبَبًا لِنَوْعٍ مِنَ الْأَحْكَامِ فَإِذَا عَلَقْنَا الْحُكْمَ بِأَمْرٍ أَعْمُ مِنَ الْخَمْرِ تَبَيَّنَ أَنَّ الْحُكْمَ كَانَ فِي الْأَصْلِ مُتَعَلِّقًا بِغَيْرِ الْخَمْرِ

An example of the fourth, that is Qiyaas wherein the Illat (principle cause of the ruling) was indentified using diction (and will therefore be invalid) is the ruling of Imaam Shaafie □ and his students that grape juice which has been cooked until half has evaporated (thus becoming intoxicating) is Khabar (and the same laws relating to Khamar will apply to other intoxicating substances as well). The reason for this is that Khamar is called Khamar because it intoxicates and other substances intoxicate as well thus they too will be regarded as Khamar (because of them both having the same Illat of being intoxicating, which was derived from the dictionary meaning of Khamar).

(Similarly) A thief (Saariq) is called Saariq because he steals the wealth of others secretly (without being seen) and a grave robber also shares this meaning (he also steals the Shrouds, etc from the deceased secretly without being seen), thus a grave robber will also be regarded as a Saariq by Qiyaas (on the dictionary meaning of Saariq, thus the same laws which apply to a Saariq will apply to a grave robber).

This is making Qiyaas on the dictionary meaning (of words) even though he (Imaam Shaafie) admits that the word was not intended for that meaning (the word Khamar and Saariq was not intended to refer to all intoxicants nor grave robbers).

The proof that this form of Qiyaas is invalid is that the Arabs refer to a horse as "Adham" because of it being black and "Kumayt" because of it being red but these words are not used when referring to a African person or red clothes (despite them having the same Illat). Thus if Qiyaas of dictionary meanings was permitted then it would be permissible (to call an African person "Adham" and red clothes "Kumayt") because of them having the same Illat.

(Another reason why this form of Qiyaas is impermissible is) Because this leads to nullifying the Sabab of Shari'ah (it nullifies the method in which the Shari'ah derives the ruling). This is (it nullifies the Sabab of Shari'ah) because the Shari'ah has made Theft (Saraqah) a Sabab for certain rulings to apply (the hand of the thief to be cut) and if we were to affix the ruling to that which is more broader in meaning than theft (Saraqah), that is stealing the wealth of others secretly, then this will mean that the Sabab for the ruling (that the hand be cut off) in the first instance was something other than theft (Saraqah, which was explicitly mentioned by Shari'ah).

Similarly Shari'ah has made drinking Khamar a Sabab for certain laws to apply (for the perpetrator to be given eighty lashes) and if we were to affix the ruling to that which is broader in meaning than drinking Khamar (that is becoming intoxicated) then it would mean that the Sabab for the ruling in the first instance was something other than Khamar (and in both instances it will result in a person changing the ruling of Shari'ah, which is impermissible).

Example of Qiyaas wherein the ruling is being sought for something mentioned in Nas

وَمِثَالُ الشَّرْطِ الْخَامِسِ وَ هُوَ مَا لَا يَكُونُ الْفَرْغُ مَنْصُوصًا عَلَيْهِ كَمَا يُقَالُ
اعْتَاقُ الرَّقَبَةِ الْكَافِرَةِ فِي كَفَّارَةِ الْيَمِينِ وَالظَّهَارِ وَلَا يَجُوزُ بِالْقِيَاسِ عَلَى
كَفَّارَةِ الْقَتْلِ وَ لَوْ جَامَعَ الْمُظَاهِرُ فِي خِلَالِ الإِطْعَامِ يَسْتَأْنِفُ الإِطْعَامَ
بِالْقِيَاسِ عَلَى الصَّوْمِ

An example of the fifth, that is Qiyaas wherein the ruling is being sought for something mentioned in Nas (and will therefore be invalid) is saying that setting a Kaafir slave free in the Kaffaarah (compensation) of (breaking an) oath and Thihaar (comparing one's wife to a blood relative) is not permissible by making Qiyaas on the compensation for murder (wherein only a Muslim slave can be set free).

(Another example where the Qiyaas will be invalid is) If a person has sexual relations with his Mathaahir (wife whom he compared to a blood relative) while feeding (the sixty poor people as Kaffaarah) then saying he must repeat the feeding by making Qiyaas on fasting (whereby if he has sexual relations with his wife during the period of fasting two months as Kaffaarah then he has to repeat it).

وَيَجُوزُ لِلْمُحْصَرِ أَنْ يَتَحَلَّلَ بِالصَّوْمِ بِالْقِيَاسِ عَلَى الْمُتَمَتِّعِ وَالْمُتَمَتِّعِ إِذَا
لَمْ يَصُمْ فِي أَيَّامِ التَّشْرِيقِ يَصُومُ بَعْدَ هَذَا بِالْقِيَاسِ عَلَى قَضَاءِ رَمَضَانَ

(The third example of Qiyaas wherein the ruling is being sought for something mentioned in Nas is saying that) It is permissible for one prevented from performing Hajj¹(after already donning the Ihraam) to become Halaal (be free from

¹ The ruling stipulated in the Quraan is that if one has been prevented from performing Hajj after already having donned the Ihraam, then he should have a sacrifice carried out on his behalf in the boundaries of the Haram and only thereafter will be free from Ihraam.

Ihraam) by fasting (instead of ordering a sacrifice to be made in the boundaries of the Haram) **by making Qiyaas on one performing Hajj Tamattu** (who can fast three days before Hajj and seven after if he cannot afford the Waajib sacrifice of Hajj Tamattu). (This Qiyaas is invalid as the verse of the Quraan is explicit in stating that the only manner in which one can become free from Ihraam is by having a sacrifice made on his behalf in the boundaries of the Haram and permitting this we will be changing the ruling of the Quraan.)

And (another example of Qiyaas wherein the ruling is being sought for something mentioned in Nas is saying that) **if a person performing Hajj Tamattu** (and could not afford the Waajib sacrifice of Hajj Tamattu, resulting in him having to fast for three days prior to Hajj seven after Hajj) **does not fast** (for three days) **before Hajj then he may fast after Hajj** (keep the three missed fasts in addition to the seven all after Hajj) **by making Qiyaas on the missed fasts of Ramadaan** (that in the same manner as the missed fasts of Ramadaan may be kept at a later date so too can these missed fasts of Hajj be kept later). (This Qiyaas is invalid as the verse of the Quraan is explicit in stating that if one cannot afford the sacrifice then he must fast for three days before Hajj and seven after and in permitting this we will be changing the ruling of the Quraan.)

Definition of Qiyaas

فصل
الْقِيَاسُ الشَّرْعِيُّ هُوَ تَرْتُّبُ الْحُكْمِ فِي غَيْرِ الْمَنْصُوصِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَى مَعْنَى
هُوَ عِلَّةُ لِذَلِكَ الْحُكْمِ فِي الْمَنْصُوصِ عَلَيْهِ

Qiyaas in Shari'ah is to establish the ruling in that not mentioned in Nas(in what has not been defined) **based on a characteristic** (found in it), which is an Illat for the ruling in

that mentioned in Nas(*they both have a common Illat because of which the same ruling can be passed*).

Ascertaining the Illat

ثُمَّ إِنَّمَا يُعْرَفُ كَوْنُ الْمَعْنَى عِلَّةً بِالْكِتَابِ وَ بِالسُّنَّةِ وَ بِالْإِجْمَاعِ وَ بِالْإِجْتِهَادِ وَ الْإِسْتِنْبَاطِ فَمِثَالُ الْعِلَّةِ الْمَعْلُومَةِ بِالْكِتَابِ كَثَرَةُ الطَّوَافِ فَإِنَّهَا جُعِلَتْ عِلَّةً لِسُقُوطِ الْحَرَجِ فِي الْإِسْتِيزَانِ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى {لَيْسَ عَلَيْكُمْ وَلَا عَلَيْهِمْ جُنَاحٌ بَعْدَهُنَّ طَوَافُونَ عَلَيْكُمْ بَعْضُكُمْ عَلَى بَعْضٍ} ثُمَّ أَسْقَطَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ ﷺ حَرَجَ نَجَاسَةِ سُورِ الْهَرَّةِ بِحُكْمِ هَذِهِ الْعِلَّةِ فَقَالَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ الْهَرَّةُ لَيْسَتْ بِنَجَسَةٍ فَإِنَّهَا مِنَ الطَّوَافِينَ عَلَيْكُمْ وَالطَّوَافَاتِ فَقَاسَ أَصْحَابُنَا جَمِيعَ مَا يَسْكُنُ فِي الْبُيُوتِ كَالْفَارَةِ وَالْحَيَّةِ عَلَى الْهَرَّةِ بِعِلَّةِ الطَّوَافِ

The characteristic being the Illat (*principle cause of the ruling*) **is ascertained through the Quraan, Sunnat, Ijmaa, deliberation and derivation.**

An example of an Illat ascertained from the Quraan is constant coming and going (*'Kathratut Tawaaf'*), as Shari'ah has made this an Illat for removing the difficulty of having to repeatedly seek permission to enter, as mentioned in the verse,

"There is no sin on yourselves or on them (*for not asking permission because*) **they often come and go from your presence, one from the other.**" (*Surah Noor: 58*)

And Rasulullaah ﷺ then later removed the difficulty of impurity being caused by the saliva of cats based on this same Illat (*Rasulullaah ﷺ ruled that the saliva of cats is not impure because cats often come and go in the home*) **and said,** "Cats are not impure as they often come and go amongst you (*they often come in and out of the house*)". **Thus our scholars** (*of the Hanafi Madhab*) **made Qiyaas** (*based on this*

Illat) on all those creatures that reside in the home, such as rats and snakes, based on this same Illat (that since they too often go in and out of the house, their saliva is also not impure).

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى { يُرِيدُ اللَّهُ بِكُمُ الْيُسْرَ وَلَا يُرِيدُ بِكُمُ الْعُسْرَ } بَيَّنَّ الشَّرْعُ أَنَّ الْإِفْطَارَ لِلْمَرِيضِ وَالْمُسَافِرِ لِتَيْسِيرِ الْأَمْرِ عَلَيْهِمْ لِيَتِمَّ كُنُوزُ مَنْ تَحَقَّقَتْ مَا يَتَرَجَّحُ فِي نَظَرِهِمْ مِنَ الْإِثْنَانِ بِوُضُوفَةِ الْوَقْتِ أَوْ تَأْخِيرِهِ إِلَى أَيَّامٍ أُخَرَ وَبِإِعْتِبَارِ هَذَا الْمَعْنَى قَالَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ الْمُسَافِرُ إِذَا نَوَى فِي أَيَّامِ رَمَضَانَ وَاجِبًا أُخَرَ يَقَعُ عَنْ وَاجِبٍ أُخَرَ لِأَنَّهُ لَمَّا ثَبَتَ لَهُ التَّرَخُّصُ بِمَا يَرْجِعُ إِلَى مَصَالِحِ بَدَنِهِ وَهُوَ الْإِفْطَارُ فَلَا يَنْبَغُ لَهُ ذَلِكَ بِمَا يَرْجِعُ إِلَى مَصَالِحِ بَدَنِهِ وَهُوَ الْإِفْطَارُ فَلَا يَنْبَغُ لَهُ ذَلِكَ بِمَا يَرْجِعُ إِلَى مَصَالِحِ بَدَنِهِ وَهُوَ إِخْرَاجُ النَّفْسِ عَنْ عَهْدَةِ الْوَاجِبِ أَوَّلَى

Similarly in the verse,

"**ALLAAH** desires ease for you (by allowing travellers and the ill to fast at a later time) and does not desire hardship for you". (Surah Baqarah: 185)

The Shari'ah explains that granting permission to the ill and the travellers to fast at a later time is to make ease for them by allowing them to adopt that which is easier for them to carry out, by either fasting in that time or delaying the fast to a later time(when it is easier for them to fast).

Considering this meaning (that fasting is not incumbent on the Musaafir and the ill in order to make ease for them) **Imaam Abu Hanifah** ﷺ says that if a Musaafir makes the intention for another Waajib fast (such as Qadhaa fast, or for a vow) in the month of Ramadaan then the fast will be for that other Waajib fast (and not the fast of Ramadaan). The reason for this is that when permission to adopt that which is beneficial for his body has been established (that is not to fast) then it would most certainly establish permission to

adopt that which is beneficial for his Deen, and that is clearing that which is Waajib upon him from his obligation.

Illat ascertained from the Sunnat

وَمِثْلُهُ الْعِلَّةُ الْمَعْلُومَةُ بِالسُّنَّةِ فِي قَوْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ الصَّلَاةُ وَالسَّلَامُ لَيْسَ الْوُضُوءُ عَلَى مَنْ نَامَ قَائِمًا أَوْ قَاعِدًا أَوْ رَاكِعًا أَوْ سَاجِدًا إِنَّمَا الْوُضُوءُ عَلَى مَنْ نَامَ مُضْطَجِعًا فَإِنَّهُ إِذَا نَامَ مُضْطَجِعًا اسْتَرْخَتْ مَفَاصِلُهُ جُعِلَ اسْتِرْخَاءُ الْمَفَاصِلِ عَلَيْهِ فَيَتَعَدَّى الْحُكْمُ بِهَذِهِ الْعِلَّةِ إِلَى النَّوْمِ مُسْتَنِدًّا أَوْ مُتَّكِنًا إِلَى شَيْءٍ لَوْ أُزِيلَ عَنْهُ لَسَقَطَ وَكَذَلِكَ يَتَعَدَّى الْحُكْمُ بِهَذِهِ الْعِلَّةِ إِلَى الْأَغْمَاءِ وَالسُّكْرِ

An example of an Illat ascertained from Sunnat is in the Hadeeth of Rasulullaah ﷺ, "Wudhu is not incumbent upon one who sleeps standing, sitting, in Ruku or in Sajdah (*wudhu will not break in these instances*). (However) Wudhu is incumbent upon one who sleeps lying down because when he sleeps lying down his limbs slack (*he does not have control of his limbs and is most likely to pass wind without realising*)" In this Hadeeth the limbs slacking was made Illat (for Wudhu breaking), thus the same ruling (of Wudhu breaking) will apply when this Illat is found while sleeping leaning against something, such that if the item (*on which he is leaning*) is removed he will fall. Similarly, the same ruling (of Wudhu breaking) will apply when this Illat is found when a person falls unconscious or is drunk.

وَكَذَلِكَ قَوْلُهُ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ تَوَضَّئْ وَصَلِّ وَ إِنْ قَطَرَ الدَّمُ عَلَى الْحَصِيرِ قَطْرًا فَإِنَّهُ دَمٌ عَرِزٌ الْفَجَرُ جَعَلَ انْفِجَارُ الدَّمِ عَلَيْهِ فَيَتَعَدَّى الْحُكْمُ بِهَذِهِ الْعِلَّةِ إِلَى الْفُسْدِ وَالْحَجَامَةِ

In a similar manner (*the illat has been ascertained from Sunnat*) in the Hadeeth, "Make Wudhu and perform Salaah, even if the blood continues to drip onto the mat,

because this is blood flowing from the veins (and is not Haidh but Istihaadhah)." The Illat (for Wudhu breaking) was flowing blood, thus the same ruling (of Wudhu breaking) will apply to one who bleeds or has cupping done on him.

Illat ascertained by Ijmaa

وَمِثَالُ الْعِلَّةِ الْمَعْلُومَةِ بِالْإِجْمَاعِ فِيمَا قُلْنَا الصَّغُرُ عِلَّةٌ لَوْلَايَةِ الْأَبِ فِي حَقِّ الصَّغِيرِ فَيَنْبُتُ الْحُكْمُ فِي حَقِّ الصَّغِيرَةِ لَوْجُودِ الْعِلَّةِ وَالْبُلُوغُ عَنْ عَقْلِ عِلَّةٌ لِرِوَالِ وَلَايَةِ الْأَبِ فِي حَقِّ الْغُلَامِ فَيَتَعَدَّى الْحُكْمُ إِلَى الْجَارِيَةِ بِهَذِهِ الْعِلَّةِ وَانْفِجَارُ الدَّمِ عِلَّةٌ لَانْتِقَاضِ الطَّهَارَةِ فِي حَقِّ الْمُسْتَحَاضَةِ فَيَتَعَدَّى الْحُكْمُ إِلَى غَيْرِهَا لَوْجُودِ الْعِلَّةِ

An example of Illat ascertained from Ijmaa is what we have said that not attaining puberty is an Illat for the father having the right of decision over his immature son, thus the same ruling (which is established for the immature son) will apply to the immature daughter as well because of the same Illat being found. (Thereafter) Attaining puberty, with sanity is Illat for the relinquishment of the right of decision for the father in favour of his immature son thus the same ruling will apply to his immature daughter as well (that when she attains puberty and is sane, the father will no longer have the right of decision over her).

(Similarly) The flowing of blood is the Illat for Wudhu breaking with regards to a Mustahaadhah (a woman who bleeds more than the maximum number of days of Haidh), thus the same ruling will apply to others besides her when the same Illat is found.

Two types of Qiyaas

ثُمَّ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ نَقُولُ الْقِيَاسُ عَلَى نَوْعَيْنِ أَحَدُهُمَا أَنْ يَكُونَ الْحُكْمُ الْمُعْدَى مِنْ نَوْعِ الْحُكْمِ الثَّابِتِ فِي الْأَصْلِ وَالثَّانِي أَنْ يَكُونَ مِنْ جَنْسِهِ مِثَالُ الْإِتِّحَادِ فِي النَّوَءِ مَا قُلْنَا إِنَّ الصَّغَرَ عَلَيْهِ لَوْلَايَةُ النِّكَاحِ فِي حَقِّ الْغُلَامِ فَيَنْبُتُ وَلَايَةُ الْإِنِّكَاحِ فِي حَقِّ الْجَارِيَةِ لَوْجُودِ الْعِلَّةِ فِيهَا وَبِهِ يَنْبُتُ الْحُكْمُ فِي النَّيِّبِ الصَّغِيرَةِ وَكَذَلِكَ قُلْنَا الطَّوْفُ عَلَيْهِ سَفُوطُ نَجَاسَةِ السُّورِ فِي سُّورِ الْهَرَّةِ فَيَتَعَدَّى الْحُكْمُ إِلَى سُّورِ سَوَاكِينِ النَّبُوتِ لَوْجُودِ الْعِلَّةِ وَبُلُوغِ الْغُلَامِ عَنْ عَقْلِ عَلَيْهِ زَوَالِ وَلَايَةِ الْإِنِّكَاحِ فَيَزُولُ الْوَلَايَةُ عَنِ الْجَارِيَةِ بِحُكْمِ هَذِهِ الْعِلَّةِ

Thereafter (after discussing the manners in which the Illat is ascertained) we say that Qiyaas is of two types. One type is where the ruling which is being applied is the same as the ruling in the original (known as 'Itiehaadun Noa') and the second (type of Qiyaas) is where the ruling which is being applied is (is not the exact same but) similar to the ruling applied in the original (known as 'Itiehaadul Jins').

An example of 'Itiehaadun No'a' (where the ruling which is being applied is the same as the ruling in the original) is what we have said that not reaching puberty is the Illat for granting (the father) the right to perform the Nikaah of his immature son as well as for his immature daughter because of the Illat being the same in both (the very same ruling applies to the immature daughter in the same manner that it applies to the immature son) and the same ruling will apply to the immature girl who was previously married as well (the father will have the right to perform her Nikaah as well in the same manner as stated above).

Similarly we say that constantly coming and going is the Illat for removing the ruling of impurity for the saliva of a cat, thus the very same ruling applies to the saliva of other animals that reside in the home because of the same Illat

being present (in both cats and other animals that reside in the home).

(Similarly, just as) **Attaining puberty with sanity is the Illat for the relinquishment of the right of decision from the father in the case of the son, so too will the right of decision be relinquished from the father because of the same Illat (when the daughter reaches puberty and is sane then in a similar manner the right will be relinquished from the father).**

Example of ‘Itiehaadul Jins’

وَمِثَالُ الْإِتِّحَادِ فِي الْجِنْسِ مَا يُقَالُ كَثَرَةُ الطَّوَافِ عَلَيْهِ سَفُوطِ حَرَجِ الْإِسْتِيْدَانِ فِي حَقِّ مَا مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُنَا فَيَسْفُطُ حَرَجُ نَجَاسَةِ السُّورِ بِهَذِهِ الْعِلَّةِ فَإِنَّ هَذَا الْحَرَجَ مِنْ جِنْسِ ذَلِكَ الْحَرَجِ لِأَمِنْ نَوْعِهِ وَكَذَلِكَ الصَّغَرُ عَلَيْهِ وَلَايَةُ التَّصَرُّفِ لِلْأَبِ فِي الْمَالِ فَيَنْبُتُ وَلَايَةُ التَّصَرُّفِ فِي النَّفْسِ بِحُكْمِ هَذِهِ الْعِلَّةِ وَإِنْ بُلُوغُ الْجَارِيَةِ عَنْ عَقْلِ عَلَيْهِ زَوَالِ وَلَايَةِ الْأَبِ فِي الْمَالِ فَيَزُولُ فِي حَقِّ النَّفْسِ بِهَذِهِ الْعِلَّةِ

An example of ‘Itiehaadul Jins’ is what has been said that constantly coming and going is the Illat for removing the difficulty of seeking permission for those slaves that we own (each time they enter) and (in a similar manner) removes the ruling of impurity from the saliva of a cat, because of it having the same Illat (of constantly coming and going). This difficulty (caused by the cat’s saliva being impure) is similar to that difficulty (caused by one’s slaves having to seek permission every time they enter) but not exactly the same.

Similarly not reaching puberty is the Illat for granting the father the right to make decision in the wealth of his immature child and in a similar manner, because of the same Illat, grants him the right to make decisions concerning her person as well (such as to perform her Nikaah) and just as the girl reaching puberty, when she is

sane, is the Illat for relinquishing the fathers right of decision in her wealth so too does this same Illat relinquish his right to make decision regarding her person.

The Illat must be wide-ranging

ثُمَّ لَا بُدَّ فِي هَذَا النَّوعِ مِنَ الْقِيَاسِ مِنْ تَجْنِيسِ الْعِلَّةِ بِأَنْ نَقُولَ إِنَّمَا يَنْبُتُ
وَلَايَةُ الْأَبِ فِي مَالِ الصَّغِيرَةِ لِأَنَّهَا عَاجِزَةٌ عَنِ التَّصَرُّفِ بِنَفْسِهَا فَانْتَبَتْ
الْشَّرْعُ وَلَايَةَ الْأَبِ كَيْ لَا يَتَعَطَّلَ مَصَالِحُهَا الْمُتَعَلِّقَةُ بِذَلِكَ وَقَدْ عَجَزَتْ
عَنِ التَّصَرُّفِ فِي نَفْسِهَا فَوَجِبَ الْقَوْلُ بِوَلَايَةِ الْأَبِ عَلَيْهَا وَعَلَى هَذَا
نُظَائِرُهُ

Then it is necessary in this type of Qiyaas (*Qiyaas in 'Itiehaadul Jins'*) for the Illat to wide-ranging (comprehensive and inclusive such that it can be applied in both the original and derived rulings) that we say that the right to make decision in the wealth of the immature girl is established for the father because she is incapable of administrating it on her own, which is why the Shari'ah has established the right of decision for the father so that she may not be deprived of the capabilities required to administer her wealth. (In a similar manner) She is most definitely incapable of making decision regarding her own person (due to her immaturity), thus it became necessary to establish the right of decision for her father over her (so that she will not be deprived of the capabilities needed to decide on that which will benefit her). Other similar rulings are dealt with in the same manner.

The ruling of 'Itiehaadun No'a'

وَحُكْمُ الْقِيَاسِ الْأَوَّلِ أَنْ لَا يَنْبُطِلَ بِالْفَرْقِ لِأَنَّ الْأَصْلَ مَعَ الْفَرْعِ لَمَّا اتَّحَدَ
فِي الْعِلَّةِ وَجَبَ اتِّحَادُهُمَا فِي الْحُكْمِ وَإِنْ افْتَرَقَا فِي غَيْرِ هَذِهِ الْعِلَّةِ وَحُكْمُ
الْقِيَاسِ الثَّانِي فَسَادُهُ بِمُمَانَعَةِ التَّجْنِيسِ وَالْفَرْقِ الْخَاصِ هُوَ بَيَانٌ أَنَّ تَأْثِيرَ

الصَّغَرِ فِي وِلَايَةِ التَّصَرُّفِ فِي الْمَالِ فَوْقَ تَأْثِيرِهِ فِي وِلَايَةِ التَّصَرُّفِ فِي النَّفْسِ

The ruling of the first type of Qiyaas ('Itiehaadun No'a', where the ruling which is being applied is the same as the ruling in the original) is that the Qiyaas will not be invalid because of the difference (between the original and that for which the ruling was derived) because once the Illat is the same in both then it is necessary for the ruling to be the same as well, even if there characteristics may be different in everything else besides this Illat.

The ruling for 'Itiehaadul Jins'

The ruling of the second type of Qiyaas ('Itiehaadul Jins', where the ruling which is being applied is not the exact same but similar to the ruling applied in the original) is that the Qiyaas will be invalid if the Illat is not wide-ranging (comprehensive and inclusive) or a vast difference (between the original and that for which the ruling is being derived) is pointed out, (for example if one were) to point out that having the right of decision in the wealth (of an immature child) is required more frequently than having the right of decision over her person (thus the necessity required in both is vastly different and the ruling can therefore not be the same).

The third type of Qiyaas

وَبَيَانُ الْقِسْمِ الثَّالِثِ وَهُوَ الْقِيَاسُ بِعِلَّةٍ مُسْتَنْبَطَةٍ بِالرَّأْيِ وَالْإِجْتِهَادِ ظَاهِرٌ وَتَحْقِيقُ ذَلِكَ إِذَا وَجَدْنَا وَصْفًا مُنَاسِبًا لِلْحُكْمِ وَهُوَ بِحَالٍ يُوجِبُ ثُبُوتَ الْحُكْمِ وَبِتَقَاضَاهُ بِالنَّظَرِ إِلَيْهِ وَقَدْ اقْتَرَنَ بِهِ الْحُكْمُ فِي مَوْضِعِ الْإِجْمَاعِ يُضَافُ الْحُكْمُ إِلَيْهِ لِلْمُنَاسَبَةِ لِالشَّهَادَةِ الشَّرْعِ بِكَوْنِهِ عِلَّةً وَنُظِيرُهُ إِذَا رَأَيْنَا شَخْصًا أَعْطِيَ فَقِيرًا دِرْهَمًا غَلَبَ عَلَى الظَّنِّ أَنَّ الْأَعْطَاءَ لِدَفْعِ

حَاجَةُ الْفَقِيرِ وَتَحْصِيلُ مَصَالِحِ الثَّوَابِ إِذَا عُرِفَ هَذَا فَتَقُولُ إِذَا رَأَيْنَا وَصْفًا مُنَاسِبًا لِلْحُكْمِ وَقَدْ افْتَرَرَ بِهِ الْحُكْمُ فِي مَوْضِعِ الْإِجْمَاعِ يَغْلِبُ الظَّنُّ بِإِضَافَةِ الْحُكْمِ إِلَى ذَلِكَ الْوَصْفِ وَغَلَبَةُ الظَّنِّ فِي الشَّرْعِ تُوجِبُ الْعَمَلَ عِنْدَ انْعِدَامِ مَا فَوْقَهَا مِنَ الدَّلِيلِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْمُسَافِرِ إِذَا غَلَبَ عَلَى ظَنِّهِ أَنَّ بَقَرِيَّةً مَاءً لَمْ يَجْزْ لَهُ النَّيْمُ وَعَلَى هَذَا مَسَائِلُ التَّحَرُّيِّ

The third type of Qiyaas, which is that Qiyaas wherein the Illat was ascertained through deliberation and reflection, is clear (obvious). The details of this (form of Qiyaas) is that when we find a characteristic suitable for the ruling and that characteristic is such that it necessitates the application of a ruling and apparently requires it when examined, and a ruling has already been affixed to it (in a previous ruling) through Ijmaa, then the ruling will attributed to that characteristic (it will be considered to be the Illat) because of it being suitable (to serve as the Illat) and not because it has been affirmed by Shari'ah to be the Illat.

An example of this is if we see a person giving the poor a dirham. The obvious reason for this (the reason for giving the poor a dirham) that comes to mind is that he gave it so that the needs of the poor can be fulfilled and he may receive reward (and we will say the Illat here is the neediness of the poor, even though it has not been clearly stated).

Once this (example above) is understood then we will (again) say that when we see a characteristic that is suitable for the ruling to be applied and a ruling has already been applied (previously) to that characteristic through Ijmaa, discretion dictates that the ruling be affixed to that characteristic (that it should be considered the Illat for that ruling). The Shari'ah has made acting on one's discretion Waajib when none of the other above mentioned proofs (Quraan, Sunnat, Ijmaa) are present, such as when according to the discretion of a

traveller he believes that there is water close by, it will not be permissible for him to perform Tayammum (*it is Waajib upon him to act upon his discretion*). In a similar manner is (*it is Waajib to act upon one's discretion in*) ascertaining the direction of Qiblah.

The ruling of this type of Qiyaas

وَحُكْمُ هَذَا الْقِيَاسِ أَنْ يَبْطُلَ بِالْفَرْقِ الْمُنَاسِبِ لِأَنَّ عِنْدَهُ يُوجَدُ مُنَاسِبٌ سِوَاهُ فِي صُورَةِ الْحُكْمِ فَلَا يَبْقَى الظَّنُّ بِإِصَافَةِ الْحُكْمِ إِلَيْهِ فَلَا يَنْبُتُ الْحُكْمُ بِهِ لِأَنَّهُ كَانَ بِنَاءً عَلَى غَلَبَةِ الظَّنِّ وَقَدْ بَطَلَ ذَلِكَ بِالْفَرْقِ وَعَلَى هَذَا كَانَ الْعَمَلُ بِالنَّوْعِ الْأَوَّلِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْحُكْمِ بِالشَّهَادَةِ بَعْدَ تَرْكِيبَةِ الشَّاهِدِ وَتَعْدِيلِهِ وَالنَّوْعِ الثَّانِي بِمَنْزِلَةِ الشَّهَادَةِ عِنْدَ ظُهُورِ الْعَدَالَةِ قَبْلَ التَّرْكِيَةِ وَالنَّوْعِ الثَّلَاثِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ شَهَادَةِ الْمُسْتَوْرِ

The ruling of this type of Qiyaas (*wherein the illat was ascertained through deliberation*) **is that it will be invalid if a difference is established** (*between the ruling one is making Qiyaas upon and that for which it is being sought*). **The reason for this** (*why it will be invalid*) **is that once a difference is established another characteristic for the ruling is found, besides that which was initially considered** (*to be the Illat*), **thus discretion will no longer dictate that the ruling should be affixed to it and the ruling will not be established by it** (*the first characteristic cannot be the Illat*). **The reason for this is that** (*it was first considered to be the illat*) **by strong discretion, which no longer remains due to the difference which has been established.**

Based upon this (*the three types of Qiyaas and the difference between them*), **the first type of Qiyaas** (*where the Illat was ascertained by the Quraan or Sunnat*) **is similar to passing judgement on testimony after the integrity and reliability of the witnesses have been established** (*and there will be no*

doubt to its validity and authenticity), the second type of Qiyaas (where the illat was ascertained through Ijmaa) is similar to passing judgement on testimony when the witnesses appear to be reliable before their credibility has been established (and it will be Waajib to act upon) and the third type of Qiyaas (where the illat was ascertained by discretion) is similar to passing judgement on the testimony of witnesses whose condition is unknown (and it will be Waajib to act upon until proven to be false).

Objecting to Qiyaas

فصل
الاسْوَلَةُ الْمُتَوَجَّهَةُ عَلَى الْقِيَاسِ ثَمَانِيَّةٌ الْمُمَانَعَةُ وَالْقَوْلُ بِمُوجِبِ الْعِلَّةِ
وَالْقَلْبُ وَالْعَكْسُ وَفَسَادُ الْوَضْعِ وَالْفَرْقُ وَالتَّقْضُ وَالْمُعَارَضَةُ

Objections to Qiyaas can occur in eight ways; refutation, what the Illat infers to, by reversal, 'Aks', by the Illat being inappropriate for the ruling, differentiation, disproof, Mua'aaridhah.

Objection through refutation

أَمَّا الْمُمَانَعَةُ فَتَوَعَّانِ أَحَدُهُمَا مَنَعَ الْوَصْفِ وَالْثَّانِي مَنَعَ الْحُكْمِ وَمِثَالُهُ فِي قَوْلِهِمْ صَدَقَهُ الْفِطْرُ وَجَبَتْ بِالْفِطْرِ فَلَا تَسْقُطُ بِمَوْتِهِ لَيْلَةَ الْفِطْرِ قُلْنَا لَا نَسْلَمُ وَجُوبَهَا بِالْفِطْرِ بَلْ عِنْدَنَا تَحِبُّ بِرَأْسِ يَمُونَهُ وَيَلِي عَلَيْهِ

Refutation (in Qiyaas) is of two types; refutation of the Illat and refutation of the ruling. An example of this (i.e. refutation of the Illat) is there (Imaam Shaafie and his students) saying that Sadaqaatul Fitr becomes Waajib because of the period of fasting coming to end, thus he will not be absolved from it if he passes away on the eve of Eid (according to Imaam Shaafie). We (the Hanafi scholars) say

that we do not accept that it is Waajib because of the period of fasting coming to an end (*that is we refute the Illat*) but according to us it is Waajib because (*the illat is*) the presence of that person (*at the time when the period of fasting ends*) and those for whom he is responsible (*those under his care such as his children, etc*).

وَكَذَلِكَ إِذَا قِيلَ قَدَرُ الزَّكَاةِ وَاجِبٌ فِي الدِّمَةِ فَلَا يَسْقُطُ بِهِلَاكِ النَّصَابِ كَالَّذِينَ قُلْنَا لَا نُسَلِّمُ أَنَّ قَدَرَ الزَّكَاةِ وَاجِبٌ فِي الدِّمَةِ بَلْ أَدَانُهُ وَاجِبٌ وَلِئِنْ قَالَ الْوَاجِبُ أَدَانُهُ فَلَا يَسْقُطُ بِالْهَلَاكِ كَالَّذِينَ بَعْدَ الْمُطَالَبَةِ قُلْنَا لَا نُسَلِّمُ أَنَّ الْأَدَاءَ وَاجِبٌ فِي صُورَةِ الدَّيْنِ بَلْ حَرَمَ الْمَنْعُ حَتَّى يَخْرُجَ عَنِ الْعَهْدَةِ بِالتَّخْلِيَةِ وَهَذَا مِنْ قَبِيلِ مَنْعِ الْحُكْمِ

Similarly if it is said that the amount of Zakaat is Waajib on a person and will therefore not fall away by the loss of that amount (*the Zakaat will still need to be paid even if his wealth is lost after it became Waajib upon him, according to Imaam Shaafie*) such as in the case of debt (*if one person owes another money as debt it will not fall away if his wealth is lost*), we say (*the Hanafi scholars*) that we do not accept that Zakaat is Waajib on a person but rather to pay it is Waajib.

If you were to (*object and*) say that even if only paying it is Waajib, it will still not fall away if his wealth is destroyed (*but will still remain Waajib for him to pay*) just as when payment for a debt is sought (*it still remains Waajib to pay even if all his wealth is destroyed*) then we will reply that we do not accept that payment is Waajib in the case when payment of the debt is sought but rather we say that refusal (*to pay the debt*) is Haraam such that he may be freed from this obligation through 'Takhleeyah' (*the creditor can take possession of his property to the value of the debt that he is owed*). This is an example of refutation of the ruling.

وَكَذَلِكَ إِذَا قَالَ الْمَسْحُ رُكْنٌ فِي بَابِ الْوُضُوءِ فَلَيْسَ تَثْلِيثُهُ كَالْغَسْلِ قُلْنَا لَا نُسَلِّمُ أَنَّ التَّثْلِيثَ مَسْنُونٌ فِي الْغَسْلِ بَلْ اطَّالَهُ الْفِعْلُ فِي مَحَلِّ الْفَرْضِ زِيَادَةً عَلَى الْمَفْرُوضِ كِاطَالَةِ الْقِيَامِ وَالْقِرَاءَةِ فِي بَابِ الصَّلَاةِ غَيْرَ أَنَّ الْإِطَالََةَ فِي بَابِ الْغَسْلِ لَا يُتَصَوَّرُ إِلَّا بِالتَّكَرَّرِ لِاسْتِيعَابِ الْفِعْلِ كُلِّ الْمَحَلِّ وَبِمِثْلِهِ نَقُولُ فِي بَابِ الْمَسْحِ بَانَ الْإِطَالََةُ مَسْنُونٌ بِطَرِيقِ الْإِسْتِيعَابِ

Similarly (another example of refutation of the ruling is) **when it is said** (by the Shaafie scholars) **that Masah is a fundamental act in Wudhu** (Fardh just as washing the face, hands, and feet), **then to make Masah three times will be Sunnat just as washing** (the face, hands and feet is Sunnat to wash three times), **we say that we do not accept that washing each limb three times is Sunnat but rather prolonging the act to more than what has been made Fardh** (is what is actually Sunnat) **such as lengthening Qiyaam and Qiraat in Salaah** (to more than what is Fardh is Sunnat) **except that lengthening the act** (of washing) **in Wudhu is not possible except by repetition** (i.e. washing three times) **as the act already extends to the entire portion** (since the act cannot be lengthened by increasing the area to washed because the entire area is already washed as part of the Fardh, we cannot only lengthen it by washing it three times instead of three) **and we say the same for Masah** (that it is Sunnat to lengthen the act of washing by increasing the area to be washed) **whereby lengthening the act is possible by making Masah of the entire head** (thus there is no need for repetition as the exact requirement of Sunnat is fulfilled here, and that is prolonging the Fardh act to more than what has been made Fardh).

وَكَذَلِكَ يُقَالُ التَّقَابُلُ فِي بَيْعِ الطَّعَامِ بِالطَّعَامِ شَرْطٌ كَالنَّقُودِ قُلْنَا لَا نُسَلِّمُ أَنَّ التَّقَابُضَ شَرْطٌ فِي بَابِ النَّقُودِ بَلِ الشَّرْطُ تَعْيِينُهَا كَيْ لَا يَكُونَ بَيْعُ النَّسْتَةِ بِالنَّسِيئَةِ غَيْرَ أَنَّ النَّقُودَ لَا تَتَعَيَّنُ إِلَّا بِالْقَبْضِ عِنْدَنَا

Similarly (the third example of refutation of the ruling) it has been said that taking possession at the same time is a condition (for the validity of the transaction) in sale of food for food just as (it is a condition) in the sale of gold (for gold) and silver (for silver). We say we do not accept that taking possession at the same time is a condition for the validity in the sale of gold (for gold) and silver (for silver) but rather the condition is specification (of the gold or silver) so that it will not lead to sale of credit for credit (whereby the price and goods will both be handed over at a later date) except that according to us (Hanafi scholars) specification is only possible in the case of gold and silver by taking possession.

Objection to the inference of the Illat

وَأَمَّا الْقَوْلُ بِمُوجِبِ الْعِلَّةِ فَهُوَ تَسْلِيمٌ كَوْنِ الْوَصْفِ عِلَّةً وَ بَيَانُ أَنَّ مَعْلُولَهَا غَيْرُ مَا ادَّعَاهُ الْمَعْلَلُ وَمِثَالُهُ الْمِرْفَقُ حَدٌّ فِي بَابِ الْوُضُوِّ فَلَا يَدْخُلُ تَحْتَ الْغُسْلِ لِأَنَّ الْحَدَّ لَا يَدْخُلُ تَحْتَ الْمَحْدُودِ فَلُنَّا الْمِرْفَقُ حَدُّ السَّاقِطِ فَلَا يَدْخُلُ تَحْتَ حُكْمِ السَّاقِطِ لِأَنَّ الْحَدَّ لَا يَدْخُلُ فِي الْمَحْدُودِ

As far as the objection to the inference of the Illat is concerned; it is where you accept the Illat but explain that it infers to other than what the Mu'alil (one who derived the Illat) claims it infers to. An example of this is (what Imaam Zufar says that) the elbow is the limit (for washing) in Wudhu and will therefore not be compulsory to wash because the limit is not included in the action. We (the scholars of the Hanafi Madhab) say that the elbow is limit of termination (that is it indicates where the action terminates) and will therefore not be included in the ruling of termination because the limit is not included in the action.

وَكَذَلِكَ يُقَالُ صَوْمٌ رَمَضَانَ صَوْمٌ فَرَضٌ فَلَا يَجُوزُ بِدُونِ التَّعْيِينِ كَالْقَضَاءِ فَلُنَّا صَوْمُ الْفَرَضِ لَا يَجُوزُ بِدُونِ التَّعْيِينِ إِلَّا أَنَّهُ وَجَدَ التَّعْيِينَ

هَهُنَا مِنْ جِهَةِ الشَّرْعِ وَ لِيْنِ قَالَ صَوْمَ رَمَضَانَ لَا يَجُوزُ بِدُونِ التَّعْيِينِ
مِنَ الْعَبْدِ كَالْقَضَاءِ فَلَنَا لَا يَجُوزُ الْقَضَاءُ بِدُونِ التَّعْيِينِ إِلَّا أَنَّ التَّعْيِينَ لَمْ
يَتَّبَتْ مِنْ جِهَةِ الشَّرْعِ فِي الْقَضَاءِ فَلِذَلِكَ يَشْتَرِطُ تَعْيِينَ الْعَبْدِ وَ هُنَا وَجَدَ
التَّعْيِينَ مِنْ جِهَةِ الشَّرْعِ فَلَا يَشْتَرِطُ تَعْيِينَ الْعَبْدِ

Similarly (another example of objection to the inference of the Illat) is what has been said (Imaam Shaafie) that the fast of Ramadaan is a Fardh fast and will therefore not be permissible except with specification (that it is a fast of Ramadaan) such as in the case of Qadhaa fasts (where by it is only permissible if specified to be a Qadhaa fast). We say that Fardh fast is only permissible with specification (just as Imaam Shaafie says) except that in this case (of the fasts of Ramadaan) the Shari'ah has already specified it (to be only for the fast of Ramadaan, thus there is no need for specification and mere intention to fast will suffice).

If Imaam Shaafie □ were to say that it is only permissible with specification from a person just as Qadhaa fasts (need to be specified by a person) then we would say that most definitely Qadhaa fasts are only permissible with specification, and since the Shari'ah has not specified it, it become necessary for a person to specify it himself. Whereas in the case of Ramadaan, specification has been made by Shari'ah, thus there is no need for a person to specify it himself.

Objection by reversal

وَ أَمَّا الْقَلْبُ فَتَوَعَّانِ أَحَدُهُمَا أَنْ يَجْعَلَ مَا جَعَلَهُ الْمُعَلَّلُ عَلَهُ لِلْحُكْمِ مَعْلُولاً
لِذَلِكَ الْحُكْمُ وَمِثَالُهُ فِي الشَّرْعِيَّاتِ جَرِيَانُ الرَّبْوَا فِي الْكَثِيرِ يُوجِبُ
جَرِيَانَهُ فِي الْقَلِيلِ كَالْإِثْمَانِ فَيَحْرُمُ بَيْعُ الْحَفَنَةِ مِنَ الطَّعَامِ بِالْحَفَنَتَيْنِ مِنْهُ
فَلَنَا لَا بَلَّ جَرِيَانُ الرَّبْوَا فِي الْقَلِيلِ يُوجِبُ جَرِيَانَهُ فِي الْكَثِيرِ كَالْإِثْمَانِ

Reversal is of two types; (the first type of reversal is) to take what the Mu'alil has made the Illat of the ruling to be the result of the ruling (that is instead of the stipulated Illat being the cause of the ruling it is taken to be the result of the ruling). An example of this in the laws of Shari'ah is the occurrence of Riba in large quantities necessitating the occurrence of Riba in small quantities as is the case with gold and silver (whereby it will Riba whether the amount are small or large, if not in equal quantities), thus (this will necessitate that) sale of one handful of food for two handfuls of food will be Haraam (as excess in small quantities is also Haraam based on this rationale). We say that it is the opposite, in that the occurrence of Riba in small quantities necessitates the occurrence of Riba in large quantities as well as is the case of gold and silver (and since the smallest quantity of measurement in which Riba can occur is half a Saa'a as there is no Shar'ie measurement smaller than this, the sale of one handful of food for two will be permissible).

وَكَذَلِكَ فِي مَسْئَلَةِ الْمُتَجَيِّ بِالْحَرَمِ حُرْمَةُ اِثْلَافِ النَّفْسِ يُوجِبُ حُرْمَةَ اِثْلَافِ الطَّرَفِ كَالصَّيْدِ قُلْنَا بَلْ حُرْمَةُ اِثْلَافِ الطَّرَفِ يُوجِبُ حُرْمَةَ اِثْلَافِ النَّفْسِ كَالصَّيْدِ فَإِذَا جُعِلَتْ عَلَيْهِ مَعْلُولًا لِذَلِكَ الْحُكْمُ لَا تَبْقَى عَلَيْهِ لَهُ لِاسْتِحَالَةِ أَنْ يَكُونَ الشَّيْءُ الْوَاحِدُ عَلَيْهِ لِلشَّرْعِ وَمَعْلُولًا لَهُ

Similarly in the ruling of taking refuge in the Haram; the prohibition of killing (a person as punishment for murder) necessitates the prohibition of severing limbs (as punishment for a crime such stealing) as is the case with hunting (the prohibition of hunting and killing an animal necessitates the prohibition of severing its limbs). We say (it is the other way around) that the prohibition of severing limbs necessitates the prohibition of killing as is the case in hunting (where the prohibition of severing the limb of an animal necessitates the prohibition of hunting an animal).

Once the illat has been made the result of the ruling then it will no longer remain as the Illat for the ruling because of it being impossible for one thing to be the Illat for the ruling and the result as well.

The second type of reversal

وَالنَّوْعُ الثَّانِي مِنَ الْقَلْبِ أَنْ يَجْعَلَ السَّائِلُ مَا جَعَلَهُ الْمُعَلِّلُ عَلَيْهِ لِمَا أَدَّعَاهُ مِنَ الْحُكْمِ عَلَيْهِ لِيُضِدَّ ذَلِكَ الْحُكْمَ فَيَصِيرُ حُجَّةً لِلْسَّائِلِ بَعْدَ أَنْ كَانَ حُجَّةً لِلْمُعَلِّلِ مِثْلَهُ صَوْمُ رَمَضَانَ صَوْمُ فَرَضٍ فَيَشْتَرِطُ النَّعِيْنُ لَهُ بَعْدَ مَا تَعَيَّنَ الْيَوْمُ لَهُ كَالْقَضَاءِ

The second type of reversal is when the same Illat which is claimed to derive the ruling is used to prove the opposite of that ruling, thus becoming a proof for the objector after being a proof for the one who derived the Illat first. An example of this is (*saying that*) the fast of Ramadaan is Fardh Fast therefore specification of the fast (*to be of Ramadaan*) is a condition (*for its validity*) as is the case of Qadhaa fasts. We say that since the fast of Ramadaan are Fardh Fasts specification is not a condition after the Shari'ah has specified a day for it as is the case with Qadhaa Fasts (*whereby if a particular day has been specified for a Qadhaa fast then it will be specified to be for that fast*).

Objection by 'Aks

وَأَمَّا الْعَكْسُ فَنَعْنِي بِهِ أَنْ يَتَمَسَّكَ السَّائِلُ بِأَصْلِ الْمُعَلِّلِ عَلَى وَجْهِ يَكُونُ الْمُعَلِّلُ مَضْطَرًّا إِلَى وَجْهِ الْمَفَارِقَةِ بَيْنَ الْأَصْلِ وَالْفَرْعِ وَمِثْلَهُ الْحُلِيُّ أَعَدْتُ لِلِابْتِدَالِ فَلَا يَجِبُ فِيهَا الزَّكَاةُ كَثِيبَابِ الْبَذْلَةِ قُلْنَا لَوْ كَانَ الْحُلِيُّ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الثِّيَابِ فَلَا تَجِبُ الزَّكَاةُ فِي حُلِيِّ الرِّجَالِ كَثِيبَابِ الْبَذْلَةِ

As far as 'Aks' is concerned, it refers to where the objector derives a ruling from the original which the Mu'alil made Qiyaas on in such a manner that forces the Mu'alil to differentiate between the original and that for which the ruling was derived. An example of this is jewellery made for adornment whereby Zakaat is not Waajib on it (*for women according to Imaam Shaafie*) just as the clothing one wears (*has no Zakaat on it*). We say that if jewellery is the same as clothing then Zakaat is not Waajib on the jewellery of men just as the clothing one wears (*has no Zakaat on it*)

Objection by the Illat being inappropriate for the ruling

وَأَمَّا فَسَادُ الْوَضْعِ فَالْمُرَادُ بِهِ أَنْ يُجْعَلَ الْعِلَّةُ وَصْفًا لَا يَلِيقُ بِذَلِكَ الْحُكْمِ
مِثْلُهُ فِي قَوْلِهِمْ فِي إِسْلَامِ أَحَدِ الزَّوْجَيْنِ اِخْتِلَافُ الدِّينِ طَرَأَ عَلَى النِّكَاحِ
فَيُفْسِدُهُ كَارْتِدَادِ أَحَدِ الزَّوْجَيْنِ فَإِنَّهُ جَعَلَ الْإِسْلَامَ عِلَّةً لِرُزْوَالِ الْمَلِكِ قُلْنَا
الْإِسْلَامُ عَهْدٌ عَاصِمٌ لِلْمَلِكِ فَلَا يَكُونُ مُؤَثِّرًا فِي زَوَالِ الْمَلِكِ وَكَذَلِكَ فِي
مَسْئَلَةِ طَوْلِ الْحُرَّةِ أَنَّهُ حُرٌّ قَادِرٌ عَلَى النِّكَاحِ فَلَا يَجُوزُ لَهُ الْأَمَةُ كَمَا لَوْ
كَانَتْ تَحْتَهُ حُرَّةٌ قُلْنَا وَصْفٌ كَوْنُهُ حُرًّا قَادِرًا يَقْتَضِي جَوَازَ النِّكَاحِ فَلَا
يَكُونُ مُؤَثِّرًا فِي عَدَمِ الْجَوَازِ

As far as the Illat not being appropriate for the ruling is concerned; it is where that Illat is made to be such a characteristic that does not fit with that ruling. An example of this is in their (*Imaam Shaafie's*) saying regarding the acceptance of Islaam by one of the spouses that difference of Deen has come into the Nikaah therefore it (*this difference of Deen*) invalidates the Nikaah, as in the case of one of the spouses abandoning Islaam (*whereby the Nikaah will be invalidated*). Here Imaam Shaafie □ made the acceptance of Islaam an Illat for the invalidation of the right of Nikaah. We say that Islaam is known to secure

rights and will therefore have no role in the invalidation of the right of Nikaah.

Similarly in the law of having the ability to marry a free woman, (*imaam Shaafie says*) he is free and capable of marrying (a free woman) therefore a slave will not be permissible for him (to marry) just as if there was a free woman in his wedlock (whereby it would be impermissible for him to marry a slave). We say him being free and capable of marrying necessitates the permissibility of Nikaah and will therefore not have any effect in making it impermissible.

Objection by disproval

وَأَمَّا النَّقْضُ فَمِثْلُ مَا يُقَالُ الْوُضُوءُ طَهَارَةٌ فَيَشْتَرِطُ لَهُ النِّيَّةُ كَالنِّيَّةِ قُلْنَا
يَنْتَقِضُ بَعْثُ التَّوْبِ وَالْإِنَاءِ

As far as disproval is concerned (*whereby the stipulated Illat is disproven because in some instance the same ruling will not apply despite the presence of that Illat*), for example what has been said (by *Imaam Shaafie*) that Wudhu is means of attaining purity thus Niyyat (*intention*) is a precondition (*for its validity*) just as in Tayammum (*Niyyat is a condition*). We say that this Qiyaas will be disproved by washing (*impure*) clothing and (*impure*) utensils (*as washing is also a means of attaining purity of the clothing or utensils but despite the Illat being present you do not state that Niyyat is a precondition for its validity*).

Objection by counteraction

وَأَمَّا الْمُعَارَضَةُ فَمِثْلُ مَا يُقَالُ الْمَسْحُ رُكْنٌ فِي الْوُضُوءِ فَلَيْسَ تَتْلِيئُهُ
كَالْعَسَلِ قُلْنَا الْمَسْحُ رُكْنٌ فَلَا يُسُّ تَتْلِيئُهُ كَمَسْحِ الْخُفِّ وَالنَّيِّمِ

As far as counteraction is concerned (whereby a proof is cited which counters the deduction of the Mu'alil), **for example what has been said** (by Imaam Shaafie) **that Masah** (of the head) **is a fundamental act of Wudhu** (just as washing the face, hands and feet), **thus make Masah three times will be Sunnat just as in washing** (the face, hands and feet it is Sunnat to wash each part three times). **We say that Masah is a fundamental act of Wudhu and therefore washing three times will not be Sunnat just as in Masah of leather socks** (Masah is also a fundamental act here but it is not Sunnat to make Masah three times) **and in Tayammum** (to make Masah of the face and hands is a fundamental act but it is not Sunnat to make Masah three times).

Definition of Sabab, Illat and Sharth

فصل

الْحُكْمُ يَتَعَلَّقُ بِسَبَبِهِ وَيَنْتَبِثُ بِعِلَّتِهِ وَ يُوجَدُ عِنْدَ شَرْطِهِ فَالسَّبَبُ مَا يَكُونُ طَرِيقًا إِلَى الشَّيْءِ بِوَاسِطَتِهِ كَالطَّرِيقِ فَإِنَّهُ سَبَبٌ لِلْوُصُولِ إِلَى الْمَقْصَدِ بِوَاسِطَةِ الْمَشْيِ وَالْحَبْلُ سَبَبٌ إِلَى الْمَاءِ بِالْإِدْلَاءِ فَعَلَى هَذَا كُلُّ مَا كَانَ طَرِيقًا إِلَى الْحُكْمِ بِوَاسِطَتِهِ يُسَمَّى سَبَبًا لَهُ شَرْعًا وَ يُسَمَّى الْوَاسِطَةُ عِلَّةً مِثْلَهُ فَتَنْحُ بَابُ الْأَصْطَبَلِ وَالْقَقْصِ وَحَلُّ قَيْدِ الْعَبْدِ فَإِنَّهُ سَبَبٌ لِلتَّائِفِ بِوَاسِطَةٍ تَوْجَدُ مِنَ الدَّابَّةِ وَالطَّيْرِ وَالْعَبْدِ

A ruling is linked to its Sabab (method in which the ruling is derived), **is established by its Illat** (principle cause of the ruling) **and is found when its Sharth** (condition) **is fulfilled.** **Thus Sabab is that which leads to something** (the ruling) **by means of something, such as a path.** **Thus the path** (Sabab) **by walking** (Illat) **leads to the destination** (Ruling). (Similarly) **The rope is the Sabab of obtaining water by throwing the bucket into the well** (the rope is the Sabab as it leads to water being obtained by means of throwing). **Thus based upon this, whatever leads to the ruling being**

obtained by means of something will be called the Sabab according to Shari'ah and the means (*through which the ruling is obtained*) is called the Illat. An example of this is opening the door of the stable, cage or shackles of the slave. As this (*opening the door or shackles*) is the Sabab for the loss by means of an action from the animal, bird or slave (*when the slave or animal runs away then the act of opening will be the Sabab for the loss by the slave or animal running away, which is the Illat*).

The ruling will linked to the Illat

وَالسَّبَبُ مَعَ الْعِلَّةِ إِذَا اجْتَمَعَا يُضَافُ الْحُكْمُ إِلَى الْعِلَّةِ دُونَ السَّبَبِ إِلَّا إِذَا تَعَدَّرَتْ الْإِضَافَةُ إِلَى الْعِلَّةِ فَيُضَافُ إِلَى السَّبَبِ حِينَئِذٍ وَ عَلَى هَذَا قَالَ أَصْحَابُنَا إِذَا دَفَعَ السَّكِّينَ إِلَى صَبِيٍّ فَقَتَلَ بِهِ نَفْسَهُ لَا يَضْمَنُ وَ لَوْ سَقَطَ مِنْ يَدِ الصَّبِيِّ فَجَرَحَهُ يَضْمَنُ وَلَوْ حَمَلَ الصَّبِيُّ عَلَى دَابَّةٍ فَسَيَّرَهَا فَجَالَتْ يُمْنَةً وَ يُسْرَةً فَسَقَطَ وَمَاتَ لَا يَضْمَنُ وَ لَوْ دَلَّ إِنْسَانًا عَلَى مَالِ الْغَيْرِ فَسَرَقَهُ أَوْ عَلَى نَفْسِهِ فَقَتَلَهُ أَوْ عَلَى قَافِلَةٍ فَقَطَعَ عَلَيْهِمُ الطَّرِيقَ لَا يَجِبُ الضَّمَانُ عَلَى الدَّالِّ

When both the Illat and Sabab are present then the ruling will be linked to the Illat and not the Sabab (*we will say that the ruling came into being as a result of the Illat*) **except if it is not possible to link it to the Illat, whereby it will then be linked to the Sabab.**

Based upon this our scholars (*of the Hanafi Madhab*) **say that if a knife is given to a child and the child kills himself with it, then the one who handed the knife over will not be accountable for the death** (*giving the knife is the Sabab for the death and the Illat for the death is the child using the knife, thus the ruling will be linked to the Illat and it will be said that the child died because of him using the knife*) **but if the knife fell from the hand of the child and injured him then the one**

who handed over the knife will be accountable for the injury (*giving the knife is the Sabab for the injury and the Illat for the injury is the knife falling, and since the ruling cannot be linked to the Illat, because the act of falling was not the act of the child, it will be linked to the Sabab and it will be said that the child was injured because the knife was given to him*).

If a person placed a child on an animal and he rode it (*on his own*), on which the animal began trying to shake him off, resulting in the child falling and passing away, the one who placed him on the animal will not be accountable for his death (*placing the child on the animal is the Sabab for the death and the child riding the animal is the Illat, thus the ruling will be linked to the Illat and it will be said that the child died because of him riding the animal*).

If a person informs another of a certain person's wealth, which the other person then goes on to steal or he informs him of (*the whereabouts of*) **another person who he then proceeds to murder or he informs him of** (*the travelling plans of*) **a caravan which he then hijacks, the informant will not be held accountable** (*informing is the Sabab for theft or murder, the act of stealing and murder is the Illat, thus the ruling will be linked to Illat and it will be said that the person was robbed or killed because of the action of the robber or murderer*).

A reply to a misconception

وَهَذَا بِخِلَافِ الْمُؤَدَّعِ إِذَا دَلَّ السَّارِقَ عَلَى الْوَدِيعَةِ فَسَرَقَهَا أَوْ دَلَّ الْمُحْرِمَ غَيْرَهُ عَلَى صَيْدِ الْحَرَمِ فَقَتَلَهُ لِأَنَّ وُجُوبَ الضَّمَانِ عَلَى الْمُؤَدَّعِ بِاعْتِبَارِ تَرْكِ الْحِفْظِ الْوَاجِبِ عَلَيْهِ لَا بِالِدَّلَالَةِ وَعَلَى الْمُحْرِمِ بِاعْتِبَارِ أَنَّ الدَّلَالََةَ مَحْظُورٌ إِحْرَامُهُ بِمَنْزِلَةِ مَسِّ الطَّيِّبِ وَ لُبْسِ الْمَخِيطِ فَيُضْمَنُ بِإِرْتِكَابِ

الْمَحْظُورُ لَا بِالذَّلَالَةِ إِلَّا أَنَّ الْجَنَائَةَ إِنَّمَا يَتَقَرَّرُ بِحَقِيقَةِ الْقَتْلِ وَ أَمَا قَبْلَهُ فَلَا حُكْمَ لَهُ لِجَوَازِ إِرْتِفَاعِ أَثَرِ الْجَنَائَةِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْإِنْدِ مَالٍ فِي بَابِ الْجَرَاحَةِ

This ruling (mentioned above) is contrary to when a trustee informs a thief to the whereabouts of the trust, such that he steals it or if a person in Ihraam informs another of the whereabouts of game, such that he kills it (whereby the informant in the above cases, despite only being the Sabab will be held accountable). The reason for Dhamaan being Waajib on the trustee is because of him abandoning the safekeeping which was Waajib on him (by informing the thief of the whereabouts of the trust) and not because of informing (the ruling is not being linked to him because he is the Sabab but rather because he abandoned what was incumbent upon him). And (Dhamaan is Waajib on) the one on Ihraam because the act of informing (the hunter of the presence of game) is prohibited in the state of Ihraam, just as applying perfume and wearing sown clothes in prohibited, thus (in the above cases) he is accountable because of him indulging in what was prohibited on him and not because of informing (that is not because he was the Sabab).

However the crime will only be established if the game is actually killed (that is he will only be held accountable after the animal is killed) as for before (the animal is killed), there is no ruling for that because it is possible that the effects of the crime may be eliminated (by the hunter not killing the game) as in the case of a wound healing when injured (such that the one who injured him will not be held accountable if the wound healed).

Sabab will have the meaning of the Illat

وَقَدْ يَكُونُ السَّبَبُ بِمَعْنَى الْعِلَّةِ فَيُضَافُ الْحُكْمُ إِلَيْهِ وَمِثَالُهُ فِيمَا يَنْبُتُ
الْعِلَّةُ بِالسَّبَبِ فَيَكُونُ السَّبَبُ فِي مَعْنَى عِلَّةِ الْعِلَّةِ فَيُضَافُ الْحُكْمُ إِلَيْهِ وَ
لِهَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا سَاقَ دَابَّةً فَاتَّلَفَ شَيْئًا ضَمِنَ السَّائِقُ وَالشَّاهِدُ إِذَا اتَّلَفَ
بِشَهَادَتِهِ مَا لَا فَظْهَرَ بَطْلَانُهَا بِالرَّجُوعِ ضَمِنَ لِأَنَّ سَيْرَ الدَّابَّةِ يُضَافُ إِلَى
السُّوقِ وَ قَضَاءُ الْقَاضِي يُضَافُ إِلَى الشَّهَادَةِ لِمَا أَنَّهُ لَا يَسْعَى تَرْكُ
الْقَضَاءِ بَعْدَ ظُهُورِ الْحَقِّ بِشَهَادَةِ الْعَدْلِ عِنْدَهُ فَصَارَ كَالْمَجْبُورِ فِي ذَلِكَ
بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْبَهِيمَةِ بِفِعْلِ السَّائِقِ

Sometimes the Sabab will have the meaning of the Illat because of which the ruling will linked to it. An example of where this can occur is where the Illat is a direct result of the Sabab as in such a case the Sabab will have the meaning of the Illat because when the Illat is a direct result of the Sabab it becomes the Illat (principle cause) of the Illat, thus the ruling will be linked to it.

As a result of this (that the Sabab will sometimes have the meaning of the Illat) we say if a shepherd herds his flock whereby it results in the damage of something, the shepherd will be responsible for the damage and if a witness causes loss of wealth as a result of his testimony, after which the invalidity of his testimony becomes apparent by retraction (he retracted his testimony), then the witness will be responsible for the loss. The reason for this (why the ruling will linked to the Sabab in the above cases) is that the movement of the flock (which is the Illat) is a direct result of the herding of the shepherd (that is the cause of the Illat is the Sabab) and the decision of the Qaadhi (which is the Illat) is a direct result of the testimony because it is not possible for the Qaadhi not to pass judgement after the testimony of a reliable witness, making him compelled (to pass judgement), in the same manner as the flock with the herding of the shepherd (who have no choice but to move).

Sabab will take the place of the Illat

ثُمَّ السَّبَبُ قَدْ يُقَامُ مَقَامَ الْعِلَّةِ عِنْدَ تَعَذُّرِ الْإِطْلَاعِ عَلَى حَقِيقَةِ الْعِلَّةِ تَبَسُّيراً
لِلْأَمْرِ عَلَى الْمُكَلَّفِ وَيَسْقُطُ بِهِ إِعْتِبَارُ الْعِلَّةِ وَيُذَارُ الْحُكْمُ عَلَى السَّبَبِ وَ
مِثَالُهُ فِي الشَّرْعِيَّاتِ النَّوْمُ الْكَامِلُ فَإِنَّهُ لَمَّا أُقِيمَ مَقَامَ الْحَدَثِ سَقَطَ إِعْتِبَارُ
حَقِيقَةِ الْحَدَثِ وَ يُذَارُ الْإِنْتِقَاضُ عَلَى كَمَالِ النَّوْمِ وَ كَذَلِكَ الْخُلُوةُ
الصَّحِيحَةُ لَمَّا أُقِيمَتْ مَقَامَ الْوُطِيِّ سَقَطَ إِعْتِبَارُ حَقِيقَةِ الْوُطِيِّ فَيُذَارُ الْحُكْمُ
عَلَى صِحَّةِ الْخُلُوةِ فِي حَقِّ كَمَالِ الْمَهْرِ وَلِزُومِ الْعِدَّةِ وَكَذَلِكَ السَّفَرُ لَمَّا
أُقِيمَ مَقَامَ الْمُشَقَّةِ فِي حَقِّ الرُّخْصَةِ سَقَطَ إِعْتِبَارُ حَقِيقَةِ الْمُشَقَّةِ وَ يُذَارُ
الْحُكْمُ عَلَى نَفْسِ السَّفَرِ حَتَّى أَنْ السُّلْطَانَ لَوْ طَافَ فِي أَطْرَافِ مَمْلَكَتِهِ
يَقْصُدُ بِهِ مِقْدَارَ السَّفَرِ كَانَ لَهُ الرُّخْصَةُ فِي الْإِفْطَارِ وَالْقَصْرِ

Then the Sabab will sometimes take the place of the Illat when determining the occurrence of the Illat is difficult, in order to make ease upon those to whom the laws of Shari'ah apply. Thereafter (once the Sabab takes the place of the Illat) the Illat will not be considered and the ruling will be dependent upon the Sabab (such that the ruling will apply with the occurrence of the Sabab regardless of whether the Illat has occurred or not).

An example of this (where the Sabab takes the place of the Illat) in the laws of Shari'ah is deep sleep, as once it takes the place of passing wind (which is the actual Illat for Wudhu breaking) then whether wind was passed or not will not be considered and the ruling of Wudhu breaking will be dependent on deep sleep (whereby the Wudhu will break if one falls asleep, regardless of whether wind was passed or not).

Similarly once '**Khalwatus Saheehah**'¹ takes the place of sexual relations (which is the actual Illat for the consummation of the marriage) then whether sexual relations occurs or not will not be considered and the ruling will be dependent on '**Khalwatus Saheehah**' with regards to the complete Mehr (the entire Mehr will become Waajib after '**Khalwatus Saheehah**') and incumbency of Iddah (if the wife is divorced after '**Khalwatus Saheehah**' then she will have to remain in Iddah).

Similarly once travelling (more than 80 km) takes the place of difficulty (which is the actual Illat for lessening Salaah on a journey) with regards to lessening Salaah (Qasr while on a journey) then whether there is actually difficulty or not will not be considered and the ruling of lessening Salaah (Qasr) will be dependent on travelling (more than 80 km) such that if the king travels on the outskirts of his kingdom in order to the extent of a journey (80 km), he will be excused from fasting and may lessen Salaah (even if there is no difficulty in that journey).

Other than the Sabab can be called the Sabab

وَقَدْ يُسَمَّى غَيْرُ السَّبَبِ سَبَبًا مَجَازًا كَالْيَمِينِ يُسَمَّى سَبَبًا لِلْكَفَّارَةِ وَ إِنَّهَا لَيْسَتْ بِسَبَبٍ فِي الْحَقِيقَةِ فَإِنَّ السَّبَبَ لَا يُنَافِي وَجُوبَ الْكَفَّارَةِ فَإِنَّ الْكَفَّارَةَ إِنَّمَا تَحِبُّ بِالْحَنْثِ وَبِهِ يَنْتَهَى الْيَمِينُ وَكَذَلِكَ تَعْلِيقُ الْحُكْمِ بِالشَّرْطِ كَالطَّلَاقِ وَالْعَتَاقِ يُسَمَّى سَبَبًا مَجَازًا وَ أَنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِسَبَبٍ فِي الْحَقِيقَةِ لِأَنَّ الْحُكْمَ إِنَّمَا يَنْبُتُ عِنْدَ وَجُودِ الشَّرْطِ وَالتَّعْلِيقُ يَنْتَهَى بِوُجُودِ الشَّرْطِ فَلَا يَكُونُ سَبَبًا مَعَ وَجُودِ التَّنَافِي بَيْنَهُمَا

¹ 'Khalwatus Saheehah' occurs when the bride and groom seclude themselves, such that if they wished to indulge in sexual intercourse they would be able to do so, even though they do not do so. After 'Khalwatus Saheehah' the marriage will be regarded as consummated.

Sometimes other than the Sabab can be called the Sabab in a manner of Majaaz. For example taking an oath is called the Sabab for Kaffaarah, whereas in reality it is not the Sabab, as the Sabab cannot oppose the ruling and taking an oath opposes the incumbency of Kaffaarah because Kaffaarah becomes Waajib on the breaking of an oath and that *(breaking an oath) ends the oath (taking an oath cannot be the Sabab for Kaffaarah because Kaffaarah only becomes Waajib when the oath is broken).*

Similarly making a ruling conditional, such as Talaaq or freedom, has been called the Sabab *(of Talaaq)* in a manner of Majaaz, whereas it is not the Sabab in reality because the ruling will only apply when the condition is fulfilled and once the condition is fulfilled it will no longer remain conditional, thus it cannot be the *(actual)* Sabab when they oppose each other.

The laws of Shari'ah are affixed to the Sabab

فصل

الْأَحْكَامُ الشَّرْعِيَّةُ يَتَعَلَّقُ بِأَسْبَابِهَا وَذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ الْوُجُوبَ غَائِبٌ عَنَّا فَلَا بُدَّ مِنْ عِلْمَةٍ يَعْرِفُ بِهَا الْعَبْدُ وَجُوبَ الْحُكْمِ وَبِهَذَا الْاِعْتِبَارِ أَضِيفَ الْأَحْكَامُ إِلَى الْأَسْبَابِ فَسَبَبُ وَجُوبِ الصَّلَاةِ الْوَقْتُ بِدَلِيلِ أَنَّ الْخُطَابَ بِإِدَاءِ الصَّلَاةِ لَا يَتَوَجَّهَ قَبْلَ دُخُولِ الْوَقْتِ وَإِنَّمَا يَتَوَجَّهَ بَعْدَ دُخُولِ الْوَقْتِ وَالْخُطَابُ مُنْبِئٌ لَوْجُوبِ الْأَدَاءِ وَمَعْرِفٌ لِلْعَبْدِ سَبَبُ وَجُوبِ قَبْلِهِ وَ هَذَا كَقَوْلِنَا أَدِّ ثَمَنَ الْمَبِيعِ وَ أَدِّ نَفَقَةَ الْمَنْكُوحَةِ وَلَا مَوْجُودٌ يَعْرِفُهُ الْعَبْدُ هَهُنَا إِلَّا دُخُولَ الْوَقْتِ فَتَبَيَّنَ أَنَّ الْوُجُوبَ يَنْبُتُ بِدُخُولِ الْوَقْتِ وَ لِأَنَّ الْوُجُوبَ ثَابِتٌ عَلَى مَنْ لَا يَتَنَاوَلُهُ الْخُطَابُ كَالنَّائِمِ وَالْمُعْمَى عَلَيْهِ وَلَا وَجُوبَ قَبْلَ الْوَقْتِ فَكَانَ ثَابِتًا بِدُخُولِ الْوَقْتِ وَ بِهَذَا ظَهَرَ أَنَّ الْجُزْءَ الْأَوَّلَ سَبَبٌ لِلْوُجُوبِ

The laws of Shari'ah are affixed to the Sabab for it (the law becomes incumbent when the Sabab is present). The reason

for this is that ALLAAH, who makes the laws Waajib upon us is not visible to us (*so we will not be able to discern when ALLAAH Ta'ala has made it Waajib to carry out*), therefore there is a need for such a sign, from which we will be able to determine that is when the law is Waajib. Based upon this (*that we need a sign from which we will be able to discern when the law is Waajib to carry out*) we affixed the laws of Shari'ah to the its Sabab, such that the Sabab of Salaah being Waajib will be time (*when the time of that Salaah sets in then only will it become Waajib*) based on the proof that the instruction to perform Salaah does not apply before the time has set in but only after. The instruction (*to perform Salaah*) establishes that it is incumbent to perform and informs a person (*as well*) of the Sabab that makes it Waajib before the time sets in. This (*that the act itself being Waajib is established from the Sabab and that it is Waajib to perform is established from the instruction*) is the same as us saying, "Pay the price of the goods" (*the price has already become incumbent upon him by the Sabab, which is the transaction itself, and our statement indicates that it is now Waajib to pay it*) and "Pay the maintenance of your wife" (*the maintenance has already become incumbent upon him by the Sabab, which is the Nikaah itself, and our statement indicates that it is now Waajib to pay it*). There is nothing present here by which a person can ascertain that it is Waajib except for time, thus it will establish that Salaah becomes Waajib when the time sets in.

(*Another proof that the Sabab for Salaah being Waajib is*) Also that Salaah is Waajib on that person who cannot hear the instruction, such as one who is asleep or unconscious (*at the time of Salaah*) and (*we all accept that*) it is not Waajib before the time sets in, therefore it is established that Salaah becomes Waajib when the time sets in (*as this Sabab*

applies to all, even one how cannot hear the instruction such as one who is asleep or unconscious).

This also establishes that the first portion of the time is the Sabab for it being Waajib (because if the last portion were the Sabab then the Salaah can only be performed after it, which would result in the Salaah becoming Qadhaa as it will be performed out of its time).

ثُمَّ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ طَرِيقَانِ أَحَدُهُمَا نَقْلُ السَّبَبِيَّةِ مِنَ الْجُزْءِ الْأَوَّلِ إِلَى الثَّانِي إِذَا لَمْ يُؤَدَّ فِي الْجُزْءِ الْأَوَّلِ ثُمَّ إِلَى الثَّالِثِ وَالرَّابِعِ إِلَى أَنْ يَنْتَهِيَ إِلَى آخِرِ الْوَقْتِ فَيَتَقَرَّرُ الْوُجُوبُ حِينَئِذٍ وَ يُعْتَبَرُ حَالُ الْعَبْدِ فِي ذَلِكَ الْجُزْءِ وَ يُعْتَبَرُ صِفَةُ ذَلِكَ الْجُزْءِ وَ يَبَيَّنُ إِعْتِبَارَ حَالِ الْعَبْدِ فِيهِ أَنَّهُ لَوْ كَانَ صَبِيًّا فِي أَوَّلِ الْوَقْتِ بَالِغًا فِي ذَلِكَ الْجُزْءِ أَوْ كَانَ كَافِرًا فِي أَوَّلِ الْوَقْتِ مُسْلِمًا فِي ذَلِكَ الْجُزْءِ أَوْ كَانَ حَائِضًا أَوْ نَفَسَاءَ فِي أَوَّلِ الْوَقْتِ طَاهِرَةً فِي ذَلِكَ الْجُزْءِ وَ جَبَّتِ الصَّلَاةُ وَعَلَى هَذَا جَمِيعُ صُورِ حُدُوثِ الْأَهْلِيَّةِ فِي آخِرِ الْوَقْتِ وَعَلَى الْعَكْسِ بَأَنْ يَحْدُثَ حَيْضٌ أَوْ نِفَاسٌ أَوْ جُنُونٌ مُسْتَوْعِبٌ أَوْ أَعْمَاءٌ مُمْتَدِّ فِي ذَلِكَ الْجُزْءِ سَقَطَتْ عَنْهُ الصَّلَاةُ وَلَوْ كَانَ مُسَافِرًا فِي أَوَّلِ الْوَقْتِ مُقِيمًا فِي آخِرِهِ يُصَلِّي أَرْبَعًا وَ لَوْ كَانَ مُقِيمًا فِي أَوَّلِ الْوَقْتِ مُسَافِرًا فِي آخِرِهِ يُصَلِّي رَكْعَتَيْنِ

Thereafter (after it has been established that the first portion of the time is the Sabab for Salaah being Waajib) **there are two methods** (in which the remaining time is also a Sabab). One of these methods is that the Sabab transfers from the first portion to the second portion, when Salaah has not been performed in the first portion and then to the third and the forth until the last portion of the time (if the Salaah has not been performed) where Salaah being Waajib will remain. The condition of the person in that (last) time will be considered as well as the condition of that (last) time.

What is meant by the condition of the person will be considered in that (last) time is that if a person was

immature (not reached puberty) in the first portion but became mature in that (last) portion or if a person was Kaafir in the first portion and then accepted Islaam in that (last) portion or was in a state of Haidh or Nifaas in the first portion but became pure in that (last) portion, then Salaah will be Waajib upon them (Salaah will be Waajib on the child who reached puberty, Kaafir who accepted Islaam, or woman in Haidh or Nifaas who attained purity in the last portion of the Salaah time). In a similar manner will all the cases wherein a person became capable of Salaah in the last portion be dealt with (Salaah will be Waajib on them if they were able to perform Salaah in the last portion) and the opposite as well, whereby a woman's Haidh or Nifaas begins, or a person goes insane for longer than a day and night, or unconscious for the remaining period of that last time, in the last portion such that Salaah will not be Waajib on them.

If a person was a traveller in the first portion of the time and a resident in the last portion of the time, then he will read four Ragaats of Salaah (he will not shorten his salaah) and if he was a resident in the first portion of the time and a traveller in the last portion, then he will read two Ragaats of Salaah (he will make Qasr, that is shorten his Salaah).

وَبَيَانُ إِعْتِبَارِ صِفَةِ ذَلِكَ الْجُزْءِ أَنَّ ذَلِكَ الْجُزْءَ إِنْ كَانَ كَامِلًا تَقَرَّرَتْ
الْوُظَيْفَةُ كَامِلَةً فَلَا يَخْرُجُ عَنِ الْعَهْدَةِ بِأَدَائِهَا فِي الْأَوْقَاتِ الْمَكْرُوهَةِ
وَمِثَالُهُ فِيمَا يُقَالُ إِنَّ آخِرَ الْوَقْتِ فِي الْفَجْرِ كَامِلٌ وَإِنَّمَا يَصِيرُ الْوَقْتُ
فَاسِدًا بِطُلُوعِ الشَّمْسِ وَ ذَلِكَ بَعْدَ خُرُوجِ الْوَقْتِ فَيَتَقَرَّرُ الْوَاجِبُ بِوَصْفِ
الْكَمَالِ فَإِذَا طَلَعَ الشَّمْسُ فِي أَثْنَاءِ الصَّلَاةِ بَطَلَ الْفَرَضُ لِأَنَّهُ لَا يُمَكِّنُهُ
إِثْمَامُ الصَّلَاةِ إِلَّا بِوَصْفِ النِّقْصَانِ بِإِعْتِبَارِ الْوَقْتِ وَلَوْ كَانَ ذَلِكَ الْجُزْءُ
نَاقِصًا كَمَا فِي صَلَاةِ الْعَصْرِ فَإِنَّ آخِرَ الْوَقْتِ وَقْتُ إِحْمَارِ الشَّمْسِ
وَالْوَقْتُ عِنْدَهُ فَاسِدٌ فَتَقَرَّرَتْ الْوُظَيْفَةُ بِصِفَةِ النِّقْصَانِ وَ لِهَذَا وَجِبَ الْقَوْلُ
بِالْجَوَازِ عِنْدَهُ مَعَ فَسَادِ الْوَقْتِ

What is meant by the condition of that (*last*) time will be considered is that if the last portion of time is Kaamil (*that is it is not defective*) then the Salaah will become Waajib on a person Kaamil (*without defect*) and a person will not be absolved from it by performing it in prohibited times (*Makruh time*). An example of this is what has been said that the last portion of time for Fajr Salaah is Kaamil and it becomes defective as the sun rises, which is after the time of Fajr has passed, thus Fajr Salaah becomes Waajib on a person (*who has not performed it as yet*) Kaamil. Therefore if the sun rises while he is performing Salaah then the Salaah will be invalid because it is not possible to perform the Salaah except with defect as the time is defective (*and since the Salaah became Waajib on hi Kaamil it has to be performed Kaamil*).

If the last portion of time is defective, such as in Salaatul Asr (*whereby the last portion in which Asr may be read is defective*) because it is the time when the sun reddens, which is a defective time, then the Salaah becomes Waajib with defect, therefore it becomes incumbent to say that (*Asr*) Salaah in this time is permissible with defect.

The second method

وَالطَّرِيقُ الثَّانِي أَنْ يُجْعَلَ كُلُّ جُزْءٍ مِنْ أَجْزَاءِ الْوَقْتِ سَبَبًا لَا عَلَى طَرِيقِ
الِإِنْتِقَالِ فَإِنَّ الْقَوْلَ بِهِ قَوْلٌ بِإِبْطَالِ السَّبَبِيَّةِ الثَّابِتَةِ بِالشَّرْعِ وَلَا يَلْزَمُ عَلَى
هَذَا تَضَاعُفُ الْوَاجِبِ فَإِنَّ الْجُزْءَ الثَّانِيَّ إِنَّمَا أَثْبَتَ عَيْنَ مَا أَثْبَتَهُ الْجُزْءُ
الْأَوَّلُ فَكَانَ فَهَذَا مِنْ بَابِ تَرَادُفِ الْعِلَلِ وَكَثْرَةِ الشُّهُودِ فِي بَابِ
الْخُصُومَاتِ

The second method (*in which the remaining time is also the Sabab*) is making each portion of the time a Sabab (*all at once*) and not by transferring (*the Sabab from one portion to*

the next) because saying that the Sabab transfers from portion to the next is claiming that the portion which the Shari'ah has made the Sabab is not the Sabab (as once it transfers to the next portion, it would mean that the previous portion is no longer the Sabab whereas the Shari'ah has made it the Sabab). (If someone were to object by saying that this method makes multiple Salaah Waajib as in this case each portion makes a Salaah Waajib, we would say) **This does not make multiple Salaah Waajib (in that time) because the second portion establishes exactly what was established in the first portion (and not another Salaah), thus it will be the same as claiming that one ruling has many Illat (which will not necessitate there being many rulings) and the same as having many witnesses to one case.**

The Sabab for fasting and Zakaat

وَسَبَبُ وَجُوبِ الصَّوْمِ شَهْرُ الشَّهْرِ لِتَوَجُّهِ الْخُطَابِ عِنْدَ شَهْرِ الشَّهْرِ
وَإِضَافَةِ الصَّوْمِ إِلَيْهِ وَسَبَبُ وَجُوبِ الزَّكَاةِ مَلِكُ النَّصَابِ النَّامِيُّ حَقِيقَةً أَوْ
حُكْمًا وَبِإِعْتِبَارِ وَجُودِ السَّبَبِ جَازَ التَّعْجِيلُ فِي بَابِ الْأَدَاءِ

The Sabab for fasting being Waajib is the coming of the month of Ramadaan because the instruction to fast applies then and fasting has been affixed to it (the fast of this month are called 'Soumu Ramadaan', which indicate that it is the Sabab).

The Sabab for Zakaat being Waajib is having possession of the growing wealth (wealth which increase in value) whether in Haqeeqat (such as stock for trade) or Hukman (such as gold and silver) and when the Sabab is present then prior fulfilment is permissible (if a person has possession of growing wealth then he may pay the Zakaat due on it before a year passes).

The Sabab for Hajj

وَسَبَبُ وُجُوبِ الْحَجِّ الْبَيْتُ لِإِضَافَتِهِ إِلَى الْبَيْتِ وَ عَدَمُ تَكَرُّرِ الْوُظُيْفَةِ فِي الْعُمْرِ وَعَلَى هَذَا لَوْ حَجَّ قَبْلَ وَجُودِ الْإِسْتِطَاعَةِ يَنْوُبُ ذَلِكَ عَنْ حَاجَةِ الْإِسْلَامِ لَوُجُودِ السَّبَبِ وَبِهِ فَارَقَ آدَاءُ الزَّكَاةِ قَبْلَ وَجُودِ النَّصَابِ لِعَدَمِ السَّبَبِ

The Sabab for Hajj being Waajib is the Ka'abah because of Hajj being affixed to it (the act of Hajj is referred to as "Hajjul Bait") and the fact that it is Waajib only once in a life time (which indicates that the Sabab is singular and occurs once, which is the Ka'abah). Based upon this (that the Sabab for Haaj being Waajib is the Ka'abah) if a person performs Hajj before having the (financial) ability to do so then this will suffice for his Fardh Hajj because the Sabab (for the Hajj being Waajib) is present.

This (Hajj sufficing for Fardh Hajj even if one did not have the financial ability because of the Sabab being present) differentiates it from payment of Zakaat before having possession of the wealth, because (in this instance of Zakaat) the Sabab is not present.

Sabab for Sadaqaatul Fitr

وَسَبَبُ وُجُوبِ صَدَقَةِ الْفِطْرِ رَأْسُ يَمُونُهُ وَيَلَى عَلَيْهِ وَ بِإِعْتِبَارِ السَّبَبِ يَجُوزُ التَّعْجِيلُ حَتَّى جَارَ آدَائُهَا قَبْلَ يَوْمِ الْفِطْرِ وَ سَبَبُ وَجُوبِ الْعُشْرِ الْأَرَاضِيِّ النَّامِيَةُ بِحَقِيقَةِ الرَّيْعِ وَ سَبَبُ وَجُوبِ الْخَرَاجِ الْأَرَاضِيِّ الصَّالِحَةِ لِلزَّرَاعَةِ فَكَانَتْ نَامِيَةً حُكْمًا وَ سَبَبُ وَجُوبِ الْوُضُوءِ الصَّلَاةِ عِنْدَ الْبَعْضِ وَ لِهَذَا وَجَبَ الْوُضُوءُ عَلَى مَنْ وَجَبَتْ عَلَيْهِ الصَّلَاةُ وَلَا وَضُوءٌ عَلَى مَنْ لَا صَلَاةَ عَلَيْهِ وَ قَالَ الْبَعْضُ سَبَبُ وَجُوبِهِ الْحَدَّثُ وَ وَجُوبُ الصَّلَاةِ شَرْطٌ وَ قَدْ رَوَى عَنْ مُحَمَّدٍ ذَلِكَ نَصًّا وَ سَبَبُ وَ وَجُوبِ الْغُسْلِ الْحَيْضُ وَالنَّفَاسُ وَالْجَنَابَةُ

The Sabab for Sadaqaatul Fitr being Waajib is the presence of the person whose expenses he bears and those under him (*on the day of Eid*) and as a result of the Sabab (*being present*) it is permissible to pay the Sadaqaatul Fitr before the day of Eid.

The Sabab of Ushr¹ being Waajib is the land being productive (*that is it yields a produce*).

The Sabab of Khiraaj being Waajib is that the land must be fertile for cultivation, which will result in it being termed productive.

The Sabab for Wudhu being Waajib is Salaah, according to some, because of which Wudhu is Waajib upon those whom Salaah is Waajib upon and Wudhu is not Waajib upon those upon whom Salaah is not Waajib upon. Some are of the opinion that the Sabab for Wudhu being Waajib is being in a state of lesser impurity (*Hadath*) and the Salaah being Waajib is a condition for Wudhu being Waajib, thus it will become Waajib when the condition is fulfilled), which has been reported to be the opinion of Imaam Muhammed □.

The Sabab for Ghusal being Waajib is being in a state of Haidh, Nifaas and Janaabat (*being in a state of higher impurity*).

Prevention of the Illat and ruling

فصل

قَالَ الْقَاضِيُ الْإِمَامُ أَبُو زَيْدٍ الْمَوَانِعُ أَرْبَعَةُ أَقْسَامٍ مَانِعٌ يَمْنَعُ إِنْْعِقَادَ الْعِلَّةِ وَ
مَانِعٌ يَمْنَعُ تَمَامَهَا وَ مَانِعٌ يَمْنَعُ إِبْدَاءَ الْحُكْمِ وَ مَانِعٌ يَمْنَعُ دَوَامَهُ نَظِيرُ

¹ Ushr is a tax on the produce of land and Khiraaj is a land tax.

الْأَوَّلُ بَيْعُ الْحُرِّ وَالْمَيْتَةِ وَالْدَّمِ فَإِنَّ عَدَمَ الْمَحَلِّيَّةِ يَمْنَعُ إِنْعِقَادَ التَّصَرُّفِ
عَلَّةً لَافَادَةِ الْحُكْمِ وَعَلَى هَذَا سَائِرُ التَّغْلِيقَاتِ عِنْدَنَا فَإِنَّ التَّغْلِيقَ يَمْنَعُ
إِنْعِقَادَ التَّصَرُّفِ عَلَّةً قَبْلَ وُجُودِ الشَّرْطِ عَلَى مَا ذَكَرْنَاهُ وَلِهَذَا لَوْ حَافَ لَا
يُطَلَّقُ إِمْرَأَتُهُ فَعَلَّقَ طَلَّاقَ إِمْرَأَتِهِ بِدُخُولِ الدَّارِ لَا يَحْتُسُّ

Qaadhi Abu Zaid says that prevention can occur in four ways;

- 1- Prevention of the Illat from occurring.**
- 2- Prevention of the Illat from completing.**
- 3- Prevention of the ruling from applying from inception.**
- 4- Prevention of the ruling from applying perpetually.**

An example of the first (prevention of the Illat from occurring) is the sale of a free person, carrion and blood. The reason for this is these items not being objects of sale (they cannot be bought or sold) prevents the Illat from occurring (which is offering to sell and acceptance) which in turn prevents the ruling (of change of ownership) from applying. In a similar manner (also examples of this type of prevention) are all conditional statements according to us (Hanafi scholars) because conditional statements prevent the occurrence of the illat for the ruling before the condition is fulfilled (it only becomes Illat once the condition is met), as we have mentioned previously (under the discussion of whether the ruling of a conditional statement applies immediately or not). This is why if a person takes an oath that he will not divorce his wife and then gives a Talaaq conditional on entry (where he says, "You are divorced if you enter the house"), his oath will not break (as the Talaaq does apply till the condition is met).

وَمِثَالُ الثَّانِي هَلَاكُ النَّصَابِ فِي أَثْنَاءِ الْحَوْلِ وَ إِمْتِنَاعُ أَحَدِ الشَّاهِدَيْنِ عَنِ الشَّهَادَةِ وَرَدُّ شَطْرِ الْعَقْدِ

An example of the second (prevention of the Illat from completing) **is loss of the Nisaab** (amount which makes Zakaat Waajib) **during the course of the year** (as having the Nisaab is the illat for Zakaat being Waajib and possessing it for a full year completes it) **and refusal of one of the two witnesses to testify** (testimony is the illat for establishing the right of another and is complete with the testimony of two) **and declining to purchase** (ownership is established in a sales transaction by proposal to purchase and acceptance and is completed with the acceptance of the buyer).

وَمِثَالُ الثَّالِثِ أَلْبَيْعُ بِشَرْطِ الْخِيَارِ وَبَقَاءُ الْوَقْتِ فِي حَقِّ صَاحِبِ الْعُدْرِ

An example of the third (prevention of the ruling from applying from inception) **is a sales transaction with the right to cancel or approve the transaction** (the illat which establishes ownership is complete by proposal and acceptance but ownership will not apply from inception because of the right to cancel or approve the transaction) **and time remaining for one who is excused** (from Tahaarat, the ruling of Wudhu breaking is prevented from applying as long as the time for that Salaah remains).

وَمِثَالُ الرَّابِعِ خِيَارُ الْبُلُوغِ وَالْعَتَقِ وَالرُّؤْيَا وَعَدَمُ الْكَفَالَةِ وَالْإِنْدِمَالُ فِي بَابِ الْجَرَاحَاتِ عَلَى هَذَا الْأَصْلِ

An example of the fourth (Prevention of the ruling from applying perpetually) **is Khiyaar Bulooḥ¹** (the ruling of Nikaah applies but does not remain perpetually as once the

¹ Khiyaar Bulooḥ:- If the Nikaah of an immature child was performed by someone other than the father or grandfather then once the child reaches Puberty he will have the right to annul the Nikaah.

child reaches puberty then she may have the Nikaah annulled), **Khiyaar Itq**¹ (the ruling of Nikaah applies but does not remain perpetually as when the slave is set free, she may have the Nikaah annulled), **Khiyaar Ru'yat**² (ownership is established but does not remain perpetually as once the buyer sees the item he may cancel the transaction), **lack of compatibility** (the ruling of Nikaah applies but the representatives of the bride she may have the Nikaah annulled) **and if the wound heals** (the ruling of Diyyah applies but is lifted once the wound heals).

وَهَذَا عَلَى إِعْتِبَارِ جَوَازِ تَخْصِيصِ الْعِلَّةِ الشَّرْعِيَّةِ فَأَمَّا عَلَى قَوْلِ مَنْ لَا يَقُولُ بِجَوَازِ تَخْصِيصِ الْعِلَّةِ فَالْمَانِعُ عِنْدَهُ ثَلَاثَةٌ أَقْسَامُ مَانِعٍ يَمْنَعُ إِبْتِدَاءَ الْعِلَّةِ وَمَانِعٍ يَمْنَعُ تَمَامَهَا وَمَانِعٍ يَمْنَعُ دَوَامَ الْحُكْمِ وَأَمَّا عِنْدَ تَمَامِ الْعِلَّةِ فَيُثَبِّتُ الْحُكْمَ لَا مُحَالَاةً وَعَلَى هَذَا كُلِّ مَا جَعَلَهُ الْفَرِيقُ الْأَوَّلُ مَانِعًا لِنُبُوتِ الْحُكْمِ جَعَلَهُ الْفَرِيقُ الثَّانِي مَانِعًا لِتَمَامِ الْعِلَّةِ وَعَلَى هَذَا الْأَصْلِ يَدُورُ الْكَلَامُ بَيْنَ الْفَرِيقَيْنِ

This (division of the types of prevention) is based on considering 'Takhseesul Illat' (acceptance of the principle that the Illat will be present but the ruling may not apply) but if you do not accept 'Takhseesul Illat' then prevention will be of three types;

- 1- Prevention of the Illat from beginning.**
- 2- Prevention of the Illat from completing.**
- 3- Prevention of the ruling from applying perpetually.**

¹ Khiyaar itq:- A married slave will have the right to annul the Nikaah when they are set free.

² Khiyaar Ru'yat:- If a person purchases something without seeing it, then he will have the right to either cancel or approve the transaction when he sees it.

As far as when the illat is complete is concerned, the ruling will apply without a doubt. In this manner whatever the first group has made an example of prevention of the ruling the second group has made an example of the Illat being incomplete. On this principle (*that the second group has incorporated the third type into the second*) the opinions vary between the two groups.

Fardh and Waajib

فَصْلٌ

الْفَرْضُ لُغَةً هُوَ التَّقْدِيرُ وَ مَفْرُوضَاتُ الشَّرْعِ مُقَدَّرَاتُهُ بِحَيْثُ لَا يَحْتَمِلُ الزِّيَادَةَ وَ النَقْصَانَ وَ فِي الشَّرْعِ مَا ثَبَتَ بِدَلِيلٍ قَطْعِيٍّ لَا شُبْهَةَ فِيهِ وَ حُكْمُهُ لَزُومُ الْعَمَلِ بِهِ وَ الْإِعْتِقَادُ بِهِ وَ الْوُجُوبُ هُوَ السُّقُوطُ يَعْنِي مَا يَسْقُطُ عَلَى الْعَبْدِ بِلَا اخْتِيَارٍ مِنْهُ وَقِيلَ هُوَ مِنَ الْوَجَبَةِ وَ هُوَ الْإِضْطِرَابُ سُمِّيَ الْوَاجِبُ بِذَلِكَ لِكَوْنِهِ مُضْطَرِباً بَيْنَ الْفَرْضِ وَ النَّفْلِ فَصَارَ فَرْضاً فِي حَقِّ الْعَمَلِ حَتَّى لَا يَجُوزُ تَرْكُهُ وَ نَفْلاً فِي حَقِّ الْإِعْتِقَادِ فَلَا يَلْزَمُنَا الْإِعْتِقَادُ بِهِ جَزْماً وَ فِي الشَّرْعِ هُوَ مَا ثَبَتَ بِدَلِيلٍ فِيهِ شُبْهَةٌ كَالْآيَةِ الْمُؤَوَّلَةِ وَ الصَّحِيحُ مِنَ الْإِحَادِ وَ حُكْمُهُ مَا ذَكَرْنَا

The dictionary meaning of Fardh is to stipulate and the Faraaidh (*plural of Fardh*) of Shari'ah is what it has stipulated such that it cannot be increased or decreased (*but exactly what the Shari'ah has stipulated is compulsory to fulfil*), in Shari'ah, Fardh refers to whatever has been established by convincing proof, which has no doubt in it. The ruling of Fardh is that it is obligatory to act upon it and believe in it (*such that if a person denies its incumbency, he will be out of the fold of Islaam*).

The dictionary meaning of Waajib is fall, that is it (*Waajib*) fell on to a person without his choice. It has also been said that it is derived from 'وَجَبَةٌ', which means undecided. Waajib has been called Waajib because it is undecided

between being Fardh and Nafl, thus it is regarded as Fardh as far as practice is concerned (*it is compulsory to practice upon it*) such that it is impermissible to discard it, and Nafl as far as belief is concerned such that it is not incumbent upon us to believe it to be certain (*whereby the one who denies will not be out of the fold of Islaam*). In Shari'ah, Waajib is that which has been established by proof which has a slight amount of uncertainty, such as verses which have been interpreted (*the derived meaning is a result of Ta'weel*) and Saheeh Ahaadeeth and the ruling of Waajib is what we have already mentioned (*it is compulsory to practice upon but one who denies it's incumbency will not cast out of the fold of Islaam*).

Sunnat and Nafl

وَالسُّنَّةُ عِبَارَةٌ عَنِ الطَّرِيقَةِ الْمَسْلُوكَةِ الْمَرْضِيَّةِ فِي بَابِ الدِّينِ سِوَاءَ كَانَتْ مِنْ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ ﷺ أَوْ مِنَ الصَّحَابَةِ قَالَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ عَلَيْكُمْ بِسُنَّتِي وَسُنَّةِ الْخُلَفَاءِ مِنْ بَعْدِي عِزُّوا عَلَيْهَا بِالنَّوَاجِذِ وَحُكْمُهَا أَنْ يُطَالَبَ الْمَرْءُ بِإِحْيَائِهَا وَيَسْتَحِقُّ الْمَلَامَةَ بِتَرْكِهَا إِلَّا أَنْ يَتْرُكَهَا بَعْدَ وَالنَّفْلِ عِبَارَةٌ عَنِ الزِّيَادَةِ وَالْعَنِيمَةِ تُسَمَّى نَفْلًا لِأَنَّهَا زِيَادَةٌ عَلَى مَا هُوَ الْمَقْصُودُ مِنَ الْجِهَادِ وَفِي الشَّرْعِ عِبَارَةٌ عَمَّا هُوَ زِيَادَةٌ عَلَى الْفَرَائِضِ وَالْوَاجِبَاتِ وَحُكْمُهُ أَنْ يُثَابَ الْمَرْءُ عَلَى فِعْلِهِ وَلَا يُعَاقَبُ بِتَرْكِهِ وَالنَّفْلُ وَالتَّطَوُّعُ نَظِيرَانِ

Sunnat refers to the preferred path adopted in matters of Deen, whether it be the practice of Rasulullaah ﷺ or of the Sahabah. Rasulullaah ﷺ has said, "Mu Sunnat is incumbent upon you and the Sunnat of the Khulafaa after me, hold on to it firmly". The ruling of Sunnat is that a person should attempt to revive it and show contempt on its disregard except where it is disregarded with a valid (*Shar'ie*) excuse.

Nafl literally means additional and the spoils of war are referred to as Nafl because it is additional to the actual

purpose of Jihaad (which is to establish the Deen of ALLAAH). In Shari'ah, Nafil refers to those acts which are additional to those which are Fardh and Waajib and the ruling of Nafil is that one will be rewarded by practicing upon it and will not be punished for disregarding it. Nafil and 'Tathouwu'a' (تَطَوُّعٌ) are the same (according to the terminology of the Fugahaa).

Definition of Azeemat

فصل

الْعَزِيمَةُ هِيَ الْقَصْدُ إِذَا كَانَ فِي نِهَآيَةِ الْوَكَادَةِ وَ لِهَذَا قُلْنَا إِنَّ الْعَزْمَ عَلَى الْوُطْئِ عَوْدٌ فِي بَابِ الظَّهَارِ لِأَنَّهُ كَالْمَوْجُودِ فَجَازَ أَنْ يُعْتَبَرَ مَوْجُوداً عِنْدَ قِيَامِ الدَّلَالَةِ وَ لِهَذَا لَوْ قَالَ أَعَزَّمُ يَكُونُ حَالِفاً وَ فِي الشَّرْعِ عِبَارَةٌ عَمَّا لَزِمْنَا مِنَ الْأَحْكَامِ ابْتِدَاءً سُمِّيَتْ عَزِيمَةً لِأَنَّهَُا فِي غَايَةِ لَوْكَادَةِ سَبَبُهَا وَ هُوَ كَوْنُ الْأَمْرِ مُفْتَرِضَ الطَّاعَةِ بِحُكْمِ أَنَّهُ إِلَهْنَا وَنَحْنُ عِبِيدُهُ وَ أَقْسَامُ الْعَزِيمَةِ مَا ذَكَرْنَا مِنَ الْفَرَضِ وَ الْوَاجِبِ

Azeemat literally means firm resolve, which is why we say that if a person firmly resolves to indulge in sexual relations with his spouse whom he has compared to his blood relative is retraction (and the Kaffaarah of Thihaar will become Waajib upon him just as if he actually indulged in sexual relations with her) because it is the same as sexual relations and will therefore be permissible to consider it as perpetrated when proof for it is established. Based upon this (that firmly resolving to do something is the same as carry the act out) if a person says, "I firmly resolved to..." (for example, "I firmly resolved to give you a dirham") it will be taking an oath (and his statement will actually mean, "I take an oath to give you a dirham", whereby Kaffaarah will be incumbent upon him if he fails to do so). In Shari'ah, Azeemat refers to those laws of Shari'ah which are incumbent upon us from the beginning as they are compulsory because of

their Sabab being compulsory. The Sabab of the laws of Shari'ah is that it is compulsory to obey the One giving the orders (*i.e. ALLAAH Ta'ala*) because ALLAAH is our Master and we are His servants (*and it is compulsory for the servant to obey his master*). The constituents of Azeemat is what we have already mentioned of Fardh and Waajib.

Definition of Rukhsat

وَأَمَّا الرُّخْصَةُ فَعِبَارَةٌ عَنِ الْيُسْرِ وَالسَّهْوَةِ وَفِي الشَّرْعِ صَرْفُ الْأَمْرِ مِنْ عُسْرٍ إِلَى يُسْرٍ بِوَاسِطَةِ عُذْرٍ فِي الْمُكَلَّفِ وَأَنْوَاعُهَا مُخْتَلِفَةٌ لِإِخْتِلَافِ أَسْبَابِهَا وَهِيَ أَعْدَارُ الْعِبَادِ وَفِي الْعَاقِبَةِ تَوَوُّلٌ إِلَى تَوْعِينِ أَحَدُهُمَا رُخْصَةُ الْفِعْلِ مَعَ بَقَاءِ الْحُرْمَةِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الْعَفْوِ فِي بَابِ الْجِنَايَةِ وَذَلِكَ نَحْوُ إِجْرَاءِ كَلِمَةِ الْكُفْرِ عَلَى اللِّسَانِ مَعَ إِطْمِينَانِ الْقَلْبِ عِنْدَ الْإِكْرَاهِ وَسَبِّ النَّبِيِّ □ وَاتِّلَافِ مَالِ الْمُسْلِمِ وَقَتْلِ النَّفْسِ ظُلْمًا وَحُكْمُهُ أَنَّهُ لَوْ صَبَرَ حَتَّى قُتِلَ يَكُونُ مَاجُورًا لِإِمْتِنَاعِهِ عَنِ الْحَرَامِ تَعْظِيمًا لِنَهْيِ الشَّارِعِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ وَالنَّوْغُ الثَّانِي تَغْيِيرُ صِفَةِ الْفِعْلِ بِأَنْ يَصِيرَ مُبَاحًا فِي حَقِّهِ قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى {فَمَنْ اضْطُرَّ فِي مَخْمَصَةٍ} وَذَلِكَ نَحْوُ الْإِكْرَاهِ عَلَى أَكْلِ الْمَيْتَةِ وَشَرْبِ الْخَمْرِ وَحُكْمُهُ أَنَّهُ لَوْ إِمْتَنَعَ عَنْ تَنَاوُلِهِ حَتَّى يَكُونَ إِثْمًا بِإِمْتِنَاعِهِ عَنِ الْمُبَاحِ وَصَارَ كَقَاتِلِ نَفْسِهِ

Rukhsat literally means ease and ease in Shari'ah is changing the order from one of difficulty to ease due to a (*valid Shar'ie*) excuse. The types of Rukhsat vary due to difference in the Sabab, which is the excuse of the servant (*which warrants ease*).

In punishments, Rukhsat is of two types. One type is permission to carry out the act while it still remains Haraam, such as forgiveness of a violent act (*whereby the violent act still remains Haraam despite being pardoned by the victim*), or similar to uttering a statement of Kufr, swearing Nabi □, destroying the property of another Muslim and

killing another wrongfully all under duress, while having Imaan in one's heart (*even thought the uttering of such statements of Kufr remain Haraam, it is permitted under duress*). **The ruling** (*of the first type, whereby the act still remains Haraam despite permission being granted to carry it out*) **is that if the person will be patient** (*and not indulge in that act*) **until he is killed, he will be greatly rewarded** (*in the Akhirah*) **because of abstaining from that which was prohibited by Rasulullaah** □.

The second type is altering the characteristic of the act such that it becomes permissible for him to carry out. ALLAAH Ta'ala has said,

"So whoever is forced (to eat these forbidden goods) because of starvation" (*Surah Maa'idah: 3*)

This (second type of Rukhsat) is like consuming carrion and drinking wine (*in dire circumstances such as starvation*). **The ruling of this second type is that if he abstains from eating until he is killed (or dies) then he will be sinful because he abstained from that which was permissible for him, like a person who commits suicide.**

Substantiating without proof

فَصْل

الْاِخْتِجَاجُ بِلَا دَلِيلٍ اَنْوَاعٌ مِنْهَا الْاِسْتِدْلَالُ بِعَدَمِ الْعِلَّةِ عَلَى عَدَمِ الْحُكْمِ
مِثَالُهُ اَلْقِيْ غَيْرُ نَاقِضٍ لَّانَّهُ لَمْ يَخْرُجْ مِنَ السَّبِيلَيْنِ وَ الْاُخْ لَا يَعْتَقُ عَلَى
الْاُخْ لَّانَّهُ لَأَوْلَادَ بَيْنَهُمَا

Substantiating without proof is of many types; amongst them (one method is) is substantiating that the non-existence of the Illat results in the ruling not being present. An example of this is (saying that) vomiting does not break

Wudhu because it has not been excreted from one of the two privates parts (since the Illat, excretion from the private parts, is not present the ruling, that Wudhu breaks, will not apply) **and that a person becoming owner of his brother will not result in him being set free because there is not parentage** (since one is not the parent of the other, which is the Illat for freedom, the ruling, of the slave being set free, will not apply).

وَسُئِلَ مُحَمَّدٌ أَيُّجِبُ الْقِصَاصُ عَلَى شَرِيكِ الصَّبِيِّ قَالَ لَا لِأَنَّ الصَّبِيَّ
رُفِعَ عَنْهُ الْقَلَمُ قَالَ السَّائِلُ فَوَجَبَ أَنْ يَجِبَ عَلَى شَرِيكِ الْأَبِ لِأَنَّ الْأَبَ لَمْ
يُرْفَعْ عَنْهُ الْقَلَمُ فَصَارَ التَّمَسُّكُ بِعَدَمِ الْعِلَّةِ عَلَى عَدَمِ الْحُكْمِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ مَا يُقَالُ
لَمْ يَمُتْ فَلَا نَ لَهُ لِأَنَّهُ لَمْ يَسْقُطْ مِنَ السَّطْحِ

(Another example of substantiating that the non-existence of the Illat results in the ruling not being present is when) **Imaam Muhammed was asked whether there is Qisaas (death penalty) on a person who assisted a child in murder, to which he replied, "No (Qisaas will not be Waajib on both), because the child is not accountable for his actions."** The questioner said, "It is proven that Qisaas will be Waajib on the person who assisted the father (in the murder of his son) because the father is accountable for his actions (thus just as the Qisaas will only be Waajib on the assistant, in the above ruling it should also only be Waajib on the assistant of the child). (The author says) **Substantiating that the non-existence of the Illat results in the ruling not being present (as the questioner did) is like saying that a certain person did not die because he did not fall from the roof (whereas there are other ways in which he could have died, thus similarly the non-existence of the Illat does not necessarily guarantee that the ruling will not apply, as it is possible that it can be applied through another means).**

الَّا إِذَا كَانَتْ عِلَّةُ الْحُكْمِ مُنْخَصِرَةً فِي مَعْنَى فَيَكُونُ ذَلِكَ الْمَعْنَى لَازِمًا
لِلْحُكْمِ فَيُسْتَدَلُّ بِإِنْفَائِهِ عَلَى عَدَمِ الْحُكْمِ مِثْلُهُ مَا رَوَى عَنْ مُحَمَّدٍ أَنَّهُ قَالَ
وَلَدُ الْمَغْضُوبَةِ لَيْسَ بِمَضْمُونٍ لِأَنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِمَغْضُوبٍ وَ لَا قِصَاصَ عَلَى
الشَّاهِدِ فِي مَسْئَلَةِ شُهُودِ الْقِصَاصِ إِذَا رَجَعُوا لِأَنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِقَاتِلٍ وَ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ
الْغَضَبَ لَازِمًا لِضَمَانِ الْغَضَبِ وَ الْقَتْلُ لَازِمٌ لَوْجُودِ الْقِصَاصِ

(Substantiating the non-existence of the Illat results in the ruling not applying is substantiating without proof) **Except** when the ruling is limited to that one characteristic (Illat), whereby that characteristic is incumbent for the application of the ruling. In such an instance it will be correct to substantiate that the ruling does not apply when the Illat is not present. An example of this is what has been narrated from Imaam Muhammed that the child born from an illegally seized slave is will not be recompensed as it was not seized and there is no Qisaas on the witness in the case where a witness retracts his testimony (when he testified against someone in a murder trial) because he did not murder anyone because illegal seizure is what makes recompense Waajib and murder is what makes Qisaas Waajib.

وَ كَذَلِكَ التَّمَسُّكُ بِاسْتِصْحَابِ الْحَالِ تَمَسُّكٌ بِعَدَمِ الدَّلِيلِ إِذْ وُجُودُ الشَّيْءِ لَا
يُوجِبُ بَقَائِهِ فَيَصْلُحُ لِلدَّفْعِ دُونَ الْإِلْزَامِ وَعَلَى هَذَا قُلْنَا مَجْهُولُ النَّسَبِ لَوْ
ادَّعَى عَلَيْهِ أَحَدٌ رَقًّا ثُمَّ جَنَى عَلَيْهِ جُنَايَةً لَا يَحِبُّ عَلَيْهِ أَرَشُ الْحُرِّ لِأَنَّ
إِجَابَ أَرَشِ الْحُرِّ الْإِزَامَ فَلَا يَثْبُتُ بِلَا دَلِيلٍ

In a similar manner (as substantiating that the non-existence of the Illat results in the ruling not being present is substantiating without proof so too is) **substantiating from the condition of a something** (in the past) is substantiating without proof. The reason for this is that the presence of something (for a period of time) does not necessitate its perpetuity (that it remained like that forever), thus the

condition of something (in the past) can be used to negate but not to affirm (as it is possible that its condition changed). Based upon this (that it can be used to negate but not to affirm) we say that a person whose lineage is unknown is a free person, if someone claims him to be his slave (here the condition of his lineage being unknown is used to negate him being a slave) and if a person then injures him (the person whose lineage is unknown) then the punishment of having injured a free man will not be carried out on the perpetrator (because his condition of his lineage being unknown can only be used to negate and not to affirm) because making the punishment of injuring a free person is affirming (that he is free) and this cannot be established without proof.

وَعَلَىٰ هَذَا قُلْنَا إِذَا زَادَ الدَّمُّ عَلَى الْعَشْرَةِ فِي الْحَيْضِ وَلِلْمَرْأَةِ عَادَةٌ مَعْرُوفَةٌ رُدَّتْ إِلَى أَيَّامِ عَادَتِهَا وَالزَّائِدُ اسْتِحَاضَةٌ لِأَنَّ الزَّائِدَ عَلَى الْعَادَةِ اتَّصَلَ بِدَمِ الْحَيْضِ وَبَدَمِ الْاسْتِحَاضَةِ فَاحْتَمَلَ الْأَمْرَيْنِ جَمِيعًا فَلَوْ حَكَمْنَا بِنَقْضِ الْعَادَةِ لَزِمَنَا الْعَمَلُ بِلَا دَلِيلٍ وَكَذَلِكَ إِذَا ابْتَدَأَتْ مَعَ الْبُلُوغِ مُسْتَحَاضَةً فَحَيْضَتُهَا عَشْرَةٌ تَحْتَمِلُ الْحَيْضَ وَالْإِسْتِحَاضَةَ فَلَوْ حَكَمْنَا بِإِرْتِقَاعِ الْحَيْضِ لَزِمَنَا الْعَمَلُ بِلَا دَلِيلٍ بِخِلَافِ مَا بَعْدَ الْعَشْرَةِ لِقِيَامِ الدَّلِيلِ عَلَى أَنَّ الْحَيْضَ لَا تَزِيدُ عَلَى الْعَشْرَةِ

Based upon this (that a ruling cannot be established without proof) we say that if a woman bleeds for more than ten days and she has a previous known habit, then (the number of days of) her previous habit will be Haidh and the extra days (more than her previous habit) will be Istihaadhah. The reason for this is that the days which exceed her previous habit consist of the blood of Haidh and Istihaadhah, having the possibility of being either one. If we were to say that her Habit changed then we would be cancelling her previous habit without proof (which is impermissible as mentioned previously).

Similarly if a girl attains maturity (*begins to menstruate*) with Istihaadhah (*she bleeds longer than ten days the first time she menstruates*), then her period of Haidh will be ten days (*and the extra days Istihaadhah*). The reason for this is the bleeding before ten days can be Haidh or Istihaadhah and if we were to say that Haidh ended (*before ten days and the other days are Istihaadhah*) then we would be acting without proof as opposed to (*saying*) the blood which exceeds ten days (*is Istihaadhah*) because there is proof that Haidh does not exceed ten days (*the Hadeeth, "Haidh does not exceed ten days"*).

وَمِنَ الدَّلِيلِ عَلَى أَنَّ لَا دَلِيلَ فِيهِ إِلَّا حُجَّةٌ لِلدَّفْعِ دُونَ الْإِلْزَامِ مَسْئَلُهُ الْمَفْقُودُ فَانْه لَا يَسْتَحِقُّ غَيْرُهُ مِيرَاثَهُ وَ لَوْ مَاتَ مِنْ أَقَارِبِهِ حَالِ فَقْدِهِ لَا يَرِثُ هُوَ مِنْهُ فَانْدَفَعَ اسْتِحْقَاقُ الْغَيْرِ بِلَا دَلِيلٍ وَ لَمْ يَنْبُتْ لَهُ الْإِسْتِحْقَاقُ بِلَا دَلِيلٍ

A proof that the condition of something (*in the past*) is a proof for negation and not affirmation is the ruling regarding a missing person (*whose whereabouts or death cannot be ascertained*) because no person will have the right to inherit from him and if one of his relatives were to die while he is missing, he will not inherit thus (*his previous condition of being alive*) will negate the right of another to inherit from him and (*his previous condition of being alive*) will not affirm his right to inherit.

A reply to an objection

فَإِنْ قِيلَ قَدْ رُوِيَ عَنْ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ أَنَّهُ قَالَ لَا خُمْسَ فِي الْعَنْبَرِ لِأَنَّ الْأَثَرَ لَمْ يَرُدْ بِهِ وَ هُوَ النَّمْسُكَ بَعْدَ الدَّلِيلِ قُلْنَا إِنَّمَا ذَكَرَ ذَلِكَ فِي بَيَانِ عُذْرِهِ فِي أَنَّهُ لَمْ يَقُلْ بِالْخُمْسِ فِي الْعَنْبَرِ وَ لِهَذَا رُوِيَ أَنَّ مُحَمَّدًا سَأَلَهُ عَنِ الْخُمْسِ فِي الْعَنْبَرِ مَا بَالُ الْعَنْبَرِ لَا خُمْسَ فِيهِ قَالَ لِأَنَّهُ كَالسَّمَكِ فَقَالَ مَا

بِأَلِ السَّمَكِ لَا خُمْسَ فِيهِ قَالَ لِأَنَّهُ كَالْمَاءِ وَ لَا خُمْسَ فِيهِ وَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى أَعْلَمُ
بِالصَّوَابِ

If someone were to say that it has been reported that Imaam Abu Hanifah said, "There is no Khums in whales because there is no narration regarding it" whereas this is substantiation without proof (*which is impermissible*). We would say that Imaam Abu Hanifah said "because there is no narration regarding it" so as to make clear his excuse for (*making Qiyaas and*) not saying that Khums is due (*Imaam Abu Hanifah did not pass the ruling without proof but derive this ruling through Qiyaas*). Because of this (*that his statement, "because there is no narration regarding it" is in actual fact his excuse for making Qiyaas*) it has been narrated that Imaam Muhammed asked him regarding Khums in whales enquiring "what is it about whales that there is no Khums in it?" To which Imaam Abu Hanifah replied, "It is like fish and there is no Khums in it". Imaam Muhammed then asked, "What is it about fish that there is no Khums in it?" Imaam Abu Hanifah replied, "It is like water (*because it lives in water*) and there is no Khums in water".

**Translation edited by
A.H.Elias (Mufti)
(May ALLAAH protect him)**